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VOLUME XVI 1968

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
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# XINKIANG-UYĞUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

(Hsin-chiang Wei-wu-erh Tzu-chih Ch'ü)

- International Boundaries
- Autonomous Region
- Minority Autonomous District
- Sub-divisions of 1
- Railways
- Roads




- 1** Ili Kazakh Autonomous District (I-li Ha-sa-ke Tzu-chih Chou)
- A** Directly subordinate to Kuldja
- B** Subordinate to Chuguchak
- C** Subordinate to Altai-Sharasume
- 2** Boro Tala Mongol Autonomous District (Po-erh-t'a-la Meng-ku Tzu-chih Chou)
- 3** Changchi "Hui" Autonomous District (Ch'ang-chi Hui-tsu Tzu-chih Chou)
- 4** Bayan Gol Mongol Autonomous District (Pa-yin-ko-leng Meng-ku Tzu-chih Chou)
- 5** Kizil-Su Kirgiz Autonomous District (Ke-tzu-le-su K'o-erh-ke-tzu Tzu-chih Chou)







THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
OF  
KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN,  
UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAIDZHAN




- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- Main arterial road with pass.

# Communications in Northern Kazakhstan



- Existing broad gauge railways.
- Broad gauge railways under construction.
- Narrow gauge railways under construction.
- Proposed broad gauge railways.
- Sections of main motor roads.
- Motor road under construction.
- Proposed roads.



## Fergana Valley

Scale 1:1,000,000

- Canals.
- Main roads.
- Towns with population of under 10,000
- " " " " between 10,000 and 50,000
- " " " " 50,000 and 100,000
- " " " " over 500,000

J.P. 1956.

Specially drawn for the Central Asian Research Centre, -1956. - J.P.

## CONTENTS

VOLUME XVI, No. 1	PAGE
Editorial	1
Russia and China in the Pamirs: 18th and 19th Centuries. By Ann Sheehy	4
The Tatars of the Crimea: A Retrospective Summary. By Chantal Lemerancier-Quelquejay	15
Recent Soviet Writing on the Mongolian PR. By Hubert Evans	26
Women in Uzbekistan	40
Taxation in Tsarist Central Asia. By D. S. M. Williams	51
Matveyev versus <i>Central Asian Review</i>	64
The National Minorities of Western China: Comment by Sir Michael Gillett	69
Book Reviews	71
Soviet Press Comment: I. The Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; II. Adjoining Countries	79
A Review of Sinkiang, Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs based upon the Chinese Press and Radio	87
Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur for Sinkiang	91

## CONTENTS

VOLUME XVI, No. 2	PAGE
Editorial	93
The Turkic Languages of the USSR: A New Development. By G. K. Dulling	97
Recent Soviet Writing on India. By Hubert Evans	110
Notes on Agricultural Development. By Margaret Miller	122
Sino-Russian Relations in the 17th Century. By W. J. Drew	136
Primary and Secondary Education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Current Situation. By Ann Sheehy	147
Notes on Industrial Development (CAR, Vol. XV, No. 4): Author's Comment	159
Book Reviews	161
Soviet Press Comment: I. The Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; II. Adjoining Countries	171

	PAGE
A Review of Sinkiang, Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs based upon the Chinese Press and Radio	179
Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur for Sinkiang	182

## CONTENTS

VOLUME XVI, No. 3	PAGE
Editorial	185
Primary and Secondary Education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan—the Current Situation. By Ann Sheehy	189
Sinkiang: the Land and the People. By W. J. Drew	205
Mixed Marriages in the Caucasus: the Problem as Observed in the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region. By Alexandre Bennigsen	217
Nation-Forming Processes in Iran	223
Recent Soviet Writing on India ( <i>concluded</i> ). By Hubert Evans	229
Recent Soviet Writing on the Mongolian PR: Oriental Studies and Linguistics ( <i>concluded</i> ). By Hubert Evans	244
Book Reviews	249
Soviet Press Comment: I. The Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; II. Adjoining Countries	258
A Review of Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur from Tashkent	267
Summary of Chinese Press and Radio Reports on Sinkiang, Mongolia and Tibet	270

## CONTENTS

VOLUME XVI, No. 4	PAGE
Editorial	273
Phases in the Economic Organization of Soviet Central Asia: Central, Regional and Republican Interests in Conflict. By Ann Sheehy	278
Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental and African Historical Study. By Hubert Evans	294
Co-ordinating Conference for the Organization of Research on the History of Oriental Culture	299
Oriental Scholarship at Leningrad Yesterday and Today	305
The Khorezm Communist Party 1920–1924. By Ann Sheehy	308

	PAGE
Indian Revolutionary Organizations in Central Asia. By Hubert Evans	322
India's Population Problem	328
British Behaviour towards Pakistan: A Soviet Interpretation. By Hubert Evans	333
★ Economic Co-operation with Iran: the Immediate Future	338
Book Reviews	342
Soviet Press Comment: I. The Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; II. Adjoining Countries	345
A Review of Sinkiang, Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs based upon the Chinese Press and Radio	356
Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur for Sinkiang	360

## VOLUME XVI

## MAPS

The Pamirs and Adjacent Territories at the end of the 19th Century	6
Mongolian People's Republic	facing page 32
Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region	facing pages 70, 206
Ethnographical Map of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region of the Chinese People's Republic	facing page 208

THE Index consists of a general index of personal and geographical names, and subjects. The subjects (e.g. education, irrigation, etc.) are given under the country or republic to which they refer. Page numbers only are given, and not the specific issue of CAR in which they occur.

It will be noticed that the text of CAR contains some inconsistencies in the spelling of proper names; these are partly due to inconsistencies in Soviet publications. Every effort has been made to arrive at the most accurate spelling and, where the spelling in CAR differs from that in the Index, the Index version should be taken as the correct one.

In the case of small places or new settlements, the oblast and/or republic in which the place is situated is given if possible; in the case of the countries bordering Central Asia, the name of the country is given beside the place-name.

The following abbreviations are used throughout:

Afgh.	for	Afghanistan	Sink.	for	Sinkiang-Uygur A.R.
Kaz.	..	Kazakh SSR	Tad.	..	Tadzhik SSR
Kirg.	..	Kirgiz SSR	Turk.	..	Turkmen SSR
Pak.	..	Pakistan	Uzb.	..	Uzbek SSR
MPR	..	Mongolian PR			





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**Russia and China in the Pamirs:  
18th and 19th Centuries**

**The Tatars of the Crimea**

**Women in Uzbekistan**

**Taxation in Tsarist Central Asia**

**Vol. XVI**

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# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

## Editors

**Geoffrey Wheeler**, Director, Central Asian Research Centre  
**Max Hayward** } of St. Antony's College, Oxford  
**Harry Willetts** }

## CONTENTS

Editorial	1
Russia and China in the Pamirs: 18th and 19th Centuries. By Ann Sheehy	4
The Tatars of the Crimea: A Retrospective Summary. By Chantal Lemerancier-Quelquejay	15
Recent Soviet Writing on the Mongolian PR. By Hubert Evans	26
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Taxation in Tsarist Central Asia. By D. S. M. Williams	51
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A review of Sinkiang, Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs Based upon the Chinese Press and Radio	87
Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur for Sinkiang	91
Maps	
The Pamirs and Adjacent Territories at the end of the 19th Century	6
Mongolian People's Republic	facing page 32
Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region	facing page 70

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LOYOLA COLLEGE, MONTREAL 28, CANADA

## ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals, etc., employed as sources, are as follows:—

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR						
AN/Kaz. SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Uzbek SSR
IZ	Izvestiya						
K	Kommunist						
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda						
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda						
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana						
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda						
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta						
NCNA	New China News Agency						
NT	New Times						
PR	Pravda						
PV	Pravda Vostoka						
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya						
SU	Soviet Union						
T	Trud						
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra						
URS	Urumchi Regional Service						
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta						

# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

Vol. XVI, No. 1

## EDITORIAL

EVERY five years since the foundation of the Central Asian Research Centre in January 1953, the *Review* has published an account of the Centre's progress in assessing developments in Central Asia and in analysing Soviet policies towards the adjoining countries.\* Mention has also been made in these accounts of notable changes in the trend of Soviet writing and of Soviet and Western reactions to the Centre's activities.

December 1967 marked the fifteenth year of the Centre's existence. Of these 15 years the last five were from the Centre's point of view the most significant, for they saw not only a fundamental change in Soviet leadership, a change with important consequences for Central Asia, but the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which has greatly increased the need for a balanced study and appraisal of Soviet and Chinese policies towards Asia as a whole and also towards Africa.

The Centre's primary concern is still with Soviet source material relating to the areas within its purview, but in so far as its resources permit, it has now begun to examine available Chinese material on Central Asia and particularly on Sinkiang, Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. This material is still very scanty—for example, the local press of Sinkiang cannot yet be obtained regularly—but it is possible that the situation will gradually improve just as it did after the consolidation of the present regime in Soviet Central Asia.

The Centre's approach to Soviet involvement in the affairs of almost every Asian and African country differs markedly from that adopted by most institutions interested in this matter. The Centre has always been aware that for many years the world—and particularly the Asian and African world—has been subjected to a steady flow of pro-Soviet propaganda designed to laud and magnify Soviet achievements and methods, and of anti-Soviet propaganda designed to belittle Soviet achievement and discredit Soviet aims and motives. In the present climate of Asian and African opinion pro-Soviet propaganda probably gains easier acceptance, not because it is more true or credible, but because its contents tell of novelty and suggest an advance on old-fashioned imperialist attitudes. This claim to novelty is, of course, a

\* Previous such accounts will be found in CAR No. 1 of 1958 and No. 1 of 1963.

well-worn but still effective device of commercial advertising—(“ ‘Swish’ washes whiter. And it removes deposits left by inferior products.”).

As newcomers on the Asian and African scene the Russians naturally attract interest and they can usefully salt their patter with caustic comment on the achievements of earlier performers. But attempts made by the latter to defend themselves by pouring undiluted scorn and contumely on their temporarily more popular rivals are likely to prove otiose, if not actually harmful.

The Centre is only academically interested in these propaganda techniques. It has never swerved from its originally declared intention of presenting an objective picture of developments in Central Asia and of Soviet policies towards the adjoining countries as this picture is reflected in Soviet writing. The *Review* and its sister publication *Mizan* never fail to draw attention to Soviet achievements in such fields as education, public health, irrigation and public works, or to the more realistic and positive attitude now apparent in Soviet writing on Asian and African affairs. During the past five years, too, the *Review* has made a point of examining with genuine approbation some of the outstanding Soviet works of oriental scholarship which would otherwise have been totally ignored in the Western academic world. But all this does not mean that the Centre is prepared to gloss over the essentially colonialist characteristics of the Soviet regime in Central Asia, the regimentation of indigenous cultures, the inconsistencies of the Soviet approach to Islam, and the delays, muddle and waste often observable in Soviet industrial and agricultural planning.

It is regrettable but not entirely surprising that this balanced and seemingly civilized approach should not find favour with Soviet critics. Although Soviet scholars examine the Centre's publications with ever-increasing attention and interest, published Soviet reactions to the Centre's activities are still hostile in the extreme. The cause of this is not far to seek. The Russians have long assumed, and with good reason, that in view of the Soviet Union's steadily growing material prosperity and increased international stature, wholesale condemnation and denigration of its methods and achievements simply do not make sense to the uncommitted world of Asia and Africa. The Soviet Government must also have noted with satisfaction the exaggerated and even fulsome tributes produced by the Western press and radio on an occasion like the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution. Compared with this relatively satisfactory state of affairs the Centre's realistic and down-to-earth approach, based as it is on the careful and cumulative analysis of Soviet writing on Asian and African affairs, comes as an unwelcome contrast and is met, not perhaps unnaturally but surely unwisely, with shrill and sometimes almost hysterical rejoinder. It is very far from being the Centre's purpose to excite such rejoinder, but it cannot avoid regarding it as an indication of the accuracy of its assessments.

---

Soviet usage in describing the Central Asian and Kazakh republics is not easy to follow. The official geographical description found in all Soviet maps is the name of the titular nationality followed by SSR, e.g. "Uzbekskaya SSR". These terms are generally speaking interchangeable with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, etc., but in certain cases the latter are obligatory, for example, *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana*. "Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekskoy SSR" is never used. On the other hand *Akademiya Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR* is invariable. The reason for this distinction may perhaps be found in the fact that whereas the republican academies were originally "filials" or branches of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, they are now academies in their own right. The republican Communist parties, on the other hand, have never had and are never likely to have the same independent status.

In view of Soviet reluctance to admit the persistence of Iranian culture in Central Asia it is curious that the purely Persian suffix of *stan* should have been appended to the names of all the main Central Asian nationalities. The name Turkestan is of Persian origin and was apparently first used by Persian geographers to describe "the country of the Turks". It was revived by the Russians as a convenient name for the governorate-general created in 1867, but the terms Uzbekistan, etc., were not used until after 1924. Soviet books of reference give them as alternative names for the republics, an additional alternative for the Turkmen SSR being Turkmeniya. The name Kirgizstan (in Kirgiz, Kyrgyzstan) is, however, never substituted in Russian for Kirgiziya, probably for reasons of euphony. It is possible that the Persianized forms were originally regarded as less objectionable than such Turkic forms as "Uzbek eli" and "Kazakh eli".

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# RUSSIA AND CHINA IN THE PAMIRS :

## 18th AND 19th CENTURIES

By ANN SHEEHY

WITH the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s, one of the topics which came to the fore was Chinese frontier claims along the Sino-Soviet border. In a talk with Japanese socialists on 10 July 1964 Mao Tse-tung declared that the Chinese had not yet presented the Soviet Union with their bill of reckoning on frontier questions. The Soviet Union retorted in September 1964 when Chinese claims were rejected in an editorial article in *Pravda* (2 September 1964), in a statement by Khrushchev on 15 September 1964 to a Japanese parliamentary delegation, and in an article by Academician V. M. Khvostov ("Kitayskiy 'schet po reyestru' i pravda istorii") in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, No. 10 of 1964. The main Soviet arguments for refusing to consider any frontier changes were that Chinese "historical arguments" were "infantile", since frontiers were always changing in the past and such arguments could be used to prove, for instance, that Britain was French and France British; that, while it was true that Tsarism had pursued a policy of aggrandizement, the areas claimed by the Chinese had likewise been acquired by an earlier Chinese policy of aggrandizement; and that the Soviet Union, unlike the Tsarist empire, was formed as a result of the voluntary unification of the Soviet republics, and the inhabitants of the territories claimed by China had chosen freely to be part of the Soviet Union on the basis of national self-determination.

At one time Chinese maps marked considerable areas of the Soviet Union as rightfully belonging to China. In Central Asia and Kazakhstan these included most of the Pamirs (amounting to nearly the whole of the present-day Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of the Tadzhik SSR). Chinese maps published in 1964, however, limited themselves to showing certain portions of the Sino-Soviet frontier as undetermined, among them almost the whole of the frontier between the Tadzhik SSR and the Sinkiang-Uygur AR (from the Uz-Bel' (Uch-Bel) pass to the Afghan frontier). In the section of his article dealing with Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Academician Khvostov maintained that, although long ago, following predatory incursions, China had stationed pickets there and collected tribute (which "more often resembled plunder") from time to time, she had never established any kind of lasting sovereignty over these territories. He made no specific mention of the Pamirs, and there seem to be no Soviet accounts devoted exclusively to how the present Sino-Soviet frontier there came to be established, but one can be pieced

together from information contained in B. I. Iskandarov's *Vostochnaya Bukhara i Pamir vo vtoroy polovine XIX v.* (Part I, Dushanbe, 1962) and in the same author's article "Izucheniye Pamira v svyazi s istoriyei sopredel'nykh stran vo vtoroy polovine XIX v.", in *Izvestiya AN/TadSSR, Otdeleniye obshchestvennykh nauk*, No. 4 (46) of 1966, pp. 28-39. Iskandarov's account is, unfortunately, fragmentary, contradictory at times, and extremely difficult to follow, particularly as his book has no map. It also has to be borne in mind that it is based almost entirely on Tsarist official archives and books and articles by Tsarist government servants, and is therefore one-sided. But it does provide some valuable information on a little-known subject.

### *Situation up to the 1870s*

The area of the Soviet Pamirs, which the Chinese claim once belonged to them, embraces in the west those parts of the territory of the former principalities of Rushan, Shugnan (Shugnan often embraced Rushan as well) and Vakhan which lay on the right bank of the river Pyandzh. According to Iskandarov, thanks to their remoteness, poverty of resources and inaccessibility, these hereditary feudal domains, inhabited mainly by Tadzhiks, led an independent or semi-independent existence, constantly warring among themselves, right up to the 1870s and 1880s. At times their more powerful neighbours, particularly Badakhshan and Kokand, established a certain ascendancy over them, but this never lasted for long. Thus the Russian Consul in Kashgar wrote to the Asiatic Department on 12 September 1883: "Shugnan and Rushan were always independent (*samostoyatel'nyy*) domains, in spite of the constant attempts of Badakhshan, Kokand and Kashgar to subordinate them to their rule." At times ties of kinship with the rulers of Kashgar, Kokand and, in particular, Badakhshan placed these small countries in a certain dependence on their powerful neighbours, "a dependence which was expressed . . . by the despatch of embassies, felicitations and gifts, but nothing more". For instance, Yusuf-Ali-khan, who ruled Shugnan from 1871 to 1883, was married to the daughter of the former ruler of Badakhshan, while his sisters were married to Khudayar, Khan of Kokand, and Yaqub Bek, *mir* of Kashgar. (Pp. 48-49)<sup>1</sup>

The bleak eastern Pamirs plateau, inhabited by nomadic Kirgiz concentrated mainly between lakes Rang-Kul', Zor-Kul' and Yashil'-Kul' and along the banks of the upper reaches of the Ak-Su and Murgab rivers, was the scene of constant internecine fighting and raids, and there were frequent clashes between the Kirgiz and Shugnan, Rushan, Vakhan and Hunza,<sup>2</sup> but "from information gathered by [Russian scholars and travellers in the 19th century] it is clear that the eastern Pamirs had long since come under the sphere of influence of Fergana and then of the

<sup>1</sup> Page references are to Iskandarov's book *Vostochnaya Bukhara . . .*, unless specified otherwise.

<sup>2</sup> Iskandarov actually uses the term *Kandzhut* (Kanjat), which embraces both Hunza and Nagar.

khanate of Kokand." (P. 51) B. Grombchevskiy, who was in charge of the Pamir and Alay settlements, wrote to the head of the Pamirs detachment on 28 July 1892 that for as long as the local inhabitants could remember the whole area between the permanent settlements of Rushan, Shugnan and Vakhan and the permanent settlements in the Kashgar valley had formed part of the khanate of Kokand. From at least the time of Madali Khan until the annexation of the khanate of Kokand by the Russians in 1876 the khanate had sent officials to the eastern Pamirs to administer the area. (Pp. 65-66)

Adjoining the eastern Pamirs to the east of the Sarykol range, which now forms the Sino-Soviet frontier, in the valley of the Tashkurgan river lay the domain of Sarykol. Up to about the middle of the 19th century at least Sarykol seems to have paid tribute to the Chinese in East Turkestan, though it was left to manage its own affairs. Iskandarov gives contradictory accounts of the situation after this. In one place he says that, although the people of Sarykol were more drawn to Kokand than to the Chinese, the hereditary ruler of Sarykol, Babash Bek (d. 1865), in order to escape constant raids, acknowledged his dependence

### THE PAMIRS AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES AT THE END OF THE 19th CENTURY



on Kashgaria but in reality ruled independently. Under his son, Sarykol was taken in 1868 by Yaqub Bek, the then ruler of Kashgar, and on the latter's death in 1877 was seized by China. (P. 26) Elsewhere Iskandarov declares that Babash Bek submitted to the khan of Kokand in order to gain protection against his neighbours ("Izucheniye . . .", p. 35) and that Sarykol belonged to the khanate of Kokand right up till the khanate's abolition in 1876. (P. 66) The Tsarist authorities in Turkestan seem to have held this latter view in 1893, apparently largely on the basis of the extent of Kokand's possessions given in Grombchevskiy's report above.

Chinese troops first appeared in the Pamirs in the middle of the 18th century. After routing the Kalmyks, in 1759 Chinese troops marched against Kashgar, then ruled by the Khojas Burhan-eddin and his brother Khan Khoja. After some resistance the Chinese took Kashgar and Yarkand, and the Khojas retreated to the Pamirs. The Chinese troops under Fu Teh caught up with them at Lake Yashil'-Kul' and there was a fierce battle, which the Chinese won. Then Fu Teh with his detachment penetrated into Shugnan, Vakhán and even the capital of Badakhshan, whither the Khojas had fled. Everywhere they passed the Chinese caused great devastation. After this, according to Iskandarov, Chinese and Kashgari troops did not appear again in the Pamirs until the second half of the 19th century. (P. 67 and "Izucheniye . . .", pp. 34 and 36)

### *The 1870s and 1880s*

By the beginning of the 1870s Anglo-Russian rivalry was becoming acute in Central Asia, and in 1872-3, in order to prevent clashes, the British and Tsarist governments signed an agreement which established a neutral zone between them in the shape of Afghanistan and Bukhara and made the river Pyandzh the dividing line between their respective spheres of influence. This arbitrary arrangement put the areas of Rushan, Shugnan and Vakhán lying on the right bank of the Pyandzh within Russia's notional sphere of influence, but in 1883 they were occupied by Afghanistan who, according to Iskandarov, was encouraged by Britain to extend her possessions to the north to distract her attention from what Britain was doing elsewhere.

The eastern Pamirs were not affected by the 1872-3 agreement and continued to come under Kokand until that khanate was conquered by the Russians in 1876. Russia did not immediately occupy the eastern Pamirs and this left them open to internecine struggles and outside attack. Yaqub Bek, "with the support of the British authorities", sent troops there under his son, who plundered the population and appointed a ruler. Kirgiz from the eastern Pamirs were persuaded to serve in Yaqub Bek's forces against the Chinese and only returned home when China again reasserted herself in Kashgaria.<sup>3</sup> (P. 67)

<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere Iskandarov states that Kirgiz from the Pamirs had earlier played an important role in Yaqub-Bek's expulsion of the Chinese from Kashgaria in 1864. ("Izucheniye . . .", p. 36) Iskandarov also declares that the Vakhán *mir* took part

Chinese (as opposed to Kashgari) troops appeared in the eastern Pamirs for the second time in 1879. In that year one of the descendants of the Khojas laid claim to the Kashgar throne and declared a holy war on the Manchu authorities in Kashgar. He got as far as the valley of Kashgar, but was there defeated by Chinese troops, who pursued him back to Chakyr-Agyl, spending about 10 days there before returning to Kashgaria. (Pp. 67-68)

The Chinese were in the eastern Pamirs again in the early 1880s. The Russian traveller A. Regel' reported in 1882 that he had been unable to visit the eastern Pamirs because of some misunderstandings between Shugnan and the Manchu troops in the eastern Pamirs (p. 167), and in 1883 an armed Chinese detachment was sent to Rang-Kul' to ask the Tsarist captain, Putyata, "why he and his men had come to China without warning the Kashgar authorities". (P. 174) The Chinese continued to appear in the eastern Pamirs during the 1880s, and Afghan troops also began to infiltrate from the western Pamirs. During the same period a considerable number of travellers, innocent and less innocent, from both Russia and western Europe also visited the Pamirs.

Iskandarov states that Russia deliberately chose not to establish her rights in the eastern Pamirs as heir to Kokand in the late 1870s and 1880s because there was no immediate threat in that area and she was fully engaged elsewhere. (P. 201) The facts suggest, however, that she may not have been aware at that time that Kokand's possessions had included the eastern Pamirs, or that, if she was, did not think them of any value. Not only did Russia take no action there but the wording of the protocol of 1884 demarcating the frontier between Fergana oblast and Sinkiang as far as the Uz-Bel' pass north-west of lake Rang-Kul', which stated that "from the Uz-Bel' pass the frontier of Russia turns to the south-west and the Chinese runs to the south" (p. 314), seemed to exclude most, if not all, of the eastern Pamirs from Russian territory.

### *Russia decides to act*

Whatever the Tsarist Government's views may have been in the 1880s as regards the ownership of the eastern Pamirs, from at least 1890 it looked on Chinese and Afghan activities there as an infringement of its rights and part of a British plan to establish its own supremacy in the Pamirs through Afghanistan and China. On 23 November 1890 the Turkestan Governor-General Vrevskiy reported to St. Petersburg: "At the present time a British mission under the command of Captain Younghusband is living in Yarkand. The mission is charged with the

in numerous battles as part of Yaqub-Bek's forces in Kashgaria. (P. 62) This fact and the fact that Yaqub-Bek was married to the daughter of the ruler of Shugnan, which placed the latter in a certain dependence on him, are the only ones quoted by Iskandarov which lend any substance to a statement by the Chinese commander in the eastern Pamirs in 1892 that Badakhshan, Vakhán and Shugnan had belonged to Yaqub-Bek.

division of the Pamirs between Afghanistan and China. . . . At present Captain Younghusband is touring the Pamirs and should return to Kashgar soon for talks about the demarcations, which will begin in the winter. China and Afghanistan never had rights to the territory of the Pamirs, which were always dependent on the former khanate of Kokand. . . . In these conditions a delimitation of the Pamirs between China and Afghanistan through the agency of the British undoubtedly violates Russia's interests in Central Asia." (P. 213)

This report and the evidence of continuing Chinese and Afghan activity in the Pamirs finally roused the Tsarist Government to take some action. On 2 February 1891 the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the War Minister: "We have no positive information to date about the talks between Younghusband and the Chinese authorities in Kashgar, but in view of the right to the Pamirs, secured to us by the Russo-British agreement of 1872-3, it would seem to me desirable to implement the measure suggested by you, namely, to send a *sotnya* or two of Cossacks to ride round the Pamirs this summer." (P. 280) Iskandarov claims that an agreement on the division of the Pamirs was, in fact, reached at the beginning of 1891 under which the basin of the Oksu [presumably the Ak-Su—A.S.] went to China and the territory to the left of this basin to Afghanistan. (P. 212)

A Russian patrol numbering 120 men under Colonel Ionov duly visited the Pamirs from early June until the end of August 1891. Ionov ran into a number of individual Chinese soldiers and in the heart of the Pamirs he came across a representative of the Kashgar authorities who had levied *zakat* from visiting merchants and the Kirgiz. He also found the population building military fortifications on the east shore of Lake Karakul' on Chinese orders. He announced to the local inhabitants that they belonged to Russia and in some instances replaced the elders appointed by the Chinese with his own nominees. Younghusband, who was travelling through the Pamirs and was temporarily detained by Ionov in Baza-i-Gumbaz, was told straight out by Ionov that "the [Russian] detachment had been sent to the Pamirs for the purpose of putting an end to the impudent behaviour (*khoz'yaynichan'ye*) of the Chinese and Afghans and to re-establish our right to this territory". (P. 282) According to Brzhezitskiy, the commander of a Russian detachment sent to the Pamirs early the following year, Ionov's visit and the implied danger that the Pamirs might become Russian after all made the British "incite both the Chinese and Afghans to defend their rights in the Pamirs, promising them every assistance. . . . Both the Chinese and the Afghans . . . set about their preparations soon after the departure of our detachment." (P. 212)

Russian fears of British intentions in the Pamirs increased constantly, particularly after the British occupied Hunza at the end of 1891 and reports that the British were building a road through Hunza to the Pamirs. On 19 December 1891 the Turkestan Governor-General

suggested that a reconnaissance party under Lt. Brzhezitskiy should be sent to the Pamirs to pick up any information it could on what the Chinese, British and Afghans were up to in the Pamirs and Hunza as well as neighbouring countries. The party would be instructed on no account to cross the Sarykol range or the Hindu Kush and provoke armed clashes. (Pp. 284-5) Agreement to send out Brzhezitskiy's reconnaissance party was given at a special meeting to discuss the Pamirs problem in St. Petersburg in January 1892, at which it was also decided to begin political talks with China and Britain. (Pp. 287-8) Brzhezitskiy's party left on 3 February 1892 and was soon reporting back that the Chinese had penetrated to the heart of the eastern Pamirs, that they had replaced local officials appointed by Ionov the year before, and that more and more Chinese troops and supplies were arriving almost daily to build fortifications near lakes Rang-Kul' and Yashil'-Kul' and elsewhere. (Pp. 253-4)

Vrevskiy was worried that Brzhezitskiy's small party might not be able to stand up to any armed British, Chinese or Afghan detachments, and on 24 February 1892 he asked the War Minister to send a special military detachment under Ionov to the Pamirs. The War Minister was agreeable, but nothing was done since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs objected on 27 February 1892 that the situation demanded no special military measures "in view of the peaceful declarations of the Chinese Government and absolutely reliable information about the military preparations of the British". (Pp. 285-6) However, the matter was brought up again less than a month later at a conference in St. Petersburg which met from 15 to 19 March 1892 to discuss the Pamirs question. The conference noted that, despite Peking's declaration of non-interference in the Pamirs question, "Chinese detachments are continuing to occupy the localities of Rang-Kul', Alichur, Yashil'-Kul', Ak-Tash and others and are making preparations to erect forts in a number of points in the region". (P. 288) Further, the British were laying a road through Hunza and were intending to occupy the important post of Baza-i-Gumbaz in the southern Pamirs, while the Afghans frequently raided Kara-Kul' and exacted illegal taxes from the Kirgiz. All this constituted a threat to Fergana oblast. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs still doubted the wisdom of sending a military detachment to the Pamirs, being hopeful of a peaceful solution through diplomatic talks further to those already held with China and Britain. Military circles, on the other hand, considered that more vigorous measures were necessary, otherwise the Chinese would entrench themselves and be more difficult to dislodge. In the end it was decided to despatch a military unit to the Pamirs but it was decreed that it should go no further south than the river Murgab. Only patrols and scouts should be sent beyond this and they should avoid armed clashes with the enemy. As regards establishing a frontier with China in the Pamirs "the members of the conference came to a unanimous conclusion. The frontier between China and Russia should

run from the Uz-Bel' pass along the Sarykol range to Mustag, since this range separated not only the possessions of Kashgar province from the khanate of Kokand, but also the Amu-Dar'ya basin from the Tarim basin." (P. 289) The conference also discussed the possibility of sending an Anglo-Russian mixed commission to elucidate the frontiers in the Pamirs between Russia, north-east Afghanistan and British India.

The military unit was not despatched to the eastern Pamirs until June. Meanwhile Brzhezitskiy continued to report back on Chinese activities. He said the Chinese were building a fort at Yashil'-Kul' to halt the movement of Afghan troops from the west to the east Pamirs. (P. 254) Yan-Darin, the Chinese commander, told Brzhezitskiy that Badakhshan, Vakhán and Shugnan had belonged to Yaqub Bek and with the conquest of Kashgar by China should therefore have passed to the Manchus. The Chinese had allowed the Afghans to hold these territories up till now because they didn't need them, but now they had decided to take Vakhán, Shugnan and Rushan. (P. 256) However, the Chinese were unable not only to achieve this, but even to hold Yashil'-Kul'. Afghan troops arrived on the scene by early April 1892, and they forced the Chinese to retreat continually to the north-west, until on 15 May they finally told the Chinese to withdraw to Kashgaria. In view of the superiority of the Afghan forces the Chinese withdrew to Rang-Kul' and then to Bulun-Kul'.

As regards the eastern Pamirs, Yan-Darin declared to Brzhezitskiy that "the Pamirs question has been concluded peaceably with the Russians and all the Pamirs belong to the Chinese." He told Brzhezitskiy to go back at once, otherwise he would use force, and in order to avoid an armed clash Brzhezitskiy had to leave his previous quarters on the Muz-Kol' river. (Pp. 256-7) In private conversation with Brzhezitskiy Yan-Darin said that he had been forced to take such drastic measures by the British who, having established themselves in Hunza, were preparing to strengthen their position in the eastern Pamirs. Brzhezitskiy reported that Yan-Darin was in touch with the British. He had sent presents to Younghusband who was visiting the Pamirs, allegedly to hunt, and he had been in contact with the British officer Durand travelling in the guise of Saib Ismat. (P. 215) According to Brzhezitskiy the Chinese troops were extremely undisciplined, and both the Chinese and the Afghans fled the population who appealed to him for protection. (Pp. 252-5)

Ionov's military detachment was ready to leave in May 1892. Instructions issued on 25 May 1892 stated that the detachment should preserve law and order in the areas adjoining the frontier demarcated with China as far as Uz-Bel'. In the area around the Murgab, Rang-Kul' and Kudara the detachment was to try and clear the region of Chinese posts and Afghan patrols by peaceful means, not insisting absolutely on the Chinese leaving the neighbourhood of Rang-Kul'.

South of the Murgab area Ionov was to confine himself to observation and trying to ensure that Russia's adversaries did not establish themselves there. (P. 290)

Ionov's detachment joined up with Brzhezitskiy's party at Rang-Kul' on 26 June 1892, and then made its headquarters on the Murgab. Reconnaissance parties were sent out. The Chinese were told to leave the fort they had built at Ak-Tash in April 1892, which they did, and the fort was destroyed. (Pp. 291-2) Elsewhere the Chinese started to withdraw as soon as they learnt of Ionov's arrival. The Afghans also made themselves scarce. The population of the eastern Pamirs, particularly those who had been under the Afghans, were reported to be pleased at the arrival of the Russians.

In view of the uneasy situation in the Pamirs, on 24 August 1892 Ionov, with the sanction of the Turkestan Governor-General, left a detachment of 160 men behind for the winter at Shadzhan not far from Murgab. The Shadzhan detachment was to continue to keep the Pamirs clear of Chinese and Afghan troops. Ionov's visit had been a success on the whole, but he had not succeeded in completely securing Russia's rights to the Pamirs. After his departure Afghan troops again appeared, and the Chinese began to restore their ruined forts and pillage the Kirgiz. But the presence of the Shadzhan detachment cut down the incursions of the Chinese and Afghan forces and British intelligence became less active. (Pp. 293 and 297)

#### *The provisional agreement of 1894*

However, in mid-February 1893 the Shadzhan detachment reported that information had been received that the Chinese had increased their garrisons in Kashgar and Yarkand and got ready provisions and transport with the intention of coming to the Pamirs in great strength at the end of February. On 21 April 1893 Kossini, the Russian ambassador in Peking, telegraphed to St. Petersburg that the Chinese Government had given an emphatic assurance that this concentration of troops in Kashgaria was not aimed against Russia but was due to unrest among the Muslims. The ambassador attributed China's intensified military preparations, "supported in every way by Britain", solely to the fear of a Russian detachment being sent to the Pamirs and recommended that troops should not be sent prematurely so as not to prejudice the talks on the Pamirs. A week later<sup>4</sup> Kossini reported that the British envoy had had a long talk with the Chinese viceroy, Li Hung-chang, on the Pamirs question in which he had stressed Russia's aggressive designs and declared that the British Government was firmly convinced that China would not yield one inch of the territory belonging to her to Russia. According to Kossini, the British envoy had offered to facilitate the supply of weapons and ammunition to Sinkiang, but this offer had been

<sup>4</sup> The date is given as 28 April 1898, but this is almost certainly a misprint for 1893.

categorically rejected by Li, who had declared that, "if some concessions to Russia are necessary, then China will make them, since Russia . . . is a friendly power and too powerful a neighbour for China to be able to be intractable with her". (Pp. 258-9)

The Chinese, in fact, seem to have decided that discretion was the better part of valour, and Iskandarov reports no further trouble with them on the ground in the Pamirs. Meanwhile talks had been continuing since 1892 between the Chinese and Russian governments on the alignment of the frontier without any sign of agreement. In a memorandum dated 30 January 1893 the Turkestan Governor-General, Vrevskiy, had rejected any idea of making a concession to the Chinese and placing the frontier to the west of the Sarykol range because the sole route connecting the Pamirs with Fergana oblast lay along the Ak-Baytal and Ak-Su rivers at the foot of the Sarykol range. Vrevskiy continued: "Russia has absolute right not only to the Pamirs west of the Sarykol range, but also to the whole expanse to the east of these mountains, right up to the permanent settlements in the Kashgar valley, since these parts were in the undoubted possession of the khanate of Kokand from the most ancient times. Only a genuine desire to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese established over the centuries could prompt us to give up voluntarily such extensive territory and agree to an amicable division of the Pamirs." Vrevskiy maintained that further concessions were impossible, not only because they would substantially damage Russia's interests, but also because of China's lack of caution in acquiescing in Britain's seizure of the whole Hunza khanate. (P. 314)

The Chinese claimed the Pamirs on historical grounds. Thus the Russian consul in Kashgar reported to the Turkestan Governor-General on 7 March 1893: "The Kashgar authorities say that their detachments went to the eastern Pamirs because the region has belonged to them since the middle of the 18th century. This does not correspond with the historical facts. The advent of Chinese troops in the Pamirs in the time of the *bogdokhan* Ch'ien Lung (1759), which the Manchus often quote in confirmation of their rights to the Pamirs, cannot serve as a basis for their claims to these parts inasmuch as the Pamirs came within the bounds of Fergana two and a half centuries before Ch'ien Lung, as can be seen from the autobiography of Babur Nameh, the ruler of Fergana and founder of the Great Mogul dynasty in India." (P. 252) The Chinese claimed that their appearance at Lake Yashil'-Kul' was to search for a document allegedly buried there in 1759 by their military commander Fu-Teh when he was pursuing the Khojas. In their discussions with the Russians the Chinese also apparently made much of the fact that the 1884 protocol demarcating the frontier between Sinkiang and Fergana oblast had stated that from the Uz-Bel' pass the Russian frontier went south-west and the Chinese south, this, in the Chinese view, granting them rights to the whole Pamirs region. (Pp. 312 and 314)

Finally, in 1894, after more than two years of fruitless diplomatic discussions a provisional agreement was concluded under which China was to observe the *de facto* situation in the Pamirs until Kashgar reached a final solution on demarcating the frontier. (P. 318) This meant, in effect, accepting, for the time being at least, the frontier along the Sarykol range decided on unilaterally by Russia in 1892. In fact there seems to have been no further discussions on this section of the Russian-Chinese frontier, which remains unchanged to this day.

## THE TATARS OF THE CRIMEA : A RETROSPECTIVE SUMMARY

By CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY

Okum nişan ursa idi	Okum nişan urmağanda
Atım koşu ozsa idi	Atım koşu ozmağanda
Çapar idi Çorabatır	Ayıt nişlesin Çorabatır?

(If my arrow had struck the mark,  
If my steed had won the contest,  
Chorabatyr would have hastened to my aid.

My arrow did not strike the mark,  
My steed did not win the contest,  
What then shall I do, O Chorabatyr?)

—From a poem by *Ismail Bey Gasprinskiy*

In September 1967, a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR proclaimed the rehabilitation of the Tatars of the Crimea and authorized the survivors of the deportations of 1944 to leave their place of exile and return, if they wished, to their native peninsula, now constituted as a mere oblast of the Federated Republic of the Ukraine. This is simply a rehabilitation of people and does not involve the re-establishment of the national Tatar home in the Crimea. It seems to mark the end of the age-long confrontation between Russia and the Crimean Tatars.<sup>1</sup>

This confrontation began at the end of the 15th century when the khanate of Crimea, together with the Chingizid dynasty of the Girey, supplanted the Golden Horde. In 1475, the Turks captured the Genoese city of Caffa (now Feodosiya) and established themselves on the southern coast of the peninsula. In 1584<sup>2</sup> the Tatar khans recognized the sovereignty of the Ottoman Padishah and until the final collapse of the principality in 1783, showed themselves to be most loyal vassals of the Ottoman Empire. They protected its northern frontiers and for centuries provided the Ottoman army with its best cavalry.

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the expression "Crimean Tatars" formerly included two communities, both Muslim and Turkic, but speaking different dialects and differing in their way of life and ethnic origin. These were: the Tatars of the northern and central steppes descended from the Nogays who had come to the Crimea during the Mongol period (13th century); and the Tatars of the southern littoral descended from various Turkic peoples (Pechenegs, Kumans etc.) who had arrived before the Mongols and were mixed with Greeks, Goths and Genoese, whom they had gradually absorbed and Turkified.

<sup>2</sup> From 1584, under the Islamic rule of Girey, the *Khutba* was said in the name of the Ottoman *Padishah* (Sultan) as a mark of submission. It was from this date that the rulers of the Crimea took the title of khan instead of that of sultan used by the first three sovereigns, Hajji Girey, Nur Devlet and Mengli Girey.

For the state of Muscovy the Crimeans proved redoubtable neighbours. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Tatar raids against the southern and central provinces of Russia followed each other almost without interruption, and the booty resulting from these raids were the most obvious source of the khanates' revenue. Some of them, notably that launched by Khan Devlet Girey in 1571 which ended in a great fire in Moscow, were major catastrophes for Russia.

The slow decline of the military power of the Ottoman Empire, the progressive closing of the east-west trade routes passing through the Crimea, and finally, the growing strength of the Muscovite state in the second half of the 17th century brought about a change in relative strength: thenceforward the khanate was able to offer only feeble resistance to Russian pressure. It was occupied for the first time in 1736, again in 1771 and was finally incorporated in the Russian Empire in 1783.

In annexing this important Muslim territory, Catherine II's government tried to avoid the mistakes made in the Tatar lands of the Middle Volga and in Bashkir country in the Urals. Contrary to what was happening in Kazan', no political assimilation was carried out in the Crimea and the Russian Orthodox Church found itself debarred from any missionary activity. Catherine II proposed to treat her new subjects as an enlightened despot. The policy followed towards Islam, which the Empress herself took to be a "reasonable" and "civilizing" religion, was astonishingly liberal. The Muslims enjoyed complete freedom of worship and all the functions of the clergy received legal and juridical recognition. The *mufti* of Bakhchisaray was officially recognized in 1794 as the spiritual head of the Muslim community. At the same time, however, the *mufti* himself and all the clergy were placed under the firm control of the Russian government. The *mufti* was not elected by the local population but was nominated by the Tsar on the recommendation of the Ministry of the Interior, and in the same way, such high dignitaries as *kadi-asker*, *kadi* and *khatib* were chosen by the authorities from among "reliable and loyal persons of good will".<sup>3</sup> The Russians thus succeeded in making the Crimean higher clergy loyal, if not to Russia, at any rate to the Tsarist monarchy. Various measures designed to achieve this end were taken: the *waqfs* were partially left untouched, whereas on the Volga they had been requisitioned in their entirety<sup>4</sup>; and religious dignitaries received gifts of land.<sup>5</sup> As the Soviet

<sup>3</sup> N. Smirnov, "Klassovaya baza Islama v Krymu" (The Social Basis of Islam in the Crimea), *Voistvuyushchii Ateist*, Moscow, No. 8-9, 1931, p. 37.

<sup>4</sup> Edige Kirimal, *Der Nationale Kampf der Krimtürken*, Emsdetten, Verlag Leske, p. 16) estimates at 457,800 hectares the total area of the *waqf* properties on the eve of the conquest of 1783 and at 95,499 hectares at the outbreak of the Revolution of 1917. Gubaydullin, ("K voprosu ideologii Gasprinskogo", *Izvestiya Azerbaydzhanskogo Vostochnogo Fakul'teta*, Baku, 1929. Vol. IV, p. 182) estimates that in 1893, the Crimean clergy still possessed 87,643 desyatins of *waqf* lands.

<sup>5</sup> Smirnov, in his article quoted above, p. 38, notes that in 1905, the Muslim clergy owned, apart from the *waqfs*, 69,466 hectares of land, or 3·8 per cent of the cultivated land in the Crimea. These lands were donated by the Russian government between 1877 and 1905.

historian Gubaydullin confirms: "The Crimean clergy, being conservative and sometimes even openly monarchist, were not able to bring about reforms comparable with those introduced in the Volga region."<sup>6</sup>

Different also from the Russian attitude on the Volga was the desire of the authorities to curry favour with the Tatar nobility, which was admitted into the ranks of the Russian aristocracy and accorded the same rights and privileges. At the beginning of the 19th century, this nobility, which represented scarcely 5 per cent of the Tatar population, were still in possession of 60 per cent of the cultivated lands of the peninsula. Their economic interests were, however, hard hit by the reduction of pasture land and they were too weak to adapt themselves to the capitalist system; they therefore underwent an economic decline. It was from this class of impoverished nobles that there emerged at the end of the 19th century the reformers and ideologists of the pan-Turk movement, of whom the most notable was the well-known Ismail Gasprinskiy.

A third factor peculiar to the Crimea, was that this "sun-drenched peninsula", "the Côte d'Azur of Russia", had ever since the conquest been subjected to systematic rural and urban colonization. This was preceded by large-scale requisition of the best lands, which were distributed first to Catherine's great officers of state<sup>7</sup> and then to a mass of colonists of all origins and races who, after 1789, inundated the territory of the former khanate. They included discharged soldiers, Ukrainian cossacks, Greeks, Wallachians, Armenians, Germans, Menonites, Bulgarians and Jews. At the same time the government of St. Petersburg strove to obliterate the very memory of the former Tatar khanate. In 1784, the newly acquired territory was named "Territory of the Taurid (Tavrida), which was later (1864) replaced by "Government [i.e. province] of the Taurid"; the old Tatar names were changed to Greek ones—Aq Mechet became Simferopol, Eski Krym became Levkopol', Gözlev became Yevpatoriya, Caffa became Feodosiya, etc.

A fourth and final unfavourable circumstance was that the Crimea was a consumer and not a producer country. Its native traders and artisans had never been able, like those of the Volga, to attain to the rank of a real bourgeois merchant class which could, like their brothers in Kazan', lead a reformist movement.

The Muslim society of the Crimea was too weak to confront the growing pressure of the Russians with armed resistance.<sup>8</sup> The only, and

<sup>6</sup> Gubaydullin, op. cit., p. 183.

<sup>7</sup> S. A. Usov, *Istorichsko-Ekonomicheskiy ocherk Kryma* (Historical and Economic Description of the Crimea) Simferopol', 1926, is quoted by Bochagov (*Milli Firka, Natsionalisticheskaya Kontrevolyutsiya v Krymu*, Simferopol, Krymizdat, 1930, p. 14) as giving the extent of the lands donated to certain great Russian families in 1784: Potemkin, 13,000 desyatins; Bezborodko, 18,000 desyatins; Chirinskiy, 27,000 desyatins. Between 1784 and 1796, 288,064 desyatins were given to officials and to favourites of the Tsarina (*ibid.*, p. 15).

<sup>8</sup> Armed revolts did, however, occur sporadically, for example, in 1808 in the Bakhchisaray district, and again in 1854 and 1880 (cf. Bochagov, op. cit., p. 17).

apparently the most simple, solution to their problems left to them was that of emigration. The history of the Crimean Tatars under the Tsarist Empire was thus simply a long and tragic series of migrations to the Ottoman Empire, migrations generally carried out in the worst possible conditions which resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of lives.

It is hard to evaluate the importance of these migrations with precision because essential data is lacking—the exact extent of the population of the khanate on the eve of the conquest.<sup>9</sup> The first relatively small exodus took place immediately after the conquest, between 1784 and 1787. It affected about 8,000 persons, all from the coastal regions and mainly belonging to the well-to-do classes.<sup>10</sup> The second exodus, a large one, was after the Treaty of Jassy (Iasi) (6.1.92), which marked the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1788–92, and also the end of Tatar hopes of recovering their independence. This time it was mainly the Tatar nomads of the steppes who emigrated, their estimated total being between 100,000 and 300,000.<sup>11</sup> This exodus “conformed with the wishes of the Russian authorities”<sup>12</sup> and left in the Crimea only 60,000 to 70,000<sup>13</sup> Tatars living in a stricken countryside. The void was soon filled by an influx of Russian and foreign colonists, and in 1804 the population was estimated by V. A. Dashkov at 194,761 of whom about 120,000 were Tatars.<sup>14</sup>

The Tatars stayed quiet during the early part of the 19th century in spite of the measures taken by the authorities at the time of the renewed Russo-Turkish war for the expulsion of the borderland peoples to the arid steppes of the interior. Only the Nogay horde of Bujajaq, which in 1807 had settled in the north of Perekop, emigrated in 1812 to Turkey. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1829, the Tatars showed no sign of

<sup>9</sup> Estimates of the Crimean population before the Russian conquest are usually based on the number of warriors which the Khan could raise for his military expeditions. In the 16th century the number of men able to bear arms reached 130,000 (according to Martin Bronewski, “Opisaniye Kryma 1578 goda”, in *Zapiski Odesskogo Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostey*, Odessa, Vol. IV) and Crimean writers do not hesitate to estimate the total population of the khanate in the 16th century at several millions. For example, Said Khalimov, “Krymskaya Avtonomnaya Respublika” in *Zhizn' Natsional'nostey*, I, 1923, pp. 119–28, and Ahmed Ozenbashly, “Rol' Tsarskogo Pravitel'stva v emigratsii Krymskikh Tatar”, *Krym.*, Vol. II, 1926 (4 million). At the time of the conquest, according to the most probable estimates, the population of the peninsula was 200,000 and that of the whole khanate, 400,000 (e.g. Tunmann, *Die Taurische Stathalterschaft oder die Krim*, Hamburg, 1787, Büschings Erdbeschreibung, Vol. I).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Markevich, “Pereseleniye Krymskikh Tatar v Turtsiyu” (The Tatar Emigration to Turkey), *Bulletin Akademii Nauk SSSR*. 7th series, I, Moscow, 1928, pp. 379–80.

<sup>11</sup> 100,000 according to Markevich, op. cit., p. 388, 300,000 according to R. A. Sumarokov, *Dosugi Krymskogo sud'i ili vtoroye puteshestviye v Tavridu Pavla Sumarokova po vysochayshemu poveleniyu* (Leisure Moments of a Judge of the Crimea or the Second Journey in the Taurid of Pavel Sumarokov by Imperial Command), St. Petersburg 1803–1805.

<sup>12</sup> Sumarokov, op. cit., quoted by Markevich, op. cit., p. 386.

<sup>13</sup> Markevich's estimate, op. cit., p. 388.

<sup>14</sup> V. A. Dashkov, *Statisticheskiy Zhurnal*, Vol. II, *Sbornik antropologicheskikh i etnograficheskikh statey o Rossii*, Moscow, 1898, quoted by Markevich, op. cit., p. 389.

unrest. By 1850, according to P. I. Keppen<sup>15</sup>, the Tatar population had increased considerably and reached 275,822 for the whole of the Taurid province, and of these more than 50,000 were Nogay nomads in the north of the peninsula.

The second large exodus took place just after the Crimean War, which had aroused false hopes among the Muslims. Fear of reprisals<sup>16</sup> and the harsh severity of the Russian authorities, who aimed at "ridding the territory of this unwanted population"<sup>17</sup> impelled 135,477 Tatars (including 46,229 Nogays), about two-thirds of the whole Muslim population, to emigrate to Turkey between 1860 and 1863.

The consequences of these migrations were disastrous for the peninsula's economy: nearly 800 villages were completely abandoned and in 1864 the total population dropped to 194,700 of whom a bare 100,000 were Tatar.<sup>18</sup> Once again the vacuum was filled by an influx of Ukrainian and Russian colonists and the Russians were not only in the majority but played a predominant part in the economy. After a short period of calm, the Tatars' fear of military conscription and of forced conversion to Christianity provoked a new exodus in 1874-75 involving some 60,000 persons.<sup>19</sup> The exodus continued for some years at a slower pace, mainly owing to the increasingly bad material condition of the Tatar peasants. In 1891, a third great exodus began which lasted until 1902 and involved 20,000 people.<sup>20</sup> At the 1897 census, the total population of the Crimea was 525,235 of whom only 187,943 were Tatars.

The Tatar community was mostly confined to the peasantry,<sup>21</sup> impoverished, and in almost every district,<sup>22</sup> in the minority; it was moreover threatened with extinction since its natural increase was far below that of the other communities.<sup>23</sup> From the point of view of education, judging from the literacy figures, the rural Tatar population

<sup>15</sup> *Etnograficheskaya Karta Rossii*, St. Petersburg, 1852.

<sup>16</sup> Markevich (op. cit., p. 393) attaches importance to the plan of General Keppen to deport all the Crimean Tatars to the Semipalatinsk district. This plan was to be partially carried out a century later.

<sup>17</sup> It was Aleksander II himself who declared apropos of the Tatar exodus, "It is not appropriate to oppose the overt or covert exodus of the Tatars. On the contrary, this voluntary emigration should be considered as a beneficial action calculated to free the territory from this unwanted population" (Markevich, op. cit., p. 395).

<sup>18</sup> Markevich, op. cit., I, p. 405.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 403.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, II, Moscow, 1929, p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> According to Bochagov, op. cit., p. 31, in 1915 the peasants represented 84 per cent, the artisans 12 per cent, the clergy 78 per cent and the nobility 76 per cent. The traders were very few in number. Of the peasants, 40-50 per cent had no land or not enough for their subsistence.

<sup>22</sup> Bochagov (op. cit.) also states that in 1897 the Tatars were in the majority only in the Yalta uyezd (58.7 per cent as against 30.2 per cent of Russians). Elsewhere they were in the minority—Yevpatoriya, 40.5 per cent; Perekop, 23.5 per cent; Simferopol' 41.8 per cent; Feodosiya 37.2 per cent. In the towns of Sevastopol' and Balaklava they represented only 1.5 and .7 per cent of the population.

<sup>23</sup> According to the *Statisticheskiiy spravochnik Tavricheskoy Gubernii za 1915 god.* quoted by Bochagov (op. cit., p. 23) it was only .71 per cent as against 2.45 per cent among the Russians, 2.34 per cent among the German and Esthonian colonists and 1.62 per cent among the Jews.

came fifteenth in the "Taurid province", only the Tsiganes (gypsies) coming below them.<sup>24</sup>

It was, nevertheless, from this small community, isolated as it was from other Muslim and Turkic elements in the Russian Empire that there sprang at the end of the 19th century the flame of the Muslim renaissance whose refulgence was to shine not only in the Crimea but in all the Muslim lands of Russia, and even in the Muslim world beyond its frontiers. The credit for this goes to an exceptional person, one of the most profound and brilliant minds to be found among the Turkic peoples in recent times, Ismail Gasprinskiy.<sup>25</sup>

After studying at a Russian school (The Military Cadet School—*Kadetskiy Korpus* in Moscow), Ismail Gasprinskiy, the son of an impoverished noble (*murzak*), lived for some years in Paris and Istanbul. He had thus while still young been in close touch with a wide variety of advanced circles—in Russia with the slavophiles (through the Katkov family), in France with the liberals and even the socialists,<sup>26</sup> and in Turkey with the Young Turks, whose ideas were to exercise a powerful influence on his *Weltanschauung*. Returning to the Crimea in 1877, he set himself a herculean task, that of giving the embryo Turkic national movement an academic and scholarly setting. *Terjüman*,<sup>27</sup> the newspaper, which he published at Bakhchisaray from 1883 onwards, became the platform from which for more than thirty years, he propagated his political ideas, ideas which to a greater or lesser degree were to inspire all the Muslim reformists of Russia and elsewhere. The essence of his policy was educational reform, by means of which he aimed at replacing the old conservative and rigid school with modern ones based on "the new method" (*usul-i-jadid*). This method was first introduced in his model *medrese* in Bakhchisaray and soon afterwards in all the Muslim towns of the empire—in the Middle Volga, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Kazakh steppes and even beyond in Persia, Turkey and India.

But the cultural renaissance was only the first phase of Gasprinskiy's work. His main object was the unity, first spiritual and later political, of the Turkic world, a unity symbolized by his well-known slogan "unity of language of thought and of action" (in Tatar, *dilde, fikirde, ishte birlik*). This he regarded as the only way to save his small country, the Crimea, from being absorbed sooner or later by the Russians. In order to give this pan-Turk unity a concrete basis, Gasprinskiy worked out for his *Terjüman* a "common Turkic language". This was based on the Turkish of Turkey, but much simplified and freed as far as possible from Arabic and Persian accretions in such a way that it could be under-

<sup>24</sup> Bozhagov, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>25</sup> In Tatar, Ismail Bey Gaspraly, born at Bakhchisaray in 1851, died in 1914.

<sup>26</sup> Gasprinskiy was one of the first Muslim writers to speak of socialism in his pamphlet *Avropa medeniyetine bir nazar muvazene* (A Critical Glance at European Civilization), Istanbul, Ebuuzia Matbu'asi, 1302 A.H.

<sup>27</sup> See Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quellejay. *La Presse et le Mouvement National chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920*. Paris, La Haye, Mouton & Co., 1964. Chap. II. "L'ère du Tergüman", pp. 35-46.

stood by all the Turkic peoples from the Balkans to China, "by the Bosphorus boatman as well as by the cameleer of Kashgar".

Gasprinskiy's influence throughout Dar ul-Islam was predominant and it is not without reason that a Tatar Soviet author has compared the part of *Terjüman* with that played by the London *Times*.<sup>28</sup> He was able to impart to latent pan-Turk nationalism a concrete form, to give the Tatars of Russia a chance to reduce the cultural start which the Turks of Turkey had gained over them and even to take the lead in the modernist Muslim movement. Oddly enough, however, it was in the Crimea itself that his ideas awakened the least echo and even encountered strong resistance.

Opposition to the liberal pan-Islamism of Gasprinskiy came from a numerically small but influential group formed from the petty bourgeoisie and peasant class, which, in about 1906, established under the influence of the "Young Turks" and also more directly under that of the Russian revolutionary movements (especially of the SRs, the socialist revolutionaries), the group known as the "Young Tatars" (*Yeni Tatarlar*).

Acting at first underground, this group led by an outstanding personality, Abdurrashid Mehdi, a teacher from Karasubazar, cared very little for the fate of Muslims living outside the Crimea. Although they associated themselves with the educational and cultural work of Gasprinskiy, they confined their attentions to the liberation of the Crimean Tatars from Russian domination. Radical agrarian reform which would result in restoring to the Tatar peasantry the lands owned by the State, the *waqfs* and the great Russian or Muslim landowners, was their main objective.

It was the militant element of this group, young intellectuals educated for the most part in Turkey and Western Europe, which in July 1917 formed the first Tatar political party, the *Milli Firqa* (the National Party). This was a nationalist party inclined towards socialism and hostile to the conservatives, and for a long time it dominated the political life of the Crimean Muslims. On 26 November 1917, the leaders of the *Milli Firqa* convened at Bakhchisaray a Tatar "parliament" (*kurultay*), which appointed a national government and undertook to raise some Tatar army units. This was the first attempt to realize, if not the independence, at any rate the autonomy of the Crimean Tatars. It met with a tragic fate two months later: in January 1918, the Bolshevik Revolutionary Military Committee (*Revkom*) of Sevastopol' refused to recognize the Tatar "government" established at Simferopol' and ordered Black Sea naval units to liquidate it. On 26 January, Bolshevik troops took possession of the Tatar capital,

<sup>28</sup> "The influence of this small paper was a thousand times greater than that of *Novoye Vremya* and even of the great *British Times*" (Jemaleddin Validor, *Ocherki istorii obrazovannosti i literatur y Tatar do revolyutsii 1917 goda* (Outline of the Education and Literature of the Tatars before the 1917 Revolution).

dispersed the *Kurultay* and arrested its leaders. The president, Chelebiyev was shortly afterwards executed in Sevastopol' prison.

The first Soviet rulers of the Crimea from January to April 1918 were brutal, tyrannical and weak. They were Russians to a man and almost completely ignored the local Muslim population. This Soviet regime was expelled by the Germans when they occupied the peninsula in the spring of 1918, and they set up a Crimean government under a Lithuanian Tatar, General Sulkevich. After the evacuation of the German forces in November this government was replaced by a liberal Russian government under Salomon Krym, a Karaim. These were halcyon days for the Crimean Tatars. The more moderate section of the *Milli Firqa* took an active part in the administration of the country, schools were opened, well-produced Tatar newspapers appeared in Simferopol', and cultural contacts were re-established with Istanbul<sup>29</sup> and Baku, then the seat of a national Muslim government. The dream of Gasprinskiy had to some extent come true and it was not even shattered in April 1919 when Russian troops from the Ukraine overturned Salomon Krym's government and established the second Soviet regime in the Crimea. On this occasion, indeed, the Bolsheviks took account of the Muslims' susceptibilities and offered several government posts to members of the *Milli Firqa*.

In June 1919, the Crimea was occupied by White forces under General Denikin, who expelled the Bolsheviks and set up a purely Russian administration. Denikin, who stood for "a single and undivided Russia", was an implacable opponent of all indigenous national movements. He broke up the Tatar National Directorate, suspended its newspapers and proscribed its political organizations, thus forcing the militant element of the *Milli Firqa* to go underground and to collaborate with Russian Bolshevik organizations. In the Crimea, as elsewhere in the Muslim lands of Russia and notably in the North Caucasus and in Bashkiriya, it was the political mistakes of the Whites who forced the Muslims into the arms of Communism. In November 1920, the Red Army expelled from the Crimea the last "White" government of General Vranghel' and the peninsula was finally annexed by Soviet Russia.

Paradoxically for the Tatars of the Crimea, the establishment of the new regime opened under good auspices.<sup>30</sup> In the summer of 1921, measures in favour of the Muslims included an extensive amnesty for the Tatar nationalists who had fought against the Reds. In return for this, the *Milli Firqa* declared itself ready to collaborate with the Soviet regime. On 23 September 1921, a pan-Crimean congress convened at Simferopol' included Tatar communists, members of the *Milli Firqa* and non-party men who had decided to support the new government. Shortly

<sup>29</sup> See Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-53.

<sup>30</sup> The best study of the Crimea under the Soviet regime is that by Edige Kirimal. See Note 4.

after, on the 18th October 1921, a decree of the *Sovnarkom* of the RSFSR announced the creation of the Crimean ASSR as part of the Russian Federative Republic. At the census of 1926 its population was 714,000 of whom only 25 per cent were Tatars as against 42 per cent Russians.

But although they only represented a small minority of the total population, the Crimean Tatars constituted an important part of the republican administration. The President of the Executive Committee (Veli Ibrahimov), the President of the *Sovnarkom*, several of the Peoples Commissars as well as a large number of responsible officials in the judicial and administrative apparatus were Muslims. Up to 1927, the Crimea was one of the few Muslim territories of Soviet Russia where the political importance of the native element was greater than its numerical importance.

For the Crimean Tatars the first six years of Soviet-ruled Crimea were certainly the most auspicious as regards the satisfaction of their national aspirations since the Russian conquest of 1783. The Tatar language had an official status equal to that of Russian, purely Tatar educational establishments were created, a national theatre and film industry flourished, archaeological excavations, a wide variety of well produced publications in excellent Tatar—all these circumstances made cultural autonomy a reality. That “the Turks of the Crimea can really regard themselves as masters of the situation”<sup>31</sup> was simply a statement of fact.

In 1928 Stalin's long and bloody campaign against “nationalist deviations” began in the national republics. This campaign started in Tatarstan with the conviction of Sultan Galiyev<sup>32</sup> and was gradually extended to all the Muslim regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia; but nowhere did it have more tragic and burdensome consequences than in the Crimea. In January 1928, Veli Ibrahimov was arrested, convicted as a “bourgeois nationalist” and executed the following May. His downfall was followed by a long purge in the course of which almost the entire pre-revolutionary Crimean intelligentsia was to perish. After 1930 the purge was exacerbated by the violent suppression of the kulaks, which bore heavily on the peasantry, and by a violent anti-religious campaign, which decimated the Muslim clergy. It was an enfeebled and exhausted Tatar community which encountered the final tragedy of its unhappy existence—the German occupation and the mass deportation of 1945.

As is now well known, after the war the entire Tatar community of the Crimea was accused of “collaboration” with the German army and deported<sup>33</sup>; and the few Soviet authors who have dealt with the

<sup>31</sup> The words are those of Edige Kirimal (op. cit., p. 290) and have been quoted by many Crimean émigré writers.

<sup>32</sup> See Bennigsen and Quelquijay, *Les Mouvements Nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie. I. Le Sultangaliévisme au Tatarstan*. Paris, La Haye, Mouton & Co., 1959.

<sup>33</sup> In a statement made by the Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 25 June 1946 three main offences were mentioned: (1) Many Tatars

subject speak of "the collective treachery of the Tatars to the Soviet State".<sup>34</sup> Such a charge is manifestly absurd *a priori*, since in such a considerable community—during the war the Tatars had totalled 250,000—there could hardly be a unanimous attitude to a matter which concerned its very existence. What were the facts? It seems that when in the winter of 1941–2 Soviet troops tried to land on the southern coast of the peninsula, some Tatar volunteers came to the assistance of the German army. In January 1942 the Germans formed the first Tatar battalions, composed partly of volunteers but mainly of prisoners of war. Kirimal<sup>35</sup> estimates the total number of soldiers serving from 1942 to 1944 in the six Tatar brigades as between 8,000 and 20,000. These brigades were officered by Germans and not by Tatars and during the whole period of the occupation the German military authorities refused on principle to further any of the various proposals for Tatar autonomy. There was no Tatar "government", but merely a semblance of national existence represented by "Muslim committees" which acted as intermediaries between the occupation authorities and the native population; mosques were rebuilt and some Tatar newspapers were able to appear.<sup>36</sup> There does not therefore seem to have been any "collective treachery". Kirimal attaches the same degree of importance to the Tatar partisans who fought side by side with the Russian partisans operating against the Germans.

By a tragic irony of fate, it was in the autumn of 1944, when the German army had been expelled from the Soviet territory which it had previously occupied (the Crimea was reconquered by the Red Army in April 1944), and when the final issue of the war was no longer in doubt, that the Germans took the action which was to have disastrous consequences for the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean soldiers evacuated first to Rumania and then to Hungary were formed into a "Crimean Regiment" as part of the Waffen SS Division of the Eastern Turks (Osttürkische Waffenverband), which also included the "Azerbaydzhan", "Idel-Ural" (Volga Tatars) and "Turkestan" regiments. After December 1944, this division had some Muslim officers.<sup>37</sup> Finally, on 17 March 1945, when the war was virtually lost, the *Ost Ministerium* agreed to the creation in Berlin of a "National Committee of the Turks of the Crimea", which came into being on 20 March and began to function on 12 April 1945.

On 30 June 1945, the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea was officially abolished and replaced by the Crimean oblast. This was attached first to the RSFSR and then, on 19 February 1954, to the

joined the German army, (2) Tatar saboteurs operated against the rear of the Red Army, and (3) The Tatars as a whole did not oppose these "traitors".

<sup>34</sup> For example, V. Altmann in "Sessiya no istorii Kryma", *Voprosy Istorii*, Moscow, No. 12, Dec., 1948, pp. 179–84.

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 305.

<sup>36</sup> In January 1943, *Azat Krym* (Free Crimea) and in July of the same year, *Ana Yurt* (The Fatherland).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Kirimal, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

Ukrainian SSR.<sup>38</sup> No detailed account of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944-5 has yet been published. All that is known is that it affected without exception the entire Muslim community, including members of the Communist Party and the Komsomol as well as Tatar soldiers serving in the Red Army. According to evidence provided by deportees and also by foreign travellers, the Crimean Tatars were dispersed throughout the Soviet Union. Their presence has been reported in all the deportation camps in Siberia, the Urals, Birobidzhan, the Baltic republics and Central Asia. A large proportion was located in the Uzbek SSR and a newspaper in the Tatar language, the *Leninist Standard*, has been published in Tashkent since 1957.

The 1957 rehabilitation suggests that the Soviet government does not contemplate the re-establishment of a Crimean national home. In the circumstances, the Crimean Tatars are doomed to be assimilated by the peoples among whom they are now living. Thus a people with a long, glorious and tragic past will disappear finally from history.

<sup>38</sup> The liquidation of the Republic was not officially announced by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR until 25 June 1946.

# RECENT SOVIET WRITING ON THE MONGOLIAN PR

By HUBERT EVANS

A preliminary acknowledgment is due to Mrs. Molly Bailey of the Central Asian Research Centre who has assembled and classified the material to hand. Within the past three years the Centre had carded 61 articles on the Mongolian PR amounting in all to 176,000 words. A breakdown of these publications by subject-matter with corresponding wordage reads:

I. Economic/Social Development since 1921: The Special Relationship with the USSR		
15 long articles	63,000	words
16 short articles	15,000	..
II. Literary Studies		
5 articles	18,000	..
III. Art and Archaeology		
6 articles	15,000	..
IV. Travel		
7 articles	23,000	..
V. Orientalism and Linguistics		
8 articles	35,000	..
VI. Unclassifiable		
4 articles	7,000	..

Lack of space unfortunately prevents our including all the above articles; it was decided, therefore, to make a selection under the first four headings. Material under the fifth heading, Orientalism and Linguistics, which contains much of value, will be presented as a separate article in a forthcoming issue of the *Journal* of the Royal Central Asian Society. Some of the articles included in the summaries below seemed to qualify for inclusion simply because they were typical, but others were chosen for their intrinsic worth.

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## I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS: THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

FROM a total of 31 articles, varying in length from 300 words to 8,000, the following five were selected:

The Western treatment of Mongolia by academic historians and by journalists was considered by M. I. Gol'man in *Kratkiye Soobshcheniya Instituta Narodov Azii*, No. 85, 1964, in a copiously annotated essay entitled "The Modern History of Mongolia in Bourgeois Historiography

and Political Journalism". The author's point of departure was that the international status acquired by the MPR during the past 40 years or so had compelled the Western world to revise its whole attitude to Mongolian studies. These were no longer a subsidiary branch of Sinology, and Mongolia herself was ceasing to be treated as a quaint anachronism of no relevance in the conditions of today.

This was all to the good so far as it went; but the new approach was more often than not vitiated by the ideological prejudice of those making it. Again and again a technically accomplished piece of research had been spoiled by its author's lapse into propaganda.

In elaboration of this argument Gol'man proceeded to discuss the work of the leading Western authorities, concentrating particularly on Murphy, Bawden, Rupen, Ballis, Ginsburg and (last but very far from least) Lattimore. Journalism—*publitsistika* in his terminology—clearly interested him less, but he devoted occasional sentences to D. Raymond, a former Moscow correspondent of *The New York Times*, and to Harrison Salisbury, assistant managing editor of that paper and author of *To Moscow and Beyond. A Reporter's Narrative. The Christian Science Monitor, The Times*, several other British dailies, and periodicals such as *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *Eastern World* were cited, chiefly in illustration of Western thinking in regard to Mongolia's admission to the United Nations Organization and her diplomatic recognition by the capitalist countries.

It is proposed in the next few paragraphs to say no more about Gol'man's rather insipid and in any event limited attention to the journalists, but to convey the gist of his comments (occupying 90 per cent of his text) on the specialists. These will be taken up in Gol'man's own order, and it will be understood that the critical comment is in all cases his.

**G. Murphy.** "The Mongolian People's Republic: A Dual Economy" (the title of a paper presented to the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists at Moscow) purported to prove the inherent subservience of the Mongolian economy to that of the Soviet Union. Both the nascent industrial sector and the broad but backward agricultural sector are, according to Murphy, directed and controlled by the wants of the USSR. He chose to ignore alike the rapid growth of contemporary industry in the MPR (nowadays providing over 40 per cent of the total gross output of the national economy) and the enormous scale of national capital investment. He deliberately shut his eyes to the difference in principle there is between the capitalist exploitation of the developing countries and the mutually advantageous co-operation of socialist states enjoying equal rights. "In the guise of abstract theorizing supported by carefully adjusted columns of figures, the worn-out nonsense about Soviet economic imperialism, the Soviet empire, and so forth is dragged through Murphy's whole address."

**C. Bawden.** What the economist Murphy refused to see was quite plain to Bawden, the philologist-historian. His detailed survey "Economic Advance in Mongolia" painted an objective picture of the achievements of the Mongolian people, and arrived at correct conclusions on the revolutionary character of the reforms, on the conversion of the MPR into an agrarian-industrial state, and on the great significance of the victory of the co-operative system.

**R. Rupen.** There was nothing objective about the 20-page synopsis called "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960". Because they are forced on his notice Rupen recorded many of the economic and cultural achievements, but in doing so belittled their importance and stooped to calumny and insinuation.

**W. B. Ballis.** In his "Historical Perspectives on the Formation and Development of the Mongolian People's Republic"—read as an address at the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists—this writer offered a superficial account, indeed a bare catalogue, of the political happenings he was supposed to be interpreting. His accent was on the MPR's liaison with the Comintern, on the coping with counter revolutionary conspiracies and risings, and on changes in the Party and Government leadership. In the recital of these there was gross hyperbole, and errors of fact abounded: worse, there was no attempt at any analysis, and a shaky knowledge of the sources robbed the whole paper of the slightest scientific value. This need astonish nobody; for the "original work" in question was merely a rehash of the author's malignant article "The Political Evolution of a Soviet Satellite" which came out in the *Western Political Quarterly* in 1956.

**G. Ginsburg.** The lengthy article in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 1961, entitled "Local Government in the Mongolian People's Republic, 1940-1960" was notable for its reliance on primary sources and for its familiarity with Soviet literature on the subject. This material would logically have compelled Ginsburg to conclusions which he did not relish—and so he abandoned logic. The result was that his central thesis, viz. the participation of the masses in the direct management of the state, was left hanging in the air; while he advanced conclusions which the evidence adduced simply precluded. This logical flaw in an otherwise laudable study betrayed the author's anxiety engendered by his realization that the reforms in local government were the expression of "a really violent political and economic hurricane" which would not stop short of the complete building of socialism and communism.

**O. Lattimore.** The loud (*bronskiy*) title of this author's latest work, *Nomads and Commissars*, suggested a pot-boiler rather than the measured and painstaking outline of modern history which in fact it is. The book explained the basic problems which have attended Mongolia's progress from 1911 until our day. Such cardinal matters as the sources and character of the revolution of 1921, and the unfolding of home and foreign policy since then, were treated objectively and sympathetically.

Discussing Mongolia's position in the Far East and Central Asia setting, Lattimore singled out the USSR-MPR relationship as the main factor determining the fate of the Mongolian people; emphasizing that the intimate bond of unity with Russia was fraught with untold benefit and advantage. But this union, he insisted, was one between peoples and not just a bargain (*sdelka*) between politicians: Mongolia is not a satellite. For sincerity, for an escape from the current of bourgeois historiography, this book could be awarded high marks.

However, it contained blemishes and mistakes of which some should be noted: (a) It is totally wrong to regard, as Lattimore did, the 1921 revolution as proceeding initially from hazy notions on the need to modernize the old society. Actually the MPR was from the very start guided by Lenin's doctrine on the non-capitalist path of development, and the first steps taken by popular authority were typical of a class struggle. (b) Lattimore was mistaken in asserting that the issues of "irreversibility", of building socialism, and of orientation on the Soviet Union were settled only in the thirties after the rout of "the right deviationists". In fact the ties with the USSR date back to the first day of victory: whereas the issue of building socialism was not determined till the years 1940-45. (c) Into the special USSR-MPR relationship Lattimore imported a theory which we categorically reject: that of "succession", meaning that Mongolia acquiesced in Soviet superintendence in lieu of Great Power paramountcy as "the lesser evil". Life itself, the whole story of the brotherly friendship of the peoples of the socialist countries, will give the lie to that. Lattimore grasped only the subjective factors in the relationship (i.e. the correct choice, the sympathy, etc.) and forgot what was fundamental, viz. its objective conformity with the natural historical process (*zakonomernost'*). (d) Lattimore has no conception of what is meant by the non-capitalist way of development, and allowed the possibility of a solution of the Mongolian social contradiction otherwise than by the way of socialism. (e) Finally, he showed himself unready, having broken with the bourgeois school, to cross over to Marxism; and hence "a certain duplicity" informed his entire book.

In *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 4 of 1966, G. S. Matveyeva wrote on "The Experience of Forming the Working-Class in the Mongolian People's Republic". The style and content of this piece ran so true to form that the practised reader could in many passages anticipate both the substance and the wording. Although the text was generously sprinkled with dates and facts, Matveyeva's principal concern was to fit the "experience" into its ideological frame. This led her into some rather ponderous preaching and a great deal of relentless repetition.

The creation of a socialist structure, Matveyeva said, and the formation of a national working-class are two inseparably connected, mutually conditioned *zakonomernosti* of development in countries that have freed themselves from colonialism. More accurately put, it is the

socialist structure that engenders the working-class, and the working-class in its turn evolves and brings to victorious conclusion the battle for the establishment of socialistic relations in production.

The experience of the MPR demonstrated that the creation of a socialist economy could proceed side by side with the tackling of urgent democratic tasks. The squeezing out of foreign capital was made possible by new forms of production and trade. Such a democratic measure as the liquidation of the economic dominance of the feudal class by confiscation of livestock and transfer of this to the poor *arats*, created the conditions favouring an *arat* husbandry which could supply Mongolian industry with raw material. The upsurge of that husbandry furthered the growth of industrial production and enlarged the range of industrial enterprise.

One of the peculiarities of the Mongolian case was the absence of the class antipode to the proletariat—that is, a national bourgeoisie. This peculiarity led to a second. Mongolia, spared the task of eliminating national capital, had to forestall its emergence.

The manpower on which a nascent working-class could alone draw was the peasantry in the *batrak*-middle peasant stratum; and when it came into being it was practically undemarcated from the class of its origin. This weakness persisted for a long time and delayed the emergence of a proletariat organized on proper lines.

S. K. Roshchin on “the National Income of the Mongolian People's Republic”, in *Kratkiye Soobshcheniya Inst N.A.*, No. 76 of 1965, was lucid as well as informative. In discussing the sources, the growth over the years and the distribution of that income, his purpose was to prove the immense advantages that have rewarded the choice of socialism by the Mongolian people in 1921. The score, so to speak, had to be entered up at appropriate intervals in exuberant enough phrases but the account was otherwise businesslike and dispassionate. It is worth mentioning this because those adjectives are too seldom applicable to Soviet economic writing on the MPR.

Citing the figures of Academician I. M. Mayskiy, the author first recalled the 1918 conditions when 90 per cent of the national income represented the yield from cattle-breeding conducted on old-fashioned lines. What little came in was dissipated unproductively, and the initial problem which confronted the revolutionary party in 1921 was how to tap the country's potential. A gradual improvement in the method of livestock raising coupled with some cautious ventures into the industrial domain found reflection in 1927, by which time the national income had not only been raised significantly but had undergone structural changes. The proceeds from cattle-breeding at 58 per cent still topped the statistical column, but competitors, notably the carrying trade and commerce, were creeping up. Two tiny items, industry and building, were just worth putting on paper. From that year onwards,

Roshchin continued, the conversion of a stagnant cattle raising society into an agrarian-industrial community gathered progressive impetus.

With effect from 1957 the Gosplan and the Finance Ministry had between them been working on the National Income as expressed both in branches and in sectors of the economy, and the central statistical bureau had been regularly publishing the resultant information. The next part of the article was a close analysis of this published material relating to the years 1957-60.<sup>1</sup> A few of the features which Roshchin considered to be salient can be noticed :

The 1959 structure "by branches" showed agriculture subdivided into cattle-breeding and farming. The comprehensive heading accounted for 36.6 per cent of the national income and the two subdivisions 29.9 per cent and 6.7 per cent respectively. Industry accounted for 13.3 per cent, building for 8.7 per cent and commerce for 31.1 per cent of the total. Cattle raising was still the occupation of as much as 64 per cent of the populace, but it was supplying the industrial enterprises with most of their required raw material. In this sense it was co-operating with, and not holding out against, industry. Its technical level, however, still left much to be desired.

The 1959 structure "by sectors" showed the State sector share in the national income as 52.3 per cent, that of the co-operative sector as 21.8 per cent and that of private *arat* husbandry as 17.6 per cent. (The combined shares of the first two were to rise by the end of 1965 to 95.7 per cent, the writer commented in this place.)

In the concluding portion of his article Roshchin examined the use to which national income was put, explaining how it went into two funds—the accumulation fund (*fond nakopleniya*) accounting for a quarter of the whole, and the consumption fund (*fond potrebleniya*). An elaborate table spanning the period 1945-60 illustrated the sums, in millions of *tugriks*, invested in the different "branches" of the economy. Industry had absorbed an annual average of one-quarter of the aggregate thus placed, so that the table bore graphic testimony to the degree of transformation attained.

A 28-page tour of the Asian horizon performed by Ya. M. Seryy in *Trudy Sagu*, 1958,<sup>2</sup> entitled "Great October and the Countries of Socialism in Asia", had a self-contained section on Mongolia. In a fast moving narrative the writer related how a territory the size of England, Germany, France and Italy put together, but thinly peopled by 650,000 souls, had been a prey to the greed of Russia and Japan, and even of the USA and Great Britain. At the beginning of the century the *arat* masses showed signs, albeit fitful, of stirring; and a bigger upheaval in 1911 drove the Manchu Governor and his officials headlong from their posts. The autonomous theocratic state which resulted was in

<sup>1</sup> Presumably the more recent figures were not available. The whole of this otherwise valuable analysis was marred by the time lag.

<sup>2</sup> Included in this miscellany because not received until 1966.—Ed.

being in 1917, and strove to insulate Mongolia from the effects of Great October. It closed the frontier and welcomed Chinese occupying forces in the capital: which automatically put an end to autonomy. Fortunately, the example of the victory of worker and peasant in Russia was now before the eyes of the Mongolian people.

In August 1919 the Soviet Government made its famous announcement on the freedom of Mongolia; reminding the latter that all treaties with Japan and China relating to her had been repudiated, and inviting her to enter into diplomatic relations.

This announcement, the writer emphasized, while it gave encouragement to the Mongolian peasantry, scared the interventionists and led to the nomination by Peking of a High Commissioner for the pacification of Mongolia: in other words, to a foreign military regime. In November (1919) the first groups of Mongolian revolutionaries got to work and laid the foundation of the People's Party. Before many months, two separate circles operating under the printer's compositor Sukhe Bator and the telegraphist Choybolsan respectively merged and drafted the Party Oath. In the summer of 1920—the Red Army had just routed the White Guards—the two national leaders visited Irkutsk to explore the prospect of Soviet help in the forthcoming contest; and on their return began preparations for the First Congress of the Mongolian People's Party. The Congress assembled on 1 March 1921 and sounded the clarion call to the people. On 18 March a People's Revolutionary Army commanded by Sukhe Bator freed Kyakhta (now Altanbulag) from the Chinese forces. A Provisional Government was set up which appealed to Soviet Russia for assistance. This was immediately forthcoming, and units of the Red Army were soon conducting combined operations with the Mongolian troops. By 11 July the people's authority had been asserted everywhere, and this day went down in history as the date of the Mongolian Revolution. The formal inauguration of the MPR was not till November 1924.

Thanks, therefore, to Great October, said the author, Mongolia's peasantry had been saved from the fate of the peasants of those countries in which capitalist exploitation took over from feudal serfdom.

*Kommunist* in its July number, 1966, had a 15-page contribution by Mr. Tsedenbal, called "Our Course: The Completion of Socialism". Perhaps a word or two is necessary to defend the inclusion here of what on the face of it is not Soviet, but Mongolian, writing on Mongolia. The particular journal carrying it is the organ of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union CP and publishes only what the Committee wants to see in print. It may well be that no original drafting has been done by Russian pens. It is pointless to surmise about that: the point is that much of this piece, e.g. the entire section on foreign policy, is Soviet writing both in its content and in its wording.

After hailing in conventional terms the 45th anniversary of the Revolution, the Mongolian Premier devoted a first section to economic

achievement. Having rapidly recapitulated earlier successes, he came to rest on the record of the lately implemented, i.e. third, Five-Year Plan. He noted especially that the nation's electrical-energy capacity had between 1961 and 1965 been multiplied by nearly three, thus permitting the functioning of dozens of new enterprises. In the same years the great Darkhan complex had come into existence. Impressive too was the scale of "capital construction"; building work and assembly work were on the way to being doubled as against 1960. Farming had fairly established itself as the second branch of agriculture [meaning that it was now worthy to be mentioned in the same breath as cattle raising, the first branch].

The second section was on foreign policy. Here the Premier began by briefly touching on the MPR's entry into UNO (1961) and on the latest diplomatic exchanges: with Great Britain, France, Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden. He then proceeded to a three-page homily on world affairs in which both the substance and the phraseology were those of Soviet propaganda; in which his own nation (usually "together with the progressive forces of the world", or "like all the peace-loving countries") was subordinated to the socialist system as such, whose signal advantage was that each component "relied not only on its internal resources and productive capacity, but on the disinterested co-operation and brotherly support of the others."

His third section might have been headed "The Future". The Party, he said, had implemented three programmes to date: the first (1921) had dealt with the issue of independence; the second (1925) had defined the tasks belonging to the democratic stage of the revolution; and the third (1940) had contemplated the foundations of socialism. At the XVth Congress (June 1966) a fourth programme had been adopted—envisaging the complete victory of socialism. It was in three parts. Part One digested the lesson of the Mongolian experience: namely, that in undeveloped countries a revolutionary democratic party of peasants and intelligentsia in concert with the international communist movement *can* apprehend the ideas of scientific socialism and become the *avant garde* of the masses in the struggle towards it. Part Two (which contained the meat) provided for the culmination of the building of socialism; the full conversion of the MPR into an industrial-agrarian state being expected by the end of the seventies. Part Three laid down the lines of foreign policy in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

## II. LITERARY STUDIES

Out of five articles, in length from 1,850 words, two were selected:

N. P. Shastina summarized and assessed the Soviet and Soviet sponsored contribution to the study of Mongolian history in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 of 1967. Her exhaustive survey "The Study of the History of Mongolia [undertaken] after [Great] October" distinguished

the two separate currents of study into which the historians had been drawn: there was first the study occasioned by the events in Mongolia from 1921 onwards—the study of “the new problematic” as she expressed it; and there was secondly the revision of the old idealistic approaches to ancient and medieval Mongolia necessitated by the new materialistic understanding of the historical process as such.

Only by compressing her 15 crowded and amply annotated pages into a tabloid can the scope of her criticism be suggested.

- (1) I. M. Mayskiy: *Contemporary Mongolia*, Irkutsk, 1921; Revised shorter edition under the title, *Mongolia on the Eve of Revolution*, M., 1959 (reviewed in CAR, No. 4, 1966, pp. 356–7).

Applying a materialist understanding of history to a practical acquaintance with the country, Mayskiy was able to present an accurate picture of Autonomous Mongolia, its formation, politics and daily life. His interpretation was marred by his so-called “pasture theory” in which he imagined he had found the driving force of Mongolian history. He later amended his view, and consequently in the second edition dropped much of the chapter on the political past of Autonomous Mongolia.

- (2) A. D. Kallinnikov: *Revolutionary Mongolia*, M., (no year); *National Revolutionary Movement in Mongolia*, M.–L., 1926; *Agrarian Relations and the Anti-feudal Agrarian Revolution in Mongolia*, M., 1933.

This junior colleague and disciple of Mayskiy was primarily interested in agrarian relations and his excursions into history were unhappy. Seeing in the rise and fall of the Nomad Empires merely the operation of the “pasture theory” he took no account of the class character of the nomad states, the propensity of the aristocracy to plunder those weaker than themselves, and the absence in nomadic society of the production of many vital requirements.

- (3) G. Ye. Grumm-Grzhimaylo: *Western Mongolia and the Uryan Khayskiy Kray*, L., 1926.

This talented scholar was responsible for the first comprehensive history of Mongolia to be published in the Russian language. Though hampered by the lack of archaeological evidence since available, he was enabled by his phenomenal learning to compose his canvas to striking effect. His chief weakness was his incurably idealistic thinking and his mistaken assessment of the role of personality in history: witness his glowing portrait of Chingis Khan. Also, knowing neither Chinese nor Mongolian he was cut off from the primary sources of study. His work, undeniably great in one sense, was in comparison, say, with Bartol'd's,<sup>3</sup> a step backwards.

<sup>3</sup> Bartol'd was excluded from the list himself presumably because his Mongolian studies were not considered to be *posle Oktyabrya*, “post-October”.

- (4) B. Ya. Vladimirtsov: *Chingis Khan*, M., 1922; *The Social System of the Mongols: Mongol Nomad Feudalism*, L., 1934.

In the earlier work this historian of international repute was ideologically unsound, and his portrayal of "the strong personality" was rightly taken to pieces by Bartol'd. The second work, published posthumously, was his capital achievement. In this he viewed the historical process from the materialistic, and very nearly Marxist, position. It was the first time that the structure of medieval Mongol society had been convincingly presented. Directing his research to the original sources, namely Rashiduddin, he established the presence of the two disparate groups—the forest tribes and the steppe tribes; and only after proving the economic basis of each did he proceed to his description of the system defined by him as *rodovoy stroy* [the clan/tribal structure] which prevailed among the Mongols in the 12th century and which changed into a feudal system in the 13th. The book was a dazzling performance which influenced the course not only of Mongolian studies but of the whole study of the East. Its very brilliance perhaps blinded its readers to certain defects, the principal of which was its author's exaggeration of the degree of development of feudal relations among the Mongols.

- (5) S. A. Kozin: *The Secret Story. A Mongolian Chronicle of 1240*. Introduction, Translation, Text and Glossaries. M.-L., 1941.

With Vladimirtsov a stage had been completed, and the scholars asked themselves where they should go next. The reply was that more material had henceforward to be gathered: the primary sources, in Mongolian, in Chinese, in Persian had now to be sounded to their depths. The call was for explanation of the old texts, with or without translation. Kozin answered it with his up-to-date edition of *Sokrovennoye Skazaniye*. (The two supplementary volumes with which he had intended to round off his massive study of this classic did not come out.)

- (6) Ts. Zh. Zhamtsarano: *The Mongol Chronicles of the XVIII Century*, M.-L., 1936.

A slight change of direction from straight translation to analysis of the original material was effected by Zhamtsarano. His interpretation of the chronicles was a signal contribution to Mongolian studies in the later thirties.

- (7) L. S. Puchkovskiy: *Mongol, Buryat-Mongol and Oyrat MSS and Xylographs*, M.-L., 1957; *Gombodzhab, Ganga-yin uruskhal*. Text, Introduction and Index. M., 1966.

Reckoning from Kozin's *Sokrovennoye Skazaniye* (1941) a lull of 16 years preceded the appearance of Puchkovskiy's valuable description of 27 Mongol, 12 Buryat and 4 Oyrat historical compositions. This same scholar last year published the text of an 18th century chronicle of Taydzhi Gombodzhab.

- (8) N. P. Shastina: "*Shara Tudzhi*". *A Mongol Chronicle of the 17th Century*. Summary text, Translation, Introduction and Notes. M.-L., 1957.

A further modification of method was exemplified by Shastina's edition of *Shara Tudzhi*; the text now edited being the gist of the original accompanied by a full translation of the abridgment. This work has been followed<sup>4</sup> by a translation with commentary of the 17th century chronicle of Lubsan Danzan which, containing as it does a retelling of the *Sokrovennoye Skazaniye* and the texts of several epics dating back to the 13th century, ranks as a primary source for the study of the medieval literature of the Mongols.

- (9) B. D. Grekov and A. Yu. Yakubovskiy: *The Golden Horde*, M.-L., 1937; 2nd edition, 1941; revised and enlarged as, *The Golden Horde and its Fall*, M.-L. 1950.

Individual chapters in Mongol history likewise came under the lens of scholarship. Noteworthy here was the study of the Golden Horde by Grekov and Yakubovskiy. Relying on oriental in preference to Western material they proved beyond a shadow of doubt that it was an artificial formation, a parasitic growth; and that its decline and fall were brought about not so much by strife among pretenders to the succession as by the progressive development of the subjugated peoples, and of the Russian people most of all. In endorsement of these findings A. N. Nasonov was independently demonstrating from the Russian chronicles the crushing burden of taxation borne under Mongol-Tatar rule; while N. Ts. Munkuyev, expounding the Chinese sources, proved a degree of exploitation just as cruel. It only remained for I. P. Petrushevskiy, working on the policy of the Mongol Il-khans *vis-à-vis* Iran and Afghanistan, to complete the dark picture. By incontrovertible documentation they had between them destroyed the favourable image of the Mongol conquerors presented by bourgeois historiography.

- (10) I. Ya. Zlatkin: *The Mongolian People's Republic*, M., 1950; *Outline History of Modern Mongolia*, M., 1957; *History of the Dzhungar Khanate (1635-1758)*, M., 1964.

The energies of this scholar have been drawn into each of the two currents of study defined in the opening paragraph above. He has given a systematic appreciation of the national liberation movement, the 1921 revolution, and the contemporary period. But also he has brilliantly reconstructed, on the strength of the documents in the Russian archives, the political and social history of the Dzhungars, i.e. the Oyrats. (*N.B.* His view that landed property was the sole economic basis of feudal relations in the nomadic society cannot be accepted. The herd *together* with land constituted the means of production, and the two cannot be divorced.)

<sup>4</sup> The work was still in the press, and its exact title was not given.

- (11) S. K. Roshchin: *The Socialistic Ingredient in the Economy of the Mongolian People's Republic*, M., 1958. Sh. Natsagdorzhi: *History of the Arat Movement in Outer Mongolia*, M., 1958.  
 L. M. Gamaullina: *The Mongolian People's Republic in the Socialist Commonwealth*, M., 1964.  
 B. Shirendyb: *The People's Revolution in Mongolia and the Formation of the Mongolian People's Revolution 1921-1924*, M., 1956.

This eleventh and last heading reveals that the MPR now has its national school of historians whose members are helping to swell the "post-October" tide of Mongolian studies published in the Soviet Union.

Since its foundation in 1961 the MPR Academy of Sciences has done much to foster a "Mong. Lit." attitude both to the classical authors and to the contemporary practitioners of literature. A concise account of the academic study of the nation's literature performed over the past five years was furnished by D. Tsend ("Literaturo-vedeniye v. MNR, 1961-1966") in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 of 1967.

Some 50 publications were listed (under their Mongolian titles) classified by areas of specialization: (a) ancient and medieval literature, including editions of the old texts, commentaries, translations; (b) modern literature studies embracing "tradition and innovation", "the novel", "poetry today", and the like; (c) "oral" literature; (d) folklore.

The article, originally written in Mongolian, had been put into Russian by N. Ts. Munkuyev.

### III. ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY

From six articles varying from 200 to 5,000 words, the following one was chosen:

The results of a Soviet-Mongolian archaeological expedition in 1966 was reported by A. P. Okladnikov, a member of the joint party, in *Vestnik*, No. 1, 1967. The subject was rock painting, and the heading of the report was "A Central Asian Home of Prehistoric Art". The presence of wall pictures in the Mankhan Somon neighbourhood of western Mongolia had already been intimated by a geologist named Namran Dorzh (as also by a Czech traveller, Pavel Powcha, in 1957), and the expedition, using their directions, arrived without trouble at the Khoyt-Tsenker Aguy—*aguy* being "cave" in Mongolian.

In the initial pages Okladnikov gave a detailed description of the surroundings, noting that the *aguy* was a real cave, not a grotto. He proceeded to describe the remarkable gallery of paintings discovered within, "remote from the prying or hostile eye". The figures, reddish, yellowish or pinkish in colour, were of animals—the ox, camel, deer, mountain-goat, and ostrich among them. Three colour plates and eight line drawings which illustrated his letterpress showed the astonishing standard of realism the artists had attained.

In the remainder of his report Okladnikov discussed the discoveries in relation to the other known rock paintings of Central Asia, assigned them to their period, and suggested their place among examples of prehistoric art in general. On the first point he observed that the Khoyt-Tsenker pictures were unique in being in the interior of a cave, but that there were otherwise obvious parallels between them and the discoveries made in Soviet Central Asia, notably the Pamirs and Kirgiziya, and in Siberia. It was arguable, however, that these new "Mankhan" finds were superior in artistry and technique.

Coming to the date, the stylistic and technical resemblances to the wall paintings of France and Spain left no doubt in Okladnikov's mind that this west Mongolian gallery with its typical avoidance of the human form but its clever and vivid portrayal of animal life was contemporaneous with those famous examples of the art of the Palaeolithic period.

Thirdly, Khoyt Tsenker—now qualifying as the oldest artistic monument of Central Asia—had become a link in what might well prove an encircling chain binding regions of the globe, in terms of art, in a manner unimaginable until quite recently.

#### IV. TRAVEL

Of seven articles conveying the impressions of the modern Russian traveller, and varying in length from 650 to over 13,500 words, several were only slightly less ephemeral than the tour notes which the special correspondents of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* every so often send home for want of anything better to report. However, there was one that had a discursive charm and a style sufficiently fluent to atone for what, at nearly 14,000 words, would surely have seemed inordinate length.

"Under the Sky of Mongolia" by A. Pobozhiy in *Novyy Mir*, No. 8 of 1967, was the personal diary of a railway engineer on his second assignment to the country after an interval of 30 years. Some of the descriptive passages were hackneyed enough: Ulan Bator, with its broad thoroughfares, European architecture, lamp-posts and motor-buses, astounds the visitor because not a single camel is to be seen; Darkhan, the industrial city that has mushroomed overnight, is the "smithy of New Mongolia"; and so forth. But there were others to compensate: the panorama of a great lake in the distance was painted with artistry, the cruelty of the Gobi Desert "patchy with its tufts of stunted, stiff grass" was captured with power.

There was no avalanche of ideological clichés; the accent was on the home life, not the political consciousness of the individual. The Chinese came into it only once, nor was there more than one allusion to their country. In the one passage the author, on his way to the Altay Hotel in the capital, comes across "some mean, ramshackle stalls, the Chinese market"; at each of them a couple of Chinese

hopeful of custom—"vegetables, vegetables, and again vegetables". In the other (the context being the railway linking the MPR with China) a Mongolian acquaintance is the speaker: "Your people constructed it—then went off home. There were trains galore to begin with, back in 1957, handling the transit goods moving to and fro between the USSR and China. And look at it now—a train, or at most two, in the twenty-four hours."

## WOMEN IN UZBEKISTAN

It is just 40 years since the emancipation of the native women in Central Asia was undertaken in earnest and they were exhorted to throw off their veils. At the time this came up against considerable opposition and 203 Uzbek women were killed for abandoning the veil in 1928 and another 165 in the first half of 1929.<sup>1</sup> "Even now", as a Czech journalist who recently visited Central Asia writes, "one can still sometimes see a woman with a thick veil over her face. I once met such a woman near the collective-farm market in Samarkand. . . . Ancient traditions cannot be wholly eradicated in a few decades. But no country can be judged correctly by individual, rare instances of a dying custom."<sup>2</sup> The available evidence suggests that the veil is indeed very little worn nowadays in Central Asia and considerable progress has been made with emancipation, but, as Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay state in the chapter on "The Muslim Family" in their recent book *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London, 1967), "the factor which most distinguishes Muslim society from that of the rest of the Soviet world is probably the status of women, who after the lapse of forty years of efforts and emancipation still occupy an inferior position" (p. 189). It is true that some women of the local nationalities can be found prominent in almost all walks of life, but the usual figures quoted in Soviet sources on the important role of women in the Central Asian republics are misleading since they include Russians and other non-Muslim nationalities. When the figures are broken down by nationality they invariably show that the native women still have some way to go to catch up with their Russian opposite numbers. Judging from the Russian-language press the worst instances of what is called a "feudal-bay attitude towards women" occur in Turkmenistan, and the women of Tadzhikistan also appear to be less emancipated than the women of Uzbekistan, to whom this article is devoted.<sup>3</sup>

### *Birth and schooldays*

There is some evidence that the indigenous nationalities of Uzbekistan look with more favour now on the birth of a girl. According to an elderly Uzbek, father of five daughters, "the saying 'a girl-child is a misfortune' has forever gone out of our lives",<sup>4</sup> and a study of the

<sup>1</sup> Sharafutdinova R., "Torzhestvo leninskikh idey ravnopraviya zhenshchin v SSSR", *ONU (Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane)*, 1963, No. 3, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Radoslav Selucky, "A Land Transformed", *New Times*, 1967, No. 44, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> For an earlier article on women in Uzbekistan see CAR, Vol. I, 1953, No. 3, pp. 47-53. See also "Family Life in the Kolkhozes of Uzbekistan" in CAR, Vol. IX, 1961, No. 1, pp. 16-23, based on M. A. Bikzhanova's *Sem'ya v kolkhozakh Uzbekistana* (Tashkent, 1959).

<sup>4</sup> PV, 19.12.67.

workers of Margelan is said to have shown that, whereas formerly a family would hold celebrations mainly only on the birth of a boy, the birth of a girl is now also celebrated.<sup>5</sup>

Eight years of schooling is compulsory in the Soviet Union. The attendance of girls of the local nationalities in Uzbekistan seems to be reasonably satisfactory in the junior classes (some elementary education was provided for girls even before the Revolution), but there are still a number of parents who are unwilling to let their daughters continue their schooling once they reach adolescence, and this leads to a fairly high drop-out rate in the senior classes, particularly in the rural areas. Usually the girls are forced to leave because their parents want to marry them off, although they are below the legal age (18) for marriage, but sometimes they seem to be simply sent to work, to judge from a report that in one kolkhoz in Tashkent oblast the drop-out rate had decreased after a decision had been taken not to allow girls of school age who had abandoned their studies to work in the kolkhoz.<sup>6</sup> There has been some improvement in recent years (the Party secretary of a kolkhoz in Naman-gan rayon claimed that all the kolkhoz girls attended school, but only as a result of a lot of patient work with them and their parents to persuade them that marriage could wait<sup>7</sup>), but the drop-out of girls of the local nationalities in the senior classes is still a serious problem. In 1966 it was stated that every year over 40,000 children in Uzbekistan aged between 8 and 15, many of them girls of the local nationality, failed to attend school.<sup>8</sup>

Often no action seems to be taken to make parents send their daughters to school. This is hardly surprising as the teachers themselves are not always above reproach. It is not unknown for a teacher to marry one of his under-age pupils, and at a plenum of the Uzbek Central Committee in July 1963 the Uzbek First Secretary, Sh. Rashidov, quoted the case of Tulepov, a teacher in an eight-year school in the Chimbay rayon of the Karakalpak ASSR who for four years refused to let his daughter attend school. Moreover, the other teachers did nothing about it.<sup>9</sup>

### *Further and higher education*

The number of women students of the local nationalities attending VUZ and tekhnikums is increasing all the time. At the beginning of the 1960/61 academic year there were 12,184 Uzbek women and 326 Karakalpak women attending the VUZ of Uzbekistan, 8,062 and 250 respectively on a full-time basis. But the gap between the local

<sup>5</sup> Kurbangaliyeva R., "Nekotoryye storony byta rabochikh g. Margilana", *ONU*, 1965, No. 9, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> Mirkhasilov S., "K voprosu o roste kul'tury kolkhoznikov Tashkentskoy oblasti", *ONU*, 1963, No. 7, p. 47.

<sup>7</sup> PV, 7.9.65.

<sup>8</sup> PV, 10.8.66.

<sup>9</sup> PV, 13.7.63.

nationalities and the Russians can be seen from the fact that in the same year there were 14,250 Russian women students (6,201 full-time) at Uzbek VUZ,<sup>10</sup> although there are at least four times fewer Russians in Uzbekistan than Uzbeks. While women accounted for over half (54.2 per cent) of the Russians attending Uzbek VUZ (which include teacher training institutes), they made up only a quarter (25.5 per cent) of the Uzbek students and 18.7 per cent of the Karakalpak students.<sup>11</sup> The situation is similar in secondary specialized educational institutions. A large number of the native women go in for teaching and medicine, and few of them show an interest in subjects with an industrial or agricultural application.

Such evidence as there is suggests that relatively few barriers are put in the way of the daughters of urban Uzbek families who wish to continue their education, but strong prejudices still exist among the rural population, particularly as attendance at most of the higher or further education institutions involves living away from home. Thus in 1959 in proportion to the population there were at least 25 times fewer Uzbek women students from the rural areas than from the towns in the VUZ and tekhnikumov of the Uzbek SSR.<sup>12</sup> Occasionally instances are reported in the press of girls who wish to continue their studies but are being forcibly prevented by their parents or relatives. In a sovkhos in Chimbay rayon one girl was only able to study at a pedagogical institute after the local Council of Atheists intervened and prevented her forcible marriage to a man from whom her parents had already accepted kalym.<sup>13</sup> Another girl living in Tashkent oblast, not far from Tashkent itself, only got her own way after appealing to *Pravda vostoka*. She had managed to attend the first year of her course to become a nursery-school teacher in spite of the constant scenes her mother made and her parents' refusal to give her her bus fares and buy her any clothes. But when she had rejected an arranged match with her cousin and announced that, as it was too far to travel daily to the college's new address, she was moving into its hostel, her parents had hidden all her belongings and locked her in the house.<sup>14</sup>

### *Employment and public life*

At first sight it might appear that women play an unusually large role in the public life of Uzbekistan since their representation in republican and local soviets is impressive. Thus 30.8 per cent of the deputies to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet in 1967<sup>15</sup> and 44.1 per cent of the deputies to the local soviets elected in 1965 were women,<sup>16</sup> a large number

<sup>10</sup> *Vysshye obrazovaniye v SSSR*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 134-5.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Valiyev A. K. *Formirovaniye i razvitiye sovetsskoy natsional'noy intelligentsii v Sredney Azii*, Tashkent, 1966, p. 135. The generally lower standard of the tuition in rural schools also affects the intake of students from rural areas.

<sup>13</sup> Iyatullin P., "Sovet ateistov", *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, 1965, No. 5, pp. 60-61.

<sup>14</sup> PV, 14.12.66.

<sup>15</sup> PV, 14.4.67.

<sup>16</sup> *Vestnik statistiki*, 1966, No. 1, p. 88.

belonging to the local nationalities. Women of the local nationalities are also well-represented on such bodies as the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet. But deputies to the soviets wield very little real power and their selection is more a matter of Party policy than popular choice. There is one native woman in the Uzbek Council of Ministers (the Minister of Social Security), and native women hold the posts of Chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet and First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Komsomol. Though these women may be extremely competent, one wonders whether they would have been the natural choice for the post, were it not the policy of the Soviet Government to make a show of the equality of women. The situation in the Uzbekistan Communist Party is similar to that in the soviets.

Native women can be found holding responsible posts in virtually every profession. There are prominent Uzbek and Karakalpak women scholars and scientists, and Uzbek women factory and sovkhos directors and kolkhoz chairmen. On 15 November 1964 a total of 18,700 Uzbek women with higher and 20,900 with specialized secondary education were employed in the economy of the USSR as a whole, and the figures for Karakalpak women were 400 and 600 respectively.<sup>17</sup> But at the same date women made up only 26 per cent of the Uzbek specialists with higher education and 14 per cent of the Karakalpak against 58 per cent of the Russian,<sup>18</sup> and in Uzbekistan itself Uzbeks must have formed well under 30 per cent of the women specialists. Even though native women favour the medical and teaching professions, the number actually going in for them is comparatively small. It is particularly noticeable that among the indigenous population teaching is a predominantly male occupation, while among the Russians it is overwhelmingly female. From a list of awards to teachers and local education officials in Uzbekistan it would seem that only about one in three of the native teachers are women.<sup>19</sup> Similarly in medicine and pharmacy, where women greatly outnumber men among the Russians, in Uzbekistan it appears that the sexes are about evenly balanced among the local population.<sup>20</sup> In 1965 only 74 per cent of those employed in the health field and 51 per cent in education in Uzbekistan were women, compared with 86 and 71 per cent in the USSR as a whole.<sup>21</sup>

Although women do not constitute as high a percentage of workers and employees in Uzbekistan as in the USSR as a whole (41 per cent against 49 per cent in 1965<sup>22</sup>), their contribution is impressive. But, while in some branches of the Uzbekistan economy the percentage of women in the labour force is close to the all-Union average, in others there are very marked differences. This largely reflects the extent to

<sup>17</sup> *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1965 g.*, Moscow, 1966, p. 582.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> PV, 12-14.10.66.

<sup>20</sup> PV, 10.12.66.

<sup>21</sup> *Narodnoye khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1965 g.*, Tashkent, 1966, p. 258;

*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1965 g.*, Moscow, 1966, p. 564.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 565.

which native women are employed in different fields. The number in industry is quite high. Out of a total of about half a million people employed in industry in Uzbekistan about 200,000 are said to be Uzbeks, and of these nearly 80,000,<sup>23</sup> or getting on for 40 per cent, are women. Most of the indigenous women seem to be employed in the textile or other light and food industries where the labour force is predominantly female. The Muslim male is obviously not so opposed to his womenfolk working in the comparative seclusion of factories employing mainly women as he is to their working in, say, the retail trade, where they would constantly come into contact with both sexes. At a recent meeting of the Bukhara obkom bureau it was noted that in Bukhara oblast in the retail trade, catering and service undertakings and other sectors, where female labour is most appropriate, mainly men work.<sup>24</sup> And in the republic as a whole in 1965 women of all nationalities constituted only about 40 per cent of the labour force in trade and the communal economy compared with 72 per cent in the USSR as a whole.<sup>25</sup>

Although a considerable number of women of the indigenous nationalities are in employment, the authorities consider that too many devote themselves entirely to housework and their personal plot. In Bukhara oblast it is said that thousands of women and girls still do not take part in socially useful work, although there is a great shortage of hands in the textile and construction industries and on the farms.<sup>26</sup> The main reasons are lack of crèches and kindergartens and a "feudal-bay attitude" towards women. In 1965-66, 50 housewives in Bukhara (35 Uzbeks, 10 Tadzhiks and five Tatars) aged 20 to 54, with one to 10 children and on the whole limited education, were asked why they did not work. The need to look after their children was cited by 28 per cent, no financial need by 16 per cent, and husband's objections by another 16 per cent. This latter reason was given by only four per cent of those questioned in a similar investigation in Leningrad. Most of the women questioned in Bukhara said they would work if the obstacles were removed, and a majority of 50 male workers interviewed are said to have been in favour of their wives working.<sup>27</sup> But a recent article stressed that to get more Uzbek women into industry national traditions must be taken into account.<sup>28</sup>

The majority of the indigenous population live in the rural areas, and here women have always formed a high proportion of the labour force and still do. In 1964, 52 per cent of those who worked in the public sector in the kolkhozes of Uzbekistan were women compared with

<sup>23</sup> Galkin V., Ziyadullayev N., "Trudovyye resursy i razvitiye legkoy promyshlennosti", *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, 1967, No. 11, p. 52.

<sup>24</sup> "O rabote sredi zhenshchin", *Partiyaya zhizn'*, 1967, No. 6, pp. 55-56.

<sup>25</sup> *Narodnoye khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1965 g.*, Tashkent, 1966, p. 258; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1965 g.*, Moscow, 1966, p. 564.

<sup>26</sup> "O rabote sredi zhenshchin", *Partiyaya zhizn'*, 1967, No. 6, pp. 55-56.

<sup>27</sup> Vafayev O., "K voprosu dal'neyshego uluchsheniya sotsial'no-bytovykh usloviy zhizni zhenshchin", *ONU*, 1967, No. 9, pp. 34-37.

<sup>28</sup> Galkin V., Ziyadullayev N., op. cit., p. 52.

an all-Union average of 55 per cent.<sup>29</sup> But the women are mainly employed seasonally on such unskilled and laborious jobs as cotton picking. A few outstanding women have become kolkhoz or village soviet chairmen and seem to manage to combine rearing as many as 10 children with their official duties as well as being a deputy to the republican Supreme Soviet. But on the whole the press complains that there are very few native women in positions of responsibility on the farms. In Bukhara oblast in 1966 only two out of 109 kolkhoz chairmen were women and in one rayon of the oblast there were only 10 women among 263 brigade leaders.<sup>30</sup> A woman brigade leader in a kolkhoz in Andizhan oblast complained recently that, although women were in a majority in cotton-growing and other spheres in the kolkhoz, very few held responsible posts. Only two of the brigade leaders were women, and all the office staff and timekeepers were men.<sup>31</sup> A writer, driving out of Kokand on a Sunday morning in April 1964, remarked how only women could be seen in the fields, as all the men had gone off to the Sunday bazaar, and this despite years of trying to change the situation. "Bazaar day comes—and the Uzbek male gets on his bike. 'Let the women work!'"<sup>32</sup>

In recent years there has been a campaign to train girls as cotton-harvester operators. Following the example of Tursunoy Akhunova, who was the first to drive a cotton harvester in 1959, in 1960 courses for girls were established in every oblast of Uzbekistan and 1,160 completed courses against a planned 1,000.<sup>33</sup> But the campaign met with resistance from the beginning. The plans for training girls to operate agricultural machinery were already lagging in some oblasts in 1961. In Tashkent oblast only 2,136 were trained instead of the planned 2,500, and in Bukhara oblast only 206 did short tractor-driver courses instead of the planned 500. Moreover, there were complaints that not all the girls who had completed courses were allowed to work on cotton-harvesters. One husband abandoned his wife and two children when she announced that she was going to switch from being a bookkeeper to a machine operator, and another girl in Fergana oblast was driven out of the house with her two-year-old daughter by her own father, but she went ahead with her plans.<sup>34</sup> The training of girls to operate agricultural machinery has continued since then, and in 1967 "hundreds and thousands" of women in Uzbekistan were at the wheel of cotton harvesters.<sup>35</sup> Some have achieved outstanding results, while others have refused to give up their profession on marriage and instead have persuaded their husbands to become agricultural machinery operators

<sup>29</sup> *Vestnik statistiki*, 1966, No. 1, p. 93.

<sup>30</sup> PV, 4.1.67.

<sup>31</sup> PV, 16.12.67.

<sup>32</sup> Viktor Vitkovich, "Dorogi, vstrechi, rasskazy", *Novyy mir*, 1966, No. 10, p. 28.

<sup>33</sup> Aliyeva A., "Zhenshchiny Uzbekistana v bor'be za pod'yem khlopkovodstva v 1956-1961 godakh", *ONU*, 1967, No. 8, pp. 55-57.

<sup>34</sup> Khasanova S., "Zhenshchiny Uzbekistana—zastrel'shchiki mashinnogo sbora khlopka", *ONU*, 1962, No. 11, pp. 21-27.

<sup>35</sup> PV, 19.12.67.

too.<sup>36</sup> In one sovkhos there are now said to be so many girls wanting to train that they cannot all get places on courses, although only two or three years ago parents had to be persuaded to let them train.<sup>37</sup> But these cases seem to be fairly atypical. In general, comparatively few girls are trained, and many who have completed courses are not allowed to make use of their new skills. In Bukhara oblast in 1966 only 63 women operated cotton-harvesters, although 193 had been trained in recent years. Farm leaders refused to give them machines on various pretexts, and Party organizations did not always stick up for the women. In two rayons of the oblast the kolkhozes had sent no girls to tekhnikums for training for three years, and in the same period only four kolkhoz women had graduated from Bukhara agricultural tekhnikum.<sup>38</sup> And all this in spite of the fact that there is such a serious shortage of trained cotton-harvester operators that crash courses have to be given to lorry-drivers and students at the beginning of the harvest.

Because of the largely seasonal nature of their work, women kolkhozniks in Uzbekistan have always tended to work fewer days a year than their menfolk. Furthermore, with increasing mechanization of agriculture and a rapidly growing rural labour force, in some areas at least there has been a marked decline in the number of days worked by both male and female kolkhozniks and also a reduction in the percentage of able-bodied women kolkhozniks participating in the public sector. In the cotton kolkhozes of Tashkent oblast, for instance, the percentage of women kolkhozniks participating in the public sector dropped from 90 in 1953 to 75.5 in 1963.<sup>39</sup> The main reasons given for women kolkhozniks not working are the same as for the indigenous women in the towns, namely lack of pre-school institutions, inadequate services and "patriarchal-feudal survivals". But, though there is a shortage of labour on some farms, and all hands are needed for the cotton harvest, an additional reason for women kolkhozniks not working is the lack of opportunities for female employment in the majority of rural settlements.<sup>40</sup>

### *Marriage and family*

It is claimed that the majority of young people of the local nationalities now marry for love, but at the same time it is quite clear from the press that arranged matches are far from being an isolated phenomenon, particularly in remote rural areas. To the man it seems to be of no matter that the girl has no affection for him,<sup>41</sup> while the girl's mother may well argue that she has been quite happy although her husband was

<sup>36</sup> PV, 1.11.66.

<sup>37</sup> PV, 10.1.67.

<sup>38</sup> PV, 4.1.67.

<sup>39</sup> Ubaydullayeva R., "Ispol'zovaniye zhenskogo truda v sel'skom khozyaystve UzSSR". *ONU*, 1966, No. 5, pp. 43-45.

<sup>40</sup> Akramov Z. M., "K voprosu o polnom i ratsional'nom izpol'zovanii trudovykh resursov v sel'skom khozyaystve Uzbekistana", *ONU*, 1966, No. 6, p. 13.

<sup>41</sup> PV, 14.12.66.

chosen for her.<sup>42</sup> One of the worst cases reported recently occurred in Surkhandar'ya oblast. An old man on his deathbed instructed that his 17-year-old daughter Dzharkin be given in marriage to a certain Ruzi Abduraimov in accordance with a long-standing agreement with the latter's father. Although Abduraimov was mentally sick, Dzharkin's mother, brother and cousin insisted on going through with the marriage. ("What will people say if we don't do what father ordered?") When some local girls protested about the match to their brigade-leader, whom they highly respected, he told them it did not concern them, only their elders. After five years of misery Dzharkin's brother and cousin realized something must be done. On the grounds that it would disgrace the family, the cousin rejected the brother's suggestion that Dzharkin should return to her mother's house, and instead they murdered Abduraimov.<sup>43</sup> Arranged matches have been given as a reason for the high proportion of divorces among young people for incompatibility, although in fact the divorce rate is comparatively low in Uzbekistan (0.5 per 1,000 population in 1965 compared with 1.6 per 1,000 population in the Soviet Union as a whole).<sup>44</sup>

As in the past a number of girls are married off under the legal age of 18. Again this is most common in rural areas. Sometimes the girl is as young as 13. If a charge is brought, usually only the groom is punished and the parents get off scot-free. The abduction of brides is also said to be still encountered in Uzbekistan,<sup>45</sup> and levirate occurs among the older generation in Karakalpakiya.<sup>46</sup>

Other factors which may prevent a girl marrying the man of her choice are insistence by the older folk on observing the taboos of endogamy or exogamy,<sup>47</sup> and the continuing prejudice against Muslim girls marrying non-Muslims. Detailed statistics are not available, but a sample study in Tashkent in 1962 showed that in the old town no Uzbek women married men of non-Muslim nationalities, whereas in the new town, where the more educated Uzbeks are likely to live, there were instances of Uzbek women marrying Russians and Ukrainians.<sup>48</sup>

Kalym is forbidden by law but, concealed or otherwise, it is often mentioned as a continuing problem. It is clear from the description of current Uzbek wedding rites by N. P. Lobacheva, reproduced in the last number of *Central Asian Review*,<sup>49</sup> that reaching agreement on the sum to be given by the groom for furniture and clothes for the bride is an

<sup>42</sup> PV, 24.1.67.

<sup>43</sup> PV, 31.3.67.

<sup>44</sup> *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1965 g.*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 48-49.

<sup>45</sup> PV, 19.3.65.

<sup>46</sup> Bekmuratova A. T., "Izmeneniya v bytu i semeynykh vzaimootnosheniyakh karakalpakov za gody sovetskoy vlasti", *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1966, No. 3, p. 107.

<sup>47</sup> Vasil'yeva G. P., Kislyakov N. A., "Voprosy scm'i i byta u narodov Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana v period stroitel'stva sotsializma i kommunizma", *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1962, No. 6, p. 13.

<sup>48</sup> Khanazarov K. Kh., "Mezhnatsional'nyye braki—odna iz progressivnykh tendentsiy sblizheniya sotsialisticheskikh natsiy", *ONU*, 1964, No. 10, p. 29.

<sup>49</sup> "Wedding Rites in the Uzbek SSR", *CAR*, Vol. XV, 1967, No. 4, pp. 290-9.

essential part of the traditional wedding, and in a letter read at a plenum of the Uzbek Central Committee a mother of five complained bitterly of the enormous kalym demanded (500 rubles in cash, 200 kg. flour, not less than 80 kg. rice, 50 kg. fruit, two sheep and nine sets of clothes), which often made it impossible for a lad to marry the girl of his choice.<sup>50</sup>

Polygamy, usually in a hidden form, is another practice which has not completely disappeared. The first marriage is registered in ZAGS or the *sel'sovet* as a legal marriage, and the others are solemnized by a mulla.<sup>51</sup>

Large undivided families are still found in Uzbekistan, but they are becoming less common. Of 122 Uzbek oil workers' families of Fergananeftgaz investigated recently, 25 (or 20.5 per cent) were large undivided. Small families separated on marriage or the birth of the first child.<sup>52</sup> Among the workers of Margelan, too, young couples usually set up house separately after the birth of their first child.<sup>53</sup> Within the family, even the large undivided family, the position of women is said to have changed for the better. A woman's earnings give her a certain independence, and women may be in complete charge of the household, particularly if they hold responsible posts in the kolkhoz. In the patriarchal families the parents often respect their children's rights, and the mother-in-law and older female relatives usually help the bride with the housework. There is no doubt, however, that in many instances the parents try to maintain their old authority. According to one source, nowadays if a bride disagrees with her mother-in-law, either the young couple move out or the wife gets a divorce if the husband sides with his mother.<sup>54</sup> But another source says that it is the parents who insist on a divorce if the bride is unwilling to carry out the outmoded demands of her husband's parents. Thus 15.4 per cent of the divorce cases that came before the Andizhan oblast court in 1959 and the first quarter of 1960, and 11.8 per cent of those that came before the Fergana oblast court in 1960, were on the grounds of "lack of respect for parents".<sup>55</sup>

Undoubtedly on the whole the position of the wife is better in the small family, away from the more conservative older generation. Among the Uzbek oil workers of Fergananeftgaz, for instance, the wife is more likely to have a job in such families.<sup>56</sup> But a number of husbands still forbid their wives to work or continue their studies, and

<sup>50</sup> Gabdulin M., Morozov M., "Formirovaniye novoy kul'tury byta", *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 6, p. 65.

<sup>51</sup> Birkin M., "Ukrepyat' sovetskuyu sem'yu", *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, 1967, No. 8, p. 85.

<sup>52</sup> Muzaparov Sh., "Sem'ya i semeynny byt rabochikh-neftyanikov Ferganskoy doliny", *ONU*, 1967, No. 5, pp. 39-41.

<sup>53</sup> Kurbangaliyeva R., *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>54</sup> Vasilyeva G. P., Kislyakov N. A., *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>55</sup> Tashtemirov U., "Nekotoryye voprosy dal'neyshego razvitiya sotsialisticheskoy sem'i", *ONU*, 1963, No. 10, p. 21.

<sup>56</sup> Muzaparov Sh., *op. cit.*, p. 40.

they may not be allowed to go to the cinema or other public entertainments. A few are even forced to wear the veil. One rather odd case of this occurred recently in Tashkent, when an elderly Russian woman took in three well-behaved male students who had nowhere to live after the earthquake. Whereupon Dil'shat Artykov, a shop assistant living on the same courtyard, fetched a woman from the *mahallah* commission and a militiaman and complained that because of the students his young wife now had to cover her face. The two officials, both natives, ordered the students to leave, considering that this was a lesser evil than the wife wearing the veil. They appear to have made no attempt to persuade the husband to abandon his old-fashioned ideas.<sup>57</sup> An extreme example of the subservience still sometimes expected from a wife is perhaps that of the 21-year-old man in Khorezm oblast who murdered his young wife because she had told her girl friends that she had been married for kalyim to a man she did not love.<sup>58</sup>

#### *Public attitudes and efforts to overcome them*

The law is there to protect women's rights, but it does not always do so. On the contrary, many infringements of the law, such as the registration of the marriage of minors or arranged matches, take place with the knowledge of the local authorities. "The leaders of rural soviets, kolkhozes and sovkhoses and deputies of the local soviet know about these instances [the marriage of minors]; however, some of them not only do not take measures to avert them, but even themselves attend such weddings."<sup>59</sup> In Fergana rayon, for instance, the marriage of a 13-year-old girl was registered by the rural soviet secretary.<sup>60</sup> Worst of all, though, is the fact that individual Party members are sometimes guilty of a feudal-bay attitude towards women, and some Party organizations do nothing to put a stop to such abuses. Even when sentences are passed in the courts, they are sometimes very light. A man in Bukhara rayon, who had two wives whom he treated so badly that he drove the first one to suicide, got off with nothing more than a fine.<sup>61</sup>

Party organizations, which should set a good example, often neglect the recruitment of women. The Uzbek First Secretary, Rashidov, complained at a plenum of the Uzbek Central Committee on primary Party organizations that in many rayon Party organizations the intake of women had decreased recently. He quoted instances of Party organizations where the women could be counted in ones. In Leninabad kolkhoz, Bulungur rayon, there was only one woman among the 46 communists, and she had become a member in 1946, i.e. 20 years previously. In a sovkhos in Narpay rayon there were two women among

<sup>57</sup> PV, 30.11.66.

<sup>58</sup> Tagayev T. T., "Ateisticheskaya propaganda—sostavnaya chast' kommunisticheskogo vospitaniya", *ONU*, 1962, No. 11, p. 31.

<sup>59</sup> Birkin M., *op. cit.*, p. 85.

<sup>60</sup> Tagayev T. T., *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>61</sup> PV, 4.1.67.

103 communists, and in another sovkhov, where women were poorly represented in the Party organization, no woman had been recruited in the last five years.<sup>62</sup> There has also been a call to draw more girls, particularly of the local nationalities, into Komsomol work.

Among the weapons which the authorities use in their attempts to improve the position of women are the women's councils, which also take an interest in such practical matters as looking into the provision of kindergartens and crèches and so on. At the end of 1967 there were 5,824 women's councils in Uzbekistan with 46,000 supporters in farms, undertakings, apartment blocks, and so on.<sup>63</sup> There have been a number of reports on the good work done by individual women's councils to defend women's rights. One in Khorezm oblast prevented a minor being married against her will to a middle-aged man when neither the brigade-leader nor the kolkhoz Party organizer intervened. (In this instance the council claimed that it had the support of the public who would not have cared a few years ago.<sup>64</sup>) The women's council in a kolkhoz in the Denau area was consulted over the appointment of a new brigade leader (their candidate, a young Komsomolka, was a great success), helped a girl to study at Moscow University, persuaded a mother not to marry her daughter to a man of the mother's choice, and got a man to have only a modest *toy*, within his means, to celebrate the birth of a son.<sup>65</sup> A *mahallah* women's council in Andizhan has been very active and successful in persuading women to work in a local knitting factory.<sup>66</sup> But in many places the women's councils seem to do little more than exist on paper. The Khorezm and Surkhandar'ya oblast women's councils and the women's councils in a number of kolkhozes in these oblasts were singled out at the recent Fourth Congress of the Women of Uzbekistan for their inactivity. And women's councils in a number of rayons of Bukhara oblast were accused of tolerating instances of the humiliation of women and various infringements of women's rights.<sup>67</sup>

### Conclusions

Although considerable progress has been made with the emancipation of the native women of Uzbekistan since the Revolution, it is inevitably a slow process. Even Party members may be inclined to preach one thing and practise another. In the absence of statistics on the marriage of minors and so on it is difficult to tell how widespread these offences are. The individual cases of the infringements of women's rights reported in the press may be fairly atypical, but they all seem to show that in general public opinion is still tolerant of a feudal-bay attitude towards women. However, with the strides made in education since the war, this situation may improve more rapidly in the future.

<sup>62</sup> PV, 18.11.66.

<sup>64</sup> PV, 20.1.65.

<sup>66</sup> PV, 8.3.67.

<sup>63</sup> PV, 20.12.67.

<sup>65</sup> PV, 24.1.67.

<sup>67</sup> PV, 20.12.67.

# TAXATION IN TSARIST CENTRAL ASIA

By D. S. M. WILLIAMS

The following contains a description of the taxation system in Tsarist Central Asia based on the relevant sections of the Pahlen Commission's Report. A glossary of terms is appended.

For a Soviet account of this system see *Central Asian Review*, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1961, pp. 352-8.

## *Syr-Dar'ya, Samarkand and Fergana oblasts*

The following taxes were levied in these three oblasts:

- (1) A kubitka<sup>1</sup> tax on the nomads.
- (2) A land-tax on the settled rural population.
- (3) A land-tax, but differently assessed and known as a temporary state *obrok* (*obrochnaya podat'*), on the Russian and non-Russian (but non-native) rural population.
- (4) A tax on town property.

In addition there were the taxes for local needs (*zemskiye sbory*) assessed on the same basis as the above, and the nomads and settled rural population paid further taxes for, among other things, the support of the village administration and irrigation officials.

Finally, stamp duty was levied on legal contracts, title deeds to property and on property transferred without payment.

## *The kubitka tax*

This was fixed at four rubles per kubitka<sup>2</sup> (or other residence) and was paid as a gross sum by each volost. It was distributed to auls by volost assemblies and to each kubitka owner by aul assemblies.<sup>3</sup> The principle of distribution was not laid down in the Turkestan Statute but the sum to be paid was in fact based on the wealth of the taxpayer, the system adopted by the Steppe Statute and the Temporary Statute of 1867.<sup>4</sup> The tax period was also not laid down in the Turkestan Statute, but in

<sup>1</sup> A kubitka was a nomad tent, but used for fiscal purposes in the sense of household.

<sup>2</sup> Statute for the Administration of the Turkestan Region, cl. 300. Hereafter "Turk". *Svod Zakonov Rossiyskoy Imperii*, 2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1913, Book 1, pp. 1125-60. Hereafter *Svod*.

<sup>3</sup> Turk., cl. 308 and 309.

<sup>4</sup> The Steppe Statute was the statute for the administration of the oblasts of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirech'ye, Ural'sk and Turgay. *Svod*, pp. 1163-81. Hereafter "Steppe". The Temporary Statute of 1867 was superseded by the Statute for the Administration of the Turkestan Region (see f.n. 2). This is the Turkestan Statute referred to in the text.

practice collections were made annually, in contrast to the three-yearly period adopted in the Steppe Governorate-General and Semirech'ye.

Due to lack of supervision the system was very much open to abuse by native officials although the tax authorities had, over the years, succeeded in introducing some order, as far as they were able under the relevant clauses of the Turkestan Statute. They had, for instance, managed to ensure that taxes were really allocated by aul and volost assemblies, but their powers of interference were limited to infringements of the formal rules and they could do nothing, for example, in cases of the deliberate undervaluing of the property of a kibitka owner.<sup>5</sup>

The number of kibitkas and the total sum due were calculated every three years.<sup>6</sup> A list of kibitka owners in each aul was drawn up by the aul elder, examined by the volost assembly and passed to the uyezd commandant for checking. From him it passed, by way of the oblast administration, to the local treasury chamber,<sup>7</sup> where the final tax lists were compiled.

Since the uyezd commandants, tax inspectors and oblast administration limited themselves to the checking of the arithmetic, the system depended very much on the honesty of the native officials who were in a position to conceal the actual number of kibitkas, and closer supervision was obviously necessary. In the Steppe Governorate-General and in Semirech'ye the number of kibitkas was checked on the spot by uyezd commandants and tax inspectors, and this method might well have been extended to the three central oblasts.

The tax was collected by aul elders,<sup>8</sup> given by them to the volost headman and paid by him into the uyezd treasury under conditions laid down by the uyezd commandant. Aul elders had to give receipts to kibitka owners from special receipt books printed annually in a form worked out by the Turkestan treasury chamber and approved by the Governor-General. The greatest weakness here was that most taxpayers were illiterate (as were also aul elders who had to employ temporary clerks for tax purposes) and were often given receipts for an amount less than they had actually paid. This was the most widespread abuse connected with tax collection among the nomads, and the authorities had tried, not wholly successfully, to combat it.<sup>9</sup>

Collection took place during the last three months of each year,<sup>10</sup> and if the sum due was not paid by the beginning of the next year

<sup>5</sup> *Otchët po revizii Turkestanskogo kraya, proizvedennoy po vysochayshemu povelenniyu Senatorom Gofmeysterom Grafom K.K. Palenom. Nalogi i poshllyny.* St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 21. Hereafter "Pahlen".

<sup>6</sup> Turk., cl. 301-4.

<sup>7</sup> Treasury chambers were local offices of the Ministry of Finance. Three chambers, Baku (Transcaspia), Omsk (Semirech'ye) and Turkestan, had jurisdiction in the territory of the Governorate-General, Turkestan.

<sup>8</sup> Turk., cl. 115, 310 and 318.

<sup>9</sup> The methods used had included issuing receipt books employing a system of coloured circles and squares corresponding to the shape and size of various types of money. Pahlen, p. 24.

<sup>10</sup> Decree of the Governor-General, 3 March 1887, No. 2906. Pahlen, p. 27.

property of the defaulter could be sold to pay the debt (excluding his kibitka and the cattle necessary for his support). If he was unable to pay, his aul was held responsible. In practice, however, this compulsory sale of property hardly ever occurred. Arrears were very rare and were usually due to chance events, such as snowstorms causing a volost headman to arrive late at the paying-in point.

Settled and semi-settled Kazakhs were recognized by the land-tax commission, which began its work with the introduction of the Turkestan Statute in 1886, as settled and had paid the land-tax, although still officially classified as nomads until 1900.<sup>11</sup> But an anomaly remained in that settled Kazakhs of Perovsk and Kazalinsk uyezds, where no land-tax organization existed, continued to be classified as nomads.

The Kazakhs also paid further taxes, including those fixed by statute for the support of the local administrative and irrigation officials,<sup>12</sup> and those imposed by volost and aul assemblies for various purposes, for example support of Russian-native schools and grants to natives at Russian schools. The size of all these taxes was fixed by the communities themselves, except in the case of aryk *aksakals* (elders) where the sum levied for their support was laid down by the military governor of the oblast.<sup>13</sup> The money obtained was paid into the local treasury chamber to the account of uyezd administrations which used it as directed by oblast administrations. In addition there were the so-called "non-obligatory" taxes which each community had the right to impose for any purpose it considered necessary. In practice, however, these were usually not voluntary but the result of pressure by officials of the uyezd administration.<sup>14</sup> For the three-year period 1908-10 the total number of kibitkas in the three oblasts was calculated as 215,285, the kibitka tax as 861,140 rubles and the tax for local needs as 366,507 rubles 58 kopeks. Additional taxes came to about 500,000 rubles, and the total amount paid in tax by each kibitka was thus eight rubles five kopeks.<sup>15</sup>

A number of faults have already been indicated but, considered as a whole, the system appears extremely crude and primitive. Although some adjustment was made for variations in wealth this was only effective for individuals and comparatively small groups such as auls. The prosperity of volosts and uyezds varied considerably, but each had to bear a burden of taxation calculated solely on the number of kibitkas.

#### *The land-tax from the settled native population*

This tax was related to the type of land: (1) irrigated land and (2) cultivated non-irrigated and unworked land.

<sup>11</sup> *Polnoye Sobraniye Zakonov Rossyiskoy Imperii. Sobraniye tret'ye. 1900/18781.*  
Hereafter "PSZ".

<sup>12</sup> Turk., cl. 318.

<sup>13</sup> Turk., cl. 107 and 323.

<sup>14</sup> Pahlen, p. 37.

<sup>15</sup> Pahlen, pp. 33, 37.

The tax on the former amounted to 10 per cent of the average gross income<sup>16</sup> fixed for a number of years on the basis of surveys and enquiries. These were carried out by "tax commissars", and the average harvest and its value determined by the land-tax commission.<sup>17</sup> The information supplied by the "commissars", which concerned the amount of irrigation, the chief products of the area, the size of the harvest and the value of the produce, was submitted for confirmation to the oblast administration, while the total amount of the tax, worked out by the land-tax commission, was passed to the Governor-General for scrutiny.<sup>18</sup>

The Turkestan Statute of 1886 had left the taxation of non-irrigated but cultivated land on its former basis, that is 10 per cent of the harvest gathered in the tax year, the size of the harvest to be estimated by the local tax-collectors,<sup>19</sup> while unworked land was not taxed at all. The process should have been supervised by the local tax inspectors, but in practice they were unable to do so owing to pressure of work and everything was left to native officials. Thus in 1900 the basis of taxation for both cultivated non-irrigated and unworked land was changed to that of an amount per desyatin<sup>20</sup> according to yield. This was to be temporarily fixed by the Minister of Finance in agreement with the Governor-General at not more than one ruble per desyatin for cultivated non-irrigated land and 20 kopeks for unworked land, but not until 1908 was sufficient information available for most of the land to be taxed.

Tax demands were sent by the Turkestan treasury chamber to taxpayers<sup>21</sup> through uyezd commandants. Allocation within a village was the responsibility of the village assembly which was supposed to make adjustments according to the wealth of each individual. The final allocations were passed by way of the volost headman to the uyezd commandant who, in the event of any irregularity, could pass them to the uyezd land-tax authorities for examination.<sup>22</sup> Allocations were, in practice, made yearly although this was not laid down by law.

Collection from villages was the responsibility of the village elder, and the system was similar to that used for the collection of the kubitka tax from the nomads. Similar exploitations of the illiteracy of most taxpayers was also in evidence. Arrears could be collected by forcible measures, including the sale of property, and, if not put into effect by the village officials within two months, could be carried out by the uyezd commandant. In most cases, however, the village population was not

<sup>16</sup> Decree concerning Direct Taxes, cl. 37-53. *Svod*, Book 2, p. 18.

<sup>17</sup> The statute setting up the land-tax commission can be found in *Svod*, Book 1, pp. 1155-6. Rules for the carrying out of land-tax business are also to be found in *Svod*, Book 1, pp. 1160-4.

<sup>18</sup> PSZ, 1900/18781.

<sup>19</sup> Turk., cl. 288.

<sup>20</sup> PSZ, 1900/18781.

<sup>21</sup> Taxpayers included village communities and other institutions owning land as well as private landowners. Waqf land was, however, freed from tax. See *Svod*, Book 2, p. 18.

<sup>22</sup> *Svod*, Book 2, p. 18.

in arrears, but if so this was due, more often than not, to lack of supervision by the uyezd administration. Private landowners, on the other hand (who were personally responsible for paying in their tax), were frequently in arrears and forcible measures, usually the sale of property, had often to be used to obtain payment. This was due partly to lack of energy by the uyezd administration and partly to the necessity of relying on native officials who lacked authority in the eyes of the owners, most of whom lived away from their property.<sup>23</sup>

The settled population paid additional taxes for the support of the village administrative and irrigation officials on the same basis as the nomads. Similarly, village assemblies were entitled to impose taxes of their own.

For 1908 the sum paid in taxation by the settled native population of about 2,800,000 amounted to about 6,820,000 rubles, two rubles 44 kopeks per person. Since the land area occupied by them amounted to 5,186,562 desyatins, each desyatin was taxed at one ruble 31 kopeks.<sup>24</sup>

The researches of the Pahlen Commission showed that the system was far from working smoothly. Allocation and collection of tax and arrears suffered from the lack of proper supervision by the Russian administration, and the system of accountability was not really suited to native traditions and ways of life. Furthermore, the land-tax could not be collected from the whole of the three oblasts as, in some areas, the necessary surveys and enquiries had not been made<sup>25</sup> and other tax systems were in operation. The commission also found that the tax assessment was often below one-tenth of the gross income obtained from the land, sometimes as little as one-twentieth or even one-thirtieth. These variations were due first to the fact that in some places the work of calculating the tax had spread over as much as 22 years and had been done by a number of people and secondly the exclusion of cotton from the crops, the value of which had been used to assess the tax. This had been necessary at first in order to encourage the local population to grow cotton but became anomalous as soon as they began to understand its full value. Another anomaly was the calculation of tax on the basis of gross income rather than nett, a practice that had been introduced to avoid too sharp a break with the past. Formerly it was probably satisfactory as the typical village inhabitant had been a small farmer working his own land, but by the early years of the 20th century the rural native population was becoming more differentiated and in the most heavily populated regions classes of large landowners and hired workers were rapidly developing.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Pahlen, p. 90.

<sup>24</sup> Pahlen, p. 98.

<sup>25</sup> These were: Perovsk and Kazalinsk uyezds, where the population was classed as nomad: three hill volosts of Samarkand oblast; the Amu-Dar'ya *oidel*. However, by 1910, of the land occupied by the settled population, 97-95 per cent was subject to the state land-tax. Pahlen, *Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khozyaystva v Turkestane*, Part 1, sect. 1, p. 100.

<sup>26</sup> Pahlen, *Pozemel'noye-podatnoye delo*, pp. 190-1.

*The "temporary state obrok" from the Russian and non-native rural population*

Those liable to this tax were: (1) Russians, (2) Dungans, (3) German sectaries (five villages in Auliye-Ata uyezd and one in Tashkent uyezd), (4) native town-dwellers who had settled on nomad land.

None of the above categories had paid state taxes before 1904 and even then the Dungans and native town-dwellers remained exempt, not being mentioned in the relevant legislation<sup>27</sup> which applied to the Russian and German village population, and lower ranks of the army, retired or on reserve. Furthermore, they were likely to remain exempt in the future as even after land-tax research had been completed their land would not belong to any official category.

The tax was fixed at 15 or 30 kopeks per desyatin of "good" land depending on the category of the population and the time of settlement. The tax for local needs<sup>28</sup> was a percentage of the state tax calculated on the basis of factors such as the type of soil and the profit from the land.

The amount due from each village was calculated annually by the Turkestan treasury chamber on the basis of information supplied by the uyezd land-tax organization, but in practice was very unequally distributed, as each village was simply taxed according to land regardless of economic conditions, which varied widely in the three oblasts.

The system of allocation and collection of tax and arrears was similar to that used for the land-tax. Arrears were comparatively large due partly to overlarge allocations to some villages and partly to the attacks of locusts (especially in Chimkent and Khodzhent uyezds). By 1908 no attempt had been made to collect these debts in spite of demands by the Turkestan treasury chamber and oblast authorities.

In 1908 the state tax amounted to 31,124 rubles and that for local needs to 11,581 rubles, while arrears on 1 January 1909 reached a total of 8,921 and 7,188 rubles respectively.<sup>29</sup>

Additional taxes were also paid on the same basis as the nomad and settled native population but full information as to their size is lacking.

The chief fault in this system, apart from the unjustified exemption of certain categories of the population, was the unfairness of allocation based merely on the amount of land without taking into account the relative prosperity of different villages and uyezds. A system was needed based on the rules operating in Semirech'ye oblast where type of soil, the value of the crop and so on were taken into account in assessing tax.

*The state tax on town property*

This was levied in the oblast and uyezd towns and 25 others, most of which consisted of separate Russian and native sections. Up to 1905

<sup>27</sup> PSZ, 1902/21323, 1903/23126.

<sup>28</sup> PSZ, 1903/23126. Turk., cl. 320.

<sup>29</sup> Pahlen, *Nalogi i poshliny*, pp. 112, 114. Hereafter "Pahlen".

the inhabitants of the Russian sections of these towns had paid nothing to the state and the natives had paid a type of land-tax, but during this year the laws in force in the rest of the Empire, including a number of variations due to the absence of town self-government (except in Tashkent), and the fact that most property was of the small one-family type, had been extended to the Governorate-General of Turkestan.<sup>30</sup> The sum due was fixed annually for each oblast and divided among towns by the oblast administration in consultation with, in Syr-Dar'ya oblast, the head of the Turkestan treasury chamber, and, in the other two oblasts, with the local tax inspectors. Their decisions needed the confirmation of the Governor-General and were based on information supplied by those responsible for allocation within the towns, that is the local land-tax authorities in co-operation with a board of taxpayers nominated by the military governor (except in Perovsk and Kazalinsk where special offices were established). In the years immediately following the introduction of the law of 1905 some complications had arisen due to the late issue of allocations by the oblast and town authorities caused by difficulties in obtaining information concerning the value of individual properties, but in general the system had worked well. This was shown by the almost complete absence of complaints against incorrect assessment from the time that the law of 1905 had come into operation.<sup>31</sup> An anomaly remained, however, due to a contradiction between the law of 1905 and clauses 320 and 321 of the Turkestan Statute. This concerned the tax for local needs from factory premises which, according to the latter, were to pay two per cent of their value whether situated in towns or elsewhere, whereas the law of 1905 included factory premises in towns in the property taxed at a fixed percentage of the state tax. They could thus be taxed twice over, and the anomaly had not been cleared up by the beginning of 1909.

The state tax for 1908 brought in 140,000 rubles and that for local needs 47,637 rubles 60 kopeks. No accurate figure for the number of town properties was available but they had been estimated as 133,728 for the three oblasts, and the average state tax on each property was thus one ruble five kopeks, with the tax for local needs amounting to 35 kopeks.<sup>32</sup>

Apart from the anomaly mentioned above, the law of 1905 had been put into effect without difficulty. Collection (carried out according to the general rules of the Empire<sup>33</sup>) and allocation were fully in accord with local conditions, and the only criticism of the system offered by the Pahlen Commission was that it did not extend far enough and could be extended to cover other towns in the three oblasts.

<sup>30</sup> PSZ, 1905/25827.

<sup>32</sup> Pahlen, p. 130.

<sup>33</sup> In towns with no administrative organization, tax was distributed by a special commission elected by property owners who were obliged to pay their allocation to the appointed collectors annually in the month of September. *Svod*, Book 2, pp. 18-22.

<sup>31</sup> Pahlen, p. 126.

*Stamp duty on legal contracts, duty on title-deeds to property and property transfers without payment*

The most unsatisfactory feature of the collection of stamp duty on legal contracts concerned agreements between natives witnessed by native judges, where incorrect application of the rules had led to losses to the treasury of several thousands of rubles. The rules were clear enough, and the loss of revenue was largely due to the administration not taking sufficient measures to acquaint native judges with the provisions of the relevant legislation.<sup>34</sup> Stamp duty on industrial and trade agreements had only been introduced in the Russian Empire in 1901. The law provided for annual inspection of industrial and trading establishments, and in 1908 429 of these had been carried out in the three oblasts (by local tax officials empowered by the Turkestan treasury chamber) revealing 53 cases of non-observance of the law.<sup>35</sup> However, the lists of these establishments were far from complete and a higher return could have been obtained from this tax.

Duty on title-deeds to property was collected on the basis of the rules applying to the whole Empire, but again the yield was reduced, in this case as a result of the undervaluing of land by the official instructions establishing the norms for land valuation, and by the limited application of other methods of official property valuation. The collection of duty on the occasion of transfers of property without payment presented no difficulties if it was based on the Russian civil law, but among the natives it was entirely unregulated. The relevant legislation<sup>36</sup> merely stated that collection should be "according to custom" and did not indicate whether the general rules of the Empire, which were in any case unsuited to the native way of life, should be applied. Furthermore, for lack of an alternative, control was in the hands of native judges and abuses occurred from time to time. Nevertheless, the sum collected from property transfers in 1907, 213,636 rubles, showed an increase of 81.3 per cent over the revenue for 1904. Stamp duty on contracts for 1907 totalled 729,992 rubles.<sup>37</sup>

*Semirech'ye oblast*

The taxes levied in Semirech'ye were similar to those collected in the three central oblasts, with the difference that the native population, being classed as nomad, did not pay a land-tax. The systems of distribution and collection were also, in most respects, similar to those used in the three central oblasts, but certain differences in procedure must be noted.

The accuracy of the stated number of kubitkas, which provided a

<sup>34</sup> Statute concerning Stamp Duty. *Svod*, Book 2, pp. 197-244; also PSZ, 1905/26415.

<sup>35</sup> Pahlen, p. 149.

<sup>36</sup> Turk.. cl. 261. See also *Svod*, Book 2, pp. 262-4, for the general rules of the Empire.

<sup>37</sup> Pahlen, p. 153.

basis for the calculation of the kibitka tax, was checked on the spot by uyezd commandants and tax inspectors who compared the lists of kibitka owners made up by aul elders with former lists and questioned kibitka owners. An attempt had been made to ensure that assemblies were held for each aul separately at the place where the nomads were living, but due to the large number of auls in each uyezd (these ranged from 137 to 282) this had been found impracticable and assemblies of several auls and even whole volosts met in one place. These assemblies also elected aul elders, fixed their salary for the next three years, and determined the value in sheep (as the unit best known to the nomads) of the assets of each kibitka owner.<sup>38</sup> The tax was then distributed on the basis of this valuation.<sup>39</sup> Collection of arrears was altogether unregulated, being left to local custom, and only in 1908 did the Omsk treasury chamber (under whose jurisdiction lay the oblast of Semirech'ye) devote any attention to this matter. Another fault peculiar to the kibitka tax system of Semirech'ye was that no provision had been made for change to a settled way of life and the payment of a land-tax. The total tax paid by the nomads came to something under seven rubles per kibitka annually, less than the tax paid by the nomads of the three central oblasts.<sup>40</sup>

The "temporary state *obrok*" was paid by the same categories of the population as in the three central oblasts, with the exception that in place of the German sectaries there existed in Semirech'ye a number of villages of Taranchis (the modern Uygurs) who had emigrated from Kuldja in 1882. The tax was fixed at 30 kopeks per desyatina of "good" land, an average sum which allowed for variations both between and inside uyezds, the gross sum (calculated by multiplying the number of desyatins to be taxed by this average sum) being distributed among uyezds by a special "office for the distribution of the state *obrok*" on the basis of information supplied by the Omsk treasury chamber concerning the amount of taxable land and the paying ability of the inhabitants. Distribution among villages was the duty of the office of the uyezd tax inspector, and allocation to individual taxpayers was done by village assemblies, usually by households, on the basis of the number of male persons in each, but sometimes taking into account property and land. The total tax per household (including the tax for local needs and additional taxes) came to about nine rubles. This is an average figure, however, and the unfairness of distribution, which was a feature of the "state *obrok*" in the three central oblasts, was avoided, the system working well in the two periods of its application from 1905 to 1907 and 1908 to 1910, which were examined by the Pahlen Commission.<sup>41</sup> The only difficulty was caused by slowness of communication,

<sup>38</sup> Pahlen, p. 157.

<sup>39</sup> Circulars of the Steppe Governor-General of 16 January 1897, No. 427, and 23 November 1888, No. 4299. Pahlen, p. 156.

<sup>40</sup> Pahlen, p. 166.

<sup>41</sup> Pahlen, pp. 182, 183.

due to the great distances involved, between the Omsk treasury chamber and the tax office in Semirech'ye.

The tax system for town property was much the same as that used in the three central oblasts except that rather more defects were observed in the business of collection and distribution. One difference was that the six towns in the oblast had paid this tax since 1885 (except Dzharkent, freed from payment until 1893).<sup>42</sup> In 1908 there were 7,044 properties subject to tax, each paying, on an average, one ruble 28 kopeks. Arrears were considerable, amounting, on 1 January 1908, to 1,051 rubles, and were due chiefly to the unwillingness of the taxpayers to produce the sum required, rather than to defects in the system of collection.<sup>43</sup>

Operations connected with the collection of stamp duty on legal contracts and duty on transfers of property had no features distinguishing them from those in the three central oblasts. In 1907 the former amounted to 56,468 rubles and the latter to 11,529 rubles. The total sum collected showed a rise of 41.25 per cent since 1904 (as compared with 81.3 per cent in the three central oblasts) due partly to economic development, but also in part to an increase in stamp duty in 1906.<sup>44</sup>

### *Transcaspia*

The taxes levied in this oblast were a kubitka tax from the native population (all classed as nomad) and stamp duty on contracts and transfers of property. The native population also paid the tax for local needs and additional taxes similar to those in the rest of the Governorate-General.

The kubitka tax had been fixed in 1892 as four rubles per kubitka annually for the whole oblast, and the tax for local needs as two rubles.<sup>45</sup> Although the oblast was theoretically part of the territory subordinate for tax purposes to the Baku treasury chamber, the Temporary Statute for the administration of the Transcaspia oblast<sup>46</sup> made all tax affairs the duty of the oblast administration. Kubitka tax was calculated by simply multiplying the number of kubitkas by four, and everything depended therefore on obtaining an accurate count of nomad dwellings. Unfortunately this was far from being the case, the counting being based on no known rules, but simply on unverified figures produced by aul elders, and the Pahlen Commission calculated that at least 5,000 kubitkas annually were escaping tax.<sup>47</sup> Collection was done by aul elders or native tax-collectors and was entirely unregulated. No receipts were given even where they existed and no attempt had been made to explain their use. Consequently abuses were prevalent, by *uchastok pristavs*

<sup>42</sup> PSZ, 1884/2491.

<sup>43</sup> Pahlen, p. 189.

<sup>44</sup> Pahlen, pp. 196, 197.

<sup>45</sup> PSZ, 1892/8562.

<sup>46</sup> *Svod*, Book 1, pp. 1119-24.

<sup>47</sup> Pahlen, p. 200.

(*uchastkovyy pristav*) as well as native officials, judging by the complaints received by the Pahlen Commission. The average amount paid by each kubitka for 1906 (state and local taxes) amounted to one ruble 22 kopeks.<sup>48</sup> There were also additional taxes, the size of which was not known, but the total amount paid by the nomads of Transcaspia was undoubtedly considerably less than that paid by the nomads of the rest of the Governorate-General.

The law concerning the payment of stamp duty also extended to Transcaspia. Native judges were completely unsupervised, however, and there were many infringements particularly in Krasnovodsk uyezd and Iolotan *pristavstvo*. A feature of the oblast was the absence of a tax inspector and subordinate officials and in this case inspections of trading and industrial establishments were carried out by the excise authorities. Duty was paid only on transfers of property in towns and was calculated by the Askhabad *okrug* court. Stamp duty and duty paid on the transfer of property amounted in 1908 to 182,798 rubles. This included, however, fines for infringements of the law by industrial and trading establishments.<sup>49</sup>

#### *Taxation of trade and industry*

The state industry tax (*promyslovyy nalog*) was extended to the three central oblasts in 1885 but to Semirech'ye and Transcaspia only with the introduction of a revised statute (for the whole Empire) in 1898.<sup>50</sup> From this time the old *zakat*, a general Muslim tax of one-fortieth of the "turnover", was finally abolished. The task of applying the rules of the statute concerning assessment, collection and so forth was given to the local tax inspectors' offices, and at first many difficulties had arisen, largely as a result of the special nature of trade in the Governorate-General. The local categories of "bazaar" and "steppe" trade, for example, could not be fitted into the general classification of types of trade. However, these difficulties had gradually been overcome and those that remained were due to the large number of small establishments engaged in trade and industry, and comparatively frequent changes of ownership. Thus the business of assessment and collection required a great deal of time and effort on the part of the local officials and in Semirech'ye the Pahlen Commission found that the tax inspectors in at least half of the uyezds left the work to native "trade deputies" and administrative officials, exercising only a very general supervision. There was thus a great deal of tax avoidance in the oblast.<sup>51</sup> In Transcaspia there were no tax inspectors, their duties being performed by the local excise and administrative officials, an arrangement which led to a large number of establishments escaping tax altogether as the

<sup>48</sup> Pahlen, p. 202.

<sup>49</sup> Pahlen, pp. 202, 203.

<sup>50</sup> PSZ, 1885/2963, 1898/15601.

<sup>51</sup> Pahlen, p. 261.

business of assessment was in the hands of those whose primary duties lay elsewhere. Another factor contributing to the lowering of revenue from Semirech'ye was the exemption from tax of trade between Russian and Chinese subjects in a 50 verst-wide strip along the Chinese border. This had been interpreted as meaning exemption from the industry tax also and at the time of the Pahlen Commission a decision on the matter was awaited from the Ministry of Finance. General supervision of the industry tax was the duty of the relevant treasury chamber and unfortunately, not being done on the spot, had resulted in tax officials being surrounded by a large number of unnecessary regulations that the circumstances of their work made it impossible for them to observe.<sup>52</sup>

Duty was paid in the Governorate-General on certain articles, for example alcoholic drinks, tobacco, matches, sugar, oil, cigarette paper, on the basis of the laws in force in the rest of the Empire, and was supervised by a special excise administration consisting, in all, of some 79 officials. In general excise affairs were satisfactory and require no special comment.

As regards the collection of customs dues, which was in general based on the laws in force in the rest of the Empire, the only feature requiring comment is the situation that had arisen from the creation of the 50 verst strip along the Chinese border in which trade between Russian and Chinese citizens was exempt from taxation.<sup>53</sup> Russian merchants had reported that the Chinese were not observing the provisions for the tax exemption of Russian goods and, due to the lack of border guards and the double watch required (at the actual border and the border of the 50 verst strip), a number of points suitable for the passage of contraband goods were completely unguarded. The Kopal uyezd tax inspector, for instance, had estimated that due to the 50 verst strip the loss of revenue amounted to 150 to 200,000 rubles in this uyezd alone.<sup>54</sup> In view of this the provision allowing free trade within the 50 verst strip might well have been abolished.

Two other taxes were levied in the Governorate-General, both on the basis of laws in force in the rest of the Empire. These were a tax on steam boilers,<sup>55</sup> assessment and collection of which were the duty of an official known as the oblast engineer (*mekhanik*), and the so-called *popudnyy* tax. The latter was a tax on each pud of goods arriving and departing by sea and was collected in the port of Krasnovodsk.<sup>56</sup> Operations connected with these taxes in the particular context of the Governorate-General of Turkestan do not require any special comment.

<sup>52</sup> Pahlen, p. 219.

<sup>53</sup> *Svod*, Book 2, p. 599, cl. 936.

<sup>54</sup> Pahlen, p. 265.

<sup>55</sup> PSZ, 1898/15600.

<sup>56</sup> *Svod*, Book 3, pp. 2117-332.

**Glossary**

oblast	administrative province
volost	a locally elected administrative body comprising several <i>mir</i> or village communities
uyezd	administrative subdivision of an oblast
otdel	sector
pristavstvo	ward
uchastok pristav	inspector of a ward
aul	village
desyatin	2.7 acres
pud	36.27lb.

## MATVEYEV VERSUS CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

THE standing of A. M. Matveyev as a student of modern Iran was recognized some time ago by *Central Asian Review*, and regular readers will remember in particular the précis offered in Vol. XI, No. 1 of 1963, of his interesting 40-page monograph on the Iranian Anjoman at Ashkhabad. It may also be recalled that Matveyev is an unflattering, even hostile, critic of CAR and that he took exception to the said précis in terms which were to our thinking so inept as to demand the rejoinder printed in Vol. XIII, No. 4 of 1965.

Matveyev has again turned his artillery in our direction—and this time along a wider front. In a 12-page contribution to *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 of 1967, entitled “*Central Asian Review on the Soviet Historiography of the Iranian Revolution, 1905–1911*”, he has objected to our treatment of Soviet writing on events in Iran during the period named. Wilful misrepresentations of that writing are according to him to be found in CAR, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1956; Vol. IV, No. 4, 1956; Vol. VI, No. 3, 1958; Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1960; Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1960; and Vol. X, No. 1, 1962.

Only the first two of these numbers, however, need be taken down from the shelf, inasmuch as Matveyev himself merely lists the titles of the relevant articles in the other four without proceeding to discuss, much less to dispute, what was said in them. To all intents and purposes the charges now brought against CAR relate to the earlier portion (pp. 287–303) of the comprehensive survey contained in Vol. IV, No. 3, and to pp. 398–403 of the continuation of the same survey in Vol. IV, No. 4.

Matveyev opens with a preliminary—and, as the immediately following quotations will demonstrate, obscurely—phrased indictment, challenging CAR's statement that the literature under study is primarily designed to indoctrinate the Soviet public on official lines and that the angle adopted varies according to the policy of the day. The Editor, he says, “makes not the slightest effort to substantiate the correctness of those assertions . . . but prefers to concentrate on the real or imaginary differences in the assessment of the Iranian revolution detected in Soviet works over the course of the years”; drawing his readers' attention to a new tendency to show Tsarist policy and action as venial by comparison with those of Britain as though that “signified a lack of objectivity on the part of the post-war generation of Soviet historians”.

To so indeterminate an accusation no answer, evidently, is possible. The prosecution must be permitted to develop its case in more detail, and to this requirement Matveyev, though not very methodically and with a good deal of repetition, from this point onwards attends. His

heads of charge are not sharply itemized, and it may make for clarity in what follows if they are given numbers.

The falsehoods of the *Central Asian Review* exposé, as Matveyev calls them, can be considered seriatim:

(1) To begin with there is the assertion that it was not until after the Second World War that Soviet historians displayed any tendency to portray the British attitude to revolutionary Iran as one of hypocrisy.

But where did Matveyev find such an assertion? It does not occur, as he pretends, either at p. 289 in No. 3 or at p. 399 in No. 4. What was said in the former passage was that while Tsarist hostility to the revolutionary movement was still (that is, in the more recent Soviet historiography) confirmed, the latterday tendency had been to distract attention from that hostility by representing British sympathy as sheer hypocrisy. In the other of the two passages the argument, clinched by a verbatim extract, was that the early writer Pavlovich, in contrast with the more recent Ivanov, had accepted and recorded "the serious support which Great Britain gave to the constitutional party of Iran at the time [of the Revolution]" even though he had gone on to add that that support was short-lived.

It is possible, and CAR for its part will be content to suppose, that Matveyev has genuinely misunderstood the meaning of the English in the two passages to which he alludes.

(2) In drawing attention to differences between the earlier and the subsequent writers, CAR has kept silent on the real reasons for re-appraisal, hoping thus to bolster the baseless argument about the official political line.

It is not immediately apparent how much punch Matveyev wants to put into this second item. Hitherto, if one reads his far from lucid paragraphs aright, he has been contending that there has been no change in the historical approach over the years—and if he has not been saying that, then what quarrel is he picking with CAR?—and now he seems to be conceding the change but blaming CAR for not explaining the justification for it.

The books and articles on the history of Iran, he continues in this place, published in the Soviet Union in the 20s and the 30s drew deeply on Western, mostly British, sources and that is how they became contaminated. Pavlovich swallowed Browne, and Gurko-Kryazhin swallowed Morgan Shuster. These "first Soviet historians saw it as their main and most important task to unmask the imperialist policy of Tsarist Russia". Exactly: the words are almost those of CAR at p. 288 in Vol. IV, No. 3.

(3) In the succeeding phase (i.e. after the Second World War) Soviet historians began to draw on the archives and on Iranian sources and were thus in a position "to revise and to check" their appreciations. They were no longer at the mercy of the predominantly British interpretation of events but could offer a properly objective assessment of Great Power policies in Iran. They could also, having cast their net wider,

bring in matter that had escaped attention before: notably, the influence of the Transcaucasian bolsheviks and the existence of such political organizations as the Social Democratic Party in Iran called *Ejtemā'iune-ūmiyun*. CAR pretends that these extra pieces of information are barely (*pochti ne*) mentioned in Iranian accounts, but that is not so. There is quite a lot (*nemalo*) about them in Kesravi, 'Ali Azari, Amir Khizi, Mahdi Malekzadeh and others.

Much of this third head of Matveyev's charge sheet is didactic and might well have been appended to (2) above. For the rest, the only new issue involved is of minor consequence: viz. which of two adjectives is the more appropriate in the context named—a "bare" mention or a "sufficient" mention?

(4) CAR is contemptuous of the Soviet authors (especially Ivanov) who have insisted on Great Britain's hostility to the Iranian revolution. It tries to make out (pp. 290, 291) that the great *bast* in the precincts of the British Legation in July 1906 was "a most impressive example of Great Britain's support of the Iranian constitutionalists" and totally ignores Edward Browne's opinion that the incident was in no sense indicative of British sympathy with the champions of constitutional reform. It is silent on the despatches from the British Minister to the Foreign Secretary that betray a cool indifference as to the eventual form of the monarchy.

Matveyev is an admirable scholar, but it is not with admiration that one gasps at his performance as a controversialist. Under this fourth head of charge he (a) puts into the mouth of CAR a statement not made on either of the pages cited (albeit a statement that *might* have been made!); (b) blames CAR for not echoing the view of a person whose authority he has himself pooh-poohed a couple of pages back; and (c) criticizes CAR for omitting to allude to a British envoy's despatches in the body of its analysis of Soviet writing on the Iranian revolution.

(5) The "tendenciousness of CAR" comes out in its treatment of the Tsarist intervention. Russia was not the only Power guilty in this connexion. Naturally the British did not need, and consequently did not introduce, troops comparing with the Russian units in strength, because they controlled the Gulf and could threaten the revolutionaries with landings anywhere along the seaboard. In the event various incidents did occur which Browne termed "acts of armed intervention by the British". CAR is wrong in stating that the Residency guard at Bushire represented the only British troops in Iran at that period: there was a consular escort at Mashhad too.

If Matveyev's readers have access to CAR they will be able to judge this issue for themselves. What CAR actually wrote was: "In order to balance the continued presence of Russian forces in North Persia from 1909 to 1914 accounts are given [in recent Soviet historiography] of the ravaging of South Persian towns by British forces during the same period." We are now brought to book with the correction that British

forces did not merely consist of the Bushire guard but of the Mushhad escort as well. If Matveyev will glance at the passage in Vol. X, No. 1 of 1962 (which appears to have escaped him), where *both* these were specified, he will learn that they amounted in all to about 40 men.

(6) CAR makes much of the fact that while earlier Soviet writers advertise the Tsarist support enjoyed by the ex-Shah, Mohammad 'Ali Mirza, later authors play down the Russian connexion. The *Review* does this to create the impression that the recent historians have had to comply with a new official directive. The view adopted by the pre-war authors was based on an uncritical use of the writings of Percy Sykes and Morgan Shuster, and the amendment is properly to be accounted for by the fresh material which has since become available.

This head of charge is practically a repetition of (2) above. No repetition of the corresponding comment is called for.

(7) The CAR commentary neglects to go to the root of the whole matter: this was that both Russia and Britain being imperialist Powers were by definition hostile to the Iranian revolution and sunk their jealousies in order to suppress it. Their immediate objective was to compel Iran to acknowledge the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and the obstacle in the path to that was of course the continuing revolution. The Russians judged Mohammad 'Ali to be a suitable enough candidate for his former throne but the British had no use for him; so in the end the Tsarist Government decided not to back their man in any material sense.

This seventh head of charge is of interest because it illustrates perhaps more strikingly than the others how stubbornly Matveyev misconstrues the scope of the survey under discussion. CAR was concerned with the trends in Soviet writing, pre-war and recent, on the Iranian revolution; it was not concerned to expose the motives of Russian and British behaviour at that time.

(8) CAR objects to the opinion of the Soviet historians that the ultimatum delivered to Iran at the close of 1911 was essentially (*v sushchnosti*) an Anglo-Russian ultimatum. This of course was the one that demanded the removal of the American financial expert Shuster, and an undertaking that in future no foreign adviser should be invited by Iran except in consultation with Great Britain and Russia. There is plenty on record to prove that the two Powers were acting in concert: the Permanent Under-Secretary of State assured the Russian Ambassador in London that Shuster's dismissal would be "sympathetically received" by His Majesty's Government; Grey answered Iran's appeal for help with the message that the Iranian Government would do well to submit to the Russian demands; the Iranian Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that "the Russian move had been made with the acquiescence of England".

It is perhaps something that Matveyev has here re-entered the arena of controversy promised by the title he has chosen for his present attack

on CAR, but let him be more honest with his readers over this eighth item. It was not a question of Soviet academic opinion on Britain's attitude to the ultimatum. The point being made by CAR was that recent Soviet writing, exemplified by the standard historians and by the *Novaya Istoriya Stran Zarubezhnogo Vostoka*, describes the 1911 ultimatum as one issued jointly by Britain and Russia. To support this observation the actual words of M. S. Ivanov's *Outline History of Iran (Ocherk istorii Irana)* were quoted: "In November 1911 the Tsarist Government together with Britain presented Iran with an ultimatum which demanded that Shuster be dismissed. . . ."

Unable for obvious reasons to substantiate the Soviet version of the affair and unwilling for reasons no less obvious to confess the fiction, what does Matveyev do? He cites Nicolson, Grey and Ali Qoli Khan to the effect that the British Government was neither taken unawares by the Russian move nor morally shocked by it. Then—and not for the first time in these curiously conducted proceedings—the prosecutor pauses in mid-argument. Was it perhaps at this point that he looked back over his draft and slipped in the expression *v sushchnosti* before the hyphenated label Anglo-Russian? Certainly at this point he decided to call it a day and to make implicit, if not exactly handsome, amends by winding up with a sentence about the formal acceptance by Iran of the "Tsarist [Tsarist alone] Ultimatum".

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### EDITORIAL COMMENT

The number of Soviet readers of Matveyev's article who have also read or are in a position to read the 10-year old articles in *Central Asian Review* which he makes the target of his criticism is probably very small indeed. This makes it reasonably safe for him to ignore the purpose of the articles which was clearly described as being to analyse as representative a selection as possible of Soviet writing on Iranian affairs available up to 1957. It was emphasized that "generally speaking the analysis is confined to Soviet views on and interpretation of Soviet affairs and history with a bare minimum of interpretative comment".

Soviet sensitivity on the subject of the marked difference ("contradiction" in Soviet parlance) between pre- and post-Pokrovskiy historiography is well known and several attempts have been made to gloss over this difference and to some extent even to rehabilitate Pokrovskiy (see CAR, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 56) but this would hardly provide the reason for Matveyev's laboured endeavour to discredit research conducted by CAR 10 years ago.

A more likely explanation is the continuing and ever increasing Soviet preoccupation with alleged "falsification of history" by Western writers. Many Soviet historians seem to judge it expedient to "unmask" CAR as one of the chief offenders in this respect, and their search for suitable ways in which they can display their assiduity leads them into strange bypaths.

## THE NATIONAL MINORITIES OF WESTERN CHINA

The following communication has been received from Sir Michael Gillett with reference to the article on the national minorities of Western China in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. XV, No. 3. Sir Michael Gillett held many consular and diplomatic posts in China including that of British Consul-General in Kashgar. He was British Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1957-63.

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I FOUND the article most interesting, though its title is misleading. For Rakhimov's article deals almost entirely with north-west China, which contains only a quarter of the total number of national minorities to be found in west China as a whole.

Communist policy towards national minorities is a fascinating subject, and an analysis of how the Russians and the Chinese deal with this matter, on paper and in practice, would be valuable. Originally the Chinese took many of their ideas from the Soviets, and it would be instructive to know how far they now deviate. In the meantime there is this article by Rakhimov. Certainly there is some "pot-and-kettlery" in it, two convenient examples of which can be found on p. 256 [CAR XV, 3]. The Uygur-Russian Dictionary of Baskakov and Nasilov published about 25 years ago already contains "a flood of lexical borrowings from other languages", ranging from *apelsin* for orange (*naranj*) through *konserva* for jam (*murabba*) to *zakaz* for order (*buyurugh* or *farman*). And when it comes to "flouting the religious feelings of the Uygurs", when Sheng Shih-Ts'ai was governing Sinkiang with the help of Russian advisers there was no official discouragement of the celebration of religious festivals by drinking parties in public places at which Tashkent vodka, imported by the Soyuzintorg was used.

It is now 14 years since I left China, so I cannot speak with up-to-date authority. But Rakhimov's article, after allowance is made for this "pot-and-kettlery", does seem to give a reasonably realistic view of how China's national minorities are now faring. Certainly what he says tallies with what was observable in 1953. And it suggests that the CPG has made considerable progress in its control over the national minorities by following the lines laid down in the Common Programme and in the Nationalities Programme of the 22nd February, 1952. The Chinese apparently now have a sufficient grip of the problem to be able to concentrate on "reforming" rather than "preserving" the customs, habits and religious beliefs of the national minorities. And "Pan-Maoism" does not seem a serious deviation like "Pan-Hanism", or "Great Power Nationalism" which was attacked in Article 50 of the Common Programme.

The traditional Chinese policy towards the non-Chinese groups in the country—particularly those that the Chinese feared, such as the

Kazakhs in Sinkiang or the Black Lisu in Yünnan—has always been to soften them up, sinicize them and, finally, to absorb them. It has long been obvious that the policy of the Central People's Government (CPG) in this sphere—as in so many other spheres—is merely the traditional Chinese policy, refurbished (in this case stressing the softening up by apparent friendliness rather than by force) and given a Communist twist. Article 34 of the Nationalities Programme, for instance, lays down that "People's Governments at higher levels" are to use all appropriate means to introduce to the people of the autonomous areas "the advanced experience and the facts of political, economic and cultural construction". This surely is but sinicization (ugly word) "writ large".

This Nationalities Programme also made it clear that the Chinese interpretation of "autonomy" is a very circumscribed one. Article 2 states that the autonomous areas are inseparable parts of the People's Republic of China, under the unified guidance of the CPG, and subject to the guidance of "People's Governments at higher levels". That is to say autonomous areas are all ultimately subordinate to a purely Chinese organ of government.

It is, as you point out, very interesting that the Soviets at last admit to a realistic view of the Chinese nationalities policy. And the generalizing tone of Rakhimov's article suggests that the Russians are now not much better informed than other people. I think this official Soviet view is likely to be nearer the truth than the completely and absolutely contrasting assessment of the BBC symposium.

To be dewy-eyed is often a result of short sight; and the Chinese are unlikely to grant visas to those who will not report favourably on developments within the People's Republic. Further, though the device of autonomous areas is but an instrument for securing more effective Chinese control over their national minorities, and thus offers a potential threat to the spiritual and moral values of the people concerned, yet autonomous areas do afford the national minorities certain obvious material benefits. Their identity is recognised, and they now have the possibility of using their native tongue administratively and of having some officials of their own race. Attention is now being paid to public health, education, and so on. And a superficial view might easily concentrate on these material benefits and overlook the darker side of the picture, which Rakhimov has not done.

The map of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, which accompanies your article, brings out some of Rakhimov's points in an interesting way. The Sinkiang Mongols have been split into two autonomous districts; and the Bayan Gol district has been extended south and east to include territory that in my time was Turki (or Uygur as that race is now incorrectly named) and untouched by the Sinkiang Mongols to the north, or the Tsinghai Mongols to the south. In my time the Bogdo massif, as far as Ch'i-chio-ching was almost purely Kazakh country, yet Urumchi has been surrounded by a comfortably wide Hui autonomous area.

## BOOK REVIEWS

DEMIN, A. I. *Agriculture in Present Day Iran.*

MARGULAN, A. Kh. and VOSTROV, V. V. Eds. *The Culture and Way of Life of the Kazakh Aul.*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. *The Steppe Aflame.*

STEPANYANTS, M. T. *Philosophy and Sociology in Pakistan.*

TATYBEKOVA, Zh. S. *The Women of Soviet Kirgiziya in the Struggle for Socialism and Communism.*

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**Philosophy and Sociology in Pakistan** (*Filosofiya i sotsiologiya v Pakistane*).

By M. T. Stepanyants. Preface by L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya. Nauka Press, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1967. 150 pp. Print order 2,300. 52k.

We all have our weaknesses, and *Central Asian Review* has a weakness for anything from the pen of either Gordon-Polonskaya or M. T. Stepanyants. Both these writers seem to us to have brought for some years a rare mixture of enthusiasm and insight to their study of Muslim thought and practice in the Indian and Pakistan setting. Readers who recall the full analysis in this journal of the former's *Muslim Trends in the Social Thought of India and Pakistan* will be primed for M. T. Stepanyants' opening remark now, that her "present work is a sort of continuation of the theme developed" by Gordon-Polonskaya in the book cited.

One had indeed that expectation several pages ahead of the remark, for the lengthy preface by Gordon-Polonskaya is no formal blessing but an articulated bridge along which one is escorted before being entrusted to the new guide. Tread by tread, the doctrine of "Muslim nationalism" as expounded by Iqbal is summarized, and the reasons recapitulated why this doctrine should have governed most of the thinking which has since been done in Pakistan. Two of Gordon-Polonskaya's sentences can be quoted: (1) "Muslim nationalism as interpreted by Iqbal, as the present work brilliantly shows, continues to play the lead in all that counts in the philosophy, morals, ethics and politics of Pakistan today"; and (2) "It is precisely with the moral and ethical solution offered by him [Iqbal], as M. Stepanyants' essay will emphasize, that the Pakistan philosophers are nowadays busied."

In her own introduction Stepanyants makes two observations, besides the remark already mentioned, which perhaps demand a word or two before one attends to the essay itself. The first is that "strictly philosophical problems in Pakistan are the province almost exclusively of academic teachers; whereas on questions of ethics, politics and economics [not only these, but] official spokesmen and other commanding figures in public life have their say". Taking this into account, she goes on, "we have thought it necessary to bring in as sources for ethical and political attitudes not only highly specialized armchair studies but the stuff of the Pakistan periodicals

(chiefly the two leading newspapers *Pakistan Times* and *Dawn*); State documents; the programmes of the political parties; . . . the Constituent Assembly Debates . . . etc." This preliminary proof of commonsense is particularly welcome to those of us who have battled with a Soviet work on recent trends in Indian philosophy where a noisy office-bearer of one of the bifurcations of the ICP got a hearing alongside philosophers of the stature of S. Radhakrishnan.

The other observation reads: "Literature on the themes dealt with in this essay is almost non-existent." Up to the moment (by p. 18, that is) this is unintelligible, and its consideration had best be postponed to the end of the review.

Stepanyants contents herself with eight or 10 pages on Shah Waliullah and Sayyid Ahmad before coming to the third of "the three towering Muslim thinkers of India", namely, Iqbal whose thought is to be pivotal to her essay. It is not proposed here to make any précis of her appreciation, seeing that this is fairly in line with what others have said elsewhere. Nevertheless some isolated judgments are worth noting: "Iqbal's philosophy, many of his ideas relating to reformation, are not distinguished by originality and to a considerable degree [merely] expand the thoughts already uttered by his predecessors. . . ." "First and foremost [he] was a really great poet . . . [whose] literary talent enabled him . . . to bring home his ideas to the people at large." Then comes this: "In the heritage of the Muslim thinkers of the past closer than all to Iqbal was medieval Sufism." Stepanyants' way of putting it pulls the reader up; remembering Iqbal's celebrated assault on the Sufi ethic. But one sees what she means. The undeniable influence of Jalaluddin Rumi, for instance, on Iqbal had not so much to do with 13th century poetry as with the humanistic and democratic content of early Sufism. Sufism gave *prostor*, "the space," Stepanyants says, for the searchings of a mind like Iqbal's, without requiring any *de jure* departure from the limits of Sunni Islam. This is all quite compatible, she maintains, with what Iqbal taught (in "The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam") about the medieval mystical technique being outmoded and in need of replacement by a method to be borrowed from European experience.

The rest of the monograph is concerned with showing how the Iqbal *mirovozzreniye* (Weltanschauung), with its rejection alike of the Western capitalist way and the Russian socialist way, has suited, and become woven into, the pattern of Pakistan's philosophical and sociological thinking. It is in the footsteps of the Master's "spiritual pluralism" and his "Muslim nationalism" that the Pakistan philosophers have since been walking. Stepanyants supports her argument by some convincing evidence, adducing in particular the works of M. M. Sharif, G. Ch. Dev, A. Rashid, and C. A. Qadir. It is clearly impossible to reproduce here her *coup d'oeil* of the modern philosophy as represented by these teachers, but as this portion of the monograph is really its pith the non-Soviet reader must at least be told the kind of commentary she offers on their texts.

1. Mohammad Miyan Sharif distinguished three levels of being: the ultimate reality, which is God; the spiritual existences, or monads; and the space-time world of sensation. The ultimate being engenders the beings of the second level as an active and reacting, conscious centre of energy, eternal, possessed of free will; and these monads in their turn engender the third

level, the world of sensation, phenomenal, temporal, transient, in which they express themselves.

This conception of reality, Stepanyants observes, is scarcely original, being in effect an Islamic adaptation of German objective idealism (Leibnitz, Hegel). But the point is that the German content of Pakistan philosophy entered *via* Iqbal: and commends itself by its "conciliatory characteristics" to a society which is against the dry orthodoxy, against materialism, against atheism—and out for compromise.

2. Govinda Chandra Dev. Since the dominion of science is coterminous with the world of phenomena, reason is graded below intuition in Pakistan philosophy. Reason indeed is on a par with sensation, and neither can get very far towards picturing reality without the aid of a "supralogical" intuition which in Dev's phrase preserves the splendour of both but is freed from their inadequacies.

But at this stage in their teaching, as Stepanyants acutely remarks, the philosophers are approaching perilous ground. "Under intuition is commonly understood the mystical experience"; and if this be enthroned, then a gap yawns between the few who have had it and the many who can accept it on trust at secondhand.

3. Akhtar Rashid. Certain of the theologians (S. Z. Chaudhuri, K. D. Ahmad) seem disposed to acquiesce in this conclusion "but many of the thinkers of Pakistan refuse to entertain it". They go back to Iqbal with his "intellectual and pragmatic check" on the testimony of the mystical experience. Thus Rashid contends that there is no need for the many to be dictated to by the chosen few. Intuition to his thinking is a subjective experience which cannot command universality: faith by nature is inert, dogmatic, and incapable of marching in step with a perpetually changing world; and therefore prone to breed fanaticism and intolerance; whereas reason is critical of everything (including itself) and so the final arbitrator.

4. C. A. Qadir. Some of the philosophers, Qadir among them, have been so critical of irrationalism as to flirt with logical positivism. Existentialism too has not been without its appeal in so far as it offers an interpretation of intuition which is consonant with Islamic tradition. But as Qadir quite rightly pointed out, it gives short shrift to collectivism "without which no group or community can develop". And "what the ideologists are after is a philosophy which shall knit their compatriots together, be marked by optimism, and instil a faith in the possibility of fashioning the ideal Islamic society".

Switching from pure philosophy to ethics—and dipping here into I. H. Qureshi, A. K. Brohi, A. A. Maudoodi, B. A. Dar, Amjad 'Ali and others—Stepanyants finds that the old feudal morality is wasting itself out and yielding to a bourgeois and petty bourgeois code enveloped in a religious cover.

Lastly, the political thinking of Pakistan is resumed. Positions here, Stepanyants notices, are dictated by the interests of those affected. Reactionaries envisage the Islamic State as something attainable only through the regeneration of outmoded institutions; whereas those in office claim that it is contingent on an amalgam of Muslim traditions with the institutions of modern bourgeois democracy. The idea of "a one-class, pure, Islamic democracy" has all but vanished, and "Islamic socialism"

obstructs alike the formation of a proletarian ideology and the spread of the ideas of scientific communism.

It is necessary to add that this important and for the most part animated book is punctuated here and there by moments of boredom. It is boring even (one supposes) to the Soviet reader of 1967 to have to face an entire page (p. 137) of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin which have nowhere been geared to the text of the essay: it is boring to Pakistani readers to learn (p. 47) that the reason why the leaders of intellectual life in their country do not "come out squarely against dialectical materialism" is that to do so would mean "encouraging an interest, to them unhealthy, in Marxism": it is boring to everybody to be told (p. 7) that the anti-Hinduism in "Muslim nationalism" was a product (*resultat*) of the British connexion.

To revert, then, to that opening remark of the author's that there was no literature on the theme of her essay. Has she not disproved it by the menu she has composed? Or perhaps she meant that there were no books about the books on her subject and that what she was proposing to serve was, as the old Turk put it, the soup of the soup of the hare.

H. E.

**Agriculture in Present Day Iran** (*Sel'skoye khozyaystvo sovremennogo Irana*). By A. I. Demin. Nauka Press, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1967. 227 pp. Print order 2,000. 76k.

THE Soviet academic, taking the cue perhaps from his political mentors, occasionally acquiesces gracefully in the principle of coexistence. Demin in the foreword to this rather miserably produced but richly documented and above all up-to-date treatise goes out of his way to be generous to his foreign companions-in-arms, complimenting Messrs. Barth, Kristjanson and Jonson on their respective studies of the Iranian countryside and handing Miss Lambton a very special bouquet. Because her work (*Landlord and Peasant in Persia*) went to the root of the matter, he says it is as valid today as when she wrote it (1953).

But the non-Soviet readers addressed in this review will want rather to know of recent Russian studies of the same problem. The relevant publications hitherto (books, that is, not articles in learned journals or in works of reference) have been:

Sh. M. Badi: *Agrarian relations in Contemporary Iran*. M., 1959.

S. G. Gorelikov: *Iran; An Economic and Geographical Description*. M., 1961.

P. A. Seidov: *The Agrarian Question and Peasant Movement in Iran*. Baku, 1963.

I. I. Polyukaytsi: *Economic Development of Iran*. M., 1965.

V. V. Trubetskoy: *The Bakhtiari: Settled Nomadic Tribes of Iran*. M., 1966.

In this present work the author, while certainly indebted to the experience of his European, American and Soviet co-workers, has more frequently drawn on Persian-language sources including self-contained books, contributions to periodicals, official documents and the daily press. The two last need hardly be named here, being familiar enough, but among the books the most thumbed are:

Kazem Zarnegar: *The Future Destiny of our Villages and Towns*. Tehran, 1959.

'Ali Mohammad Izadi: *The Distribution of Land is not the Remedy*, Shiraz, 1960.

Ahmad Human: *Agricultural Economy*, Tehran, 1955.

'Ali Akbar Nurad: *Co-operative Societies and the Agricultural Bank*, Tehran, 1953.

Mohammad 'Ali 'Ebadi: *Land Reform in Iran*, Tehran, 1961.

The articles cited are, notably, those in *Sokhan*, 1963-4, by Jamshid Behnam and Shahpur Rasokh; those in *Tehran Ekonomist*, 1961-6, by Arsalan Khal'atbari, Esghar Yusef-Zade, Golsorkhi, and Valian; those in *Tahqiqate Eqtesadi* (Economic Survey), 1961-5, by Mansur 'Ata'i.

It is with history beginning on 6 December 1959—the day when the "Bill" got into the press—that Demin is concerned. He recounts the tale of alarm and excursion which unfolded from that date. A turning point was reached early in May 1961 when 'Ali Amini's Government took office with "the ardent" Arsanjani as Minister of Agriculture. The press of 20.6.61 is quoted to the effect that the head of the USA Mission for Economic Co-operation (the old Point Four) visited the Premier and promised to assist in implementing the reforms—"but the affair ended in promises": what happened was that the aid was actually reduced from \$105.7 million to \$87.3 million in the next year (1962). Whatever the cause of American coolness was, it suited the book of the Russians at that juncture; for, as Demin adds in an aside, they were just then instilling a little warmth into their own relationship with Iran.

Delays exasperated the peasantry, and the situation began to get out of hand. But at last on 10 January 1962 the Bill, by then revised, was endorsed by the Cabinet and received the Shah's assent four days later.

The pros and cons of this Bill, which signalled Stage One in the programme of agricultural reform, are then weighed. Demin's finding is, on balance, favourable for it did "at least, and for the first time, permit a considerable contingent of the workers in rural Iran to acquire parcels of land". Had it not been a damaging blow to Iran's semi-feudal landlordism it would scarcely have provoked the violent reaction it did. There were manoeuvres to get it rescinded; as being unconstitutional (not having been approved by Parliament), and as violating a precept of Islam ("since a Muslim may not pray on soil of which he has become the proprietor by means of compulsion"). In Firuzabad, Engineer Malek 'Abedi, the official charged with introducing the reforms in the region, was done to death. The opposition, says Demin in this place, had gone too far. The Government struck hard, and from then on these "semi-feudal landlords ceased to play first fiddle".

The course of the Government, now set on the elimination of the great estates, was expressed in the "Shah's Programme". The referendum in that connexion was a resounding Government triumph. Even so, the clergy with the khans of Fars and parts of Khuzestan and such landlords as could control the local water supply and thus coerce the peasants physically, held out: all these three elements of the opposition mixture braced themselves for the 1963 elections. In the result, however, a parliament came into being which for the first time was not "the political stronghold of the great landlords, the khans, and the clergy".

The realization of Stage One of the agrarian reform had dragged on until mid-1966. Demin, assessing the resulting situation, disputes certain of the published figures and argues that about 63 per cent of lands still resided with landlords, church and State, and that on the said estates the feudal form of production persisted: so that it is misleading to talk of "a white revolution".

Stage Two, affecting the smaller and average landlords came into force on 4 June 1964, and into operation with effect from February 1965. But the author has little belief in the initial will of the ruling circles to face the implications of this stage. Their conviction was, and still is, that the modest landlords constitute the basis of "a healthy Iranian society", and their intention all along had been, in Stage Two, to superintend the long-term leasing, not the surrender, of lands by these small proprietors. In a sense, therefore, Stage Two has been "too easy", and the authorities have now marched with a flourish of trumpets into Stage Three which embodies village uplift in its widest connotation—irrigation, communication, method, education.

As a bourgeois operation calculated to guarantee the conditions of capitalist development, the agrarian reforms have worked, is Demin's verdict. But they have not signified a *perelom*, a complete break with the past, in agricultural production.

H. E.

**The Culture and Way of Life of the Kazakh Aul** (*Kul'tura i byt kazakhskogo aula*). Edited by A. Kh. Margulan and V. V. Vostrov. Nauka Press, Alma-Ata, 1967. 304 pp. Print order 3,700. R1.75.

THIS is an interesting ethnographic study in depth of two kolkhozes in the Taldy-Kurgan rayon of Alma-Ata oblast which is designed to show what the life of the Kazakh peasant is like today and how it has changed under Soviet rule. The two kolkhozes, which were the object of intensive investigation by a group of Kazakhstan ethnographers during the course of four years (1960-4), are the show kolkhoz im. XXII s'yezda KPSS, which boasts no fewer than 18 Heroes of Socialist Labour, and the run-of-the-mill kolkhoz Zhetysu with a mere two. The chairmen of both kolkhozes are Kazakhs but, whereas the members of the first belong to 19 nationalities including Kazakh, Russian, German, Ukrainian, Korean and Uygur, those of the second are predominantly Kazakh.

A brief history is given of each kolkhoz, followed by lengthy chapters on their economy (with the emphasis on the role of the Kazakh kolkhozniks), the material culture (housing, dress, food and handicrafts) of the Kazakhs, their family life, and education and culture. There was no permanent settlement on the territory of the Zhetysu kolkhoz before the kolkhoz was set up, but Chubar, the centre of kolkhoz im. XXII s'yezda KPSS and originally the winter quarters of certain Kazakh clans, was settled by Russian and Ukrainian peasants in 1910. In 1921 under the land and water reform Chubar was returned to the Kazakhs and more or less fell into ruins as the Kazakhs continued to lead their former nomadic existence. The predecessors of the present kolkhozes were set up at the end of the 1920s, when Russians again settled in Chubar. The kolkhozes go in for mixed farming. Their most important crop is sugar beet, followed by wheat. Cultivation is largely mechanized and chemicals are used. Animal husbandry occupies

second place after crop cultivation, with sheep heading the list, followed by cattle, horses (for kumys and draught purposes) and camels. Efforts are being made to improve the breeds and artificial insemination is practised, but the shepherds still lead a semi-nomadic existence as the distance between the winter and summer pastures is 250-500 km.

Having shown that the Kazakhs now grow bumper crops and practise modern farming techniques, the book goes on to describe the changes in their living conditions. Except on the summer pastures, where yurts are used, they live in Russian-style houses, almost all of which have been built in the last 15 years. The houses are built partly by the owners and their friends and partly by hired labour, and the former two-roomed plan is giving way to three or more rooms. All the houses in the kolkhoz im. XXII s'yezda KPSS have electricity (conditions are markedly better here than in the Zhetysu kolkhoz), and some even have a bathroom and central heating, but the majority have to depend on wells for their water supplies. The average Kazakh kolkhoznik now has an extensive wardrobe and a more varied diet. With the availability of manufactured goods, many of the old handicrafts have lost their importance, and it is mainly the older women who make the traditional felts. However, echoes of the Kazakhs' former nomadic life can be seen in their lack of pride in the appearance of their home and indifferent attitude towards hygiene, their tendency to eat and sleep on the floor even when they have tables and beds, their low consumption of fruit and vegetables, and their improvidence as regards laying in fuel supplies for the winter and repairing their outbuildings in good time. The shepherds come in for particular criticism for the unhygienic and generally primitive conditions in which they are content to live in their yurts in the summer months.

In the two kolkhozes under study the families of the Kazakh kolkhozniks are mostly conjugal, but some large ones exist on the old pattern. Sometimes two brothers live together with their families. This is very convenient if one is a shepherd, as he can leave his children in the settlement when he is away on the remote pastures. Relations within the Kazakh families are depicted as idyllic, and it is claimed that even the children never quarrel. Kinship ties are still very strong, and a good deal of adoption goes on between relatives. Almost all the children now attend school up to the age of 15, and many continue their education at a VUZ or tekhnikum. Amateur theatrical activities are also very popular and of a high standard. But many of the old customs are still observed. Circumcision of boys is universal, and the costly rites connected with births, weddings and particularly funerals are still observed. Marriages are sometimes registered with the civil authorities only when the third child is born and the family becomes eligible for an allowance. Polygamy is tolerated, and clan exogamy is almost universally observed, as is burial in the clan cemetery. There are no mosques in the kolkhozes but practising Muslims meet together on major feast days.

While the book provides a valuable picture of the life of Kazakh kolkhozniks today, it has to be remembered that Soviet writers almost invariably don rose-coloured spectacles when looking at their own country. Moreover, the exceptionally high standards of the kolkhoz im. XXII s'yezda KPSS, which make it a show place for foreign visitors, are not balanced by a description of life in a backward kolkhoz. It is a pity too, though

predictable, that the ravages of collectivization and the stabilization of the nomads are not mentioned.

Less understandable is the omission of any indication of the proportion of Kazakhs now engaging in crop cultivation as opposed to the traditional sheep-rearing. And surely for a more real understanding of the progress of the Kazakhs we should be told more about the other nationalities in the two kolkhozes. We are not given even approximate figures for the national composition of the kolkhoz members, the kolkhoz intelligentsia (except teachers) or the labour force, nor is any opinion vouchsafed as to whether or not the greater prosperity of the kolkhoz *im. XXII s'yezda KPSS* is due to the larger European element in its population, as one suspects it might be. One would also like to know if the different nationalities tend to live in compact groups (there is some indication that they do) and if the Kazakhs spend their leisure hours with the other nationalities. Inter-marriage between the Kazakhs and the non-Muslim nationalities seems to be limited, and no cases of Kazakh girls marrying Europeans are quoted.

The book is illustrated, but there is no index or bibliography.

A. S.

**The Women of Soviet Kirgiziya in the Struggle for Socialism and Communism** (*Zhenshchiny Sovetskogo Kirgizstana v bor'be za sotsializm i kommunizm*). By Zh. S. Tatybekova. Ilim Press, Frunze, 1967. 260 pp. Print order 500. R1.16.

THIS book is sub-titled "The historical experience of the emancipation of the women of the East in the process of the construction of socialism and communism", but in fact its story starts only in 1938, about 10 years after the main campaign to emancipate women began, and little is said specifically about the continuing problems of making the equality of women a reality. In effect the book deals with the role of women of all nationalities in the economic and cultural life of Kirgiziya in the period 1938-65 and consists largely of an endless catalogue of their achievements. Figures, occasionally broken by nationality, are given to show the extent of female participation in industry, agriculture and so on, and the names of numerous women who overfulfilled their norms at some time or another are recorded for posterity.

A. S.

**The Steppe Aflame** (*Plamya v stepi*). Short stories from the Mongolian. A Ministry of Defence Publication, Moscow, 1967. 235 pp. Print order 3,000. 76k.

THIS is a collection of 17 short stories translated from the Mongolian with occasional footnotes to assist the general reader. The three Soviet translators have selected tales which have a setting and a purpose in common. The setting is fire and the sword, and the purpose is to exhibit the courage of a small people fighting for national independence through the years of endurance that began in 1921 and lasted until the Japanese defeat in the Second World War. The selection, which is sponsored by the Ministry of Defence, is calculated to show how the Mongolians were heartened in their struggle by Russian support and by the presence, both in the earlier phase and the later, of Soviet comrades in their midst.

The stories are simple in structure and effectively rendered. They are likely to be enjoyed by the readership for which they are intended. H. E.

# SOVIET PRESS COMMENT

1 OCTOBER-31 DECEMBER 1967

## I. THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND KAZAKH SSRS

As might be expected, this quarter was dominated by the 50th anniversary of the Revolution. Long articles on Soviet history, whole pages devoted to the achievements of other republics of the Soviet Union, and exhortations to work harder and compete in order to fulfil anniversary plans were abundant. These increased in quantity and enthusiasm up to the 7th November; on the 8th the celebration marches and processions were described at length; then followed two days' silence, after which the press reverted to a more normal pattern.

### *Party and Government*

Because of the jubilee the annual budgetary session of the Supreme Soviet was put forward from December to mid-October: the economy and plan fulfilment were discussed. Anniversary sessions of the republican Supreme Soviets were held on 6 November.

Sharif Rashidov, First Secretary of the Uzbekistan CP, was awarded the Order of Lenin; but in the subsequent congratulatory articles almost more attention was paid to his literary than to his political work.

The economic reforms continued to be implemented.

### *Foreign Affairs*

Coverage of foreign affairs was similar to that in the metropolitan press. Towards the end of the year 100-200 word reports, almost invariably entitled "Events in China", were appearing three or four times a week; trouble in Sinkiang was mentioned several times in these (see under Sinkiang below). Many foreign delegations visited Central Asia after having taken part in the anniversary celebrations in Moscow: these included Turks, Afghans, Canadians, Latin Americans and Portuguese. On 24 November religious dignitaries from the Lebanon visited Uzbekistan. In October a "Tadzhik decade" was held in Lithuania and a similar Uzbek festival in Hungary.

### *Agriculture and Irrigation*

In the second half of the quarter agricultural topics received the most attention, particularly cotton with the harvest drawing to a close at the end of the year. Apart from Turkmenistan, which published the final figure of 700,000 metric tons sold to the state, or 145 per cent of the target (TI 28.12.67), the full harvest statistics for Central Asia have yet to be released. The Turkmen result is a good one, despite a highly inauspicious spring, and will probably be the best proportionately for Central Asia. Successes were attributed to efficient irrigation (the fact that output in the Tedzhen area has more than doubled since 1961 is wholly accredited to the Karakum canal), to a more expert knowledge and handling of chemicals and the use of

aviation in crop spraying, and to generally increased mechanization, although throughout the quarter there were the usual numerous complaints about the extreme difficulty in obtaining spare parts and about workers who left the cotton-harvesting machines out in the fields and hopelessly neglected their maintenance.

As December approached an increasing amount of criticism was directed at farmers who had not prepared for winter by amassing stores of fodder; in Kazakhstan for instance, a quarter of the fodder was said to be still in the fields, four million hectares' worth of straw had still to be collected, many new farm buildings had not been finished and old ones not repaired. (KP 22.11.67)

On December 30th, PV reported a meeting of the Uzbek Central Committee and Soviet of Ministers about rice production. In some areas, for example around Andizhan, Fergana and Bukhara, below 20 per cent of the crop was actually harvested. Rice workers have been very slow in making proper use of machines and chemicals available: in outlying districts over 70 per cent was gathered by hand. Plans were made to rectify this situation.

Irrigation projects which have been completed include 44 km. of the Karakum canal between Ashkhabad and Geok-Tepe which was opened at the beginning of November. On December 3 a diversion tunnel for the river Talas—part of the construction of the Kirovskoye reservoir—was completed. (SK 5.12.67). And at the end of December the tunnel between the Vakhsh and Yavan valleys was finally bored (KT 30.12.67)—see CAR, XV, 4, pp. 343–5. Criticisms were made about the slow rate of progress on the Irtys-Karaganda canal.

### *Communications*

At the end of October the Orbita television receiver centre was opened in Alma-Ata; it receives programmes direct from Moscow via the Molniya-1 satellite.

The electrification of the Tselinograd-Atbasar section of the Karaganda-Magnitogorsk railway has been completed (IZ 11.11.67), and a further 335 km. of the new Gur'yev-Astrakhan railway was finished six months early. (KP 2.11.67)

### *Construction industry*

The inefficiencies of the Central Asian building industry were frequently exposed: either builders had fulfilled plans on time but at the expense of quality, resulting in shoddy buildings, or they were hopelessly behind schedule for no good reason; generally there was enormous wastage and lack of economy. The MSO (Interkolkhoz Building Organization) was criticized for failing to keep promises and inexcusable irresponsibility. (KT 31.12.67)

The other chief cause for complaint was the lack of heating in many houses. In some cases promises were made several years ago to install central heating and ditches were dug for the necessary pipes, but to this day nothing further has been done (e.g. in Ordzhonikidzeabad—KT 29.10.67). In *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (7.10.67) it was claimed that the education of the children in the Milyutin middle school, Kustanay oblast, was seriously impaired because there was no heating in the school.

There was also a much more encouraging side to the picture, notably in

Tashkent where reconstruction after the 1966 earthquake seems to be making excellent progress. (PV 29.10.67)

Of the other projects which have been completed and opened, the most important was the Central Asia—Centre gas pipe-line, carrying Central Asian gas to Moscow and officially opened at the beginning of October.

#### *Education and culture*

Education was off to a good start this quarter as October 1st is Teachers' Day in the Soviet Union. Enormous space was covered with the problems of Party and ideological instruction, the organization of which is not up to standard in many places. Two subjects which came to the fore towards the end of the quarter were teachers' training colleges (*pedinstituty*) and the importance of social sciences. A complaint was made about the lack of textbooks in Tadzhik, and it seems that the only Uzbek-Russian dictionaries in existence are many-volumed, out of date and very hard to come by; despite plans made and orders given there is still no practicable phrase book. (PV 21.12.67)

The anniversary produced a flood of anthologies and general histories, among which the one to arouse the greatest interest was *The Victory of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan*, (*Pobeda sovetskoy vlasti v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane*) compiled by a group of Central Asian historians, under the chief editorship of I. I. Mints, who, having had access to new material, were said to have brought the conclusive answer to the bourgeois falsifiers, particularly on the well-worn controversy of nationalities.

The 70th anniversary of the birth of the Kazakh writer, Mukhtar Auevov, and the 80th anniversary of that of the Tadzhik writer, Lakhuti [presumably the well-known *Persian* writer Abul Qasem Lahuti,—Ed.] were widely celebrated both locally and in the central press.

The role and function of newspapers was examined at the end of November as the time for renewing subscriptions as the new year approached.

#### *Territorial changes*

Two new oblasts have been created: Namangan, in the Fergana Valley, comprising the town of Namangan and seven agricultural rayons of the Andizhan and Fergana oblasts (PR 19.12.67); and Taldy-Kurgan in Kazakhstan which includes the towns of Taldy-Kurgan and Tekeli and eight rayons formerly part of Alma-Ata oblast. (PR 24.12.67)

#### *Miscellany*

Many prolix articles were written about the latest innovation—NOT (the Scientific Organization of Labour); this was applied to almost every conceivable field, such as building, teaching, industry, town transport (in which it could help stagger the rush hour) and many more.

Similarly, whole pages were devoted to the work of the *narodnyy kontrol'* or people's control.

With the five-day week in operation just about everywhere by October, there were naturally many reports of how it was working out. It seems to have created one or two problems, for instance the hours of public transport do not correspond everywhere to the new working hours, and many clubs are remarkably empty as they are unimaginatively run and have not taken advantage of a highly favourable situation.

The 4th Congress of Uzbek women, originally scheduled for 1966 and postponed because of the earthquake, took place in December (see "Women in Uzbekistan", p. 50). The cinematographers of the Turkmen SSR also met in December, and on 26 October a jubilee plenum of Kazakh writers was held. (KP 27.10.67)

K. F.

## II. ADJOINING COUNTRIES

### *Afghanistan*

The coverage of Afghan affairs was negligible, and the resulting folder of cuttings this quarter was perhaps the slimmest on record.

In mid-October the press reported the retirement on health grounds of the premier, M. Mayvandal, and his replacement *ad interim* by the Minister of Planning, M. Yaftali. This information was followed up a fortnight later by the announcement that the King had entrusted the formation of a new government to the ex-Foreign Minister, Nur Ahmad E'temadi, whose biography was appended to the item.

Unexpectedly little was made of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, but the King's ample message to Mr. Podgorniy was reproduced which described the Afghan-Soviet relationship as the case *par excellence* of the peaceful coexistence and fruitful co-operation of two countries contrasted in their system of government. M. Yaftali's briefer telegram to Mr. Kosygin was also printed and so was a TASS report of the reception given on 10 November in the Kremlin to the President of the Afghan Senate and one member of that House who had attended the celebration as H.M.'s personal representatives.

A photograph of a grain elevator constructed on the outskirts of Kabul with Soviet aid appeared in SK 11.10.67 and was repeated in TI 26.10.67.

KT 16.12.67 reported under the caption "An International Meeting of Poets" the proceedings of a symposium chaired by Dr. Ahmad Dzhaved, Professor of Afghan Literature at Tashkent University. The addresses, in so far as these were specified, were by prominent Soviet scholars such as Prof. Braginskiy and Dr. Dvoryankov. It was not, the reader could only infer, a gathering of poets, but a seminar on Afghan poetry.

### **The Indian Sub-Continent**

#### *India*

Reporting, somewhat below the average in volume, embraced as many topics as ever. What follows is necessarily a selection from the references that occurred.

An Indo-Soviet cultural society from Kerala State was in Alma-Ata on a short visit, said KP 1.10.67. A few days later PR and most other journals carried a TASS message from Delhi to the effect that Chinese troops had opened fire on Indian frontier posts, and a parallel message from Peking quoting Chinese allegations of an Indian violation of the frontier. Little, however, was made of the affair or of the resulting Note of protest presented to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi. *Trud* 6.10.67 printed an article by M. Achuthan, Secretary of the All-India Trades Unions Congress, entitled "Mighty Effort" which took pride in the mounting strike figures of the past several years and sought to link the gratifying results with the growing intimacy of the Indian and the Soviet trade unions.

K. Perevoshchikov in IZ 8.10.67 had a lengthy piece from Bombay about "the fascist organization Shiv Sena" or Army of Shivaji, of which, he said, there were about 100 branches in the state endeavouring by acts of hooliganism to disrupt the working-class and particularly the city proletariat. "The Green Expanses of Kerala," was the heading of an account of this industrially backward "problem state" by I. Serebryakov of *Pravda*, also appearing on 8.10.67. Mrs. Indira Gandhi's non-official visit to Moscow was widely but rather briefly dealt with during the next few days, and around the same dates there were non-committal mentions of an alleged Indo-Pakistan frontier incident. IZ 18.10.67 reported "a first crack" in the Uttar Pradesh coalition government.

The month had by then advanced sufficiently for some space to be allotted to the half-century of the October Revolution. On 19.10.67 Dr. Gangadhar Adhikari, a member of the ICP's Central Secretariat, wrote on "The Echoes of Victory" in *Izvestiya*, and on 20.10.67 *Pravda* carried a long article from the pen of Rajeshwar Rao, General Secretary of the National Council of the ICP. This recapitulated the October story and linked that landmark in human history with the national liberation movement in India, which according to the writer did not cease with independence and was still in progress. The felicitations of the President on the one hand, and of the Indian Communists on the other, to the USSR were featured, though unobtrusively, in the next days.

On November 5, 6 and 7 the press accorded further space to India's observance of the jubilee; reproducing (IZ 5.11.67) Comrade Shripata Amrita Dange's address to the Party on this subject, and alluding (in PR 6.11.67) to Mrs. Indira Gandhi's references to "the source of inspiration" on which India had been, and was yet, able to draw "although we have opted for a different way of development". The premier's presence again in Moscow for the celebrations was briefly noticed in the press of 7.11.67.

The conference of the "Trade Union of Rajas" convened in Bombay on 13 November to discuss ways and means of safeguarding their pensions was written up by Yu. Gotlober in PR and K. Perevoshchikov in IZ; the latter quoting "bourgeois papers" as asserting with more sentimentality than truth that certain of the princes had had to travel third class to attend. In the concluding week of November all papers covered, but without comment of their own, the West Bengal political scene: the Governor, readers were told, had dissolved the United Left Front composed of 14 progressive parties including the ICP. Against this step, taken allegedly on the instructions of the Indian National Congress at the Centre, local revulsion had been violent; the Communists declaring that parliamentary democracy had been flouted. On the same dates the press made much of the visit paid by the West German Chancellor. There was precious little "good will" about it was the sarcastic remark of PR 23.11.67, and it was intimated that the visitor had warned his hosts that their recognition of East Germany would be treated as an unfriendly act.

In December, India's allotment of space was modest. It was noticed that S. Nijalingappa, Chief Minister of Mysore State, had been elected President of the Indian National Congress in place of Mr. K. Kamaraj (PR etc. 8.12.67); and a few snippets were devoted to the session in Delhi of the National Council of the ICP. But the sole item to which any weight was given was the continuing turmoil in West Bengal. Civil disobedience

was described as being unrestrained, and the explosion of the home-made bomb at Shantineketan near the dais where Mrs. Gandhi was presenting diplomas was also featured—but all with a studied avoidance of comment.

### *Pakistan*

The press notices at the end of the previous quarter were misleading in their references to President Ayub Khan's "four-day visit". The stay in Moscow was of that duration, but the Field-Marshal was actually in the Soviet Union for some five days more, halting at Volgograd, Simferopol', Yalta and elsewhere on the homeward journey. This itinerary was quietly followed in the press of early October, but the papers made up for this on 6.10.67, splashing their pages with a full résumé of the visit and appending the official joint communiqué. This document, the Soviet public could see, was earnest in its tone and the sentences promising a plan of economic co-operation to cover the period till 1975 suggested that both sides meant business. If there was little to report during the remainder of the month, that little was certainly in keeping with the spirit of the communiqué. The popularity of the "Belarus" tractors was reported by A. Filippov in PR and by V. Kondrashov in IZ; and both newspapers remarked on the enthusiasm with which Pakistan was marking the jubilee of the October Revolution.

This topic was carried over into November, when there were several allusions to "friendship weeks" organized up and down the country. In particular the founding of a Pakistan-Soviet Society in Rawalpindi was reported. Attention, too, was paid to a Tadjikistan *dekada*, or ten-day festival, in Pakistan. The visitors, led by M. Nazarov, Minister of Culture, were received at the Universities of Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. Emphasis, the Soviet press added, was laid on the common historical background of the guests and the hosts, as also upon the admiration of the latter for the achievements of the Central Asian republic in the years of socialism.

A couple of papers commented shortly, and slightly, on the visit to Rawalpindi of the Federal German Chancellor.

Almost the only item reported in December was the arrest in Dacca of the veteran Marxist, Mani Singh. PR 17.12.67 would have its readers believe that this had raised a storm of protest in Pakistan, adding that "the Soviet public joins its voice to the demand for Mani Singh's release".

### *Nepal*

Of about one dozen allusions to Nepal in the press of the quarter, most related to the visit to Katmandu in December of a delegation representing the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The visit was described as the first of its kind and of good augury for the future relationship of the two countries.

Of four references in October/November, one (KZ 6.10.67) was the report of an illustrated lecture on the Red Army delivered by the Soviet Military Attaché to the all-Nepal Veterans Association; another (SK 2.11.67) was prompted by the visit of a Soviet-Nepalese Friendship Society from the Kirgiz SSR; a third (PR 10.11.67) was an appreciation of the Nepalese newspapers which had issued special supplements on the jubilee date; and the last (SK 26.11.67) reported the presence of a concert party

which included artistes from six republics, Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Tadzhikistan, Latvia and Georgia.

### *Iran*

The press quoted, with implied approval, the Shah's observations on foreign policy in the course of his address, early in October, to the newly elected parliament. There were formal references a little later in the month to what was itself the formal reshaping of the Cabinet, without change of premier, for another four-year term of office. Towards the close of the month the exchange of conventionally worded telegrams on the occasion of the Shah's birthday and coinciding coronation was carried in IZ 29.10.67; and a reception given by the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow to mark the same date was reported in PR 27.10.67. It was, however, noticeable that the Soviet press refrained from any coverage of the coronation itself.

In IZ 27.10.67 under the caption "Iran, Southern Neighbour", A. Trofimov wrote somewhat patronizingly on the improved relations of the last years. Since his opening sentence asserted that the Soviet State had from the very day of its foundation been the good friend of Iran, the inference was that things had subsequently gone wrong through the fault of the southern neighbour. The Shah's own remarks in an interview with TASS correspondents, as reproduced in IZ 2.11.67, were, while remaining a model of tact, calculated to redress the balance of blame. Until the beginning of the Second World War, he said, relations had been good, but during the hostilities and for some years afterwards "certain complications" had arisen which he would call "a consequence of the war". With effect from 1962 a new phase had begun: "The Soviet Union has no territorial designs on Iran, and Iran for her part has none on the territory of the USSR."

On the 50th anniversary of the Revolution the press carried (a) the conventionally phrased felicitations of the Iranian Premier to Mr. Kosygin; and (b) messages (i) from Comrade Abdulsamad Kambakhsh, a member of the bureau of the Central Committee of the People's Party of Iran (PR 8.11.67); and (ii) from the Central Committee of the People's Party of Iran (Tudeh) as such (PR 10.11.67). In (i) there was a scathing attack on the reactionaries in power who had deprived Iran of the perspectives offered ever since the October Revolution and driven "the Party" underground. In (ii) there was a similar but more temperately worded condemnation of "internal reaction" as also of "the dissident behaviour of the Mao Tse-tung group" which was "simply pouring water into the mill of imperialism".

In December the main item carried was the visit of an Iranian military delegation to the USSR. The coverage was ample but stiff; most of the paragraphs in which it was couched consisting of names and cumbersome designations.

### *Mongolia*

It was predictable that Mongolian news in the first part of the quarter would hinge on the jubilee of the Russian Revolution. It was also predictable that what the Mongolians would say of this event would be identical in form as well as substance with what the Russians themselves were saying. To all intents and purposes, as the Soviet press showed, the

Mongolians treated the celebration as their own: the moon gave back her borrowed light. This renders it pointless to summarize here the notices that flooded the newspapers in the first three or four weeks. One may just remark that a special publication of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences entitled "Great October and Mongolia" was again and again advertised; that the language of *Unen*, as rendered, was little short of ecstatic; and that the climax was reached by Yu. Tsedenbal's full sheet contribution in PR 23.10.67 called "The Friendship and Co-operation of Peoples in the Grand Achievement of October" and his equally full article on "The Lenin Way" in IZ 31.10.67.

Only slightly less ebullient—and this owing to the staid phraseology of official ceremonial—was the coverage of the succeeding fortnight. Mr. Tsedenbal had, of course, gone to Moscow for the actual celebration, and his oration reproduced in PR-IZ 5.11.67 marked the peak of the November reporting.

The second half of the quarter was flat by comparison, but the press, republican as well as metropolitan, did its best on 26.11.67 to feature, with many photographs, the 43rd anniversary of the proclamation of the MPR. For the rest, the special correspondents, notably N. Metel'skiy of *Pravda* and A. Ter-Grigoryan of *Izvestiya*, obliged as and when need arose with more or less lengthy, and by now stereotyped, pieces with such headings as "The Gobi Today" or "Daybreak over the Steppe".

### *Sinkiang*

There were perhaps half-a-dozen allusions to Sinkiang. These were invariably embedded in surveys of the Chinese scene as a whole (several times in the recurrent TASS feature "Events in China") and did not add up to much. Usually the agency communicating the item did not conceal that it was doing so at second-hand. In the upshot the Soviet reader was left to take his choice between (i) the "Sinkiang Variant", meaning a compromise of the Mao group with local military and political leaders, and (ii) continuing disorders.

### *Tibet*

Tibet came into focus once, viz. in an article headed "In the footsteps of the Bogdykhans" and signed "Press Service *Izvestiya*", 14 December. This quoted the Lhasa (Chinese language) newspaper *Hsitsang Jihpao* to the effect that an armed struggle "to usurp authority" was taking place on a big scale. It added that well informed English newspapers which put the rebels in east Tibet in the summer at twenty thousand, held that resistance was now at a pitch where Peking could no longer control certain areas.

The article also stated that for a decade at least Peking had been systematically sending in young Chinese to settle and marry. These today numbered about one million, and the consequence was that the majority of families in Lhasa and Shigatsze, the two largest towns, were either Chinese or mixed. The influx had been accompanied by a campaign designed to obliterate national customs, Buddhism, and the Tibetan language. It was an attitude reminiscent of the Bogdykhan Emperors towards the non-Chinese.

# A REVIEW OF SINKIANG, TIBETAN AND MONGOLIAN AFFAIRS BASED UPON THE CHINESE PRESS AND RADIO

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1967

## *Sinkiang*

Urumchi Radio is among the group of provincial stations broadcasting only relays of Peking material. This was not always so. Whether the reason be technical or political the result—added to the near-silence of Peking programmes on Sinkiang matters—is that there has for long been extremely little news. The *People's Daily*, up to the date received, carried no Sinkiang items either. There is nothing surprising in this since provincial news, as such, finds little space in its columns. The criterion, whatever the source, is not news value but support for or illustration of Maoist conformity. The doings of the Albanian Central Committee or an attack on Soviet revisionism would, therefore, rate much more space than any number of sensible news items from the provinces. Karachi Radio, it may be noted, reported that Pakistan and China had signed an agreement on 21 October at Islamabad to facilitate overland trade between West Pakistan and Sinkiang. It was said to provide for movement of goods on a limited basis between the border areas and to envisage the reopening of the Gilgit route.

Before considering the significance of the lack of Sinkiang news from Chinese official sources there are one or two straightforward items to notice. Sinkiang was among the cotton-producing areas of China (NCNA, 1.11.67) where aerial spraying of chemicals, mainly pesticides, had contributed to a "bumper" crop. Sinkiang was one of the national minority areas where "the revolutionary masses and PLA units hailed the inauguration of the Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee" that took over the government of that region on 1 November (NCNA, 3.11.67). The next day's early morning NCNA news bulletin included Sinkiang among the areas welcoming the promulgation of Mao's new educational instructions.

The general absence of Sinkiang news must almost certainly be connected with, though not necessarily explained by, the standing of the Sinkiang leadership in relation to Peking. What this is cannot be known from official sources for they do not say. Easily aroused Chinese susceptibilities about conditions in so sensitive an area as Sinkiang, simple ignorance of what is going on there or inability to control it could all be contributory factors.

There is, however, one item of news worth close attention and there are numbers of independent sources of evidence that should be noticed which corroborate each other in offering a view of the Sinkiang leadership that can inspire little confidence in terms of Maoist loyalty. In China's provincial capitals there were rallies around 1 October to celebrate the 18th anniversary of China's national day. Those reported to have been held in Urumchi (NCNA in Chinese, 3.10.67) were:

1. Rallies organized by the authority of the Sinkiang Military Region.
2. A rally by a local PLA unit.

3. Meetings by mass revolutionary organizations of which the names of five were given.

It cannot be assumed that all or any of the revolutionary organizations listed are bodies that Peking has approved, but though they are almost certainly caught up in mutual rivalry it can hardly be doubted that they enjoy the approval of the Sinkiang leadership—supposing that there is a unified leadership under Wang En-mao. A glance at the names of the prominent persons attending these rallies suggests some points of interest. Item 1 yields eight examples. Three of these (including, of course, Wang En-mao) have suffered serious criticisms. Another—Chang Hsi-lin, a deputy-commander of the Military Region—was credibly reported to have been named by Premier Chou En-lai in January 1967 the leader of a team to investigate conditions then obtaining in Sinkiang. One of the meetings of the mass revolutionary organizations was addressed by the Governor, Saifuddin, who, in this context, was given the conventional style of “a responsible person of the Sinkiang Military Region”.

Two pamphlets printed and circulated in Shanghai last July, therefore, technically the output of the Chinese press, attacked Wang En-mao in text and cartoons. The charges against him were that he gave undue favour to religion at the expense of the thoughts of Mao; he intrigued with the Soviet Union; he emphasized nationality questions rather than the class struggle; he opposed Mao and supported Liu Shao-ch'i, and he suppressed the masses during the cultural revolution. While these and other earlier criticisms of Wang and his colleagues were unofficial, nevertheless they have up to the present not been denied but, on the contrary, may be said to have had tacit official approval if not encouragement.

It seems fair to infer that Peking can have no confidence in the Sinkiang leadership but that there are, on the other hand, under Wang En-mao those who, free from his domination, might wish to follow the Maoist line. Further, it may be supposed that while this situation obtains, the “mass revolutionary organizations” will never be allowed sufficient strength to move towards a revolutionary take-over in the region, nor could Peking remove Wang En-mao, even if it would. The instance of Chang Hsi-lin perhaps suggests that the influence of the moderate administrators is not without effect in far-away Sinkiang.

Not surprisingly no reports from official Chinese sources have been noticed that lend support to the view that there are or have been serious disturbances in various parts of Sinkiang. TASS (both in Russian for abroad and in English, 28.11.67, 9.12.67) and CTK supported each other in reporting new attacks on Wang En-mao in Peking posters and connected them with the serious clashes alleged to have taken place between Red Guards and army units. TASS (in English, 9.12.67) further reported (without reference to dates) the cutting of the railway linking Lanchow and Urumchi, thus obliging Premier Chou En-lai to postpone a visit to Sinkiang. A commission of five persons sent to the region “to restore order” were alleged to have been arrested there by “Mao's opponents”.

It is difficult to assess the reliability of these reports but there is nothing inherently incredible about them. They tend to confirm the views expressed above that the Sinkiang leadership is largely going its own way having to cope with local disturbances but untroubled by effective deterrence from Peking. If this is true it is a situation all too familiar in earlier stages of

Sinkiang history this century and might compel a reassessment of the view that Sinkiang has never been so strongly held by China this century as by the present Government.

## *Mongolia*

### *A. Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region*

The impression that lack of official news of Sinkiang leaves upon the mind that all is not well there is deepened by the contrasting mass of broadcast material about Inner Mongolia. Here "the situation is excellent", the revolutionary take-over has taken place, its one-time chief, Ulanfu, being loudly and officially condemned for much the same offences unofficially charged against Wang En-mao.

Statistics are not lacking to prove the economic soundness of Inner Mongolia, but none has been noticed making any reference to that pride of the early years of the regime—the steel complex at Paotow. All stock-breeding figures show increases, 11 million head of livestock having been born during 1967, transport by air and rail has been improved and extended and there was an all-time record for wheat production in the western part of the region (that is to say, where most of the dominant Chinese element in the population are found and is, therefore, well farmed). The *People's Daily* of 4 November gave the total population of Inner Mongolia's "various nationalities" as 13 millions. This represents, if true, a probable increase of about two millions in the number of Chinese in the region since 1959. This is not intrinsically unlikely.

The work of the Preparatory Group for the Revolutionary Committee of Inner Mongolia began to bear fruit in early October. The first "red political organ implementing the three-way alliance" was established in Jaoda League and the Revolutionary Committee of Ningcheng County was set up (Inner Mongolia Regional Service, 7.10.67). Meanwhile developments were taking place in Huhehot in both the municipal and regional governments. The founding of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee was celebrated by a rally of 100,000 on 18 October (Huhehot, 18.10.67). Similar events took place at the same time in the Silingol League.

After numbers of other revolutionary committees had been set up all over the region, on 1 November there was an inaugural rally for the Regional Revolutionary Committee (Huhehot, 1.11.67). The first meeting of its "working personnel" followed on 9 November (Huhehot, 10.11.67). Only Chinese names were listed. The *People's Daily* carried, on 2 November, jointly with the *Liberation Daily*, an editorial: "The Red Sun Shines over the Grasslands of Inner Mongolia. It was now "the forward bastion of anti-revolution on the northern frontiers of our nation". It had "vital importance in the consolidation of China's frontiers" and "the strengthening of the unity of the various nationalities in our country". "All the nationalities in our great socialist motherland . . . had a common ideological basis—Marx-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought and a common road of Socialism and Communism correctly handling the nationalities question, never forgetting the class struggle." It was one of Ulanfu's crimes that he did, as is the case with Wang En-mao, forget the class struggle in favour of the nationalities question.

That the events of early November in Inner Mongolia have increasingly the character of a strengthening of the Chinese grip on the region with the

submergence of any lingering Mongolian feeling in the management of its affairs is shown by two things: that "at the crucial juncture the army in Inner Mongolia stepped boldly forward to give resolute support to the proletarian revolutionaries", and that the infiltration of large numbers of "intellectual youths" from the schools and colleges of Peking into the administration of government, industry and farming in the region has been going on vigorously since the take-over. To judge from the repeated exhortations that there have been to correct and rehabilitate erring cadres (and this includes some described as "top office holders"—*Inner Mongolia Daily*, 25.10.67) the "take-over" bears the appearance of a combination of force and expediency.

With regard to the world outside Inner Mongolia, solidarity in vigilance was pledged (Huhehot 18.10.67) against "Soviet-Mongolian special agents". On 3 November the PLA promised (among other things) to "deal relentlessly with any foreign class-enemy who dared to engage in sabotage, resolutely to suppress US-Chiang special agents and Soviet, Mongolian and Japanese spies". Inner Mongolia was "the Northern Gate of the Motherland".

### B. *Mongolian People's Republic*

There is no Chinese comment on the Mongolian People's Republic to report. Criticism of Mao's policies (mainly in *Unen* editorials) continues from the other direction.

### *Tibet*

There is even less reporting on Tibet from Chinese sources than on Sinkiang. The region was mentioned with other areas (but *not* Sinkiang) where "revolutionary masses . . . have organized many study courses, forums and discussions".

The former head of the CCP's South-West Bureau, Li Ching-ch'üan, who has for long been subjected to a barrage of criticisms, was condemned for his "towering crimes" among minorities in the province of Szechuan—especially the Tibetans. Comparing this condemnation of Li with similar charges against other important individuals in south-western provinces indicates that his "towering crimes" against the Tibetans probably consisted mainly in taking a line of evolutionary application of Communist principles and adaptation to Tibetan institutions.

W. J. D.

## SOVIET BROADCASTS IN UYGUR FOR SINKIANG

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1967

THERE is at the moment of writing these comments very little bulk of material available but such as there is provides considerable interest.

A few items overlap in time with the comments on the previous quarter's broadcasts. These continued the already established practice of broadcasting in the names of Uygur émigrés and they emphasized points already familiar: e.g. the hostility shown towards Muslims in Sinkiang during the cultural revolution; the glorification of "the Eastern Turkestani leaders" who were either executed by the Kuo Min Tang or survived to be betrayed by Mao; the advantages enjoyed by Muslims in the Soviet Union; and the chauvinistic nationalities policy of the Chinese Communists. This was a charge supported in a talk on 30 September by reference to Mao's pledge at a Party plenum in 1938, repeated at the VIIIth Party Congress in 1945, to "grant the right of self-determination to the national minorities in China". Later, the talk went on, "Mao and his servile followers changed their attitude on this issue and adopted a policy of assimilation". The item in Mao's 1945 report to which reference is made certainly bears the reading given to it (as recorded both in Lawrence and Wishart's edition of the *Selected Works* and in the 1965 Peking edition). The evidence of the facts—were they fully possible of ascertainment—would confirm or refute the bold assertion that this policy had been changed to one of assimilation.

A talk in a series commemorating the Jubilee of the October Revolution dealt with the development of Uygur culture in the Soviet Union. The Uygurs, who "are one of the most ancient peoples of Central Asia" and are "members of the Soviet multi-national family" (there are about 100,000 of them in the Soviet Union) provide a fine example of the way "Soviet culture has risen to the highest possible level of human culture in the past fifty years". Marco Polo is called to witness to the high cultural level of the Uygurs in his time. However, the talk went on to quote from a work just published that asserts the complete illiteracy of the Uygurs in pre-October Revolution days. References to opportunities for advanced education for Uygurs in institutions at Tashkent and Alma-Ata might well sound attractive to Uygurs in Sinkiang.

A short commentary on 24 October on the "New Life of the Mongolian Farmers", while making but a slight contribution to the already vast lore on Soviet aid to Mongolia, was significant for its conveying in the main language of Sinkiang the idea of the advantageous position enjoyed by a border people like the Mongols when they have been "successful in replacing the colonial and feudal system that reigned in their country with an independent, thriving state".


This was followed up two days later by a refutation of Mao's propaganda that the economy of the national minorities in China is flourishing. Although the minority regions in China possessed extensive natural resources they were the most backward regions in China. This thus far

factual piece of propaganda was followed by the rather more dubious claim that the only measures of economic development in the minority regions were taken during the early years of the present regime and that the most important enterprises were only established through Soviet aid. The assertion is then made that Mao's "wrong economic policy and the terror and punishment that his so-called cultural revolution have ushered in for the national minority regions were a heavy blow to their economic welfare".

The full text of Brezhnev's 3 November report reviewing the events of the first 50 years of the Soviet state was reported in several instalments. It will be recalled that he claimed that knowledge of Lenin's nationalities policy was world-wide. It had brought great prosperity to the various peoples of the Soviet Union. Diversity in fraternal unity was the main theme of this part of his report. The 50th anniversary was "a true festival of all the republics. Each component nationality was living a rich, full-blooded, free and happy life". In later sections of this lengthy report which dealt with China there was no reference to Chinese mishandling of the minority problem beyond the general charge of the "Mao group's" pursuit of a "chauvinistic and Great-Power course".

Three broadcasts, on 6 and 7 December, developed the line that is being currently emphasized, namely, that the Chinese Communists started well in their treatment of the minorities but that all progress had been reversed since the cultural revolution which had "constituted a departure from the Marxist-Leninist policy on national minorities". Unlike China, the Soviet Union had continued to develop harmonious relationships among its various nationalities. Mao and his clique were now "using Sinkiang as a colony and doing their best to destroy the love which the people of East Turkestan had for Lenin and the Soviet people". The peoples of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet were strongly opposing the so-called cultural revolution. It was alleged that in Inner Mongolia a situation had developed in which "the soldiers no longer dared to oppose the local people". These reports are difficult to evaluate. They are in all probability based on the reading of wall posters in Peking which to some degree must reflect the actual conditions in the regions they refer to. However, Inner Mongolia, at any rate, is an area where a Revolutionary Committee of the approved style is now installed in authority. It is therefore necessary to read reports such as the above with not a little caution.

W. J. D.



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**Notes on Agricultural Development**

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# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

## *Editors*

**Geoffrey Wheeler**, Director, Central Asian Research Centre  
**Max Hayward**  
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## CONTENTS

Editorial	93
The Turkic Languages of the USSR: A New Development. By G. K. Dulling	97
Recent Soviet Writing on India. By Hubert Evans	110
Notes on Agricultural Development. By Margaret Miller	122
Sino-Russian Relations in the 17th Century. By W. J. Drew	136
Primary and Secondary Education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Current Situation. By Ann Sheehy	147
Notes on Industrial Development (CAR, Vol. XV, No. 4): Author's Comment	159
Book Reviews	161
Soviet Press Comment: I. The Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; II. Adjoining Countries	171
A Review of Sinkiang, Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs based upon the Chinese Press and Radio	179
Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur for Sinkiang	182

## ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals, etc., employed as sources, are as follows:—

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR							
AN/Kaz.	SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg.	SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad.	SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk.	SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb.	SSR	"	"	"	"	"	"	Uzbek SSR
IMRS	Inner Mongolian Regional Service							
IZ	Izvestiya							
K	Kommunist							
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda							
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda							
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana							
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda							
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta							
NCNA	New China News Agency							
NT	New Times							
PR	Pravda							
PV	Pravda Vostoka							
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya							
SRS	Sinkiang Regional Service							
SU	Soviet Union							
T	Trud							
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra							
TRS	Tibet Regional Service							
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta							

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# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

Vol. XVI, No. 2

## EDITORIAL

GEOFFREY WHEELER, Director of the Central Asian Research Centre, retired from this post on 11 April. It is not easy to think of him as "retired". To meet him is to be impressed anew by his intellectual vigour and freshness, his clear and copious memory, the fastidious precision of his speech. His most recent talk in a St. Antony's seminar was, as we have come to expect, richly informative, lucid and judicious, and delivered with that deceptive ease which comes from mature scholarship and a life-long passion for factual and verbal exactitude. His undiminished enthusiasm and energy make it inconceivable that he should relax his interest in the subject to which he has given many years of fruitful work. *Central Asian Review* will continue to appear under his editorship, and many of us will hope that he will find time to write his reminiscences and to share with us his ripe reflections on the past and present of the peoples whose languages, history and culture he knows so intimately.

He can be proud of his achievement in establishing and developing the CARC. He himself never fails to give credit to his colleagues, who have served the Centre so loyally and ably: but we know that we speak for them too in saying that his vision and devotion above all have won for the Centre and its publications the respectful attention of scholars in this country and abroad. The knowledge that the direction of the Centre will be in the very capable hands of David Morison, editor of CAR's sister publication *Mizan*, reassures us that Geoffrey Wheeler's work will be successfully continued.

His friends in Oxford wish Geoffrey many years of happy—and what for him is the same thing—busy retirement.

H. M. Hayward  
H. T. Willetts

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As we have several times pointed out, a notable feature of the Sino-Soviet rift is the reticence on the subject observed in the Soviet press in general and the Central Asian press in particular. Our regret at not being able to profit by what must be exclusive Soviet sources of information on Sinkiang and Tibet is mingled with respect for Soviet observance of the principle "least said, soonest mended".

A useful way of tracing the course of Soviet policy towards a given foreign country is to examine the articles on that country in the successive *Yezhegodniks* (Yearbooks) of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*. The articles on China in these volumes relating to the years 1961-66 are of particular interest.

It is generally agreed that the Sino-Soviet rift began to assume really serious proportions in 1959. But the first indication of such a development appeared in the Yearbook relating to 1963; that relating to 1962, during which relations were openly strained particularly on the Sino-Soviet frontier in Central Asia, contained no suggestion of anything other than amicable relations and close co-operation. It is perhaps significant that whereas all other Yearbooks from 1961 to 1967 contain a section called "Outstanding Events" (*Vazhneyshiy Sobytiya*), that relating to 1962 has no such section.

In contrast to the lurid description in the 1964 Yearbook of China's hostile attitude to the USSR during 1963, the 1965 Yearbook, compiled of course after Khrushchev's downfall in October 1964, again omits any reference to friction between the two states. It reports the introduction of a Chinese script<sup>1</sup> in place of the Arabic script hitherto used in Sinkiang for the Uygur and Kazakh languages, making no mention of the fact that in 1956 it had been decided to substitute the cyrillic script for the Arabic.

The 1966 Yearbook gave prominence to Kosygin's visit to Peking in February 1965 and numerous exchanges of telegrams of congratulation and condolence. The Soviet protest to the Chinese Government about "provocative action" of Chinese students at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in March 1965 was briefly reported.

The 1967 Yearbook described under "Outstanding Events" the development of the "anti-Soviet campaign in the CPR during 1966". The main object of this campaign was given as "the support of nationalist and chauvinist madness and of an internal state of affairs which would favour all kinds of illegalities and the removal of Mao's political opponents". The campaign was also said to have aimed at the rupture of relations with the USSR. The section on Foreign Policy gave a long list of Chinese insults and measures directed against the Soviet Union adding that "the Soviet side continued as always to carry out its obligations in respect of co-operation with the CPR in accordance with existing agreements".

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In the Editorial of CAR, No. 3 of 1967, we drew attention to the fact that in the Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU relating to the 50th anniversary of the Revolution, no mention was made of the phase

<sup>1</sup> The Russians seem to have misunderstood the Chinese decree of October 1964 on the subject. The clear implication of this decree is that the languages in question would be written in the same script used for phonetic transcription of Chinese, i.e., a Latin alphabet.

of *sliyaniye* or "merging" which, it had previously been laid down, would follow the present phase of *sblizheniye* or "drawing closer". We commented that this omission would be noted with some relief in the republics, where alarm had probably been evoked by the threat of their eventual liquidation contained in the Party Programme adopted at the XXIIInd Party Congress.

It is of considerable significance that the very same point was brought out in an article in *Zhurnalists*, No. 12 of 1967 by N. Potapov, who is described as an instructor in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The article is an unmistakable warning to Soviet writers to treat the question of nationalities with the utmost caution. "There is nothing so easily wounded as national sentiment which even under socialism retains all its strength." And the article goes on to say that until quite recently articles have been appearing in the press asserting that some of the national languages had no prospect of future development, and implying that the "merging of the nations" was an imminent development. Emphasizing that such a line is in direct contradiction of the Theses the writer added: "Thus, in this most important document of our times there is a clear and precise mention of *sblizheniye*, but none of *sliyaniye*—and absolutely nothing about the disappearance of any languages in the present phase of the development of society."

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A recent review of Violet Conolly's admirable work *Beyond the Urals*, OUP, 1967,<sup>2</sup> referred to Soviet Central Asia as a "densely inhabited" region and its population as "relatively sophisticated". We find both these statements liable to misinterpretation, if not actually misleading. The total area of the Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs is approximately equal to that of the Indian sub-continent, but its population hardly exceeds 30 million, by comparison with India and Pakistan's unquestionably dense population of nearly 600 million. The reviewer does not say in relation to what other area he regards the Central Asian population as sophisticated but it seems likely that he is thinking of the urban element, which is the only one the foreign traveller has the opportunity of judging.

Soviet critics of Western writers on Central Asia are loud in their condemnation of what they see as the deliberate playing down of the achievements of the Revolution. In fact, however, these achievements nowadays receive from the West a meed of praise to which, in respect of industrial progress, urban development, irrigation and the like, they are certainly entitled. These are activities which are to a considerable extent open to foreign inspection. But the rural areas still remain *terra clausa*: if any foreign travellers have made prolonged tours in them, as Schuyler and Curzon did in the nineteenth century, they have preferred

<sup>2</sup> Reviewed in *Britain-USSR*, No. 20, Spring 1968.

to keep silent about what they saw. Occasional glimpses of rural life which can be gained from novels and from the press suggest that conditions are not superior to those prevailing in the adjoining countries, which are regularly deplored by Soviet writers who, by contrast, visit remote rural districts without let or hindrance. Glowing Soviet descriptions of rural Turkmenistan would ring much truer if they could be compared at first hand with the remarkable—and observable—development of the Turkmen country in north-eastern Iran.

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A remarkable production entitled *Ethnographical Map of Turanians (Uralo-Altaians)* has come into our possession. Dated 1967, it is published by the Facultad de Filosofia of the Universidad del Salvador in Buenos Aires and has been “completed with data from the map edited by the Japan Turanian Association”.

It is hardly possible to conceive of a more misleading publication. To begin with it uses an ethnographical terminology and classification which is either obsolete or has never been used anywhere else. The old Tsarist terms Kazak-Kirghiz, Sart and Kara-Kirghiz are resuscitated. The Turkic tribes inhabiting central Iran as well as Tehran itself are described as *Turkmens*. A vast area in north-east Afghanistan is inhabited by an unknown people, the *Armaks* (Hazaras?). The whole population of western India is composed of “Scytho-Indians” who are classified as *Turco-Tatars*. Almost the whole of the Sinkiang-Uygur AR is shown as populated by “Kashgariks” and “Kara-Kirghiz”. These are but a few of the inaccuracies perpetrated in this expensively produced 5-colour map.

# THE TURKIC LANGUAGES OF THE USSR : A NEW DEVELOPMENT

By G. K. DULLING

## I

WHATEVER may have been the basic policy in 1939 which led to the cyrillization of the until then adequate Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet (UTLA), the results could do no other than still further obscure the underlying unity of the Turkic languages of the USSR. There can be little doubt that at that time disunity was deliberately fostered, since it is incredible that the successors to an organization which was able, in Baku in 1926, to formulate an entirely workable new alphabet, which was phonetically adequate, and which was immediately applicable to hitherto unwritten languages, should be incapable of producing an equally acceptable cyrillic equivalent. That now the blame for the mistakes and anomalies arising from this cyrillization should be laid at the door of the several national committees entrusted with this project is immaterial.

In June 1952, in *Voprosy Yazykoznaniiya*, N. A. Baskakov published his important article on the development of the languages and writing of the Turkic peoples of the USSR.<sup>1</sup> In this article he subscribed to the then popular Stalinist view of linguistic development, but nevertheless felt free to draw attention to the fact that, although Turkic languages had been allowed to develop in freedom, certain anomalies had been introduced into the alphabets, which were both undesirable and tending to confusion; quite apart from the fact that it was then the professed aim of any improvement to bring the scripts of national alphabets as closely as possible into line with that of Russian so that the acquisition of that language could be facilitated.

It was again in November 1966 that the whole question of alphabet reform was raised in *Vestnik AN SSSR*. Here emphasis was laid on the necessity of improving mutual intelligibility of written languages, which could be brought about only by a reform of the various alphabets. In this article it was stated that a group of Turkologists had been assigned to prepare a theoretically sound plan for the unification of the present cyrillic Turkic alphabets. It is presumably this new approach which has formed the basis of Baskakov's present article,<sup>2</sup> although nowhere in the text is any reference made to the setting up of such a

<sup>1</sup> *The Turkic Languages of Central Asia: Problems of Planned Culture Contact*, CARC, London, 1954, revised 1960.

<sup>2</sup> "The Present State and Future Development of Alphabets for the Turkic National Languages of the USSR", *Voprosy Yazykoznaniiya*, No. 5, 1967, pp. 33-46.

body, and it is largely an elaboration of his views first put forward in 1952.

What follows is a very slightly abridged and simplified English version of Baskakov's article. In the interests of clarity and to overcome certain typographical difficulties Baskakov's alphabetic comparisons and recommendations have been relegated to separate tables.

## II

Baskakov begins by tracing the history of written Turkic from the Yenisey runes to UTLA, and cites the following alphabets as having been used to represent Turkic through the centuries: Brahmi, Manichee, Syriac, Sogdo/Uygur, and Arabic. The type of alphabet adopted, he points out, was to a large extent dependent upon religion, or proximity to peoples already having a national script. Thus the Keraim, the successors to the Khazars, adopted the Hebrew script along with the Jewish faith; while the successors to the Cumanians who lived in close intercourse with Armenians adopted their script. Arabic of course was used for purposes of consolidating nationalities, and by several Turkic peoples, including, up until recent times, the Uygurs of the Chinese People's Republic.

After the October Revolution an urgent necessity for alphabet reform arose, particularly in view of changes in the dialect base of the old written languages, resulting in a more intimate connexion between the spoken and the written word, as well as the creation of new literary languages, and the spread of literacy generally. Initially attempts were made to reform the Arabic alphabet, which was then in general use by the majority of Turkic speakers, but these attempts to adapt the Arabic alphabet to the peculiarities of Turkic languages were unsuccessful. Because of the failure of these attempts at Arabic reform, the First Turcological Congress in Baku in 1926 raised the question of replacing the Arabic alphabet by a single latinized alphabet suitable for all Turkic languages. Although in fact raised at this conference, it had previously been suggested at an earlier important congress. In view of the decision taken, TSIK SSSR set up an all-union central committee for the new alphabet (VTsKNA) which was to co-ordinate all work on the creation of scripts for all the peoples of the Soviet Union, not previously having a national script, or making use of a Russian or Arabic one. At this time Azeri, Turkmen, Kumyk, Krim-Tatar, Nogay, Kazakh, Karakalpak, Tatar, Bashkir, Uygur, Uzbek and Kirgiz were using a reformed Arabic alphabet, while Chuvash, Altay, Khakass and Yakut used a cyrillic form. Karachay-Balkar, Gagauz and Tuvinian had only rudimentary scripts, however. All of them, with the exception of Chuvash, went over to a latinized alphabet between 1922 [*sic*] and 1929.

The working out of UTLA was entrusted to local republican scientific organizations who were in close touch with VTsKNA, who in turn called upon leading specialists in the languages of the USSR.

All proposals in connexion with the new alphabet were carefully scrutinized and assessed by various experts in the fields of psychology, polygraphy, methodology, etc., to determine shape and form, once the phonetic values of the signs had been established and unified.

In its final form UTLA consisted of 39 different symbols—25 deriving from the latin alphabet, and 14 new, or modified, signs. From this total of 39 signs each language was able to select for its alphabet such a number of characters as was appropriate to its phonetic structure. Thus, alphabets for existing languages consisted of a varying number of letters—from 26 for Yakut to 34 for Kumyk, Karachay-Balkar and Tatar, and 35 for Bashkir. Had the same unificatory principle been adopted during the change-over into the Russian (cyrillic) form, then, in current alphabets based on Russian there would still have been only 39 letters for the alphabet as a whole, and from 26 to 35 characters in each individual language.

However, when during 1938–40 the work of russification of UTLA was in hand, it was undertaken by local research organizations working in isolation from each other. These, although having available to them both the previous experience of the work done on UTLA and consultation with the research institute of languages and scripts of the peoples of the USSR (formed after the dissolution of VTsKNA), took other decisions in respect of the selection of characters for their alphabets, without any regard to any unificatory principle, and without the necessary co-ordination of the principles underlying the general phonetics met with in the majority, or even in separate groups, of Turkic languages. As a natural consequence of this, modern cyrilized Turkic alphabets have many differences and divergences between them—thus, for one and the same sound in different languages, different characters are used; in several languages one character is used to denote two or more sounds, or even combinations of sounds, while other alphabets are seriously deficient and confusing in the adequate representation of the phonetic structure of the language. As a result, instead of the 39 characters of UTLA, the total number of characters in use in modern cyrillic alphabets is 74, although the number of basic phonemes still remains at its original 39.

This proliferation of characters in the cyrilized alphabets arises firstly from the retention of the single Russian signs for “ya”, “ye”, “yo”, “yu”; as well as of the “hard” and “soft” signs, which have been adopted as consonantal and vowel modifiers and separative signs; and secondly from the existence of different signs to represent one and the same sound in different languages. Thus, of the original UTLA characters, 21 now exist as single cyrillic characters; seven have two variants; two have three variants; six have four; and three UTLA characters have 5–6 each in cyrillic.<sup>3</sup> Although it would have been possible to limit the operation to a straightforward transcription of

<sup>3</sup> For details of these and other characters mentioned, see Tables at end of article.

UTLA into cyrillic, this was not done because it was felt necessary to take over the Russian alphabet complete with all its conventions, so that the teaching of the Russian language to those already familiar with its script could be facilitated.

Despite this, however, in not one of the present Turkic alphabets were all the conventions of Russian orthography correctly applied; and this is particularly so in the incorrect use of the Russian iotacized vowels, whose use in Turkic can lead only to confusion. Russian has but five non-iotacized vowels—a, e, o, u, and y, whereas Turkic has nine, and therefore, where iotacization is required, in some cases at least, the analytic method of representation must be resorted to; and this, of course, is especially true of the Turkic front vowel series. The use of the Russian iotacized series for back vowels can lead only to confusion, and this confusion is made even worse when it is remembered that, in some languages, the Russian iotacized back vowel can represent the corresponding non-iotacized front vowel (e.g. in Karachay-Balkar, where Russian *ë* (yo) also stands for Kar. *ö*). Furthermore, the particular use, in Russian, of iotacized vowels to denote palatalization of the preceding consonant is misapplied. Most noticeable in this respect is the use of the ending “-yar” in Turkmen for the present tense in post-consonantal positions [e.g. “gur-yar” (he sets up) for the orthographically correct “gur-jar”]. This kind of confusion in no way simplifies the learning of Russian for Turkic students.

In the case of consonants, too, the rules of Russian orthography were broken. In all Turkic languages there is but one symbol to represent the two types of “l” (“l” and “l̄”) and no sort of sign, either the “soft sign” or a diacritical mark is used to indicate the palatalization of “l” in association with front vowels. In the words “al-” and “kel-” for example the value of the “l” is different, and, if the conventions of Russian orthography were to be applied correctly, ought to be differently indicated. This is merely one instance of where the principle of equating the conventions of Russian orthography with Turkic orthography has been broken, although there are countless more instances where, from a Russian orthographical point of view, Turkic words are misspelt.

Despite the professed aim of facilitating the learning of Russian, current Turkic alphabets succeed only in making it more difficult, as well as making more difficult the learning of Turkic orthography. The analytic representation of the compounds “j-a”, “j-o” etc., would be a greater help for Turkic-speaking students to obtain a true understanding of the real nature and value of the Russian phonemes “ya” and “yo” etc. If one goes on to analyse current Turkic alphabets, it will become apparent that further correspondences of a similar nature must also be eradicated. The understanding of the conventions of Russian orthography will be simplified by underlining the differences between Russian and the cyrilized Turkic alphabet.

While one of the first steps in the reform of Turkic alphabets must be the elimination of the Russian iotacized vowels which are superfluous to Turkic, and which Turkic can well do without, this will, however, involve some changes in the orthography of Russian loan-words, especially where the use of iotacized vowels indicates palatalization.

The adoption of all the conventions of Russian orthography is expedient for Turkic languages only when such languages possess, as does Russian, associated pairs of palatalized and unpalatalized consonants: there is only one such—Karaim—and that, therefore, can be left out of consideration.

From a consideration of the foregoing it is to be concluded that four criteria are to be established for the improvement and unification of existing Turkic alphabets on phonetic lines:

- i Closely type-allied sounds are to be represented by one and the same phoneme in all languages.
- ii Each character/letter must denote one sound, and not a combination of sounds.
- iii Each sound must be represented by one character/letter only, and not by a combination of letters.
- iv Each character/letter must not vary in value between languages.

(At this point Baskakov proceeds to examine existing Turkic alphabets in the light of the above criteria, and lists, although not exhaustively, divergences from them. As explained above, all these have been summarized in tabular form, which contain all the anomalies cited by Baskakov.)

It is evident from any such examination of existing alphabets that far-reaching corrections and improvements are necessary; and, in order to bring these about, it would seem necessary to draw up a unified alphabet on a cyrillic base, taking as an example UTLA, which, with its 39 symbols, completely represented the phonemic structure of all Turkic languages. In doing so, however, all conventions of Russian orthography must be rejected, since it has already been seen how impossible it is for modern Turkic languages (except Karaim) to take over these conventions along with the alphabet. In using such a Russian-based alphabet, a strict differentiation must be made between the peculiarities of Russian orthography, and the special phonemic/phonetic features of individual Turkic languages. By pointing out such differences and similarities between the Russian and the native language, a teacher would help a student to acquire a better comprehension of the basis of his own and the Russian language.

In devising such an alphabet it will certainly be possible to make use of such cyrillic characters as truly represent Turkic phonemes, while not adopting those cyrillic characters which exist to represent specifically Russian phonemes.

On this principle, first of all the characters "ya", "ye", "yo" and "yu" are seen to be completely superfluous to Turkic. Unnecessary

too for all the modern Turkic literary languages are such letters as "ts", "shch", and the "soft sign", which can be dispensed with in Turkic, whether or not they may be used in the orthography of loan-words. The use of variant characters to represent the same Turkic phoneme can also be done away with, and a single character used instead.

As a result of these eliminations the complete Turkic alphabet—to cover all languages—would consist of 39–40 characters, of which 10–11 would be vowel, and 29 consonantal phonemes.<sup>4</sup> Each individual alphabet would not exceed 35 characters. (The proposed new alphabet, together with Baskakov's comments, is given in Table II.)

Any reform of the alphabets along these lines, which are in any case intended only as a basis for discussion, must, of course, necessarily take a long time.

### III

In general Baskakov's article summarized above gives a very perfunctory impression; it is repetitive in the extreme; it contains numerous errors (e.g. on p. 38 it ascribes a character for "dzh" to Chuvash, while a few lines further on it denies that such a phoneme exists in the language); the proof-reading has been very slipshod; it says little that is new; and, in various instances which will be referred to later, breaks the very rules which it is trying to establish. Little or no attention is paid to the special problems of Chuvash, and it is therefore to be assumed that the proposals which Baskakov puts forward are not to be applied to that language. Presumably he considers Chuvash to be *sui generis*, and does not wish to interfere with such an old-established Cyrillic alphabet.

As far as the historical background is concerned, it seems strange that, among the various alphabets listed no mention is made of missionary Cyrillic, which formed the basis for many Turkic alphabets, and which played an important part, particularly in Siberia, in the early russification of local Turkic languages. The question of whether Arabic is, or is not, a suitable alphabet for Turkic is too lightly dismissed, and it is by no means proved that it is incapable of adapting itself to the development of Turkic, whether in its original form or in modified *dayakhshi*, as can be shown by its continued use in Uygur, and by the fact that (unmodified) it is still used for Azeri, Turkmen and Uzbek in Persia and Afghanistan without any difficulty. Among languages which never used UTLA should be included Gagauz, which continued to be written, if at all, in Russian or Rumanian transliteration until it acquired its own Cyrillic alphabet in final form in December 1957.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The "10–11 vowel phonemes" seems, from the context, to depend on whether "ye" and "e" are to be retained as separate phonemes, or whether "e" is to replace "ye" in all positions.

<sup>5</sup> It is noteworthy that the commission for a Gagauz alphabet was set up first in 1950, and finally, after many vicissitudes, produced an alphabet in July 1957. This

The whole idea of alphabet reform is, of course, by no means new, and, indeed, most alphabets seemed to invite modification of one sort or another. In this connexion it must not be forgotten that UTLA itself went through various modifications in different languages.

Of such reforms, the two most noteworthy in recent times have been the introduction of Gagauz, which is the simplest of all Turkic alphabets, and the reform, both alphabetic and orthographic, of Azerbaydzhani in January 1959. Both these alphabets exhibit those features which Baskakov now describes as novel, although nowhere in the course of the article does he refer to them. Thus both Gagauz and Azerbaydzhani dispense with Russian iotacized vowels (although Gagauz retains them in loan-words); Gagauz indicates primary and secondary long vowels by reduplication<sup>6</sup>; while Azerbaydzhani transliterates loan-words analytically. It is, of course, true that Baskakov first suggested the abolition of Russian iotacized vowels in 1952, as well as a simplification in the numbers of letters in use; but this is not referred to either.

In general there is little to quarrel with in the proposals which Baskakov puts forward, always provided that they are looked at from the alphabetic point of view, and that one accepts that UTLA was a satisfactory alphabet for representing Turkic languages. This new alphabet is to all intents and purposes merely a cyrillic version of UTLA, with no outstanding divergences, and is one which makes not too great a break with existing orthographies. No great labour would be involved in turning from one to the other, and, indeed, it would seem likely that both alphabets could exist side by side for some considerable period, since, for the most part, only letter-shapes are involved. Obviously in due time dictionaries, school textbooks and the like would have to be written in the new alphabets, but no major upheaval is involved comparable, say, to the change-over to the latin alphabet in Turkey, or the change over to cyrillic Turkic alphabets; it is rather more comparable to the Russian spelling reforms (with abolition of characters) of 1918, or to the periodic reforms in Dutch orthography.

On the question of detail of the proposals, the vowels certainly seem to be adequately dealt with. There can be no justification for the retention of the very Russian iotacized vowels (although they are, of course, still a commonplace in cyrillic Tadzhik and Mongol); but in this connexion it is very extraordinary to see that, in defiance of all that he has said, Baskakov still proposes the retention of two separate characters (one of them iotacized) and with varying functions, for the /e/ phoneme (cf. (9)).<sup>7</sup> Here surely is a plain case where one symbol, and only one, should be adopted, as has been done in Azerbaydzhani.

alphabet was modified in the light of six months' experience, and finalised in Dec. 1957 (see Pokrovskaya, *Grammatika Gagauzskovo Yazyka*, pp. 7-8).

<sup>6</sup> Reduplication of vowel to indicate length has, furthermore, always been a feature of Yakut, Khakass, Altay and Tuvian. Originally Turkmen UTLA also used reduplication, but this was abolished during the orthographic reforms of the mid-1930s.

<sup>7</sup> Here, and elsewhere, figures in brackets refer to the corresponding letter in Table II.

Not quite happy either is his proposed solution for the Uzbek a/o sounds. Here their phonetic representation would be anti-unificatory; while their orthographic representation brings him into conflict with his own criterion; but of the two alternatives the latter is probably the better.

In allowing a degree of latitude in the representation of the various classes of the /i/ phoneme, he has simplified matters a lot; but here again it is strange to see that he proposes the same combination of symbols to represent both long Turkmen "i:" and the Kazakh diphthong "ij" [cf. (14)], although perhaps this is due merely to oversight, or the influence of current Turkmen practice.

As far as the consonantal system is concerned it would seem justifiable to retain, where practicable, the principle that vocalism should decide value, even though it does run counter to the "single letter/single sound" rule. But in that case, there would seem to be no adequate reason why this principle should not be extended to cover other characters too. On this basis there would be justification in equating the special character (8) in Yakut and Altay with the more general (11); and certainly there would be no valid reason for suggesting separate characters, (13) and (28), to represent the apical pronunciation of /z/ and /s/ in Turkmen, which seems to be carrying phoneticism a little too far. This peculiar pronunciation is idiosyncratic, and has no semantic value (as opposed to Bashkir, where it does). It is furthermore by no means universal in the language (cf. the exactly comparable distinction in Castilian and South American Spanish). It is difficult to see why such a suggestion should be made, when no provision is made for the special labio-velar /kʷ/ common to both Gagauz and Turkmen, and when the strongly palatalized /k/ of Azeri has had its special symbol abolished. Such an arbitrary differentiation can scarcely be called "unificatory"; quite apart from the fact that (8) breaks the rule that one sound should be represented by one single character only.

The use of double signs involving the soft sign would, however, appear to be not altogether undesirable, particularly in cases such as (8), and in the palatalized "n" of Yakut, a sound which Baskakov never mentions once. (In current orthography this is n + soft sign.) Despite its obvious use in such cases, Baskakov mentions it only for optional retention (42), while keeping a place for the hard sign (38).

At present (38) has two uses which Baskakov proposes to retain. In Tuvinian it is used as a sign of pharyngealization of the preceding vowel—a phenomenon peculiar to the language, and this use is apparently to continue, although it might have been thought that some form of diacritical mark would have served as well. Its second use—that of "separative sign"—is more dubious, occurring as it does only in words of Arabic or Persian origin, and even then not always when it might be expected (i.e. as a transliteration of "hamza"), and with no degree of consistency. Thus, for example, the general word for

"world" ("dünya" in Turkish) which is of Arabic/Persian origin has a "hard sign" following the "n" in Bashkir, while this is omitted in, for example, Turkmen and Kazakh.<sup>8</sup>

Additionally in Turkmen, for example, it is specifically used after "r" in some words of Persian origin to indicate the iotacization of the following "e" (e.g. tir"yek—opium; cher"yek—a quarter). With the disappearance of iotacized vowels such a specialized use need no longer apply, and, since its retention in other cases seems unnecessary, its place in the alphabet should be optional at most.

Apart from the foregoing the cyrillization is straightforward, and does not deserve any special comment. Obviously no unified alphabet can hope to do more than approximate roughly to an agreed norm, particularly as regards vowel sounds; and at least this alphabet has resisted any temptation towards a proliferation of vowel symbols; and is, as far as it goes, neither more nor less adequate than UTLA.

#### IV

It is clear that, if these proposals of Baskakov are indeed the forerunners of a full-scale alphabetic reform, then it must be implicit that the former linguistic policies of the USSR, certainly as far as Turkic is concerned, have, in their essentials been abandoned. Three points particularly appear to stand out. In the first place it seems fairly clear that any thought of integrating Russian and Turkic phonetics, which included the adoption of Russian orthographic conventions and the correct treatment of loan-words, with which such great play was made in 1952, even to the extent of discussing Russian phonetic loans into Turkic, has been seen to be impracticable. Gone too is the theory that it was necessary to bring the scripts and orthographies of national alphabets as close as possible to that of Russian. The second point is the treatment of loan-words referred to above. Baskakov's article deals scarcely at all with this question, although it is again implicit that he foresees revisions in this field as well, since he proposes the complete abolition of at least four, and at most seven, Russian characters from the new cyrillic Turkic alphabet, which, it is suggested, should be replaced by analytic combinations. This would seem to indicate an endorsement of the revised Azerbaydzhani loan-orthography; although it is not made clear whether Baskakov foresees each language making phonetic, as opposed to orthographic, borrowings.

The third point on which there has been a reversal of policy is the idea that a close integration of Russian and Turkic is desirable as a means of facilitating the teaching of Russian to Turkic speakers. It would seem that practical experience has shown this to be a fallacy; but it is obviously impossible to say whether the fault lay in the alphabets, or in a deep-rooted unwillingness to learn.

<sup>8</sup> It may be noted in passing that in cyrillic Tadzhik it is written n + soft sign + iotacized vowel.

Thus the very three points which were the main arguments in favour of the cyrillization and integration policy of 1939 are seen to have been scrapped, and their place taken by a proposed alphabet reform, which, according to the 1966 *Vestnik AN SSSR*, is to have as its aim increased inter-intelligibility, which in itself is yet another departure from 1939 policy. The question must however remain; can such inter-intelligibility be achieved by simple alphabet reform?

As at present codified, individual literary languages are so divergent that the mere fact of there being alphabetic variations as well is but a very minor hurdle to be overcome in comparing one language with another. Even with a revised and unified alphabet, such as now proposed, a quite extensive knowledge of comparative Turkic phonetics will be required before any given text can be comprehended by a speaker of a language belonging to a different group. Unless, therefore, the text in question is composed largely of Russian loans, it would still remain unintelligible without special study, and even this small intelligibility would be sacrificed if such Russian loans were to be rendered phonetically instead of orthographically.

As is well known there have been various attempts made during the last 100 years to devise some kind of "orta tili" which would take the place of the Chagatay literary language. Thus the Kazan school proposed a unified language for the use of speakers of the Kipchak group of languages, while more recently Turkestanian émigrés living in Europe made do with a modernized form of Chagatay in a latin script which had more affinities with Turkish than with UTLA. Despite these attempts, the main current of Turkic literary development lay, even long before the Revolution, in attempts to establish local literary languages, and this tendency was, of course, assiduously fostered since 1917. If now the Russian authorities wish to improve mutual intelligibility by introducing some vague form of "orta tili" (and this seems to be the ultimate aim; otherwise why become involved with alphabet reform?) this whole tendency, together with its underlying philosophy, will have to be reversed. Whether this is indeed practical politics at this late stage is extremely doubtful, and it is likely that the most that could be hoped for, for the time being at least, is that a supranational Turkic "orta tili" should exist alongside present "national literary" languages; although it had always been previously supposed that Russian was to be such a *lingua franca*.

In his introduction to Volume II of *Languages of the USSR—Turkic* (Moscow, 1966) Baskakov stressed the great homogeneity of the Turkic languages, going so far as to claim that, with the exception of Chuvash and Yakut, they were inter-intelligible from Europe to Eastern Siberia. This claim is only doubtfully valid from the point of view of spoken languages, and certainly invalid from the point of view of literary languages. That such a claim should have been made, however, and that there should now be attempts at alphabetic unification, does show

an official tendency to be prepared to recognize basic Turkic unity, at least linguistically. In his comments on Baskakov's 1952 article (*op. cit.*), Wurm was of the opinion that "the modification of these alphabets and orthographies on more uniform lines . . . would break down the barriers of artificial differences put up between the individual languages, and might increase the tendencies towards Turkic unification". It is, however, difficult to see how a mere tinkering about with existing alphabets can contribute much to unification—and this is all that is proposed at present. As it is, any unificatory policy along these lines must inevitably founder on the twin rocks of factitious nationalities and phonetic spelling—of which the most obvious example is Karakalpak, which is, in effect, no more than a Kazakh dialect. From this point of view, Baskakov's proposed new alphabet is unificatory only in the sense that it abolishes differences in letter-shapes between languages. If true unification is required, then at least the criterion that "one sign must represent one sound in all languages" must be abandoned, since it is this very phonetic representation which is the biggest stumbling block to literary inter-intelligibility. For this purpose an alphabet "for the eye" is obviously more desirable than a mere representation of local pronunciation.

The homogeneity of the Turkic languages lies in basic Turkic vocabulary with the addition of cultural loans, and therefore it can fairly be said that at this period, through russification, Turkic is more homogeneous than ever it was under Islam, which never influenced the Siberian languages. Another important factor is obviously morphology; and it is on these two fundamentals that any unificatory policy must be based. Unfortunately, from the unificatory point of view, lexical homogeneity has been largely eroded through the acceptance as standard of phonetic spellings which, in many instances, are little more than dialect variants. Such strict phoneticism can do nothing other than obscure basic homogeneity.

The strength of written Chagatay lay in just the very fact that it took little or no account of phonetic variations, and so even the works of "local Chagatay" schools were mutually intelligible without too much difficulty, since there was at least some sort of standardized orthography, which, if not necessarily accurately reflecting the differences, say, between Uzbek and Kazakh phoneticism, at least was adequate for its purpose, namely, inter-communication over a wide area. If, therefore, unification is now sought after, it should be looked for, not so much in a revision of alphabets (although this is obviously an important first step), as in a basic revision of orthography. Such a revision need not necessarily be reactionary, nor need it involve the disappearance of lexical variants (e.g. "el" and "qol" for "hand"); but at least it should do away with such variants as "yol"/"dzhol" (= "road"). Reforms along these lines, which could embrace all the more important current literary languages at least, would be truly

unificatory in tendency. Nevertheless, the conception of any basic orthographical revision is completely absent from Baskakov's present article, and this renders it, from a "unificatory" point of view, of little value. The reforms proposed now by Baskakov merely scratch at the surface of the question, without making any real proposals for the realization of a unificatory policy for Turkic.

After reading his article one is left with the impression that a rather bored Baskakov, invited to contribute his views on a unificatory policy, has merely seized on the first idea that came to mind—the cyrillization of UTLA. In doing so, he has certainly not made any major contribution towards a solution of this very complex problem.

### Bibliography

The following are just some of the books and articles which may usefully be consulted on this subject.

1. *Yazyki Narodov SSSR*. Vol. II—*Tyurkskiye Yazyki*. Ed. N. A. Baskakov, Moscow, 1966.
2. *The Turkic Languages of Central Asia: Problems of Planned Culture Contact*. CARC, London, revised edition 1960. (Contains in addition to a translation of Baskakov's 1952 article, comments on it by Dr. S. Wurm, and an appendix by C. G. Simpson on Azerbaydzhani orthographic reform.)
3. *Handbuch der Orientalistik*. 5<sup>er</sup> Band—*Turkologie*. Leiden, 1963. (Particularly the section on "Literaturen".)
4. *Turkic Peoples of the USSR*. S. Wurm. CARC, London, 1954.
5. *Introduction to Altaic Linguistics*. N. Poppe, Wiesbaden, 1965. (Gives examples of all the alphabets—except UTLA and Armenian—in which Turkic has been written.)
6. *Central Asian Review*. Vol. IX, No. 2, 1962. (Contains Simpson's review of Baskakov's *Tyurkskiye Yazyki*—Moscow, 1960, which also discusses the intelligibility question.)

### Notes on the Tables

*Tables Ia (vowels) and Ib (consonants)* give details of all the anomalies cited by Baskakov in the course of his article, and show the phonemic equivalents of all letters currently in use in the cyrillic Turkic alphabets. A dash (—) indicates that a particular phoneme is lacking in the language in question (e.g. /ä/ in the Siberian languages). For the sake of clarity the vowels have been arranged in phonemic and not alphabetical order.

The first column shows the most common symbol, while the second shows variations in form. Excluded from this general scheme is Chuvash, whose variant symbols are shown at the extreme right of the Tables.

As far as Table Ib is concerned, in cases where a particular letter







TABLE II PROPOSED NEW UNIFIED CYRILLIC TURKIC ALPHABET

No.	New Cyr. Alph.	UTLA	Phoneme*	Notes	Letters to be replaced	Arabic	Turkey Turkish
1	а	а	[a]	Conventionally it could be used for Karachay Balkar [a'], for Tatar and Bashkir [ä], as well as variants. In Uzbek it could be used for [ä], where other languages have ə. Alternatively in Uzbek 'a' could represent [ä] and ə [ä]. To indicate vowel length in Turkmen a diacritical mark 'ā' could be used, or the vowel could be doubled (aa).	—	ا	а
2	э	э	[ä]	—	ä, аь (а)	—	е
3	б	в	[b]	—	—	ب	б
4	в	w	[v]	In those languages which have the bilabial [w], the letter 'ÿ' should be used.	—	و	в
5	г	г	[g]	In some languages, e.g. Altay, where [ɣ] has no phonemic value it can be replaced by г. The Azeri form of palatalized [g'] (now shown as ж) has no phonemic value and can be rendered as г, whose value can be determined by the vocalism.	ж	گ	г
6	ґ	ґ	[ɣ]	This letter may be included in the alphabet of those languages where phonemic differentiation is required between [ɣ] and [g], e.g. in Uzbek (гул = flower; ғул = fetters). In those languages where vocalism determines the value, ґ can be omitted.	ґ, гъ, (г)	غ	ğ
7	д	d	[d]	—	—	د	d
8	дь	dj	[dj]	For use only in Altay and Yakut.	j	—	—
9	е/э	e	[e]	When initial—if Russian = [je] but in Turkic as [e]. [e] should be represented postconsonantly as 'e', but initially as э. It would also be possible to use э for all positions. In Tatar and Bashkir 'e', now meaning [i] can be replaced by 'i', which in Khakass has the same value. 'e' in Tatar and Bashkir to represent the diphthongs [ji] and [ji] are to be represented by йи and йэ. [je] in word or syllable anlaut in Turkmen, and in syllable anlaut in Kazakh should now be represented by йе or йэ.	—	—	e
10	ж	з	[ž]	—	—	ژ	j
11	ж	ç	[ʒ]	—	ч, ч, дж, (ж)	چ	ç
12	з	z	[z]	—	—	ز	z
13	з	đ	[ž]	In Bashkir and Turkmen only.	(з)	ذ	—
14	и	i	[i]	This is to represent [i], [i] and [j]. In Tatar, Bashkir and Khakass where [i] and [j], [i] have to be differentiated, it will represent [i] only. (Cf. ныс (to cut), нис (we) and нис (five) in Khakass.) In Turkmen [i:] can be indicated either by doubling (ии) or by the compound ий. In diphthongs, Tatar [ij] will be rendered as ий, while in Kazakh it will be ий, since in the latter language [i] has no phonemic differentiation, and the letter 'i' can be dispensed with from the alphabet.	(i—Kazakh)	ي	i
15	і	ı	[i]	In Khakass, Tatar and Bashkir only (see above).	(e)	—	—
16	й	j	[j]	—	—	ي	y
17	к	k	[k]	In several languages, where [q] has no phonemic value, e.g. in Altay this can also be represented by 'к', and the value inferred from the vocalism.	—	ك	k
18	қ	q	[q]	—	к, къ	ق	k
19	л	l	[l] [l]	Correct realization of the phoneme depends on vocalism.	—	ل	l
20	м	m	[m]	—	—	م	m
21	н	n	[n]	—	—	ن	n
22	ң	ñ	[ɲ]	—	нг, нг, нъ	ڭ	—
23	о	o	[o]	Also to be used to represent open [ɤ] of Tatar and Bashkir.	—	ا	o
24	ө	ö	[ö]	Also to be used to represent open [ü] of Tatar and Bashkir. (It would be correct to represent [ɤ] and [ü] by y and ʏ.)	ö, оь, ё/о	—	ö
25	п	p	[p]	—	—	پ	p
26	р	r	[r]	—	—	ر	r
27	с	s	[s]	—	—	س	s
28	ç	ʃ	[ʃ]	Found in Bashkir and Turkmen.	—	ش	—
29	т	t	[t]	—	—	ت	t
30	у	u	[u]	This includes in Kazakh the phoneme [ɯ] now represented artificially by 'У'.	У	و	u
31	ÿ	v	[w]	Also as second part of diphthong, e.g. Kazakh [ɥw]: уÿ.	в, у, У	ف	—
32	Ү	y	[ü]	—	ÿ, уь, ю/у	—	ü
33	ф	f	[f]	—	—	ف	f
34	х	x	[x]	—	—	خ	h
35	ҳ	h	[h]	—	h, гъ, (x)	ح	h
36	ч	c	[ç]	—	—	چ	ç
37	ш	ʃ	[ʃ]	—	—	ش	ʃ
38	ъ	'	—	A separative sign; in Tuvian will have the additional function of indicating the pharyngealization of the preceding vowel.	—	ع	—
39	ы	ь	[ɨ]	Includes variants [ɨ], [jɨ] and [ɨ].	—	—	ı
40	ы	я	[ɨ]	These are optional letters which may be included in	—	—	—

5	г	g	[g]	In some languages, e.g. Altay, where [ɣ] has no phonemic value it can be replaced by r. The Azeri form of palatalized [g'] (now shown as ж) has no phonemic value and can be rendered as r, whose value can be determined by the vocalism.	ж	گ	g
6	ҕ	ɣ	[ɣ]	This letter may be included in the alphabet of those languages where phonemic differentiation is required between [ɣ] and [g], e.g. in Uzbek (гул = flower; гул = fetters). In those languages where vocalism determines the value, ғ can be omitted.	ҕ, гъ, (г)	غ	ğ
7	д	d	[d]	—	—	د	d
8	дь	dj	[dj]	For use only in Altay and Yakut.	ј	—	—
9	е/э	e	[e]	When initial—if Russian = [je] but in Turkic as [e]. [e] should be represented postconsonantly as 'e', but initially as э. It would also be possible to use э for all positions. In Tatar and Bashkir 'e', now meaning [i] can be replaced by 'i', which in Khakass has the same value. 'e' in Tatar and Bashkir to represent the diphthongs [ji] and [ji] are to be represented by йи and йы. [je] in word or syllable anlaut in Turkmen, and in syllable anlaut in Kazakh should now be represented by йе or йэ.	—	—	e
10	ж	z	[ž]	—	—	ژ	j
11	ж	ç	[ʒ]	—	ч, ч̣, дж, (ж)	چ	c
12	з	z	[z]	—	—	ز	z
13	з̣	ḏ	[ž]	In Bashkir and Turkmen only.	(з)	ذ	—
14	и	i	[i]	This is to represent [ij], [i] and [i]. In Tatar, Bashkir and Khakass where [i] and [i], [i] have to be differentiated, it will represent [i] only. (Cf. пыс (to cut), пис (we) and пис (five) in Khakass.) In Turkmen [i:] can be indicated either by doubling (ии) or by the compound ий. In diphthongs, Tatar [ij] will be rendered as ий, while in Kazakh it will be ий, since in the latter language [i] has no phonemic differentiation, and the letter 'i' can be dispensed with from the alphabet.	(i—Kazakh)	ي	i
15	і	ı	[i]	In Khakass, Tatar and Bashkir only (see above).	(e)	ا	—
16	й	j	[j]	—	—	ي	y
17	к	k	[k]	In several languages, where [q] has no phonemic value, e.g. in Altay this can also be represented by 'к', and the value inferred from the vocalism.	—	ك	k
18	қ	q	[q]	—	к, къ	ق	k
19	л	l	[l] [l]	Correct realization of the phoneme depends on vocalism.	—	ل	l
20	м	m	[m]	—	—	م	m
21	н	n	[n]	—	—	ن	n
22	ң	ŋ	[ŋ]	—	ң, нг, нъ	ن	—
23	о	o	[o]	Also to be used to represent open [ɔ] of Tatar and Bashkir.	—	ا	o
24	ө	ö	[ö]	Also to be used to represent open [ɔ] of Tatar and Bashkir. (It would be correct to represent [ɔ] and [ɔ] by y and ʏ.)	ө, оь, ê/o	ا	ö
25	п	p	[p]	—	—	پ	p
26	р	r	[r]	—	—	ر	r
27	с	s	[s]	—	—	س	s
28	ç	ḥ	[š]	Found in Bashkir and Turkmen.	—	ح	—
29	т	t	[t]	—	—	ت	t
30	у	u	[u]	This includes in Kazakh the phoneme [u] now represented artificially by 'у'.	ұ	و	u
31	ў	v	[w]	Also as second part of diphthong, e.g. Kazakh [ɥw]: уў.	в, у, ʏ	و	—
32	Ү	y	[ü]	—	ү, уь, ю/y	ا	ü
33	ф	f	[f]	—	—	ف	f
34	х	x	[x]	—	—	خ	h
35	ҕ	h	[h]	—	h, гъ, (x)	ح	h
36	ч	c	[ç]	—	—	چ	ç
37	ш	š	[š]	—	—	ش	š
38	ь	·	—	A separative sign; in Tuvinian will have the additional function of indicating the pharyngealization of the preceding vowel.	—	ع	—
39	ы	ь	[ɨ]	Includes variants [ɨ], [ɨ] and [ɨ].	—	ا	ɨ
40	ц	ç	[ts]	These are optional letters, which may be included to denote their corresponding values, and in loan words. They could, however, be transliterated: ц = ts; ш = шч.	—	ا	—
41	щ	šç	[šç]		—	ا	—
42	ь	—	—		—	а	—

\* The phoneme shown is taken to include all its variants.



is common in form and value to all languages, an occasional double value is indicated by a plus sign (+) in the language concerned.

One or two symbols, omitted by Baskakov, have been included for the sake of completeness: these are indicated by a \*.

*Table II* gives the proposed new unified cyrillic alphabet, together with Baskakov's notes taken from the body of the article. Two additional columns, not appearing in the original, have been added showing the comparative Arabic and Turkish forms. Some obvious printing errors in the original have been corrected.

In the column "Letters to be replaced" some letters [e.g. (a)] are shown in brackets. This indicates that, while remaining in the alphabet, they will no longer, in some languages, have their present value (generally one value of a doublet is to be suppressed).

The phonetic notation used throughout is that of Baskakov himself. No attempt has been made to translate it into IPA.

## RECENT SOVIET WRITING ON INDIA

By HUBERT EVANS

Over the past years—from the beginning, that is, of 1964—some 77 articles on India, predominantly academic rather than journalistic in quality, have appeared either in periodicals of standing or else (and less frequently) as component pieces in volumes of collected studies.

These articles, accounting for nearly 330,000 words, allowed the following very rough classification by subject matter:

1. Ideological problems	21 articles
2. On Indian-Soviet relations	20 "
3. Literary, cultural and ethnographical questions	19 "
4. Linguistics	12 "
5. Oriental (in the sense of classical) studies	5 "

In the case of headings 1 and 2, there was necessarily a marked monotony as well as much repetition and overlapping; in the case of 4 and 5 a somewhat narrow specialization. For these reasons the present survey will confine itself to the score of articles, and the 70,000 odd words, quoted under 3.

As in earlier instalments of this series, the aim has been to render the substance and flavour of each article, with very little—indeed, nothing in many instances—in the way of criticism.

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THE story of the "Earlier Days of the Communist Press in India" was recapitulated by Y. V. Kruglov in a 30-page survey constituting a self-contained chapter in a volume entitled *The Press Abroad. A Collection of Articles*, Moscow University Publishers, 1964.

The appearance of the inaugural number of Shripat Amrit Dange's weekly *Socialist* on 5 August 1922 was the first tread on the frequently rickety staircase that climbed for 10 years towards *Communist*, the organ of the (provisional) Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, founded in 1933 under the editorship of Dr. G. Adhikari. The detailed documentation of the period separating those two dates was saved from tedium by the lively narrative prose into which it was put. The defect of this quality was that it gave now and then disproportionate room and emphasis to what was ephemeral and of small impact; so that Ghulam Hussein, for instance, with his Urdu monthly *Inqilab* received vastly more attention than M. N. Roy. The latter's papers, published in Berlin, Zurich and Paris from 1922 to 1928 were (in one sentence, no more) "of no particular significance in the history of the Communist press having regard to his erroneous and inconsistent position", whereas Ghulam Hussein—whose performance on the Communist stage was a

walk-on part which he played for about 12 months before throwing in his hand for good in 1924—was even favoured with half a page of biography.

Kruglov's article explained how the weekly *Socialist* of Bombay was transformed, after 26 numbers, into a monthly of greater educative value, the crucial need of the time being to teach people their "A, B, C". Then, in Calcutta, but only for about one year, there was published the Bengali weekly *Janavani*; and in the north, simultaneously, there was *Inqilab*, another flash in the pan. The trouble in those days was lack of co-ordination over the subcontinent *plus*, Kruglov added, a dearth of individuals with the requisite political sense. When Dange, Shaikat Usmani, Muzaffar Ahmad and Nalini were gaoled in 1924, the Communist press could hardly carry on. The necessity of a countrywide tie-up was by then obvious, and in December 1925 an All-India Conference implemented the creation of a Communist Party, albeit puny and lacking in mass appeal, with S. V. Ghate as its secretary.

In the years 1926-27, Kruglov proceeded, workers and peasants movements or parties crystallized out in the Punjab, Bengal and Bombay, and an organ of publicity went with each of them. The degree to which those organs were Communist, Kruglov was careful to insist, was determined by the external pressures of the environment. Thus, in the case of the Punjab, *Kirti*, the journal in point, failed to take a consistently Communist line because the movement whose organ it was fell under terrorist influence; Bhagat Singh the terrorist at the helm sought to control and suborn the Communist S. S. Josh in the editor's chair: Whereas in Bengal and Bombay the workers and peasants organizations were under the wing of the National Congress, and hence their organs (*Langal*, and afterwards *Ganavani* in Bengal; *Kranti* in Bombay) though edited by Communists of distinction like Muzaffar Ahmad and Dange himself, were in the last resort answerable to non-Communist direction.

A little later, the Bombay press of the Workers and Peasants Movement was supplemented by a second weekly, this time in English, *viz.*, *Spark* edited by M. G. Desai with the assistance of G. Adhikari; but all too soon Desai was arrested and publication ceased. Lester Hutchinson was then invited to revive it under the name of *The New Spark*, but his arrest in the Meerut Conspiracy proceedings brought this, too, to an abrupt end. With scarcely a pause the breach was filled by a third enterprise, *The Workers Weekly*, which had more staying power. This journal, Kruglov said, Congress sponsored as it was, did more service to Communism than to its parent cause, pleading powerfully—and not in vain, as the sequel showed—for a fully integrated All-India Communist Party having its own press. The time for this was shortly to arrive.

In an essay entitled "The Criticism of Bourgeois Society and the Advocacy of Egalitarian Principles in India" appearing in *Narody*

*Azi i Afriki*, No. 6 of 1967, E. N. Komarov assessed the contribution to social equality of eight outstanding figures in the 19th century and this. A virtue of the essay was that it did not ramble; its four separately headed sections presented methodically the changing pattern of the 130 odd years under study. A defect was that the conventional Soviet labelling imposed an artificial uniformity which could not but blur the distinguishing features of certain of the persons in the list.

Summarized, Komarov's account would read:

1. Ram Mohan Roy, "India's first enlightener", who led the procession, condemned the medieval exploitation of the peasantry and attacked Hindu orthodoxy. But unfortunately, in company with the other liberal thinkers, the "moderates" who spoke for India from the 20s to perhaps the 70s of the past century, he was enamoured of the Western bourgeois scene and in particular admired the English as "a blessed nation in the enjoyment of civic and political freedom".

During the last quarter of the century the extremists took the stage. They were nationalists and highly critical of bourgeois attitudes at home and abroad alike. Of this radical school, Bankim Chandra Chatterji and Swami Vivekananda were the ornaments; they "were among the few Indians before the close of the 19th century who were acquainted with socialistic thought". However, their socialism was mainly an ideal belonging to the distant future.

2. It was not until the early 20th century, and as a concomitant of the national liberation movement then gaining impetus, that people began to talk of India's being committed to the struggle of labour versus capital. In that struggle the British were seen not simply as the embodiment of foreign paramountcy but as the backers of an exploiting class in India itself. As a corrective to big business the idealistic Ananda K. Coomaraswami preached a revival of the traditional methods of small production on the basis of the caste system. Another idealist, Rabindranath Tagore, with greater prescience envisaged the uplift of a backward society, degraded by colonialism, on the basis of a collective economy. But more than anybody it was Mahatma Gandhi who expressed this synthesis of social advance and radical nationalism. It was a shortcoming in the teaching of all these egalitarians that while damning capitalism in principle it did not provide for legislation to implement the alternative.

3. Anyhow, the idea of socialism had by this time become woven into Indian politics, and the new era which Great October inaugurated was one that advanced Indian thinkers could hail with enthusiasm. Bolshevism, declared Bipin Chandra Pal in 1919, signified the right of a people to live freely and happily, knowing neither exploitation nor the persecutions of the rich and the self-styled upper classes. Sympathy with scientific socialism was of course a very different thing from adopting it. Although a Communist "movement" showed itself in the

20s, society remained bourgeois in practice and at best utopian in its approaches to socialism.

4. This was the juncture at which Jawaharlal Nehru entered the arena. He had done so late enough to breathe an atmosphere quite different from that in which the thinking of his *guru*, the Mahatma, had reached maturity. He had studied Marx and was aware of the achievements of socialism in the USSR. He accepted socialism as vital to the welfare of the body politic in the contemporary world. All this, however, did not mean that Nehru grasped scientific socialism as an integral system; too often, with him, the real was fighting with the utopian. His thinking resulted in "an exceedingly complex variant of subjective socialism".

Two articles in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 of 1966, were so closely associated in substance and in method as to justify, if not require, a joint notice. One, by V. I. Pavlov, was "The Integration of Rural Handicraft with Agriculture in 19th Century India", and the other, by A. M. Kolontayev, was "The Reproduction of Agricultural Instruments in the Peasant Economy of 20th Century India". The question in either case which occupied the authors was how in the respective centuries—both of them well within the era of capitalism, factory production and the money-commodity relationship—the cultivator obtained his implements and how the maker of these fitted into the farming community as an integral part of it.

Pavlov began by confessing disarmingly that at one time and in good company he had been carried away "by his predilection for all that was progressive in Indian society" into a premature, untenable judgment. This was that the bygone mode of remunerating the rural craftsman (*viz.*, by assigning him a fixed share in the aggregate of the community crop or else allocating him an actual plot of land), had in the 19th century yielded place to the situation where he was simply an individual supplier—and no longer, that is, a community supplier—dealing with his customer under a private arrangement.

A recent work by A. I. Chicherov<sup>1</sup> had set Pavlov thinking again, and without by any means accepting all of Chicherov's views he had been led by closer study, especially of conditions in Maharashtra, Gujerat, and Panjab, to the conclusion that the traditional system of remuneration did *not* lapse in the 19th century. It did of course happen, thanks to a rapidly increasing disparity in the distribution of wealth, that the artisan tended to behave not exclusively as the community craftsman but in addition as an independent producer prepared to satisfy the consumer orders of the individual member of the community: e.g. a carpenter would build a dwelling, a *chamar* make shoes. And it was part of the same process that certain artisans, such as the weavers and oil-makers, should drop out more obviously than others from the old "depersonalized" intra-community structure.

<sup>1</sup> A. I. Chicherov, *Economic Development of India before the British Conquest*, Moscow, 1965. For an analysis, see CAR, Vol. XV, No. 1, pp. 57-61.

Kolontayev, concentrating more narrowly on the production of farm implements, found that even in the present century the age-old peasant economy had offered an astonishing resistance to the forces of change. In older days all output had been rewarded in kind: the change now observable was the hiving off of the "free" craftsmen from the "community" craftsmen. But in the matter of farm implements, the low average level economically of the cultivator (as indeed of his supplier) favoured the retention of a system of guaranteed services and of minimum guaranteed rewards which did not depend on a market situation.

"The Panchayats and their Role in Contemporary India" by N. N. Sosina (*Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1966) had the characteristics of an undergraduate essay. It summarized lucidly everything that had been said in India about panchayats from the recommendations of the Mehta Committee in 1959 to the Santhanam Committee report on Panchayati Raj elections in 1965.

In marshalling the evidence the writer was content to follow R. N. Mathur's "Problem and Prospects of Democratic Decentralization in India" in *Modern Review*, Calcutta, 1962, and her "four facets of the case" were in fact his.

1. Many authorities, she said, had been driven to the conclusion that the system perpetuated and intensified "factionalism and casteism". She quoted (a) B. Chatterjee ("Leadership in Panchayati Raj", *Modern Review*, Calcutta, 1965) to the effect that Indian cultivators were psychologically unprepared for the reforms envisaged in the programme of rural uplift through the panchayats; and that leadership in the village was still that of yesterday: it meant the landlords, the traders, and the moneylenders; (b) R. Choudhury ("Panchayats and Interest Groups. Study of a Bengal Village", *Economic Weekly*, Bombay, 1964) as illustrating how in a typical village the panchayat was run by two upper-caste families; (c) Ramdass ("Panchayati Raj", *New Age*, 1962) as maintaining that the system played into the hands of the conservative element, enabling it to take over local self-government as a perquisite of its own.

2. Secondly there was the political facet: Should party politics come into it, or not? The Santhanam Committee recommended that the political parties ought not to identify themselves with the elections to panchayats whose functioning, in the Committee's finding, lay quite outside the proper scope of party politics. On the other hand, B. Maheshwari ("Political Parties and Panchayati Raj", *AICC Economic Review*, 1962) took a diametrically opposite view, arguing that the political parties could alone engender a healthy political consciousness in the rural populace and that politics could not disrupt the traditional unity of village life, as some were fond of contending, for the simple reason that such an idyllic harmony was nothing but an old

wives' tale. Sosina's own comment, her first so far, was that this was a "sensible" reading of the case.

3. Thirdly there was the financial side. The majority view here (as voiced notably by Prof. S. L. Singh, Rector of the Faculty of Political Science at Patna) was that the panchayats, being starved of funds from above and unauthorized to draw on local resources, were powerless to tackle any of the crucial problems of local self-government, and that the decentralization of which the Government of India boasted was "all show".

4. Finally for consideration was the question of control by the Centre or by the State. Mathur and Maheshwari concurred in advocating more co-operation and less superintendence. At present Panchayati Raj was an appendage to parliamentary democracy instead of serving as the foundation on which the central organs of administration could rest.

This useful round-up of Indian opinion ended with an inconsequent sentence which ran: "Progressive forces in India are conducting the fight for the democratization of local self-government against the ideological influence of religion, against stagnation and inertia and age-old prejudice which hinder the penetration of an advanced outlook into the village."

In *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 of 1965, S. V. Trubnikova wrote on "Alochana—A New Direction". The reference was to the energetic overhaul from which this Hindi journal had benefited since the end of 1963 when Sh. Chauhan assumed the editorship. It was nowadays a first-rate forum of wideawake literary debate. Trubnikova said, as a selection from its recent contents would prove.

She instanced to begin with an article by Jai Kumar Jalaj (January, 1964) which discussed the bridge connecting, or ideally connecting, modern Indian literature with the classical Sanskrit models. Noteworthy, too, was a review (April, 1964) by R. K. Megh of Hazari Prasad Drivedi's latest novel *The Beautiful Chandralekha*, which commented on the humanistic treatment of the heroine's character and praised the author for his skilful combination of historical truth with artistic invention.

Of most timely interest were certain articles designed to show that Hindi literature and Urdu literature were the literatures of one people; namely, the people inhabiting the area of Hindustan proper. Trubnikova cited Mahtab Ali's contribution (January, 1964) called "The Influence of Urdu on Contemporary Hindi Poetry" in which this critic illustrated the Urdu framework favoured by Jaishankar Prasad, Pant, Mahadev Varma and other singers of the so-styled "Indian" nationalism.

Considerable attention, again, was being paid to the impact of foreign literatures on Indian writers; a special section in each number being devoted to this. Thus, for instance, the influence of Sartre and Camus was dealt with (October, 1963; April, 1964) by Professor Prakash Chandra Gupta; and that of T. S. Eliot by Govind Rajnish (January,

1964). It had been fashionable to exaggerate Eliot's hold on the Hindi "experimentalists" but there was a significant difference between the gloomy pessimism of Eliot's poetry and the comparative optimism of the modern Indian poets. Also in this section on World Literature was an essay by Mulkraj Anand (July, 1964) dealing with British writing on India which contained among other items an acute estimate of Kipling.

*Alochana* was unprepared, Trubnikova noticed, to echo the voice of the majority regarding the experimentalists just mentioned. Two articles, "The Problem of Complexity" by Paramanand Shrivastava (July, 1964) and "Experimentalist Poetry and Humanism" by Jagdish Gupta (July, 1963) rebutted the charge of "reaction" and "decadence" commonly brought against the experimentalists, and showed them to be in the best sense progressive.

Deserving notice finally were several articles on the writer as citizen. The most important of these was Sh. Chauhan's own, entitled "The Writer's Freedom and his Restrictions" (April, 1964), attacking the bourgeois *littérateurs* who deny the necessity of any connexion between letters and the urgent social and political issues of the day.

Immediately following the above appreciation of *Alochana's* new look, was a review of "*Indo-Asian Culture, 1963*" by N. N. Sosina. Since this Quarterly is in English and readily accessible, it will not be necessary to waste any space here on Sosina's detailed description of the 1963 contents. It will only be in point to cite certain of her running comments. Thus: N. Dhebar ("Philosophy of Social Justice" in Vol. XII, No. 2) gave a totally erroneous picture of the Communist system; S. Ch. Sarkar ("Development of the Village in India" in Vol. XI, No. 4) took a line which was out of keeping with the objective realities of the country's economic situation; R. N. Dandekar, writing on the ancient period, broke away from the traditional idealistic representations of India; R. L. Roy ("Social Position of Music and Musicians in India" in Vol. XI, No. 3) was interesting and original, but underestimated the role of slavery in India; B. K. Majumdar ("The Malay Peninsula: Indian Influence", in Vol. XII, No. 1) showed bias in his portrayal of the peninsula as a Far East centre of unadulterated Indian culture. A general remark in conclusion was that the journal subjected many an old problem to a fresh and usually unprejudiced scrutiny, and also ventilated not a few others which had escaped attention hitherto.

N. I. Prigarina wrote with accomplished scholarship in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 of 1965, on "Humanism in the Philosophical Poetry of Iqbal". The article was clearly intended for readers already acquainted with the conventions governing the classical writing of Persian poetry, and could therefore plunge *in medias res*: in other words, into the original pages of the *Payām e Mashreq*. Direct

quotation (accompanied by Russian renderings) accounted for a good half of the article.

Iqbal's *Message of the East* has, of course, long been available in translation to a wide public which knows therefore its general purport and scope, and also recalls that it was conceived as a reply to Goethe's *West-Östlicher Divan*. As made plain above, Prigarina was not writing for that public, but for the reader supposed to recognize the consecrated vocabulary—*tapesh, shur, arzu, suz o saz, tab o tab* and the rest—and so to appreciate what was happening when Iqbal put these pet (*izlyublennyye*) terms of his into the mouth of Satan.

The temptation dialogue was treated in some detail and so was the argument between God and Man. It is only feasible here to record two or three of the salient points made: (a) In his handling of the Love versus Reason theme (to the disadvantage of the latter) Iqbal was following Rumi. (b) No single image of a lyrical hero emerged: at one moment the sceptic challenging the Deity would be encountered; at the next, the dervish or ascetic; in yet another place the tribune [of the people]; elsewhere the impartial onlooker; and so on. (c) It was precisely in the poems about the West that the Oriental flavour of the writing was most pronounced.

S. Trubnikova in her assessment of "R. Dinkar, Singer of the National Liberation Struggle"<sup>2</sup> (*Obshchestvennyye Nauki v Uzbekistane*, No. 8-9, 1964) was doubtless correct in attending to his earlier verse at the expense of his later, more mellow work. But it followed that her readers were introduced to pieces like *Delhi and Moscow, Comrades and Himalayas*, more often clamorous than mellifluous, to the neglect of the wit and sensitivity displayed 20 years afterwards (1955-57) in *Nim Leaves* and *Aphorisms*. Worse than this, Trubnikova (who sounds rather a priggish person) maintained that poor Dinkar got his ideology all awry—witness the very title of one of his poems, *Where there is no Path*—conceiving revolution to be something off the path instead of right on it. "Dreaming", she said, "of the bright world of the future, the poet fails to understand the social and political conditions of the springs of revolution; wrongly accounting it some spontaneous irrepressible force. . . . Misapprehensions of the sort plainly betray the limitation and political immaturity of his *Weltanschauung*."

A short but intense essay by B. L. Ogibenin, "In the Domain of Vedic Mythology", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3 of 1967, was wanting in clarity. Or perhaps it would be fairer to say that none but the reader having (a) in his mind some notion of the elusive cosmogony implied in the hymns of the *Rigveda*, and (b) at his elbow the latest paper of the French scholar G. Dumézil, *Les trois fonctions dans le Rigveda et les dieux indiens de Mitanni*, Académie Royale de Belgique, XLVII, 1961,

<sup>2</sup> Dinkar's language is Hindi. The author appeared to assume that all her readers would know this.

would find it clear. For the purpose of the essay was to pronounce how far the paper referred to in (b) assisted an understanding of the cosmogony referred to in (a).

Having examined the "tristructurality of *prêtres, guerriers* and *producteurs (pasteurs)*", postulated by Dumézil, the author, while partly admitting the relevance of the theory, submitted his own qualification of it in these words: "The functions of the deities are to be treated not as independent but as interconnected; which allows a fuller and more economic description of the symbolic structure of the classic [sc. the Rigveda]. The correlation of the magico-religious and the warrior functions on the one side, with the productive function on the other, is thus seen as an extraordinarily important link, for the Rigveda, as between the macrocosmic and the microcosmic."

A highly professional résumé of "Recent Palaeolithic Research in India" (*Vestnik, AN/SSSR, Moscow, No. 9, 1967*) was so well arranged and expressed as to hold the attention even of the profane. The writer, Dr. P. I. Boriskovskiy, had been commissioned to visit India in the winter of 1966-67, and this was a preliminary Note submitted on return. Much of the interest, at any rate to the lay mind, consisted in the cultural unity which it is nowadays possible to establish between the Indian and the Soviet Central Asian setting. The discoveries of the past 15 years or so attested, said Dr. Boriskovskiy, not simply that India was within the zone where man's isolation from the animal kingdom occurred, but that the Madras region, Poona, Hoshangabad and elsewhere exhibited specific affinities with the Tadzhik SSR and the Kazakh SSR. This was proved by the cut stone choppers and other tools dating back some hundreds of thousands of years recently unearthed by Indian archaeologists. Among so many similarities there were of course occasional items of differentiation, and to these the author also alluded. Besides implements, there were other evidences to record of palaeolithic man's mode of existence in India; notably, it had been discovered that the flat beetling slabs of rock so characteristic of the landscape in Central India, forming as they frequently did a sort of penthouse, had served as shelters, hideouts and perhaps as homes.

There was a remark, Boriskovskiy said, in the preface to *Indian Prehistory*, Poona, 1965, to the effect that the majority of Western archaeologists were hardly keeping abreast of the latest palaeolithic finds in India, and that the Soviet archaeologists were alone *au fait* of them. He thought that this was so, but pointed out that the Indian and the Soviet archaeologist were at the moment professionally compelled to share each other's results.

To Ye. K. Brosalina, writing on Tagore in *Vestnik* of Leningrad University, No. 2 of 1967, it seemed that most students of the famous dramatist had been content with a purely descriptive account of his

works<sup>3</sup> and that even such authorities on Tagore as Shukumar Shen and P. Bishi had attempted the classification of his writings from the merely formal consideration of which one of the three elements—prose, poetry, or song—predominated in the particular piece. This kind of approach, she maintained, ignored the “problematic” (*problematika*) of the dramas, and a more correct classification could be arrived at by taking into account the constant dramatic ingredients such as ideas, theme, conflict, correlation of characters and action, and effect of dialogue.

In her article “The Principal Currents in Tagore’s Dramatic Works” she found it possible to proceed, from these premises, to the determination of the following four cycles.

1. Lyric dramas: e.g. *Valmiki Pratibha*, *Chitrangada*, *Nalini*. In these, with dramatis personae restricted to the minimum, the emphasis is on the inner emotional struggle: people are by nature good and only prevented by circumstances from revealing and proving their proper selves. The monologue, consequently, predominates in these dramas.

2. Season dramas: e.g. *Phalguni*, *Sharadotshab*, *The Post Office*. These dwell on the kinship of man with the natural world: a power is detected in nature which could help to reform human society. Hence there is something static rather than dynamic in these pieces: there is little action, and because there is no plot, no development of the characters. Everything turns on the explanatory dialogue; one of the speakers having no role except to prompt the appropriate explanation.

3. Historical dramas: e.g. *Raja o Rani*, *Malini*. This time the characters are numerous and not merely laid bare but allowed to develop in step with the developing situation. Salient among the problems dealt with are those connected with the obligations as well as the opportunities of the ruler, and with the birth of a new morality breaking away from the old. The poetic, expository monologue is supplemented by the dialogue of debate serving as the spur to action.

4. Social dramas: e.g. *Muktadhara*, *Raktakarabi*. Though these partly overlap the historical plays, their real concern is with man in capitalist society, and with the relations between big and small nations. A weak local context (“in a certain kingdom”; “in a certain state”) is the foil for a strong temporal topicality. Neither the poetic nor the expository monologue intrudes much: it is the dialogue of dispute that counts.

Brosalina observed in conclusion that her cycles turned out to fit into distinct chronological compartments: lyrical dramas belonged to the 80s; historical dramas to the 90s; season dramas to the opening decade of this century; and social dramas to the second decade. This confirmed in her view the main direction of Tagore’s creative work as a whole—its slow but sure movement to a position of realism.

<sup>3</sup> Surely too sweeping. E. Thompson did more than “describe” many years ago, and so did Radhakrishnan fairly recently in *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, 1960.

Bengali literature came a second time under the Soviet lens in this same number (No. 2 of 1967) of the Leningrad *Vestnik*, when V. A. Novikova discussed Bankim Chandra's *Kamalakanta* in an essay entitled " *Kamalakanta* as a Satirical Work ".

It seems likely that she could expect to interest as wide a readership in USSR as any outside Bengal itself with her engaging account of this 19th century classic, seeing that the Russian version published in 1962 is to the best of belief the only translation to have been made in any language, Indian languages not excepted.

The composition, Novikova explained, consists of a series of stories of novella length strung together by the recurring character of *Kamalakanta* himself, who is supposed to be a poor Brahman hopelessly addicted to opium but nevertheless capable of criticism, now biting and now playful, of the scene around him. Pandits, zamindars and government clerks are pilloried, humbler folk more gently treated, in a collection of vignettes brilliantly evoking the Bengal of yesterday.

There were two articles on the caste system. Intended for the general reader rather than the Indianist, they were informative up to a point, but stopped short of the crucial issues. If caste meant a rigid scheme of, in Marx's phrase, " mutual repulsion and organic isolation " worked out a couple of thousand years ago under religio-ritualistic pressures having no relevance whatever in the modern world, why, the Soviet reader must have asked himself, were the Indians clinging to its observance with as much—and on some of the evidence adduced in these articles more—tenacity as ever? Why, again, was it, if caste be a loathsome accretion, that " Mahatma Gandhi crusaded not for its abolition but only for its reform " ? Why, finally, if caste all that long time ago " was introduced with the blessing of Hinduism " need Hindus feel committed to it today? Christians after all have abandoned many practices blessed by their Church in the past.

The first of the articles, " Indian Castes Today " by O. Oskolkova and Yu. Gusev, printed in *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya*, No. 6 of 1966, opened by charging the British with deliberately fortifying caste as an impediment to national unity—they consolidated the system. This bizarre construction, however, of the present state of affairs was not sustained for more than a half-page. From there on the writers contented themselves with compressing into a small compass a commendable amount of what can best be called accurate reference book information: i.e. they told the reader what a caste is, named the main ones in the hierarchy, and alluded to recent legislation designed to protect the Untouchables.

The second article (in two parts) A. Kutsenkov's " I. Harijans—Pariahs of Society. II. Caste and Social Progress " in *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, Nos. 5 & 6, 1967, was more graphic and more topical, being based on some open-eyed local investigation. It mentioned not simply the legislation to safeguard the Untouchables, but reported the meagre

practical benefits actually resulting from it, and it spoke also of the hardening of caste as an agency of political lobbying.

In the first of the two articles on caste, Hinduism was named in a sentence of seven or eight words, and into the second it did not really enter at all by name. One reason for not implicating Hinduism may perhaps have been that it has latterly become the Soviet fashion to display sympathy with, or at the least acquiesce with good grace in, the religions confessed in the countries of Asia. A. Litman's account of the Ashram of Swami Shivananda near Hardwar ("Among the Holy", *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 8, 1967) was a pointed reminder of this. Writing with patent sincerity, a well-informed Indianist here lauded to the skies the talented and humane men and women who associate themselves with the Divine Life. Nor is it open to anyone to counter, and say: Ah, but theirs is a Hinduism so diluted as to be indistinguishable from a universally acceptable ethical code. On the contrary, these cultivated disciples, as Litman was at pains to demonstrate, practise the very essence of Hinduism, ritual included. They insist that their acts of daily routine should be hallowed by Vedic hymns, by recitation and chanting from the Rigveda; that their prayers should be preceded and terminated by the exclamation, *sostenuto* and resonant, of the sacred and mystical syllable *Om*. Their Hall of Harmony is adorned with the sculptures of the Hindu Gods, each with its garland of yellow blossom, each with the little lamp aglow at its pedestal. They are Hindus of the Hindus.

The point will also be taken by the alert reader that Litman got his invitation to stay at the Ashram, and in particular his personal introduction to Swami Hridayananda ("Mataji" at the Ashram) through the President of the Indian-Soviet Cultural Society, Mr. K. P. S. Menon, a close kinsman of hers. These, then, the inference is, are the people who are most alive to the meaning of the Soviet Union; and these the charming and instructed (*obayatel'nyye, obrazovannyye*) souls whose company the educated Soviet visitor to India today will delight to keep.

*Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 2 of 1967, had an article "On the Origin and Ethnic History of the Bhils" by I. M. Semashko marked by learning and professionalism in equal measure. The author, having discussed and weighed the theories of Grierson, Enthoven, Venkatachar, Majumdar and others, came to the conclusion that anthropology, linguistics and ethnography combined to indicate both pre-Aryan and pre-Dravidic elements, in other words autochthonous elements, in the Bhil ancestry.

The sectarian mark, or *tilak*, painted in sandalwood, unguents and colouring matter on the forehead and between the eyes, fascinated the Europeans of 150 years ago, but for some reason it has never been made a subject of exact study in the West.

[continued on page 135.]

# NOTES ON AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

BY MARGARET MILLER

Previous Notes on economic development have appeared in the *Central Asian Review* (Vol. XV, Nos. 2 and 4) and have covered industry. The present Notes deal with agriculture, and are based on material selected from the local and the metropolitan press in the following periods: the late months of 1966, and the months of May, November and December 1967. As is to be expected, the earlier periods offer a wider range of topics, the late months of 1967 being absorbed in the twin subjects of the 50th anniversary celebrations and the outcome of the 1967 harvest.

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## COTTON

IN an area where cotton is king there were many references to the progress of this crop. *Izvestiya* reported (14.11.67) that 5,570 thousand (metric) tons of raw cotton had been delivered to the Government procurement agencies, 127,000 tons above the planned figure, and that continuing sales would raise this amount still further. To the total the Uzbek SSR contributed a massive 3,812 thousand tons, the Turkmen SSR 616 thousand, the Tadzhik SSR was close behind with 553 thousand, and the smaller producers, the Kirgiz and Kazakh republics with 166 thousand and 92 thousand tons respectively. At later dates British sources gave this year's cotton crop as a record of over six million tons (Economic Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*, December 1967), and as 5.97 million tons (*Financial Times*, 24.1.68).

These impressive results were obtained in a year when climatic conditions were far from favourable. A cold spring, with heavy rainfall, was followed by drought conditions necessitating re-sowing in some areas (e.g. 36,000 hectares in Samarkand oblast, Uzbek SSR, PV 14.11.67). But a stream of complaints indicated that the results could and should have been even better than they were. Blame centred on farm managements for relaxing their efforts the moment the planned amount of production had been reached. They immediately withdrew machinery and workers from the cotton fields, and made no effort to salvage the large amounts of "white gold" left lying in the fields themselves, on the roads, in temporary stores. The services provided for workers at the height of the harvesting season, notably the serving of hot meals in the fields and day nurseries for children, were abruptly cut down, with a corresponding decline in productivity of labour. Thus in the Srednechirchik rayon of the Uzbek SSR, a group of farms had 3,513 workers in the fields on 4 November, using 134 harvesting machines and

bringing in 296 tons of cotton. By 9 November, the number of workers had dropped to 2,454, of machines to 46, and the amount harvested to 78 tons (PV 15.11.67 and 17.11.67). A writer in *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (17.11.67) blamed the same managerial irresponsibility for the loss of a "considerable part" of the harvest, adding that "it was not the cotton in the field that mattered, it was the cotton in the Government's pocket". Other deficiencies noted were the failure to supply drying apparatus where it was wanted (TI 30.11.67), the slow progress made in repairing machinery, particularly for loading and unloading operations, the lack of electric power and of spare parts (KT 22.11.67 and 8.12.67).

It was not clear what the delinquent managers did with the resources withdrawn so prematurely from cotton. Obviously they were not being applied to the urgent task of autumn ploughing, in preparation for the 1968 harvest. Serious delays in these operations were reported from the Kirgiz and Turkmen SSRs (SK 2.12.67 and TI 28.11.67).

## OTHER CROPS

### *Grain*

The predominance of cotton-growing in the area under review was felt to react unfavourably on the progress of other crops, which received less than the amount of attention required to ensure the production planned for them in the ambitious schemes of land improvement sponsored by Mr. Brezhnev (see *Pravda* 28 May 1966, for the relevant Decree and supporting speeches). An important feature of these schemes was the extension of grain-growing to new and, where necessary, irrigated lands, thus increasing total production and securing the high and stable harvests required to obviate such large-scale purchases of grain on the world market as took place in the drought year of 1963 and in subsequent years.

The Uzbek SSR was one of the designated areas, and the republican Central Committee devoted a Plenary Session to a review of the matter (PV 2.12.67 and 5.12.67). Winter wheat gave the best results in the republic but not all the oblasts responsible had succeeded in starting preparations for the 1968 harvest as soon as the current cotton crop was in. The situation was good in Samarkand, the largest grain-growing oblast, also in Tashkent and Syr-Dar'ya oblasts. But the second most important grain area, Kashkadar'ya oblast, and also Surkhan-Dar'ya, were far behind the plans laid down for them, and nowhere were plans for growing grain under irrigation anywhere near the expected level. The prospects for increases in the cultivation of rice, maize, lucerne, were equally bleak. According to the First Secretary of the Bulungar rayon committee, the weak spot in his and in other areas was an acute shortage of trained mechanizers (machine operators—*mekhanizator*) for harvest operations, and slow progress in implementing other sections of the Government's land improvement measures, e.g. the

supply and maintenance of suitable machinery and of spare parts, the application of fertilizers to the soil.

In view of the importance of grain-growing in the Kazakh SSR, surprisingly little information emerged in the periods under review on progress in this republic. References were mainly to achievements in separate districts, which gave little indication of the situation throughout the whole area. Thus Kokchetav oblast claimed to have delivered 28 thousand tons of grain to the Government procurement agencies instead of the planned amount of 18.9 thousand tons (KP 15.11.67). On the basis of the results of this year's harvest, Kustanay oblast expected to fulfil in four years its obligations for grain production for the whole of the current five-year plan (KP 29.11.67), and Sergeevka rayon in North Kazakhstan oblast looked forward to doing the same in three years (KP 30.11.67). These successes had been achieved in all the districts mentioned above, in spite of poor weather conditions, and the familiar difficulties with the supply of machinery and fertilizers.

The only reference to grain-growing difficulties in the republic came from *Izvestiya* (22.11.67), where it was said that unusually large areas under grain had had to be re-sown in the current season, due not only to unfavourable weather, but to "gross violations of agricultural techniques".

### *Rice*

It is a well-established part of Government policy to increase the production of rice, especially on irrigated and hitherto unused land. Here again, the information was scattered, but it did indicate that serious "teething troubles" were being encountered in the areas surveyed, mainly the Uzbek SSR and the Karakalpak ASSR. *Pravda Vostoka* reported (6.4.67) on the so far unsuccessful efforts to turn the area of the lower Amu-Dar'ya into a "rice Klondyke". Operations to this end had been inaugurated in 1962, but they had not gone according to plan, and the expected yield of 25 centners per hectare from the new rice plantations, established largely on lands allocated to state farms out of the state land fund, had reached only six to 10 centners. Costs of production of rice had rocketed. In 1962 they had been 16 rubles 14 kopeks per centner on a state farm in the Karakalpak ASSR, by 1966 this had risen to 37 rubles 35 kopeks, and on another state farm had reached the record figure of 47 rubles 10 kopeks.

An analysis of the causes of this costly failure revealed undue haste, and lack of co-ordination in planning. Irrigation systems were set up, but not the necessary drainage systems to prevent salination. Scientists had not been given time to study local conditions and evolve the special herbicides and chemicals needed to combat weed infestation in these particular areas. Staff shortages and high labour turnover were chronic problems, which could only be solved by the provision of everyday services and cultural amenities for the workers. In the meantime one

state farm that needed 600 workers could only provide 130 apartments, and little was being done to build baths, shops, clubs, schools. Supplies of fertilizers were not forthcoming in anything like the required amounts.

The special correspondent of *Pravda Vostoka* who conducted the survey, concluded that there was no reason why the lower Amu-Dar'ya should not yet be turned into a rich centre of rice production, but the problem would have to be looked at as one whole, and not from a number of separate angles.

A similar survey was carried out in the Kazakh SSR, to discover why the scheme to utilize the waters of the Syr-Dar'ya to extend rice cultivation on hitherto unused land, was not making the expected progress in spite of elaborate preparations, including the setting up of a special Government body with six building trusts attached to it (KP 20.4.67). Here the main cause was thought to be the traditional weaknesses of the building industry, especially in design work, which had so far frustrated Government efforts to secure a supply of building materials locally, instead of importing them from distant sources at great expense. Otherwise the reasons for failure were the same as in the Uzbek SSR survey noted above, namely, lack of co-ordination in planning, and shortage of labour because of bad living conditions.

A later report from the Uzbek SSR indicated that the growing of grain as well as rice under irrigation was being held up because scientific institutions were not adapting their work to the new conditions, and were failing to ensure that the right type of seeds were made available, and the right methods of work adopted, for the cultivation of crops in conditions which made them suitable for mechanized harvesting (PV 19.11.67).

Briefer references indicated at least local successes in cultivating this important food crop. From the Khorezm oblast (Uzbek SSR, PV 16.11.67) came a report that in the last four years the production of rice had increased one and a half times. In the current year it had reached 16.5 thousand tons, and would be 26 thousand tons by 1970. The republic as a whole had overfulfilled its procurement plan by 120.8 per cent, and had sold more than 100,000 tons of this "pearl among grains" to the state (PV 26.11.67). The Tadzhik SSR had fulfilled its procurement plan by delivering 50 thousand centners of rice to the Government (KT 22.11.67).

#### *Lucerne and sugar beet*

A gloomy review of the progress of seed cultivation for lucerne came from the Turkmen SSR (TI 22.11.67). Chardzhou was the only region that came in for favourable mention. Elsewhere low yields, insufficient mechanization especially for harvesting and threshing, failure to fulfil production plans, insufficient use of pesticides, were the order of the day. Producers sheltered behind the excuse that irrigation was lacking, but the writer who was the head of a seed-farming institute, blamed lack

of initiative for the failure to produce sufficient seed for use in the republic and export to other parts of the USSR. It was unlikely, he said, that the 4,000 centners planned for 1968 would be realized.

By way of contrast the sugar beet harvest in the Kirgiz SSR was described in optimistic terms (SK 18.11.67). The sown area at 53 thousand hectares and the average yield per hectare at 378 centners were mentioned with approval, and deliveries to the Government had been more than fulfilled. The sugar content of the crop was up on that of the previous year. The factors contributing to success were listed as: good organization and remuneration of labour, especially the use of mechanized links (see later section on Labour and Management); adequate use of mineral fertilisers and pesticides and of machinery. The only shadow in this bright picture was the failure of the sugar beet factories to match with their processing facilities the producing capacities of the farmers.

### *Fruit and vegetables*

As with grain crops, undue preoccupation with cotton was blamed by an agronomist writing from Kurgan-Tyube for the backwardness of this branch of agriculture (KT 3.1.67). Farm managers thought that such crops were of secondary importance that they were "unprofitable", and that they were "carried" by the main crop, cotton. The writer, however, attacked this attitude, and blamed these same managers for starting planning at the wrong end, considering first the size of the cotton crop, and only at far remove the suitability of the soil for growing fruit and vegetables, and, what should be the primary concern, the needs of the population. In the area from which he was writing the latter had irrigation. Even when farms did instal irrigation systems, they were sometimes used so ineffectively that yields were no higher than on farms been estimated at an annual 10-15 thousand tons. But for 1966 the planned production had been only three thousand tons and realized production less than half of that. He argued that if managers would take the trouble to instal irrigation systems, the yield from these so-called "unprofitable" crops could be raised 15 to 20 times, and if they would pay more attention to the organization of their labour force, valuable silk crops could be grown at times when labour was free of work in the cotton fields.

The scrutiny of further materials on this subject revealed a strong conviction among commentators that the area under review, as a whole, was capable of supplying all its own needs, and even sending much-needed exports to the large industrial cities of European Russia, but that a start had barely been made towards turning such aims into reality (PV 13.12.67). Difficulties enumerated in expanding the cultivation of early vegetables and potatoes in Kazakhstan included, in addition to the managerial indifference mentioned above, lack of mechanization and of storage facilities, inattention to seed selection, and, above all, neglect of

without special water supply (KP 8.5.67). Writers from the Uzbek SSR, where the existing area of 200,000 hectares under fruit and vegetables was being rapidly expanded, laid stress not only on the crying need for more mechanization, but for the better use of the machinery already available. Only 25 per cent of the seeding machines and 14 per cent of the harvesting machines at the disposal of the farms were actually in use (PV 10.12.67 and 13.12.67). With a view to increased productivity, holdings should be specialized on one branch of production and enlarged in size so as to facilitate mechanized operations (TI 21.11.67). It was thought to be impermissible that on about 10 per cent of the farms in some areas, holdings were deliberately planned to cover only one hectare (KT 16.11.67). All sources agreed on the need for more fertilizers, pesticides etc. and for the better organization and remuneration of labour.

A familiar complaint concerned the inadequacies of the distribution system. Only one-third of a consignment of tomatoes delivered to the Government procurement centre ever reached its destination (Tashkent): the remainder perished because of transport delays. The only cure was for producers and consumers to work on a basis of direct contracts, a system already well established in the more advanced industrial areas of the Soviet Union for the distribution of garments, shoes and other products of the light industries. The procurement centre, it was suggested, should be by-passed and used purely as an export office for dispatching vegetables to the northern industrial regions of Kazakhstan (PV 15.11.67).

#### LABOUR AND MANAGEMENT

In the early part of the period under review, a great deal was written on various aspects of the economics of farming, topics which were swamped in later preoccupations with harvest results in the anniversary year. In particular, attention was focused on the following subjects: the adoption, as in industry, of profitability as the main criterion of farm working, and the transfer of farms to an economic accounting basis (a matter which had been decided in principle as long ago as March 1965, and had been made mandatory for state farms in April 1967; for text of the Decree see *Pravda*, 15 April 1967); organizing farm labour more effectively and securing farm workers' material self-interest in high harvest results, by encouraging the formation of mechanized links and brigades; the need for economic analysis and the status of farm economists.

#### *Economic accounting*

From Kazakhstan came encouraging reports of the good results achieved by transferring the Novo-Aleksandrovskiy state farm in Tselinograd oblast to an economic accounting basis. Planned expenditure per hectare sown to grain decreased by approximately 10 per cent, realized value of production rose by about 25 per cent, and above-plan

profits were no less than five and a half times greater than estimated, mostly because of higher than expected sales to the Government (KP 24.12.66). Equally satisfactory working was reported from a cotton-growing farm in the Tadzhik SSR, which, after the transfer to the new methods, raised its profitability of labour one and a half times, its wages by 35 to 40 per cent, and its rate of profitability by 50 per cent, as compared with a neighbouring farm with the same climatic and other conditions which had remained on the old system (KT 14.12.66).

But the director of the Lenin state farm in East-Kazakhstan oblast complained that the spirit of the Government Decree of April 1967 was not being observed. A detailed analysis of the division of his farm's profit for the year (over half a million rubles) showed that more than half of it was immediately snatched back into state funds, whereas the allocations to the farm's funds for raising wages, paying bonuses, and providing amenities for the workers were each less than 2 per cent of the realized profit instead of the 10 to 15 per cent laid down in the Decree. This lessened the authority of the director by placing him in a worse position than the head of a less efficient farm, and making it impossible for him to reward exceptionally good workers at a higher rate than their less energetic colleagues (KP 20.5.67).

### *Mechanized links*

If he could not do so, workers would continue to show the apathy and indifference long recognized as being the root cause of the malaise in agriculture. In the middle of 1965, the chief agronomist on a state farm in Altay Kray made the revolutionary suggestion that the cure lay in organizing farm labour in small links (*zveno*), allotting to them in perpetuity a section of land on which to grow the planned crops, providing them with fuel, machinery etc., and leaving them the maximum independence in securing the best results. (For the article by V. Zhulin see *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 7 August 1965.) Since then the idea has spread widely, not only in the area where it originated but throughout many parts of the Soviet Union.

The stock breeding farm Dzhergatel, in the Talas region of the Kirgiz SSR, secured highly satisfactory results from the adoption of this method (SK 30.11.66). The links were kept small in size, typically four mechanizers and seven other workers, and they were given freedom from managerial interference in working out the tasks set in their technological charts. Limits of expenditure were imposed for fuel and repairs to machinery. Thirty per cent of any economy went into the pockets of the link members, any over-expenditure was deducted from their wages. Members were paid a basic monthly wage: additional earnings depended on the actual outcome of the harvest. The experiment was successful in increasing yields of maize, winter wheat, barley, esparto grass and other crops, and in raising the morale of the workers, who appreciated the independence they enjoyed and the high wages they earned. Similar

results were reported from a cotton-growing collective farm in the Suzak region of the Kirgiz SSR (SK 6.1.67), and on the Lenin collective farm in the Vose region in the Tadzhik SSR (KT 27.11.67).

### *Economic analysis and economists*

The futility of attempting to run farms on an economic accounting basis without due preparation and the training of qualified staff was illustrated by the results of an economic analysis of the work of the cotton-growing farm Guliston in the Ordzhonikidze rayon of the Tadzhik SSR (KT 19.5.67). The analysis showed that, although the farm was outwardly prosperous, it was in fact incurring many hidden losses. Comparing the results of the farm's working in 1965 and 1966, it could be claimed that the yield per ruble of capital invested showed some improvement (from 1r. 34k. to 1r. 46k.). But most of this came from an increase in gross production, a rise in the purchase prices paid by the Government and the sale of above-plan production to the Government. Only a very small proportion came from the sale of high-grade cotton. The expenditure per hectare on production costs actually increased.

The 1966 results could have been much better if the average yield per hectare had been achieved by all the brigades on the farm, instead of by only five out of 17. Twenty-nine thousand rubles had been lost because of over-expenditure on mineral fertilizers, due to the continuing tendency to think in terms of the highest possible gross production at no matter what cost. More than 120 thousand rubles could have been saved by making fuller use of the harvesting and other machinery available on the farm, and a further substantial sum by the more economic use of motor transport, which cost eight kopecks per ton-kilometre on Guliston as compared with only five on a nearby collective farm. Livestock raising showed a loss, which could have been turned into a profit by growing more fodder crops, and by dealing more efficiently with the problem of sterility.

It took a team of experts from the republican Agricultural Institute several months of intensive work to make these discoveries. Meanwhile it was admitted that qualified economists were too few in number to allow even one such specialist for every average-sized farm, let alone the larger teams required to collect and analyse the necessary data on farms of greater extent. The economists who were available were badly used. They were changed frequently, made to work as agronomists, while less qualified people worked as "economists", were paid 10 per cent less than an accountant, and subordinated to the chief accountant instead of answering directly to the farm director (PV 18.5.67). The need to expand the training of future farm economists was considered at conferences and seminars throughout the area, but little concrete information emerged as to what could be done to remedy the situation quickly (SK 9.12.66, PV 10.12.66, TI 10.12.66).

A question urgently requiring the attention of skilled economists was that of making more even use of collective farm labour throughout the whole year, and cutting down on the expense of hiring outside labour during the hectic summer months (SK 25.12.66). The remedies suggested included the following: the introduction of stimulus payments so as to make communal farm work more attractive to collective farm members, making a start on improvements such as irrigation schemes, road works, clearing stones from fields, which ensured employment outside the peak periods of agricultural activities; exchanging labour with other farms where the timing of field operations made this possible; co-operating with factories engaged in processing agricultural raw material, with a view to their utilizing farm labour when the harvest was over and the work of the factory began.

## LIVESTOCK

### *Fodder base*

Commentators showed a lively interest in the question of pasture land for the large livestock population of the area covered by these Notes. The growth in the number of animals was outstripping the resources of natural pastures, and attention was directed to the need to improve the quality of such pastures, and to supplement them by cultivated pasture land, and by establishing special farms to grow fodder crops. Two republics, the Kirgiz SSR and the Kazakh SSR, promulgated special Decrees on the subject, laying down in specific detail what was to be done to improve the situation in the period 1968-70 (SK 17.5.67 and 12.11.67, KP 23.11.67: PR 12.11.67).

The first Kirgiz Decree (May 1967) laid special stress on labour problems and repair of machinery. The productivity of labour was to be improved by organizing mechanized brigades and links on the farms, and making sure that special efficiency attracted additional rewards in money and in kind. The winners in socialist competitions were to receive substantial money prizes. These rewards were to be extended to outside workers brought in to help with the harvest as well as to established farm workers. Housing, medical and educational services, supplies of working clothing and footwear, consumer goods, cinemas, radios, were also to be provided for the workers. It was noted with displeasure that only 60 per cent of the available machinery in the republic could be used because of inadequate facilities for repair work, and the responsible body (*Kirgizselkhoztekhnik*) was instructed to improve its workshops.

The second Kirgiz Decree (November 1967) provided for the application of fertilizers to 172 thousand hectares of natural pastures and hayfields, and 17 thousand hectares were to be sown to cultivated pastures, including five thousand hectares under irrigation. Seed farms were to be established on 2,100 hectares with a view to producing 630 tons of seed for fodder crops by 1971. In a number of oblasts, including Osh, Issyk-Kul', Tyan'-Shan', the republican Ministry of Agriculture and

Academy of Sciences were to be responsible for setting up model farms to show how the above and other land improvement measures could be introduced. The director of the Nizhniy-Chuisk state farm was told to establish an experimental section on his farm, showing the need for fences, access roads, the provision of amenities for the workers, water supply, irrigation networks, and how these could be used with the maximum efficiency. Three machine-livestock stations and five inter-regional building-management administrations were set up to see to the provision of needed materials and machinery.

The Kazakh SSR Decree (November 1967) also emphasized the importance of looking after the everyday needs of the workers, and the improvement of repair work, especially for water supply equipment, and for workshops processing and enriching fodder supplies. The need for shelter as well as fodder for the animals was strongly underlined. A feature of all the Decrees was the insistence on practical measures of inspection and checking to ensure that their provisions were in fact carried out. Specific individuals were to be made responsible for different sections of the work, and were to report progress at regular intervals to named supervisory bodies, Government or Party.

### *Wintering of stock*

#### *(a) Improving pastures*

The Panfilov collective farm in the Kalinin rayon of the Kirgiz SSR gave a vivid account of the difficulties to be overcome in carrying out these ameliorative measures. It had 8,000 hectares of stubborn scrub to clear on its pastures, and this demanded a long and expensive series of operations, burning off the unwanted growth in the autumn, applying pesticides in the spring to discourage the new shoots, resting the land for a year, repeating the burning-off process at regular intervals. No one farm had the capacity to do all this, and the writer suggested that a special section should be set up in *Kirgizselkhoztekhnik* to relieve farmers of the organizational work while leaving them responsible for making the necessary payments. The spectacular increase in productivity (e.g. milk yields, wool clip) from clearing scrub and weeds, applying fertilizers, would go a long way to meet the expense, particularly as grass would grow at an earlier date on pastures so treated, allowing stock to be driven there sooner and effecting further savings on concentrates and coarse fodder (SK 7.12.67).

#### *(b) Transport and fodder deficiencies*

The flood of complaints on all aspects of the improvements outlined in official documents raises doubts as to whether they can be implemented quickly enough to prevent the usual heavy losses of stock in the current winter period. At the end of 1967 very few areas were able to report a satisfactory situation with regard to fodder and shelter. The Kazakh SSR had to care for 10 million sheep and 341 thousand horses and

camels on its winter pastures, but reports from different areas made it clear that a sizeable proportion had poor prospects of survival. Even when fodder was available in the required amounts it was not transported to the distant pastures where it was to be used. In East-Kazakhstan (where the situation could become "catastrophic"), North-Kazakhstan and Alma-Ata oblasts, farms had between 50 and 60 per cent of the fodder supplies required, in the Chimkent area less than half. Fodder was poorly protected against the weather and was accessible to the animals. Livestock were badly housed in draughty, dilapidated buildings, or faced the prospect of wintering outdoors (KP 21.11.67). There was a serious shortage of salt for livestock (KP 7.12.67 reporting on conditions in the Irgiz rayon). Sufficient amounts were lying at Chelkar, but the lorries and trailers to carry it to the farms were not forthcoming—"The Decree is there, the machines are not"—and soon winter storms would make the roads impassable for motor traffic. In all the sources quoted from the Kazakh SSR, and further sources referring to the Kirgiz SSR (SK 28.11.67, 3 and 8.12.67), there were complaints of lack of amenities for staff and a chronic shortage of trained workers.

### *Mechanization*

One way of economizing in staff for livestock rearing would be to mechanize heavy processes, but this remained backward in the area under review, as it did throughout the country as a whole. In the Kirgiz SSR the degree of mechanization in water supply was a modest 21 per cent, in milking 26 per cent, carting manure 28.8 per cent, and spreading feed 21 per cent (SK 13.5.67). To make things worse, apparatus was poorly installed and badly used. Cases cited were: a mechanical milking apparatus could not be used because the specialists who installed it "forgot" to attach the refrigerators; a milking shed was built and equipped at a cost of 100 thousand rubles, and later turned into a warehouse; in Talas rayon only 17 out of 35 milking installations were in working order; machinery for carting manure and spreading feed stood idle and rusted away, while the operations were conducted by manual labour.

### *Stock breeding*

The drive for increased productivity in livestock rearing as in every sector of economic activity, lent special interest to the question of breeding pedigree stock. Experiments with large horned cattle began in the Tyan'-Shan' mountains of the Kirgiz SSR well before the Second World War, and cross-breeding between local and pedigree animals doubled the milk yield by 1950, as well as increasing live weight  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times, and improving the quality of meat. Further successes were recorded since that date, and the cross-breeds, which constituted 90 per cent of the republic's entire pedigree stock, were in extensive demand from the other Central Asian republics and from the Mongolian People's Republic (SK 22.11.67).

The Tadzhik SSR also reported progress in this matter (KT 7.12.67), but the writer thought that productivity could be doubled again by training qualified staff, establishing specialist breeding farms in every region, and using advanced methods such as artificial insemination. Again, no evidence emerged of official action being taken on these suggestions.

#### SOIL EROSION

Measures to prevent soil erosion by wind and water figured prominently in the Government's 1966 land improvement schemes. The peculiar problems of mountainous areas were being studied in the Tadzhik SSR by the republican forestry experimental station. Their main preoccupations were the climatic conditions of different areas, with a view to determining the most suitable types of trees to plant, the techniques of terracing on steep slopes, and the agricultural methods to be adopted where this was done. At present all heavy operations connected with terracing were being performed manually. Progress could be immensely speeded up by the provision of suitable machines (KT 24.11.67).

#### CONCLUSIONS

It is not possible to construct an accurate picture of agricultural progress in the area under review on the basis of figures which are confined to the achievements of separate rayons or oblasts in one or other of the sub-divisions of the area, or to the working results on individual farms. The study does, however, reveal general trends of interest and importance, if not of novelty to readers closely acquainted with the history of the area.

The first of these trends is the one-sided nature of agricultural activity, arising from the overriding importance assigned to the foreign-currency-earning cotton crop (p. 122). This prevents desirable diversification, and holds back development in other sectors of agriculture. It has unfortunate psychological effects in perpetuating the old *val* mentality, which militates against the new methods of economic working and the new emphasis on quality and profitability. Similarly, the pre-reform defect of "departmentalism" in planning is held to be partly responsible for the disappointing results so far of the efforts to increase the areas sown to rice (p. 124). The consequent neglect of the needs of the local population is meeting with opposition, as is shown by demands for the satisfaction of consumer requirements, e.g. for fruit and vegetables (p. 126).

Another trend is the intense interest shown in the need for economic rationality in farm working. As in all other spheres of agricultural activity, this is gravely impeded by the persistence of the Stalinist mentality among supervisory bodies. Their continuing unwillingness to delegate autonomy to men at local level discourages managerial initiative and penalizes efficiency (e.g. the inequitable distribution of farm

profits, pp. 127-9). The "departmental approach" characteristic of the pre-reform command economy continues to show itself in the habit of concentrating funds on objects yielding obvious results, such as building, rather than ensuring the most effective use of these funds by thinking ahead and allowing for necessary maintenance (pp. 129-30).

A strongly recurrent theme is the difficulty of attracting to, and retaining in, agricultural work sufficient labour with the requisite skills. It has long been known that this is a factor which has held back development in Russia's territories beyond the Urals. What the study underlines is that, given the rising expectations engendered throughout the whole of the economy by the changes of the last few years, the problem will not be solved in its entirety by recent Government decrees on extra pay for workers in these areas (IZ 27.9.67). This will have to be accompanied by really substantial improvements in housing, medical, educational and cultural services, the provision of laundries, restaurants, shops, clubs, cinemas etc., facilities which in many parts of the area reviewed are at an abysmally low level or altogether lacking. Until the situation is transformed, the area will continue to suffer from chronic shortages and high mobility of labour.

The study highlights another impediment to progress, viz. the weakness of the building industry. Shelters for livestock, premises for repair shops, vital irrigation installations, are all insufficient in numbers and new construction is held up for long periods. The Government has recently issued a Decree on the building industry as a whole, the main object of which is to ensure that it gets the number of qualified workers it requires (PR 16.2.68). It is significant that the provision of housing and the other services mentioned above figures largely in the Decree. The pressure of rising expectations in these respects is bound to be even stronger in the area under review than in the more developed parts of the USSR.

Because of these unfavourable trends it can be stated with confidence that the ambitious schemes of development envisaged in the Government's 1966 Decree on land improvements are likely to be implemented more slowly in the area under review than in the western territories of Russia where the economic machine has been founded and improved at an earlier stage, and where climatic conditions are less exacting. This will probably be specially evident in the important sector of livestock rearing. Numbers and productivity would rise to a spectacular degree, if only improved irrigation, prevention of soil erosion, mechanization of heavy processes, provision of skilled labour and of essential buildings could be rapidly completed. Available evidence holds out little hope of early success, and there are many examples of loss and inefficiency, sometimes on a truly monumental scale.

It is a hopeful sign that the tone of criticism is so clear and strong throughout the whole field of agricultural operations, and that the remedies proposed are not confined to mere exhortation, but are becom-

ing increasingly definite and specific in nature. At least they serve to show the ways in which increases in capital allocations to agriculture could best be utilized. That such increases are not forthcoming at present on the expected scale may be due to several reasons: the disturbed international situation; successful pressure from the industrial lobby; the realization on the economic side that increased allocations cannot be effectively utilized until the infrastructure of agriculture in general is improved, and the requisite skilled labour to operate and maintain the new machines and installations is assured. Until such questions are resolved it may be expected that the resources of the area under review will continue to be used at considerably less than their full potential.

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[continued from page 121.]

Yu. P. Nosenko writing in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 of 1966, under the heading "Religious Signs of the Hindu Sects", described how in consultation with knowledgeable pandits he had succeeded in verifying these symbols to the number of 94. Very largely, he said, these marks were nowadays worn by the orthodox only on ceremonial occasions and often without much idea of what they stood for.

# SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE 17th CENTURY

By W. J. DREW

A book with the above title has recently been received.<sup>1</sup> Its author, Vincent Chen, himself a Chinese, is a Ph.D. of Yale and, at the time of writing his book, Assistant Professor of International Law at St. John's University, New York City. Dr. Chen has used two main sources: John F. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia and China* and Ho Chin-t'ao, *So-fang Pei-cheng*. The first of these is a translation from Russian of official documents, travel narratives and diaries belonging to the period. The other is a compilation in Chinese of historical materials on the Northern Territories presumed to have been made in about 1858.

The value of Dr. Chen's book is in the fact that it is the only known account in English of the history of the developing relations between China and Russia throughout that century. In the earlier part of it China and Russia were becoming conscious of each other and in its later years they achieved a stable settlement in the Treaty of Nerchinsk which was to govern their relations for the next century and a half.

When considering the relative positions of China and the Soviet Union as the two foremost Central Asian states it is important to bear in mind that it was from a position of strength that China achieved this 17th century settlement with Russia. By the mid-19th century a much weakened Manchu dynasty was forced to revise the long-established north-eastern frontier and to negotiate disadvantageous boundary agreements in Central Asia with Tsarist Russia as the new colonial power there. Now that under Mao's leadership China has "stood-up" and is conscious of regained strength, on no part of her borders with her Soviet neighbour is she prepared to let these 19th century definitions go unchallenged.

With this background in mind a condensation of this book is now offered to readers of CAR. It is recognized that making a condensation involves accepting hazards. For instance, the attempt to present a clear and continuous but brief narrative may possibly sometimes misrepresent the author's meaning or omit some essential feature. Again, the effort to be consistent in spelling proper names could involve a misrendering of some. Such risks as these it has been considered worth the taking.

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## Introduction

DURING the 17th century while western European countries were busily expanding westward and eastward, Russia quietly crossed the Urals, absorbed Siberia and reached Alaska. Whereas the western Europeans

<sup>1</sup> *Sino-Russian Relations in the 17th Century*. By Vincent Chen. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 147 pp. Bibliog. Index. 17 guilders.

were engaged in maritime approaches towards China the Russians became conscious of the country during their eastward movement and explored the possibilities of establishing contact across the expanses of northern Asia. In both countries new dynasties were rising to power. The first Romanov acceded in 1613, the first Manchu state was established in 1616 and the Manchu dynasty of the Ching was proclaimed in Peking in 1644.

In the stable conditions that obtained after Russia's "time of troubles" in the 16th century three main factors are discernible in her thrust eastwards: the quest for security against the Mongols, the mystique of the Byzantine heritage and destiny and the adventurous drive of the Cossacks. Russia reached the Pacific Ocean in 1647, the Nerchinsk district was settled in 1641 and a fortress built there in 1656. Albazin on the Amur was founded by Khabarov in 1651.

The Manchus first established control over the Amur basin before extending their suzerainty over Mongolia with the decline there of the authority of the Chinese dynasty of the Ming. The Manchus worked from their eastern base westwards assimilating to themselves other Tungusic tribes they found as they extended their power. Northwards they crossed the Amur in 1616 and reached the Sea of Okhotsk in 1636. The Yablonovyy and Stanovoy ranges stretching as far as the Pacific coast became the effective northern limit of Manchu power. Thus the consolidation of the new Manchu position in the area was contemporaneous with early Russian settlement there. Mongolia was not completely secured to China until the powerful reign of the K'ang-hsi Emperor (1662-1722) when the chieftain, Galdan, who constituted the main opposition to the westward extension of Manchu control, was defeated. Galdan's resistance to the Manchus forms an important element in the background to the developing relations between China and Russia in the latter part of the century.

#### *The Mongols in Sino-Soviet relations*

The Mongols, occupying as they did the territories between China and the furthest points to which Russia had by the beginning of the 17th century penetrated towards China, were potentially either bridge or barrier. Until Russia had reached the Ob', the Irtysh and the Yenisey rivers she had struck but little opposition. Her further progress across Siberia and her hopes of establishing some contact with China then became dependent upon cultivating good relations with an influential Mongol ruler. Such a one they found in the Altin Khan—ruler of the Khalkas, the main element in the population of what was later Outer Mongolia. The Altin Khan was brought under a degree of vassalage to Russia in 1616. The Tsar and the Khan made an alliance against his western neighbours, the Kalmuks (the dominant tribal faction of these at the time in question being the Dzungars). The object of the alliance was to keep open a line of communication from Russia to the Altin Khan's territories free of Kalmuk interference.

In 1618 the first Russian probe towards China was made. This was the mission of Petlin and Mundorf. There followed after the return of this mission in 1620 a period of 12 years during which early contacts were not followed up. Then, in 1633, the Altin Khan, harassed by a southern neighbour, the Khan of Kalgan, and conscious of the increasing threat of the Manchus to his east, sought closer relations with Russia and offered his submission. He sought that in return for an undertaking to take the field against the enemies of Russia the Tsar might afford him protection against his. The Russians were glad to make the most of this offer, challenged, as they were, in their eastern advance across Siberia. Although, because of the lessening of the perils he had apprehended from his southern borders, the Khan retracted in the matter of complete submission, nevertheless there now ensued a period during which the Russians were able to utilize their relationship with him to further their aim of making contact with China. In 1638, the Altin Khan entered into an accord with Russia agreeing that his people should act as intermediaries in commerce between the two Empires. Tomsk became the centre of a trade that began to move in both directions, Russians then being introduced for the first time to tea. During the 1650s Russia's dealings with the Altin Khan's Mongols were complicated by two factors, namely: the unsettled situation that resulted from the death of the old Khan and the increasing strength of China's position under the Manchus in relation to Mongolia. Lobsan, the old Khan's son and successor, submitted to Russia and sought the Tsar's support. Russia's main attention had, however, now been diverted further west, to the Dzungars, whom it was hoped to bring under the Tsar's rule. Two missions (in 1665 and 1667) failed in this aim. The Dzungar Chiefs, Chokur and Senga, did, however, agree to conditions that would assist Russia's purpose of trading with China.

Galdan now enters the story. He had been trained for the lama priesthood but after the murder in 1671 by two younger brothers of his brother Senga and later (in 1676) the defeat at his hands of his uncle, Chokur, he reached a position of supremacy. He proceeded to build up the power of the Dzungars to withstand that of the Manchus and to prevent Dzungar lands from falling under their rule. He succeeded in establishing, though not without challenge from Lobsan, a strong position north of the Tien Shan bringing also Yarkand, Kashgar and other parts of what is now southern Sinkiang into subjection to his rule. He then turned his attention eastwards to Lobsan's Khalkas and westwards to the Kazakhs. Lobsan, finding Russia's protection of no avail, sought help in 1681 from China. Before this was forthcoming Galdan had defeated him. China by this time had come to look upon Galdan as a threat to her own security. China's intervention on Lobsan's behalf caused Galdan to turn to Russia. Russia was restrained from giving him assistance by the movement of feeling in Russia towards avoiding trouble with China that eventuated in the negotiations out of which grew

the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. Another seven years of struggle after the treaty on the part of China, free from the fear of Russian intervention, brought down Galdan. He died, forsaken and defeated, in 1697. The whole of Mongolia (including that part of it incorporated into Sinkiang in the present century) was now firmly secured to China.

#### *Early contacts between Russia and China*

Russia's first attempt to reach China was made in 1608 when an ambassage-cum-trading caravan under one, Volinskiy, set off to the Altin Khan, hoping to travel on to Peking. It failed in the attempt because of hostilities between the Dzungars and the Altin Khan's people. There followed 10 years later the mission of Petlin and Mundorff already mentioned. This mission, travelling through the Altin Khan's territories, succeeded in reaching Peking, penetrating the Great Wall at Kalgan. The Emperor could not comprehend an embassy from a foreign ruler arriving in Peking without some sign of submission so sent it back to Russia without granting an audience. It was also outside Chinese experience that a mission should combine trade with politics. Though there could be no question from the Chinese side of returning an embassy to the Tsar, the Emperor did, if an extant letter in the Russian language is to be credited, express willingness to enter into correspondence with the Tsar. The mission is held to have succeeded in that it obtained much sought for information about China, including visual evidence of the Ming's waning power on the northern fringes of the Empire. It is necessary to set over against the evidence of Russian sources the fact that no account of this mission has been found in Chinese records.

Three more attempts were made by Russia at establishing contact by means of embassies in the years between 1653 and 1670—a period during which China began to recover prosperity under the new Manchu dynasty. These all foundered in some degree over difficulties of Chinese protocol. Permanent relations were brought about not by missions through the lands of the Mongols but by the expansion and consolidation of the two empires' positions in the Amur basin.

#### *Conflict on the Amur*

It has been seen that the Manchus, before subjugating China itself, had established a strong base in these north-eastern regions. As for the Russians, after the organization by them of the Yakutsk district in 1632, they began exploring the Amur basin with a view to exploiting its resources—especially as a grain growing area—in support of the development of Yakutsk. The initial Russian move towards the Amur was, therefore, a southward probe from their new colony. As either side became conscious of the other, conflict and friction very soon began.

For a time events favoured the Russians. As we have seen, Nerchinsk was settled in 1641 and a fortress built there in 1656, Albazin, lower down the Amur, having been built in 1651. The few years following 1649

are notable for the part played by Khabarov. Those inhabitants of the Amur area whom he could force to pay tribute to Russia did so. In 1651, convinced that the area could meet Yakutsk's entire grain requirement, he launched barges upon the river and sailed down it with a force, not only subduing the native tribesmen, but defeating the Chinese forces sent to defend the territory. Khabarov set up a winter camp on the site of the city that now bears his name.

By 1652 the Manchus, having taken over China eight years earlier, had made sufficient progress in establishing their control over the country as to be able to direct attention to the Manchurian frontier and the problem of the Russian incursions. Khabarov was confident of being able to maintain his ground against the Chinese. Although they were forced to retreat in their early engagements the performance of the Chinese nevertheless had the important consequence of checking the boldness of the Russians. Indecisive skirmishing continued for the next five years. In 1657 the Chinese set up a civil and military base at Ninguta from which to deal decisively with these Russian intrusions. The following year the Russians were defeated and forced back beyond the Amur. The fort at Nerchinsk on the river Shilka, which had just been built, was evacuated but for a small garrison and the Russians made their headquarters further out of Chinese reach. China had, for the moment, succeeded in bringing the whole of the Amur to its mouth under her control. The Russians abandoned the Amur and the Chinese then withdrew their forces. By 1663 Russian adventurers had returned and had rebuilt the fort of Albazin on the left bank of the Middle Amur. Russian fur trappers intruded into the territory beyond the river's right bank and rebellious subjects of the Chinese Emperor began seeking asylum under Russia at Nerchinsk. At the same time many Cossacks also voluntarily surrendered to China in the skirmishes that took place. The Chinese demanded the extradition of deserters. Especially were they insistent on the return of the tribal chieftain Gantimur who had shifted his allegiance from China to Russia. Questions relating to peace on the Amur and the extradition of deserters were the subject of exchanges between the Chinese authorities in Manchuria and the Russian Governor at Nerchinsk, as well as between the Emperor and the Tsar, during the years 1670 and 1671. The Chinese received no satisfaction about the return of Gantimur and conflict which had broken out afresh on the Amur frontier in 1669 continued.

The Russians continued their attempts to colonize the Amur region and to lay the local tribes under tribute. Hostilities dragged on inconclusively until 1675. Russia, embroiled as she was then with both Poland and Turkey, determined to send a new mission to Peking to negotiate a settlement of the troubles in the Far East.

#### *Spafariy's embassy 1675-1677*

Nikolay Gavrilovich Spafariy received the Tsar's appointment on 20 February 1675 to be the bearer of a letter to the Emperor of China. His

instructions were to establish diplomatic relations, to ascertain which was the safest route for trade with China and generally to gain information on prevailing conditions in Siberia and China. He was ordered to uphold the dignity of the name and title of the Tsar in all places and circumstances. As usual, trade was as much a part of his mission as diplomacy. The mission set out on 3 March and arrived at Nerchinsk on 4 December 1675. After months spent on the threshold of China arguing questions of protocol, Spafariy proceeded to Peking and arrived at court on 5 June 1676. He was given an audience, the first of several, on the 15th. The fact that the mission had come to trade as well as to conduct diplomatic business was contrary to Chinese custom and added its own complications to court procedure. Although Spafariy at first demurred at the requirement of the *kow-tow* before the Emperor, he eventually agreed. A Jesuit interpreter was present at the audiences to ease the language difficulties.

One of the critical questions upon the solution of which peace on the Amur depended was the repatriation to China of the chieftain Gantimur and his followers. Russia, for her part, demanded just as strongly the return of Russian subjects held in China. Agreement was, in fact, reached on terms of exchange. However, the Jesuit priest Verbiest, conveyed secretly to Spafariy a knowledge of the Emperor's true intentions in relation to the Amur frontier. These were that he meant to capture Albazin and Nerchinsk and that a Russian refusal to return Gantimur would be the occasion for China to resume the attack. Provided the border Cossacks committed no breach of the peace the Chinese would be prepared to wait for one more reply from the Tsar after Spafariy's return to Russia. The unruly behaviour in the streets of Peking of Cossacks attached to the mission and further protocol complications speeded Spafariy's departure without any answer to the desire expressed in the Tsar's letter for the establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations with China. The Chinese made it plain that the Emperor could only address another sovereign as an inferior and that the Tsar's gifts to the Emperor were to be regarded as tribute. Spafariy made every effort to obtain equality of status for his sovereign but his mission was finally on 1 September 1676 ordered to leave Peking within that day.

### *War on the Amur*

Spafariy counselled that Russia should refrain from navigating the lower Amur and its northern tributary the Zeya and from collecting taxes from the Tungus peoples in the area. His counsel was disregarded. In 1676 and the years following the Russians built a number of forts along the Amur and its tributaries. This interfered with the activities of Chinese hunters and traders, and threatened their safety. Native tribes were soon playing China and Russia off against each other and China found it increasingly difficult to gather tribute from them. Moreover,

Chinese criminals fled from retribution to the protection of the Russians. During 1681 and 1682 China made fruitless representations to Nerchinsk and Albazin urging the Russians to withdraw and to cease from intimidating the inhabitants. The following year a group of Chinese hunters were allegedly beaten up and burned alive.

K'ang-hsi, having consolidated the power of the Manchu dynasty in China, was not prepared to tolerate a continuance of such a situation in the old Manchu strategic base and prepared for decisive military action on the Amur. He did not underestimate the strength of his adversary nor fail to ensure that supplies and communications would be adequate to sustain a large scale campaign. He therefore built transports for use on the Manchurian rivers, put in operation the time-honoured system of military farming, built granaries, organized intelligence, instituted well-planned posting facilities and built warships for use on the Amur. Three years were spent in these preparations. In the Spring of 1682 an imperial edict to the Governor of Albazin enumerated China's grievances. If the Russians did not quit the territory they had occupied nor deport Gantimur then imperial forces would go into action against them. The Russians proffered no reply. The Chinese therefore acted and by the end of 1683 all of the Russian settlements on the lower Amur and its tributaries had been destroyed, except for Albazin.

The Cossacks there preferred to accept a state of seige and the prolongation of hostilities rather than to surrender. In 1684 the Chinese advanced up the Amur and surrounded Albazin. At the same time they deployed forces to cut off the Russian's return route westwards. In June 1685 an ultimatum was served upon the defenders. The Emperor's terms were that the Russians must retire at once to Yakutsk "as the boundary for hunting and collecting tribute"<sup>2</sup> and must extradite deserters. The threat of extermination was the alternative. The defenders of Albazin made no reply. The Chinese, therefore, attacked and the Governor, Tolbuzin, was forced to surrender. A truce was arranged whereby the fort was evacuated, its defenders either withdrawing to Nerchinsk or electing to go over to the Chinese side. The fort and dwelling houses were burned to the ground and the Chinese then retired down-river to Aigun (Aihun).

The Russian Government's intention now was to abandon Albazin, but the local Russians were soon re-establishing themselves there and, as formerly, were levying tribute upon the natives. The Chinese forces again advanced against the place in July 1686. They devastated the surrounding country and laid seige to the fort for three months. The situation was saved for the defenders by diplomatic exchanges between Russia and China which led to the meeting of plenipotentiaries and the treaty of Nerchinsk.

The Tsar had determined, such were the exigencies of the situation

<sup>2</sup> Author's translation from *So-fang Pei-ch'eng*.

on Russia's European borders, to avoid trouble with China. Communications, however, being what they were and control over the local Russians so attenuated, events took their course to the point just described. This coincided with its becoming known in Peking, through the arrival there in September 1686 of two advance envoys from the Tsar, that a plenipotentiary negotiating mission was on its way. The Emperor had but recently sent by the hand of two Dutch intermediaries a message to the Tsar proposing terms for a peaceful settlement. The Emperor's message declared his intention of recovering the districts of Albazin and Nerchinsk (Yaksa and Nipchu to the Manchus) and of delimiting a boundary not to be transgressed.

The Emperor, incommoded by having Galdan's rebellion on his western flank, was glad of the chance of averting further trouble with Russia and gave order for the siege of Albazin to be raised. The order was implemented in November with the eventual announcement of the departure from Moscow of the mission, which was headed by Feder Alekseyevich Golovin.

#### *The Treaty of Nerchinsk*

The instructions given to Golovin were, as usual, concerned both with politics and commerce. The main political requirement was the fixing of a boundary. The course of the Amur and its tributary, the Bystra (*sic*), represented the Russians' first preference. On the commercial side the cession of Albazin to the Chinese was to be the ultimate counter with which to secure the trading privileges desired from China. Both sides sought from the high Mongol personages through whose territory the mission passed on its way intelligence of the other.

The Chinese mission was headed by Prince Songotu of the imperial house. Its terms were based on the assertion that the locations of Nerchinsk and Albazin were in territory neither Russian, nor even neutral. They were aimed at retaining as much as possible of the Amur basin for China as would be consistent with the maintenance of a secure frontier, as well as at the repatriation of the chieftain Gantimur and other deserters.

The point fixed for the venue was Selenginsk but owing to the unsettled state of the Mongols in the area, who were not yet finally subjugated to the new dynasty, Nerchinsk was the eventual choice. Songotu's final instructions from the K'ang-hsi Emperor envisaged the possibility of letting Nerchinsk go to the Russians and drawing the western end of the boundary along the line of the river Argun. The two missions having met and exchanged credentials and presents with splendid pomp, the negotiations opened on 22 August 1689. The Chinese had brought with them as go-betweens the Jesuits, Gerbillon and Periera.

After the inevitable protocol manoeuvres the real business of the conference was well under way by the 26th when both sides stated their terms. To the Chinese the boundary was the most important matter

and they proposed that it should be formed by the Yablonovyy and Stanovoy mountains north-eastwards to the Pacific Ocean. At the same time they wished to deal with the definition of a boundary between Outer Mongolia and Siberia so as to secure, free from Russian interference, control of the Mongols. The Russians held this to be outside the scope of their instructions and the Chinese agreed to the postponement of the matter.

When negotiations appeared to be making good progress the Russians put forward the proposition that the line of the Argun and the Amur throughout their continuous length should be the boundary. Thereupon the Chinese threatened to take action against Nerchinsk and Albazin and to incite the local inhabitants to revolt. The Russians then sought for renewed negotiations, stressing the importance of recognizing the equal standing of both monarchs and seeking a treaty that would afford Russia favourable trading conditions in China. The Chinese were keen to secure a boundary settlement and to reach agreement with the Russians so as to be free to deal with Galdan who was at that moment putting out feelers towards an alliance with Russia. They were therefore willing to act on Jesuit advice and make considerable concessions towards recognizing the sovereign and equal status of the Tsar.

At length the terms of a treaty in six articles were agreed. The treaty was signed and sealed on 7 September 1689 with great ceremony and copies were exchanged in three languages—Manchu, Russian and Latin, the Latin being the authoritative version. The main provisions of the treaty were the determination of a boundary; the razing and evacuation of Albazin; the removal of Russian dwellings from the south bank of the river Argun; provision for subjects of either side to come and go for purposes of trade, and for the extradition of future deserters. All differences which had troubled frontier relations up to the date of the treaty were to be buried in oblivion—so much for the doughty Gantimur who had outlived his usefulness as a diplomatic bargaining counter! The Emperor of China was given discretion to erect boundary markers. This was eventually done.

The boundary described in the treaty followed the river Argun from its source to its confluence with its northern tributary the Shilka. (This is also the point at which the Argun becomes the Amur.) The boundary passed up the Shilka and then up its tributary, the Gorbitsu, to its source in the Yablonovyy mountains. Thence it passed eastwards "from the source of that river to the sea . . . along the top of the mountain chain". All streams running southwards into the Amur were to be under Chinese jurisdiction and all northwards under Russian. Since the Stanovoy mountains opened out eastwards to embrace the Uda basin, the status of this river system was left indeterminate. A compromise Latin text—the official one—concealed differences between the respective attitudes of Russia and China in this matter. The successful conclusion of the treaty settled the boundary to China's general satisfaction, gave her a

free hand to finish off Galdan, secured for Russia a footing for her trade and gave her monarch the distinction of dealing on equal terms with the Son of Heaven.

#### *Post-1689 relations*

In 1692 Peter the Great despatched to Peking a mission under a German in his service—Evert Isbrandt Ides—with the purpose of confirming the 1689 treaty. Though the mission's instructions concerned both trade and politics the Russians' main object was to obtain gold, silver and Chinese luxury goods. The mission had, therefore, to ascertain what Russian products could most acceptably be offered in exchange and what trading conditions would be like. On the political side the mission was to find out the Emperor's attitude to the treaty, to demand the extradition of deserting Mongols and to ask that a site might be provided in Peking for an Orthodox church to be built at the Tsar's expense.

All Russia's missions to China prior to 1689 had primarily been for the development of trade. As a result of the 1692 mission an agreement was reached extending trading arrangements from the Amur to Peking. Subsequently it was even more evident that the Russian Government sent to Peking men who bore the title of diplomatic agents but whose first responsibilities were commercial. Nevertheless, the Emperor seems not only to have raised no objections to the arrival of the Russian caravans but to have greatly assisted them. It may be supposed that this was to ensure the Tsar's neutrality in the struggle against Galdan.

The official allowance was but one caravan in three years and their stay in Peking was not to exceed 80 days. In the period from 1698 to 1718, 10 Russian caravans were admitted to Peking. The first few of these used the route across Manchuria. After the pacification of Mongolia the shorter route via Kiakhta and Urga came into favour.

From 1655 onwards a Russian church had existed at Albazin as the centre for propagating the Orthodox faith among the tribal peoples of the region. In 1685 a group of Russians settled in Peking, bringing with them the appurtenances of their religion and an Orthodox priest to minister to them. The numbers of the faithful increased—due largely to the adoption of Orthodox Christianity by the Chinese wives of the settlers. This led the metropolitan of Tobol'sk, following the concession gained in 1692 by Ides, to send two more clergy to assist the original, now aged, priest. Although the Tsar's plan to build a church in Peking was not immediately fulfilled the faithful continued to use an edifice dignified by the style of the Church of St. Nicholas. The end of the century marked the issue by the Tsar of an order for the establishment of a Russian Orthodox Mission in Peking. Ever since the days of Spafariy the Russians had envied the missionary monopoly of the

Catholics in China. Rivalry with the Jesuits led the Russians to hope for the conversion to Orthodoxy even of the Emperor himself.

A century that opened with Russia becoming vaguely aware of China and proceeding through exploratory missions, skirmishing and war, ended with a state of peaceful intercourse. The treaty that provided the foundation for that fortunate outcome was not only the first that China concluded with a European nation, but also proved to be extraordinarily durable, regulating, as it did, relations between China and Russia until the middle of the 19th century.

# PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN— THE CURRENT SITUATION

By ANN SHEEHY

This is the first part of a two-part article. It deals primarily with the material conditions of the schools. The second part will concentrate on the teachers and the standards of tuition.

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## *General reforms in the Soviet educational system*

THERE have been a number of changes in the schools of the Soviet Union in the years since December 1958 when Khrushchev announced his major educational reforms, which increased the period of compulsory education from seven to eight years (this was achieved by 1962), and extended the period of general secondary education from 10 to 11 years, so that those in the senior classes (9th to 11th grades) could devote two days a week to acquiring a trade through production training in a factory or school workshop or on a farm. (See "Trends in Education in Central Asia" in CAR, 1959, Vol. VII, No. 1, pp. 14-20, and "Reorganization of Education" in CAR, 1961, Vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 24-44.) From the very beginning doubts were expressed about the wisdom of introducing production training. The first sign of a retreat came in August 1964, when the period of general secondary education was once more reduced to 10 years, largely at the expense of production training, which was reduced from 12 to six hours a week. In March 1966 it was announced that production training was no longer compulsory, since it had been found that adequate facilities did not exist everywhere to teach all the senior school-children a trade. Moreover, many of them never made any use afterwards of the skill they had acquired. Instead of production training, all the children now have to do labour training, which likewise involves practical work in a workshop, say, or on a farm, but without acquiring a formal trade. Production training can still be given in those schools with the necessary facilities in the time allotted for labour training and out of normal school hours.

Since 1966 a further major reform has been in progress. It is intended that secondary (i.e. ten-year) education will be compulsory for all by 1970. In addition the curricula are being revised. It has been found that the seven-year-olds now entering Grade 1 are much more advanced than their counterparts of 15 to 20 years ago, and it has been decided to reduce the period of primary education from four to three years. In

addition syllabuses are being changed throughout the school to bring them more into line with modern demands, and from the 7th grade on optional subjects are being introduced to encourage the children's individual bents. One aim of the reform is to reduce the load on the children, particularly as regards homework. A decree of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers published on 19 November 1966 stipulates that the maximum compulsory hours of lessons a week, including labour training, physical culture and art, are 24 in grades 1 to 4 and 30 in grades 5 to 10, save in national schools, i.e. where the language of instruction is not Russian, where an extra two or three hours a week are permitted. In grades 1 to 8 the maximum class size is to be 40, and 35 in grades 9 and 10. In rural national schools classes with over 25 pupils can be divided into two groups for Russian lessons. In certain schools and classes there is to be special emphasis in the 9th and 10th grades on maths and computer techniques, physics and radio-electronics, chemistry and chemical technology, biology and agrobiolgy, and the humanities. The decree once again reminded the authorities that neither children nor teachers are to be used for agricultural or any other work beyond the limits of labour training. The former organizer of production training in each school is being replaced by an organizer of extra-curricular activities. A start was made on introducing these changes in the 1966/67 school year, and it is hoped that they will be completed in the main not later than the 1970/71 school year. After the continual changes of the past few years teachers have been assured that these will be the last ones for some time.

#### *Massive increase in school population in Central Asia and Kazakhstan*

One of the most striking features of the development of education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in recent years has been the massive increase in the school population. This has been due partly to prolonging the period of compulsory education and the greater numbers continuing their schooling in the 9th and 10th grades, but very much more to the very high birth rates in these republics. In Uzbekistan, for instance, over 2,800,000 children are receiving primary and general secondary education, twice as many as in 1959,<sup>1</sup> and in Kazakhstan there has been an increase of over a million to 2,857,000 in the last seven years.<sup>2</sup> Comparable increases have been registered in the other three republics. Increases of such magnitude over a relatively short period have naturally imposed severe strains on the education system.

#### *School construction*

A massive school building programme has been necessary to try and cope with the influx and also to replace buildings which are far below the minimum standards required today. Large sums from the republican

<sup>1</sup> PV. 18.1.68.

<sup>2</sup> KP. 19.8.67.

budgets have been allocated to school construction, and kolkhozes and undertakings have been encouraged to use their own funds to build schools. In Uzbekistan in the period 1959 to 1965 a total of 2,524 new schools with 628,000 places were built, of which 2,091 (363,800 places) were built by the kolkhozes.<sup>3</sup> Adding in extensions to existing schools and the conversion of other buildings for use as schools, the total number of new places provided in Uzbekistan in the years 1959 to 1966 was 1,200,000, of which 770,000 came from the kolkhozes.<sup>4</sup> In Kazakhstan 1,300,000 new places were provided in seven years.<sup>5</sup> But almost invariably the annual plans for school construction are not fulfilled. The shortfall was 126,000 places in Kazakhstan in the period 1959 to 1966,<sup>6</sup> and 17,000 in Turkmenistan in the years 1961-65.<sup>7</sup>

For a time the rate of school construction seems to have led to a reduction in the number of schools having to operate in shifts, at least in some places, but on the whole the number of schools working in shifts appears to be growing now rather than diminishing, as construction fails to keep pace with the rapid increase in the number of school-children. In 1965, for instance, it was reckoned that, while the number of children attending school in Tadzhikistan was growing at the rate of about 36,000 a year, new buildings for only 20,000 to 23,000 were being provided.<sup>8</sup> In Turkmenistan in 1967, 40 per cent of the children were on the second shift.<sup>9</sup> Three shifts are by no means unknown. In Gur'yev in 1965 it was anticipated that nearly 4,000 out of the 19,000 school-children would be on the third shift,<sup>10</sup> while three shifts have been mentioned at schools in Frunze, Dushanbe, Aktyubinsk, Chimkent and Kzyl-Orda oblasts, and the Khodzhambas rayon of Turkmenistan.<sup>11</sup> Tashkent only eliminated the third shift a short time before the earthquake in 1966, at which time only 52 or less than a quarter of its schools were one-shift.<sup>12</sup> On the whole Uzbekistan seems to have made the greatest progress towards one-shift working, and in January 1968 it was claimed that all rural and the majority of urban schools were working in one shift.<sup>13</sup>

The reasons for Uzbekistan's comparatively good performance seems to lie in the major contribution to the school building programme of the republic's kolkhozes, which, unlike those in the other republics, have provided more new school places than the State and other organizations put together. The Uzbek kolkhozes are relatively

<sup>3</sup> *Narodnoye khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1965 g.*, Tashkent, 1966, pp. 281, 283.

<sup>4</sup> Kuchkarov, A., "Sovershenstvovat' sistemu narodnogo obrazovaniya," *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, No. 6, 1967, p. 72.

<sup>5</sup> KP, 16.8.67.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> IZ, 12.7.66.

<sup>8</sup> UG, (*Uchitel'skaya gazeta*), 3.7.65.

<sup>9</sup> TI, 22.10.67.

<sup>10</sup> *Leninskaya smena*, 25.8.65.

<sup>11</sup> SK, 26.10.67, KT, 5.6.65, UG, 7.12.65, IZ, 27.8.66.

<sup>12</sup> UG, 15.3.66.

<sup>13</sup> UG, 25.1.68.

wealthy on the whole. In some places, however, the kolkhozes are simply not well enough off to finance school building. In Tadzhikistan, for instance, it has been suggested that the poorer farms, particularly the small ones in the mountains, should be given three or even six-year loans to enable them to replace schools at present housed in kibitkas.<sup>14</sup> The extent to which school building can depend on the prosperity of the farms can be seen in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan. After the good harvest of 1966 the sovkhoses and kolkhozes of Kokchetav oblast embarked on a more extensive school building programme than ever before in 1967,<sup>15</sup> and in Tselinograd oblast the third shift was finally eliminated and it was reckoned that all the schools in one rayon would be on one shift in two to three years at the current rate of construction.<sup>16</sup> But although the authorities encourage the farms and other organizations to build schools for their communities, the kolkhozes often run into difficulties over finding contractors to undertake the job and obtaining the necessary building materials. It was for these reasons that in Uzbekistan, for instance, over a three and a half year period new schools were built with kolkhoz funds to the tune of only 168,000 places, although the kolkhozes themselves had earmarked enough money for 494,000 places.<sup>17</sup> In Kazakhstan it has been reported that some farm authorities, baulked in their attempts to raise bank loans and acquire construction materials to build schools, have resorted to the stratagem of building housing, for which loans and supplies are readily available, and then using the housing as a school, an obviously far from ideal solution as the premises are cramped and there is no room for laboratories and the like.<sup>18</sup>

Two of the problems hindering school construction in general are the low priority it is accorded by construction, building supplies and other organizations, and the tendency to "plan many foundations but few roofs", that is to spread the funds over a large number of projects at once instead of concentrating on a few schools at a time and finishing them before starting on others. This results in some schools being under construction for anything up to six or even 10 years, and it increases the costs. In some sovkhoses in Kazakhstan the absurd situation has existed whereby the annual allocation of funds for school building projects is only sufficient to lay a few courses of bricks, the top ones of which have to be removed the following year, when construction recommences, because they have deteriorated with the weather.<sup>19</sup>

Although the standard of the new school buildings is said to be improving and some rural schools are fine two- and three-storey buildings the equal of those in the towns, there are numerous complaints

<sup>14</sup> UG. 3.7.65.

<sup>16</sup> UG. 16.1.68.

<sup>17</sup> PV. 25.8.66.

<sup>18</sup> PR. 11.8.66.

<sup>19</sup> PR. 11.8.66, 14.6.67.

<sup>15</sup> UG. 15.8.67.

in the press about the poor quality of school construction. Sometimes repairs have to be undertaken almost as soon as the new building is occupied, or the building is occupied before it has been passed and its defects are never remedied. Boilers break down immediately, plaster falls off the walls, and doors, windows and floorboards warp. One of the causes is the perennial hectic last minute rush in August to have the buildings ready in time for the new school year.

Large-scale school construction is continuing during the current Five-Year Plan (1966-70). In Kirgiziya it is hoped that this will make it possible to abolish the third shift in the republic's schools and decrease the number of schools operating in two shifts,<sup>20</sup> but in Turkmenistan the number of new places planned is said to be far from enough to reduce shift-working.<sup>21</sup> The school building programme has to take into account not only the growing school population but also the fact that many schools are in urgent need of replacement. In Tadzhikistan in 1965 there were 1,105 schools still housed in kubitkas, and hundreds were said to be in need of urgent major repairs.<sup>22</sup> In Uzbekistan in 1966, 538 schools needed to be scrapped. A large number of schools are without running water, sewerage, electricity or central heating. In the Samarkand, Fergana and Khorezm oblasts of Uzbekistan and the Karakalpak ASSR in 1966, for instance, over half the schools were still without electric light.<sup>23</sup>

#### *School equipment, furniture and maintenance*

There has been a big increase in recent years in the expenditure on school equipment, and efforts have been made to equip the schools with workshops, science and language laboratories and gymnasiums, and supply them with various technical aids such as record players and film-projectors. Considerable progress has been made, but the situation still leaves much to be desired. In 1967, 2,400 schools in Uzbekistan had no workshops at all, and half of all eight-year schools had no science laboratories.<sup>24</sup> About 20 per cent of secondary schools had no laboratories either.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, plans for the construction of new workshops and laboratories for the coming school year were sadly behind-hand in mid-August, when only 109 out of a planned 326 new workshops were ready and only 406 out of a planned 1,046 science laboratories.<sup>26</sup> On the whole the situation seems to be better over workshops than laboratories, probably because the schools can often get hold of machinery and tools from the undertaking under whose patronage they are placed. Laboratory equipment is much more

<sup>20</sup> SK. 25.10.67.

<sup>22</sup> UG. 3.7.65.

<sup>21</sup> PV. 10.8.66, 25.8.66.

<sup>24</sup> Tyulenev, A., "Obucheniye i vospitaniye shkol'nikov—partiynuyu zabotu," *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, No. 3, 1967, p. 28.

<sup>23</sup> Kuchkarov, A., op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>26</sup> PV. 11.8.67.

<sup>21</sup> TI. 11.4.67.

difficult to come by (in Turkmenistan even the school attached to the Pedagogical Research Institute has no properly equipped physics and chemistry laboratories<sup>27</sup>) and the position is sometimes aggravated by distribution shortcomings. In Kazakhstan it was found that stacks of laboratory equipment, including some expensive imported items, were lying undistributed in crates in the supply organization's yard.<sup>28</sup> Where a school is really well-equipped, as in the case of Karaganda School No. 1,<sup>29</sup> it seems to be due mainly to the enthusiasm of the teacher or teachers who are prepared to chase all over the country for it, bully scientific organizations into donating it and make some themselves.

As in many other respects, it is the rural schools which are worst off for workshops and laboratories. The same is true of gymnasiums and sports equipment. Many schools do not have a proper sports ground or gymnasium. In 1967 there were gymnasiums in only 2,000, or about two-fifths, of the eight-year and middle schools of Uzbekistan.<sup>30</sup> In Kazakhstan, however, there has been a major improvement in this respect in the last few years. There are gymnasiums now in almost all the schools in Aktyubinsk and Semipalatinsk, for instance.<sup>31</sup>

As regards various technical aids, many schools are said to have TV sets, tape-recorders, cine-projectors and so on. Osh boarding-school, for instance, boasts of six cine-cameras, six tape-recorders, 20 projectors, four record-players, three sets of television equipment, two radio networks, 18 radios, many cameras and its own film library.<sup>32</sup> But again, the position is by no means satisfactory everywhere, particularly in the rural areas. In Turkmenistan, at least, it appears that finance, planning and supply organizations still sometimes tend to regard the acquisition of a radio or TV set as a sign of gross indulgence on the part of the school head.<sup>33</sup>

School furniture is also a problem. Local furniture factories sometimes do not make any, and it is difficult to get supplies from elsewhere. In 1965 Aktyubinsk oblast alone was in urgent need of 4,000 desks,<sup>34</sup> while in 1967 the schools of Kokchetav oblast received only 2,504 of the 6,306 desks they needed.<sup>35</sup> In the Kerki rayon of Turkmenistan the orders for desks and other school furniture are not met year after year, and the furniture that is supplied is of very poor quality.<sup>36</sup>

Every year as the new school year approaches a great fuss is made in the press about having all the schools repaired and done up in time. Major repairs are done by the construction organizations, but in order to save money the elder children, their teachers and parents, as well as the organization under whose patronage the school is placed, are roped in to whitewash, paint, repair desks, tidy up the grounds and so on. The

<sup>27</sup> TI. 11.1.67.

<sup>29</sup> UG. 16.9.65.

<sup>31</sup> UG. 12.8.67.

<sup>33</sup> TI. 11.4.67.

<sup>35</sup> UG. 15.8.67.

<sup>28</sup> UG. 9.9.67.

<sup>30</sup> Tyulenev, A., op cit., p. 28.

<sup>32</sup> SK. 29.3.68.

<sup>34</sup> UG. 30.10.65.

<sup>36</sup> TI. 30.12.66.

extent of the repairs apparently necessary suggests that the quality of building and maintenance must be poor. Similarly the number of desks requiring attention every year is vast. For instance in mid-August 1967, with a fortnight to go before the new term, over 12,000 desks had still not been repaired in Tashkent alone.<sup>37</sup> Is it, one wonders, because of their poor quality, extreme decrepitude, or the rough treatment they get?

The summer months are not only the time for doing repairs, but also for laying in fuel supplies for the winter. However, this is not always done, nor is trouble always taken to install or repair stoves. In Bukhara oblast, for instance, in the winter of 1966/67 there were many instances when classes were held in unheated premises, yet in the summer of 1967 there were once again delays in laying in fuel for the coming winter.<sup>38</sup> In 1965 there was a complaint from the GBAO that its schools were not allocated enough money to buy fuel, which is very expensive locally.<sup>39</sup>

#### *School meals, transport and medical services*

Up to 1966 at least it seems that the plans for new schools did not automatically include provision for a canteen and although many schools have canteens or buffets there are many that do not, or if they do the choice of food is very poor. The eating arrangements are said to be particularly badly organized in the schools of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya.<sup>40</sup> In Kirgiziya, in many schools except those in Frunze the buffets are in cramped, unsuitable premises.<sup>41</sup> In 1966 a correspondent found only one good school canteen in the Enbekshikazakhskiy rayon of Alma-Ata oblast—in the rayon centre Issyk—but its prices were high. Some schools in the rayon were so overcrowded that it was difficult to find room for a buffet, let alone a canteen. But others where there was room still had neither. There was no question of free meals at sovkhos or kolkhoz expense, as some farms provide in other places, and the farms supplied the schools with milk only after their plans for milk deliveries to the State had been fulfilled.<sup>42</sup>

School transport is another problem. In order to ensure full attendance, farms, undertakings and local authorities are under an obligation to provide free transport for those children who live some distance from a school, but often none is provided. In the Uzgen rayon of Kirgiziya, for instance, in early 1968 about 2,000 children or half those needing transport were not getting it, and in the Ak-Su rural soviet of Moskovskiy rayon 270 children were having to walk up to 5 km. to school.<sup>43</sup> Sometimes it seems that the children are brought to school but are not taken home again, as in Firyuza in Turkmenistan.<sup>44</sup>

The school medical services seem to be improving but have also come in for criticism. In Uzbekistan, for example, more and more children are being inoculated against various diseases, but there are not enough

<sup>37</sup> PV. 11.8.67.

<sup>38</sup> KT. 5.6.65.

<sup>39</sup> SK. 29.3.68.

<sup>40</sup> SK. 22.3.68.

<sup>38</sup> PV. 6.8.67.

<sup>40</sup> UG. 8.6.67.

<sup>42</sup> UG. 15.11.66.

<sup>44</sup> UG. 29.9.66.

school doctors and some school doctors who hold another job as well rarely visit the schools. The quality of the medical overhauls of the children is described as poor, and some children, known to be in need of treatment, are not getting it.<sup>45</sup> The Minister of Health of Kirgiziya complained recently that conditions in the schools themselves affected the children's health. He mentioned in particular lack of hygiene, overcrowded classes, poor lighting, furniture of the wrong size, inadequate eating arrangements, and too much homework.<sup>46</sup>

### *Textbooks, visual aids and school requisites*

Textbooks are a perennial problem, both as regards quantity and quality. Many of those for the Russian-language schools are imported from other republics, while those in the native languages are produced locally. Every year there are delays in publication, and not enough come off the local presses or are received from elsewhere to satisfy the demand. At the beginning of August 1967 only 509 of the necessary 623 titles had been received in Uzbekistan, and for only 147 of these (70 in Uzbek and 77 in Russian) had the full print order been delivered.<sup>47</sup> In Tadzhikistan by mid-August 1967 only 85 out of 102 titles had been published. Delays were also being experienced in the delivery of textbooks published outside the republic.<sup>48</sup> Some of the difficulties over textbooks have been caused by the fact that they are frequently changed. Where the textbooks are still in use, old ones are bought up from the population, but this second-hand trade seems to take place mainly in the towns and hardly, if at all, in the rural areas. Because the second-hand trade was reasonably well organised, the urban schools of Kazakhstan were somewhat better provided with textbooks by the beginning of the 1967/68 school year, but in many rural schools the children were without textbooks. One publishing house had only fulfilled 85 per cent of its order, and there were no textbooks for the 8th grade and no English grammar for the 5th grade.<sup>49</sup>

The textbook publishing houses have their own difficulties. In Tadzhikistan the printing presses are said to be old and unable to cope.<sup>50</sup> In Uzbekistan, where one book in three of those published is a textbook, the scholastic publishers can only get a limited amount of the fine quality papers they need and mostly they have to make do with the worst qualities, and often even newsprint. The situation is the same with binding materials. The result is that the textbooks are unattractive to look at and do not last long, necessitating the publication every year of vast new editions. The publishers also have only a limited number of the necessary types for mathematical and scientific subjects and foreign

<sup>45</sup> PV. 25.8.66, 27.8.66.

<sup>46</sup> SK. 29.3.68.

<sup>47</sup> PV. 11.8.67.

<sup>48</sup> KT. 16.8.67.

<sup>49</sup> UG. 9.9.67.

<sup>50</sup> KT. 16.8.67.

languages, which greatly hampers the publication of textbooks for these subjects.<sup>51</sup>

Of the textbooks published in the native language some are translations of Russian textbooks and some, particularly those for languages, are original works. In Uzbekistan 70 out of about 120 titles and in Tadzhikistan 48 out of 102 currently being produced are the work of local authors.<sup>52</sup> It seems to be these textbooks which come in for most criticism on scholastic grounds. For instance, the grammars for Russian in the Uzbek school have been written with no idea of continuity from grade to grade and there is no tie-up over vocabulary between the grammars and the Russian readers.<sup>53</sup> Work is in hand at present on compiling new textbooks for the revised syllabuses which are being introduced. In Kazakhstan this means that 86 new textbooks will have to be written and 74 translated.<sup>54</sup> In Uzbekistan competitions are being held for some of the new textbooks for languages and literature, and there are plans to start offset printing in colour in the next three to four years for textbooks for grades 1 to 4 and also for biology, geography and some other subjects for the senior classes.<sup>55</sup>

The shortage of visual aids, particularly in rural schools, is frequently mentioned, and often the teachers and pupils have to make their own. Again it is the native-language schools which appear to suffer most. In Turkmenistan in 1965, for instance, there was a shortage of maps and the like with legends in Turkmen.<sup>56</sup> But even more basic school requisites can be hard to come by. In September 1967 the shops in Alma-Ata and many other parts of Kazakhstan were out of fountain-pens and pencil sets, and there was an acute shortage of satchels. Alma-Ata had ordered 40,000, but received only 11,000, whereas there was a demand for 60,000 from the city's children alone.<sup>57</sup> Exercise books may be unobtainable, particularly in the rural areas, and so may school uniforms and slide rules. In October 1967 a Tashkent oblast teacher, whose syllabus includes teaching the 8th grade how to use a slide rule, complained that he had been unable to find any in Tashkent, Ufa or Kazan'.<sup>58</sup> An effort is being made to improve the situation over textbooks and school equipment by opening specialist shops. In Kirgiziya such shops were due to open in Frunze, Osh and Przheval'sk in 1967 and in Rybach'ye, Kyzyl-Kiya, Dzhahal-Abad and Talas in 1968.<sup>59</sup>

#### *Extended-day schools and groups*

One of the innovations in Soviet schools in recent years has been the extended-day school or group, which provides facilities for the

<sup>51</sup> Valiyev, V., "Uchashchimsya—vysokokachestvennyye uchebniki", *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, No. 9, 1967, pp. 80, 82.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75; KT, 2.7.67.

<sup>53</sup> UG, 13.7.65.

<sup>54</sup> UG, 24.8.67.

<sup>55</sup> TI, 24.1.65.

<sup>56</sup> UG, 5.10.67.

<sup>55</sup> UG, 16.9.67.

<sup>57</sup> UG, 9.9.67.

<sup>59</sup> UG, 29.7.67.

children to stay on after lessons to do their homework and engage in various extra-curricular activities. The number of children attending extended-day schools or groups has grown considerably since they were first introduced. In Uzbekistan, for instance, the figures were 7,000 in 1960 and 137,500 in 1966,<sup>60</sup> while in Kirgiziya they were 3,000 in 1960 and 35,000 now.<sup>61</sup> However, the numbers in extended-day schools and groups have not grown as fast as the authorities would have liked. Shift-working no doubt limits the possibilities at present, but many teachers, it seems, think the extra hours are to compensate for the scholastic shortcomings of the pupils rather than recreation and the children spend too much time at their desks, which is why they often do not like extended-day schooling.<sup>62</sup> It is, however, regarded as a success and of benefit both to poor families and to education, and the aim is that as many as possible of the new schools being built should be of the extended-day type.

*The problem of small schools, boarding schools and school hostels*

The size of school currently in favour is one taking about a thousand, possibly more, pupils and able to offer a full range of facilities. It is intended that the rural secondary schools should approximate as far as possible to the urban schools and that there should be hostels attached to them for those children who live too far away to make the journey every day. One of the major obstacles to educational progress in the rural areas at present is the existence of a large number of small schools, particularly in the less inhabited parts. Firstly, there are the tiny primary schools. In the Kurgul'dzhinskiy rayon of Tselinograd oblast for example, there are 41 small schools, of which 32 have only one teacher,<sup>63</sup> and in Kirgiziya in 1966 there were about 250 schools where one teacher coped with 10 to 40 children.<sup>64</sup> Secondly, there are the eight-year and secondary schools which are either single-entry or have less than 16 parallel classes in an eight-year and 20 in a secondary school. As many as two-thirds of the eight-year and secondary schools come into this category in Kirgiziya,<sup>65</sup> while in Uzbekistan many of the rural eight-year schools are single-entry. Moreover, in the majority of these the size of the classes is below the norm.<sup>66</sup> In all the republics the change to universal ten-year education has meant that eight-year schools are being turned into secondary schools, often with very unsatisfactory results in the case of the smaller schools. In the Iolotan' rayon of Turkmenistan, for instance, many of the eight-year schools now converted into secondary schools are cramped and have no laboratories. Moreover, they do not have more than 15 to 17 pupils in any one grade.<sup>67</sup> Many of the small schools are in tumble-down premises. their

<sup>60</sup> PV. 25.8.66.

<sup>61</sup> SK. 6.3.68.

<sup>62</sup> UG. 16.2.68.

<sup>64</sup> UG. 15.3.66.

<sup>66</sup> PV. 25.8.66.

<sup>63</sup> UG. 16.1.68.

<sup>65</sup> SK. 13.12.67.

<sup>67</sup> TI. 25.2.68.

equipment is poor, and more important they are unable to attract qualified specialist teachers, since they cannot offer them enough work in their field. It has also been argued that such schools are not only unsatisfactory from the educational point of view, but are also more expensive to build and to run.

Some progress has been made in closing down the smaller schools and transferring their pupils to larger ones. In 1966 alone 30 were closed in Kirgiziya,<sup>68</sup> and in Kazakhstan about 1,000 small primary schools have been merged with larger ones, and some have been turned into secondary schools. The average number of pupils per school in Kazakhstan has risen from 147 in 1959/60 to 279 in 1967.<sup>69</sup> The closing down of the smaller schools means either that transport has to be provided to take the children to school or that boarding schools or hostels attached to day schools have to be set up. At present there are only a limited number of school hostels and boarding schools, which cater for those from difficult homes as well as remote areas, but their numbers have grown considerably since they were first set up on any scale about 10 years ago. In Kazakhstan the number of boarding schools has increased from 18 to 157 in seven years and the number of children in them has grown more than tenfold. There are also about 100,000 children in school hostels.<sup>70</sup> In Tadzhikistan in 1965 there were 33 boarding schools with 12,675 pupils,<sup>71</sup> and in Uzbekistan in 1966, 122 boarding schools with 44,000 pupils.<sup>72</sup> But as yet the number of boarding schools and hostels is not nearly enough to meet the need for them. In some places it seems that the initial reluctance of parents to send their children to boarding schools has been overcome and the demand for places exceeds supply. In other places the parents still need convincing, but everywhere there seems to be a marked reluctance on the part of the indigenous peoples to let their daughters attend boarding schools. In Tadzhikistan the percentage of girls in boarding schools is very small,<sup>73</sup> while in the Kazandzhik, Kizyl-Atrek, Murgab and Mary rayons of Turkmenistan in 1965 there were no Turkmen girls in boarding schools at all.<sup>74</sup>

The quality of the boarding schools and hostels seems to vary a good deal. Some, mostly in the towns, appear to be well-run and to offer the children a much better education than they would have got otherwise. But one gains the impression that far too many are extremely joyless institutions. Some are unheated, ill-equipped, and do not even serve hot meals. Some also have totally inadequate staff. In one rural hostel in Kazakhstan in 1965 there were no facilities for the children to wash or do their washing. Therefore they had to go home periodically for a few days, with dire effects on their studies. In a hostel for the children of *chabans* situated in a semi-basement in Ural'sk there was not even

<sup>68</sup> SK. 4.2.67.

<sup>69</sup> KP. 16.8.67.

<sup>71</sup> KT. 4.6.65.

<sup>73</sup> KT. 4.6.65.

<sup>70</sup> KP. 19.8.67.

<sup>72</sup> PV. 25.8.66.

<sup>74</sup> TI. 12.2.65.

enough room for beds for all the children.<sup>75</sup> At the Il'yaly boarding school in Turkmenistan in 1966 a correspondent found the premises dirty, the furniture in the dormitories and classrooms broken down, and the children scruffily-dressed in clothes and shoes of the wrong size. The school was not wired for electricity, and the same food was served up day after day with no vegetables.<sup>76</sup> An equally depressing picture is presented by a large boarding school in the Leninskiy rayon of Tadzhikistan. Here over 500 children, some from Dushanbe, Regar and Gissar but most from kolkhozes, are housed in three large three-storey buildings. All suffer from unfavourable family circumstances, no father, ailing parents and so on, and the school is their only home. There are some good teachers, but the general atmosphere is cold and unfriendly, and many of the teachers show no genuine interest in the children. Some of the teachers have been or are involved in shady affairs, and there is a high turnover of staff. The present head, who came in August 1967 and is leaving at the end of the year, found the walls peeling and windows broken in the dormitories. The children had to eat in the open in September while the canteen was being done up. In the winter the boiler broke down, the children had to sleep fully dressed, and 60 fell ill. For several weeks they were not taken to the bath-house and did not change their underwear, with dire results. And yet the head and the director of studies think that everything is normal.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> UG. 30.10.65.

<sup>76</sup> TI. 11.10.66.

<sup>77</sup> KT. 16.3.68.

## NOTES ON INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

In *Kommunist Tadzhikstana* of 17 March 1968, V. Belan wrote a critical review of Dr. Margaret Miller's article "Notes on Industrial Development", published in *Central Asian Review*, No. 4 of 1967. The following is Dr. Miller's comment on the review.

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Mr. BELAN accuses me of giving a distorted picture by concentrating on the weaknesses in industrial management, as revealed in the excerpts which I quote from the press of his republic, and ignoring the good points. This is untrue. If Mr. Belan will look at my Notes again, he will find many cases cited of successful working throughout the area under review, sometimes in the face of great difficulties. He must know that it is the habit of the Soviet press to dwell in detail on the obstacles encountered in carrying out the current economic reforms, and he can hardly expect Western scholars to take no notice of this material. To do so would be to fail in their first duty of giving a full, as well as an objective, picture of what is going on. One result of stressing failures as well as successes is *not* to seek to "prove" that the Russians are falling down on the job (although from the tone of his review I do not expect Mr. Belan to believe this), but to show Western readers how difficult and complicated, and at the same time how essential, are the tasks that the Russians have set themselves, and thus to enlist understanding in the West of the obstacles that have to be overcome by the practical men, directors, foremen, managers and others, entrusted with the everyday running of factories in this time of transition.

Mr. Belan contradicts himself, for example, by quoting extensively and approvingly from my "Conclusions", the content of which demonstrates the falsity of some of his previous detailed criticisms. He also contradicts his own Government, who for many years have been expressing deep concern about the relative economic backwardness of Russia's territories beyond the Urals, and who have recently intensified their efforts to correct this situation. The story is well known to all informed western observers, and is not in any way invalidated by our critic's claims of industrial achievements in the Tadzhik SSR in 1966 in excess of those recorded for the Soviet Union as a whole. As he is aware, my Notes covered not only his republic, but the other three Central Asian republics, as well as the Kazakh SSR.

The same parochial outlook undermines his remaining objections that I have not in every case quoted *in extenso* and verbatim from my sources. When such a large amount of material has to be handled compression becomes essential, and it is the accuracy of the broad

conclusions that matters, not whether a particular remark is attributed to one official or another, or exactly how many workers in a factory attend lectures or indulge in absenteeism.

Mr. Belan's contribution can be usefully assessed only against the realization that it is written in the out-moded context of the "cold war" mentality. There is the "personal smear" technique, expressed in innuendoes against the status of the Central Asian Research Centre as a responsible body conducting objective research, and against the professional competence of its contributors. There are the inconsistent criticisms, expressed with lack of perspective, confusion and rigidity of thought, intellectual poverty of outlook, a total absence of the courtesy normally used in any interchange of opinions between professional workers. In short, this is a stalinist exercise, in which the writer sets out from the beginning to prove that what he wants to believe, or has been taught to believe, is in fact true, irrespective of the nature and content of the work he is reviewing.

It could well be a cause of deep despondency to scholars who have laboured for decades to shed some light on the deliberately imposed obscurity of parts of the Soviet economic scene, to discover that such sterile views can still find their way into print. For my own part, I am consoled by the revelation in the material surveyed in my Notes of the growing "boldness" and "independence" among industrialists, qualities specifically called for by the Soviet leaders themselves as being essential for the successful implementation of the reforms. It cannot be doubted that before long the strong new winds generated by the exercise of these qualities, as well as by others equally in evidence, such as courage, determination, competence, realism, common sense, will blow into oblivion the constricting mental attitudes of a dead past.

## BOOK REVIEWS

- BABAKHODZHAYEV, M. A. *Russo-Afghan Trade and Economic Relations in the Second Half of the 18th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century.*
- FEDCHINA, V. N. *How the Map of Central Asia was Created.*
- KOTOVSKIY, G. G. and Others. Eds. *Ivan Pavlovich Minayev. A Collection of Articles.*
- LOBASHEV, A. I. *The Rural Population and Agriculture of Afghanistan in Figures.*
- MINTS, I. I. Chief ed. *The Triumph of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.*
- SHAMIDE, A. I. *The Workers and Trade Union Movements in Iran, 1946-1953.*
- SMIRNOV, A. G. *The Scientific and Technological Intelligentsia of India.*
- YESENOV, Sh. Ye. *October and Science in Kazakhstan.*

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**The Triumph of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan** (*Pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane*). Chief editor I. I. Mints. Fan Press, Tashkent, 1967. 772 pp. Print order 5,000. R4.00.

THIS major collective work is the first general history of the Revolution in Central Asia and Kazakhstan as a whole. It is also the first volume of a six-volume "History of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the USSR". It has been written jointly by scholars of the four Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan under the guidance of Academician I. I. Mints of the all-Union Academy of Sciences. The original draft was discussed by an enlarged session of the special sections of the all-Union and republican Academies of Sciences concerned with the project which was held in Tashkent from 23 to 26 November 1965. Over 700 people attended this session, including historians from Moscow, Baku, Tbilisi, Kazan', Ufa, Alma-Ata, Frunze, Ashkhabad, Chardzhou, Dushanbe, Nukus, Tashkent and Samarkand, veterans of the Revolution in Central Asia, and jurists, philosophers and economists. The result of all this collective effort is a very long, detailed and one-sided account of the Revolution in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which perpetuates all the old myths including those of foreign machinations.

The introduction to the book is the standard one to Soviet historical works in which the author or authors review chronologically previous works on the same subject. The authors distinguish three periods in Soviet historiography of the Revolution in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The first, up to the mid-1930s, was marked by the continuing influence of the bourgeois historical school, represented by Bartol'd and others, and by a "sharp struggle . . . with hostile . . . views in which the ideology of the

class enemy was manifested" (p. 12). The second period, from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s, produced works that were much sounder ideologically but suffered from the effects of the "cult of personality". The denunciation of Stalin in 1956 ushered in the third period, during which the atmosphere has been much freer, a great deal of new documentary material from the archives has become accessible, and several times as much historical literature on the subject has been published in the Central Asian republics as in the previous 40 years. The present work is, in fact, based largely on collections of documents and reminiscences published in recent years and information from archive sources. Contemporary local newspapers have also been used extensively.

The Soviet regime is, understandably, sensitive about the nature of the Bolshevik take-over of power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the main aim of all recent Soviet writing on the Revolution in this area has been to try and prove that, contrary to the assertions of bourgeois historians, the native peoples not only supported the Revolution but took an active part in it. It is claimed that it was possible for socialism to triumph in such a backward agrarian region because the national liberation movement of the native peoples against Tsarism, imperialism and their own exploiting classes merged with the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat. The existence of the "historical pre-requisites" is the subject of the first chapter, which describes how the native peoples were exploited both by their own feudal elements and by and by Russian capital, the revolutionary movement among the Russians in the area in the early 20th century, and signs of dissatisfaction with Tsarist rule among the native peoples culminating in the 1916 revolt.

Chapter 2 deals with the February 1917 Revolution and the following three or four months. It argues that the setting up of the Provisional Government brought no real improvement in the lives of the toiling masses who reacted by setting up their own mass democratic organizations. These ranged from the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies to the unions of toiling Muslims. Among the Russian population it was the railwaymen who were the most revolutionary, while among the native population it was those conscripted to serve in the rear in 1916 who, on their return home, played a leading role in setting up Muslim soviets and unions of toiling Muslims in opposition to the bourgeois-nationalist Shuroi-Islamiya, Ulema and Alash organizations. The disillusionment of the native peasantry with the Provisional Government is said to have been shown by a number of isolated clashes with the bays and the local administration.

Events from July to October 1917 form the subject of Chapter 3. Although the majority of the soviets, which were dominated by Mensheviks and SRs (Socialist-Revolutionaries), supported the Provisional Government, there was increasing hostility between the Provisional Government and the local Bolsheviks, who were most strongly represented in the Tashkent soviet. Reflecting events in the centre of the country, there was a wave of strikes, mutinies amongst the soldiery, and a tendency towards a general breakdown of law and order. An attempt by the Tashkent soviet to take over power in September was unsuccessful, but the influence of the Bolsheviks is said to have increased everywhere. The Revolution itself and the establishment of Soviet rule in Central Asia and Kazakhstan are described in Chapter 4. It is pointed out that because of the backward nature of the area, the

weakness of the proletariat and the Bolsheviks in Turkestan and Kazakhstan, the relatively greater influence of the Mensheviks and SRs than in the centre of the country, the hold of the Muslim clergy and bourgeois-nationalist ideology over the largely illiterate natives, and a certain amount of anti-Russian feeling, the Revolution encountered greater difficulties here than in the industrial regions of Russia. Thus the establishment of Soviet rule took from the beginning of November 1917, when the railwaymen and soldiers in Tashkent seized power after an armed uprising, until March 1918. The fifth chapter is concerned with the early months of Soviet rule up to June 1918. It deals with such matters as the replacement of the old administrative institutions, the setting up of the Red Guard and Red Army, the new regime's earliest economic and cultural measures, the defeat of counter-revolutionary forces, in particular the Kokand Autonomous Government, the proclamation of the autonomy of Turkestan, and the setting up of the first Bolshevik organizations, leading up to the First Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party in June 1918.

The history of the Revolution in Central Asia and Kazakhstan is rounded off in Chapter 6 with an account of how Soviet regimes were established in the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara in 1920. It is explained that, because of the extremely backward nature of these two territories, neither the "revolutions" in Khiva and Bukhara nor the regimes set up immediately afterwards were socialist, since various strata of society, including the national bourgeoisie and tribal leaders, played a part in both. But, thanks to the proximity and assistance of Soviet Russia and the leading role of the Communist Party in the overthrow of the khans, the new regimes were not bourgeois either, but popular Soviet ones, which were a transitional stage to socialist republics.

With the best will in the world it would be difficult to accept the version of the Revolution in Central Asia given in this volume as the true one. Not only is no attempt made to present the point of view of the Bolsheviks' opponents, either Russian or native, but they are painted such an unrelieved black and the Bolsheviks themselves such an almost equally unrelieved white that any reader with an open mind would realise that the account was far from impartial. Moreover, various allegations are made, for example, that Bukhara and Khiva were "flooded" with British advisers, military instructors and agents (pp. 661 and 683-4), which are quite unsupported by a source reference. Not that a reference to an archive source can necessarily be taken as evidence of a statement's truth when often neither the date nor the nature of the source is specified and the archives are inaccessible to any but Soviet eyes. One also wonders, for instance, why the authors have ignored the recently published (1964) reminiscences of N. M. Shcherbakov, the commander of the Red Army troops who invaded Khiva in December 1919, in their account of the "revolution" in Khiva. Were they too revealing?

But even supposing one accepted the evidence of the book as true and as the whole story, does it really prove the crucial point of widespread native support for and participation in the Revolution on the Bolshevik side? Undoubtedly some Muslim factory workers engaged in strikes, a few Muslim soviets were set up in 1917, and some Muslims assisted the Bolsheviks during the Revolution, but the apparently endless catalogue of instances of native support does not really amount to much. Furthermore,

most of them refer to the towns where only a minority of the native population lived. As a report of the meeting to discuss the draft of the book remarked: "Some comrades, noting that the authors of the book had tried to show the growth of revolutionary attitudes not only in the towns but also in the Central Asian countryside, at the same time pointed out that in the draft of the volume there was little information on outbursts by native peasants on the eve of October, particularly in the Uzbek, Tadzhik and Kirgiz areas. These reproaches are, of course, just, but at the same time one must take into account the poverty of the existing source material on this question." \*

One of the most embarrassing facts with which Soviet historians of the Revolution in Central Asia have to deal is that both the IIIrd Kray Congress of Soviets of Turkestan in November 1917 and the IVth Congress in January 1918 refused to include members of the indigenous nationalities in the government of Turkestan. At one time almost the whole policy of the Turkestan Bolsheviks on the national question at this period was depicted as mistaken. More recently some Soviet writers have gone to the other extreme and claimed that it was above reproach. The authors of the present work admit that the local Bolsheviks made a serious mistake, but they try to play it down. But the Bolsheviks do not come at all well out of a comparison with the attitude of the other political groups in Turkestan at the time. Not only did the Provisional Government give the natives responsible posts, but the All-Turkestan Provisional Executive Committee set up by the Turkestan kray soviet immediately after the Tashkent soviet seized power included one Muslim and one Kazakh among its nine members. At the IIIrd Congress of Soviets a fortnight later the Muslims and Right SRs and Mensheviks proposed that natives should get half the places in the government of Turkestan, the Kray Congress of Peasant Deputies was prepared to allocate 10 out of 34 places to the Muslims, and even the Left SRs who were the Bolsheviks' closest allies, envisaged native participation. It was only the Bolsheviks, who dominated the Congress, who refused to include any natives in the sovnarkom. Arguments that the proposals of the other political groups would have meant the appointment of "bourgeois nationalists" hardly convince in the circumstances.

Another point on which the book is remarkably revealing is the nature of the "revolution" in Bukhara. From the evidence provided it is quite clear that the Bukharan Communist Party, which allegedly played the leading role, was a creature and tool of the Russian Communist Party.

In its great detail the book does, in fact, contain a good deal that is of interest. One might mention in particular the descriptions of the take-over of power by the individual soviets and the early measures of the Turkestan Soviet Government. It is also refreshing to see the names of various former non-persons such as Khodzhayev and Ryskulov appearing once again, although the general lack of interest in personalities and their individual roles is one of the factors that makes this book, like other Soviet histories, very heavy going. However, the text is well laid out and, *mirabile dictu*, there are indexes of names and places. There are also lists of the archive and periodical sources used as well as of the Red Guard units and trade

\* Agapov, P., "Forum istorikov Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana," *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane*, No. 1 of 1966, p. 72.

unions formed in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 1917 and 1918. The print order of 5,000 seems rather small for what is presumably intended to be a standard work.

A. S.

**Ivan Pavlovich Minayev. A Collection of Articles** (*Ivan Pavlovich Minayev. Sbornik statey*) Ed. G. G. Kotovskiy and others. Nauka Press, Moscow, 1967. 136 pp. Print order 2,300. 44k.

EXPERIENCE teaches that it is unwise to neglect the publications of the Nauka Press however uninviting these commonly are in terms of book production. Miserably bound and printed on wretched paper the present volume must not only have held its Soviet readers "on merits" but have given them, as it should give us, to think. It is surely a point to bear in mind that a band of orientalists should here have come together to extol almost, if not quite, to the skies a noted scholar who on the evidence submitted was typical of the society in which he was raised. Minayev believed and proclaimed that Imperial Russia had been assigned by providence a civilizing mission. He also believed and taught that what counted above all with Eastern peoples was religion: "this was the cement", he said, "which held their communities together, in this and this alone had they found their peace". To one of his principal works, his *Ocherki Tseylona i Indii* (Essays on Ceylon and India) he prefaced Carlyle's dictum about religion's being the central value in man's every relationship.

Ivan Pavlovich Minayev (1840-90) had an international reputation in his day as an indologist of exceptionally versatile attainment. His name, indeed, was familiar in circles that did not normally intersect: the Sanskritists and the Pali scholars of Berlin and Paris prized his work; the sages of India, Ceylon and Burma admired his mastery of their own idiom; the British administrators were happy to facilitate his repeated travels, and the Anglo-Indian press wrote him up; a Viceroy gave him an interview, and humbler folk speaking Hindustani or Pahari received him in their villages on the plains of the North Western Provinces or in the Kumaon hills.

The career of this accomplished and also humane man has been discussed, as it had to be, from a variety of angles. Thus, separate portraits have been offered of Minayev in the academic world of St. Petersburg; of Minayev the authority on Buddhism; of Minayev contributing to Pali studies; of Minayev committing to paper his day-to-day appraisals of the contemporary scene in the lands which his learning had fitted him to understand. It was part of his creed that orientalism must not be dry-as-dust and that his student years in Russia, and then in Germany, England and France, were but preparation for "one more university" which was the East itself. In this he broke with the German habit of scholarship—and not only the German habit either. As G. G. Kotovskiy, the general editor of this collection, puts it in his introduction, "Minayev was the first Russian, and very likely the first European, indianist in whom Sanskritology and Ancient India's culture were organically combined with just as profound and painstaking an investigation of the problems of the India of his own day". And as Minayev himself wrote in 1884, "the scientific study of India ought not, for the Russian orientalist, to spend itself on India's past".

Two of the consequences of this individual approach are brought out in

several of these component portraits. First of all Minayev did not go down too well with the stuffy hierarchy at St. Petersburg University where he was shunted from the main line of his interest, the history of the culture of the East, to the Chair of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European Languages which was to him, retaining the metaphor, a quiet siding. Secondly, an ardent concern with contemporary life in the East implied a critical attitude to the Russian and the British presence there. Minayev was outspokenly liberal and, to go by some of his quoted correspondence, prone to label the Generals as *duraki*—idiots. This did not always endear him to imperial authority.

On the other hand it is sufficiently clear—clearer than these Soviet biographers would admit—that Minayev conceded, on balance, the case for imperialism. Again and again he alluded to Russia's civilizing mission, and what held good for the Russians obviously had to hold good in respect of the British. It is of course quite right of these admirers to attend to the sympathy with the poor and oppressed which shines through the diaries of the visits Minayev made to the East. In one passage he confessed his feelings of hot shame at engaging three *pankahwalas* for a few farthings to fan his sinful body day and night. But the Soviet writer was off on his hobby-horse at this, bringing in a lot about the catastrophic regime which had been fastened on the country by the British, and arguing that "this fact [the starvation wage of *pankahwalas*] served as one more proof for Minayev of that social injustice which had been sanctioned with the volition of the so-called Western Civilizer in the East". This is reading into the journals something which, on the evidence of the extracts quoted, is not there. What Minayev recorded was that wherever he looked he saw a society in disarray, and that this society would have somehow, eventually, to set itself straight. The English meantime had not, he thought, put down deep roots; they were "a sort of superficial element" and one fine day would take their leave of India. But until that day dawned they had their mission: "Under the British dominion a country [was] enjoying peace and order" where otherwise dissension would have ruled.

H. E.

**The Workers and Trade Union Movements in Iran, 1946–1953** (*Rabocheye i Profsoyuznoye dvizheniye v Irane, 1946–1953*). By A. I. Shamide. Azerbaydzhan SSR Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1965. 212 pp. Print order 800. 95k.

A. I. SHAMIDE is so uncompromisingly hostile to the established regime in Iran that his book today reads as though it had been written before 1962. It is possible indeed that this is the case. Studies of a recent, i.e. post-war, period like this are not infrequently in Soviet historiography brought up to the hour by a postscript, and one cannot help noticing that the last date occurring in the postscript to the present monograph is 1961. Either, therefore, there was a time-lag before the typescript went to press on 20.1.65, or else this was just an instance of the occasional rebellious wave that fights with the current long after the turn of the tide.

The author's concern is very largely with the falsification of history which, according to him, has been perpetrated with effect from 1953, the year of the *coup*, "by the representatives of the ruling classes of Iran, the

USA and Great Britain" in an attempt "to justify the contemporary social order in the country, and its alliance with the imperialists". Books, brochures and articles, he says, have been poured out, the concerted aim of which is to conceal the fact that the proletarian movement of the 40s and 50s was connected with the same movement of the 20s and 30s, and to pretend instead that the workers and trade union movement in Iran was born as late as 1942, and then of foreign parentage.

A number of works, mostly in Persian, are cited and discussed as the vehicles of this falsification. Many of them, Shamide asserts, were written by reactionaries or by renegades from the workers' cause on the instructions of the then Military Governor of Tehran Lieut-Gen. Bakhtiyar "to denigrate the democratic organizations of Iran, to delude Iranian society and to vindicate the terror directed against the vanguard of the Iranian national liberation movement". In particular the author visits his wrath, and not seldom his vituperation, on the following writers: Mostafa Fateh; Fatehollah Mo'tamadi; Zia' Khorsandi; and Dr. Jazayeri. The first named had obliged with his *Fifty Years of Iranian Oil*, his *Black Book on the Officer Organization of the Tudeh*, and his *Penetration of Communism in Iran*. F. Mo'tamadi's *Outline History of Labour in Iran from the Establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty until our Day*, published by the Ministry of Labour in 1956, was a similar essay in malicious distortion. Z. Khorsandi contributed to the pile of lies with his *History of the Worker Question in Iran*; and Dr. Jazayeri with his voluminous *Social Economy* made it his business "to slander the democratic unions and make out that they obstructed the normal work at the factories and on the shop floors". The authorities had crowned the heap with two illustrated volumes which bore the screeching title *Illegal Actions of the Central United Council*.<sup>1</sup>

The throttling of the working-class was bad enough, but those in power did something which in Shamide's account was even more reprehensible morally; which was to put it over to the public at large that the causes engendering a revolutionary movement were *absent* in Iran's case and "that any such manifestation was therefore not national but imported". There was no occasion, these people pronounced, in Iran for socialism, and hence no room for a movement towards it. A theory was thought up which envisaged the workers as one of three co-operating forces, namely, the Labour, the Worker, the Employer. The first "vivifying the community" was the secret of the nation's existence and strength; the second was "the lever throwing into motion the wheel of community life"; and the third was "the stimulus to the progress of the economy". It followed from this doctrine that "anybody . . . sowing discord between two of the forces (that is, employer and employed) was guilty of undermining the country's welfare".

It was also denied that the working-class had played any role in the struggle for the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951. The masses were a herd which the outstanding personalities, the heroes, led. These pernicious doctrines, Shamide observes, were endorsed by the Shah himself who declared bluntly that the workers should have nothing to do with politics, and sought to associate May Day with the birthday of his late father.

In explaining the difficulties into which the entire proletarian movement

<sup>1</sup> *Shuraye mottahedeye markazi.*

was plunged on the morrow of August 1953, the author fastens certain mistakes on its leaders. Misled [one would think they were hardly to be blamed for this] by Stalin's well-known announcement on the point, the Central Committee of the Party concluded that the national bourgeoisie, even in a country like Iran, had lost its revolutionary character. The said leaders therefore deliberately and consistently fell foul of it. More inexcusably the leadership never understood the correct relationship between party and trade unions; so that the Central United Council of the latter too often (and especially when it went underground) took over the functions of the party. Again, in the elections to trade union office, the wishes of the actual workers were ignored; and generally speaking neither the Central Committee nor the Central United Council recruited leaders from the working or peasant class.

The style, like the matter of this book, recalled an earlier day. The author's preference was for maddeningly staccato paragraphs, often of only two or three lines, and sometimes of only one.

H. E.

**Russo-Afghan Trade and Economic Relations in the Second Half of the 18th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century.** (*Russko-Afganskiye torgovo-ekonomicheskkiye otnosheniya vo vtoroy polovine XVIII nachale XX v.*) By M. A. Babakhodzhayev. Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, Tashkent, 1965, 132 pp. Print order 750. 74k.

REGULAR readers of *Central Asian Review* will remember that M. A. Babakhodzhayev<sup>2</sup> published a substantial article on Russo-Afghan trade relations in *Kratkiye soobshcheniya Inst. N.A.*, No. 73 of 1963. The historical purview was there restricted to the 80s and 90s of the last century, and what the author has tackled in this larger study is the panorama of the years 1747 to 1917.

Those limits are not arbitrarily chosen. Until the middle of the 18th century there was nothing properly deserving the name of trade connexion between Russia and Afghanistan but only a succession of sporadic exchanges. The early date, then, marks the opening of the Tsarist trade relationship with the Afghans, and the later date, of course, its close.

Babakhodzhayev's careful and closely documented monograph is in three chapters. Chapter I deals with events up to the Central Asian annexation. In that phase, the author shows, the principal items of Afghan export were Anglo-Indian goods in transit; the proportion of articles of Afghan origin being insignificant. Similarly, the bulk of goods entering Afghanistan from Russia were for re-export to India. British competition for the Afghan market was unremitting and had grown very stiff by the 40s of the 19th century, with the result that Russian exports destined for Afghanistan itself began to shrink.

Chapter II relates and explains the change in the character and structure of Russo-Afghan trade that set in from about 1870 to the end of the century. The second phase, the author argues, was essentially one in which the favourable strove with the unfavourable factors. On one side there was a

<sup>2</sup> Not to be confused with A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, author of *The Collapse of British Policy in Central Asia and the Middle East (1918-1924)*, Moscow, 1962.

sovereign power, and on the other a country whose foreign policy was controlled by Britain. Nevertheless, the volume and value of Russo-Afghan trade did increase significantly, and a particular development was that the proportion of Anglo-Indian goods concealed in the Afghan export total fell.

Chapter III looking at the third and final phase of Tsarist times demonstrates that notwithstanding the impossibility of formal agreements, trade managed to expand steadily; to such a degree, indeed, did it flourish that between 1901 and 1913 the commodity circulation climbed in value from about 3 million to 12½ million rubles. Russia's foreign economic policy had been galvanized by the requirements of raw material and new markets implicit in her rapidly enlarged industry. The Government offered all kinds of tempting baits to the export of certain listed categories of goods; the Amu-Dar'ya flotilla was transferred to a civil department; the improvement of communications to the frontier was pushed ahead.

The course and vigour of Russo-Afghan trade, Babakhodzhayev says in conclusion, directly shaped the subsequent commodity specialization of Afghan agriculture and strengthened its dependence on the world capital market. When, however, the Great War broke out and Russia's economic position weakened, the influence of British capital reasserted itself, especially in the north and the north-west of the country.

A great many of the sources on which the author has drawn are familiar, but a great many are not. To the extent that archives inaccessible to the West have been made use of, previous gaps have been filled in a story of imperial endeavour colliding so often with our own.

H. E.

**How the Map of Central Asia was Created** (*Kak sozdavalas' karta Sredney Azii*). By V. N. Fedchina. Nauka Press, Moscow, 1967. 132 pp. Print order 1,800. 78k.

THIS is a scholarly account of the history of the compilation of maps of Central Asia from the time of Ptolemy to the beginning of the 20th century based on little-known manuscript and archive sources. It is a chequered story. Ptolemy's reasonably correct and extensive information on Central Asia was completely forgotten in Europe in the Dark Ages, and it was scholars of the Arab khalifate in the 9th to 14th centuries who, having taken the knowledge of the ancient Greeks and Romans and extended it, passed it back to Europe. Italian navigators of the 13th to 15th centuries, using navigational equipment and instruments, made substantial additions to the existing information on the Caspian, but when the Caspian lost its importance as a trade route to the East at the end of the 15th century their new material was forgotten and the old names and mistaken ideas of Ptolemy began to appear on maps once again. The West European map-makers clung obstinately to Ptolemy's ideas right up till the 18th century, rejecting any new information which did not coincide with Ptolemy. According to Vera Fedchina, it was only the extensive work of Russian expeditions in Central Asia which gradually corrected the mistaken ideas of European scholars. The author distinguishes three periods in the history of Russian maps of Central Asia: the 16th and 17th centuries, when the maps were based on inquiries and visual observations; the 18th century when the first surveys were made; and the 19th and early 20th with their use of

more refined and scientific map-making techniques. A curious fact about the three periods is the fact that the cartographers of each one made little or no use of the work of their predecessors.

The book has seven tables, 26 illustrations (including six 18th- and 19th-century maps published for the first time), and a bibliography containing 281 titles. There is an index of names.

A. S.

### SHORTER NOTICES

**October and Science in Kazakhstan** (*Oktyabr' i nauka Kazakhstana*). Chief editor Sh. Ye. Yesenov. Nauka Press, Alma-Ata, 1967, 576 pp. Print order 4,000. R2.70.

THIS volume, one of many produced in honour of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution, is devoted to the development of science and scholarship in Soviet Kazakhstan. Various prominent members of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences give an account of past achievements and current research in a wide number of fields including nuclear physics, astrophysics, geology, metallurgy, botany, zoology and other sciences as well as economics, history, philosophy, jurisprudence, linguistics and literary studies. As befits a jubilee edition the book is well produced by Soviet standards, and it is illustrated with photographs of the most prominent members of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences as well as of some of its scientific equipment.

A. S.

**The Scientific and Technological Intelligentsia of India** (*Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya intelligentsiya Indii*). By A. G. Smirnov. Nauka Press, Moscow, 1967. 154 pp. Print order 1,400. 52k.

THIS is a copiously annotated, and clearly very exact, account of the progress in scientific and technological education in India over the past 20 years. It is the first study of the kind to have been published in Russian and the general editor, A. Levkovskiy, is doubtless correct in suggesting that it will fill not simply an academic but a practical lacuna, for it contains much that Russian specialists working in India will want to know. Written with the close collaboration of a number of Indians well qualified to pronounce on the country's immediate and likely requirements, it is informative and up to date. It seems, moreover, to be marked throughout, in so far as the running comment is concerned, by sound common sense.

H. E.

**The Rural Population and Agriculture of Afghanistan in Figures.** (*Sel'skoye naseleniye i sel'skoye khozyaystvo Afganistana v tsifrakh*). By A. I. Lobashev. Nauka Press, Moscow, 1967. 90 pp. Print order 1,600. 32k.

THE title of this little paperback is accurate. Well above 50 of its 90 pages are given to statistical tables, and even the remaining 40 are heavily peppered with figures. Most of the material can no doubt be dug out from *The Survey of Progress* published by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1963 and *The Population and Agricultural Survey of 500 Villages* published by the Ministry of Planning in 1964. But not everybody has direct access to these. Other serious students of the resources of Afghanistan will find in Lobashev a competent and not too garrulous guide.

H. E.

# SOVIET PRESS COMMENT

1 JANUARY-31 MARCH 1968

## I. THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND KAZAKH SSRs

THIS was an extremely quiet quarter after the prolific exclamation marks of the last quarter with the 50th anniversary of the Revolution and the rush to fulfil the cotton harvest plans, although it was two national anniversaries that produced the greatest number of articles on one subject: one was the 50th anniversary of the armed forces on 23 February, and the other was the 100th anniversary of the birth of Gorkiy on 28 March, although the republican newspapers were pressed to find many connexions between Soviet Central Asia and Gorkiy.

### *Party*

This was the quarter for oblast, rayon and town Party conferences. Reports of these came in daily from all corners of the republics. One of the more remarkable was the Andizhan oblast Party conference, in which it transpired that the leaders of the Party obkom, and in particular the First Secretary, had been thoroughly dishonest; they had appropriated State property and had been guilty of nepotism and consequently were dismissed from their posts (PV 2.3.68). Another notable change of office was the appointment of Suyumbayev as Chairman of the Kirgiz Council of Ministers, announced on 24 January; the former chairman—Mambetov—was relieved of his duties (SK 24.1.68).

A plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was held in Tashkent in mid-January to discuss capital building (*kapital'noye stroitel'stvo*); one of the reasons for a slow rate of work in this field was attributed to a shortage of workers (PV 16.1.68). On 30 January a plenum of the Kirgiz Communist Party was held in Frunze: this discussed the role of social sciences in a Communist society and further improvements in this field (SK 30.1.68).

At the beginning of January the Tadzhik Supreme Soviet met and chiefly discussed the profitability of agricultural produce in the sovkhozes and kolkhozes of the republic (KT 4.1.68). At the end of March the Kirgiz Supreme Soviet met and spoke about the role and work of local soviets.

### *Foreign affairs*

Coverage of foreign affairs was similar to that in the central press. A meeting was held in a Turkmen factory to show support for Vietnam (TI 10.2.68), and in KZ (10.3.68) the activities of the Americans in Vietnam were compared to those of "the imperialists, Bailey and Tredwell", in Tashkent in 1919. In PV (28.3.68) an article appeared about the faculty for foreign students in Tashkent University; at present it is comprised of 156 Vietnamese, 3 Algerians and 1 Ceylonese.

The second anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration between India and Pakistan was noted on 14 January.

Paragraphs about China again appeared frequently under the invariable heading—"Events in China" (see Adjoining Countries below).

### *Agriculture and irrigation*

As might be expected it was a comparatively uneventful quarter for agriculture with general concern over winter fodder gradually giving way to concern over sowing and other preparations for spring. It transpired that the Kazakh SSR was ready and equipped for spring planting, whereas other republics, such as the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs, had failed to plan ahead and lay in sufficient stocks of seed. In March PV featured an enquiry into spring preparations with daily reports from different regions of the republic. This revealed some appalling inefficiencies; for example in the Karakalpak ASSR the new sovkhoses need 3,100 tons of rice seed but have only acquired 1,140 tons, and fields which yielded a good harvest last year cannot be resown as they have been neglected and have become entirely bogged up. There were the usual complaints about the lack of spare parts for agricultural machinery, and the back page of PV (29.3.68) carried photographs of some new machines to be used for cotton harvesting in 1968. The Central Asian republics intend to grow six million tons of cotton this year and so far the outlook is promising as there has been sufficient rain.

On 25 February the Tadzhik Council of Ministers met to take measures against agricultural pests and poisons by means of melioration, crop spraying by aircraft, etc., as these caused big losses in the 1967 cotton harvest. On 7 and 8 February a plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party resolved to increase grain production and sell more bread and livestock to the State.

The beetgrowers of Kazakhstan met (KP 18.1.68), as did the Uzbek rice workers (PV 20.3.68), and on 12 March a conference of Kirgiz poppy growers took place in Przheval'sk; this brought to light a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs and extremely poor results; the fact that they failed to reach their target for 1967 was only partially attributable to unfavourable conditions (SK 12.3.68).

Plans were made and approved for various irrigation projects and important steps forward were taken towards the completion of those already under way. For instance, after almost seven years work, on 30 March, a giant explosion shattered a part of the Vakhsh river-bed and so created a dam for the Baypazy hydro-complex (see CAR, No. 4 of 1967, pp. 343-4). This is going to help irrigate the hitherto waterless Yavan valley.

The highest canal in the country, the Ishkashim in the Pamirs, is nearing completion (IZ 26.3.68) (see CAR, 1963, No. 2, p. 153).

Plans have been drawn up for the Bol'shoi Namangan canal (PV 29.2.68) which will enable thousands of hectares of new land to be cultivated. The canal will be composed of two parts of approximately 55 km. and 100 km. and will run parallel to the Northern Fergana canal.

A second part of the Amu-Bukhara canal has also been planned because in dry years there is not sufficient water for the Bukhara and Samarkand oblasts. It will use water from the Zerafshan and will probably be 220 km. long (PV 13.3.68).

*Industry*

The new economic reforms continue to be widely applied; 55 industrial enterprises now work "in the new way" with very encouraging results statistically (KT 21.3.68). In a stocking factory in Dushanbe, after a year of the new system of planning and economic stimulus, productivity has risen by 16.2 per cent and the employees were said to work more willingly and tardiness and absenteeism were much reduced.

NOT (Scientific Organization of Labour) was again featured repeatedly, particularly in connexion with the five-day week.

The biggest GRES in Central Asia, over 1,350 kilowatts in power, is to be built in the Murgab oasis near the Karakum canal. The Shekhitlinskoye deposit of gas was opened up in east Turkmenistan and will be used in the planned GRES.

The first 50 km. of a gas pipeline running from Mayskoye via Ashkhabad to Bezmeyn were laid. All 340 kilometres should be in operation next year.

*Education and culture*

In this quarter there was a congress of Uzbek teachers in January (PV 18.1.68) and a congress of Kirgiz teachers in Frunze in March (SK 27.3.68) which caused a flood of articles about the importance, status, vocation and problems of teachers with emphasis on the use of psychology in teaching.

The Kazakh composers met and also the Kazakh and Tadzhi artists. In March many articles appeared about the cinema as a medium of propaganda and Party instruction.

In January (PR 22.1.68, SK 26.1.68) it was suggested that the Kazakh and Central Asian Academies of Sciences should co-ordinate efforts and combine research in certain subjects, such as irrigation, the results of which would be relevant to them all.

The first steps were taken towards the realization of an eight-volumed Kazakh encyclopaedia to be completed in 1977 (KP 27.3.68) and also towards that of an Uzbek encyclopaedia (PV 13.3.68) to be completed by the 50th anniversary of the Uzbek SSR in 1974. This was seen as an important event in the cultural life of the republic.

*Everyday life*

Numerous articles are still devoted to the five-day week and the remarkable amount of problems which arise from two days leisure. Restaurants and cinemas tend to be incompetently run; some cinemas issue tickets at awkward hours, others show a different film from the one they advertise, and many continue to use out-of-date projection and sound equipment. Instead of a constructive, healthy mood prevailing, too often the extra leisure results in frayed nerves (SK 17.2.68).

Among general topics two seem to have come to the fore this quarter: first, law and order with especial regard to hooliganism, drunkenness and poachers. In an article in KT (3.3.68) it transpired that the Tadzhi courts approve two-thirds of workers' appeals for reinstatement in their jobs and that trade union organizations are lazy and negligent and fail to defend workers' rights. Of 1,366 Comrades' Courts in the Tadzhi SSR many do not work fairly or look into individual cases but operate perfunctorily and formally.

The second topic was life in towns. There were articles about whether the streets are swept, about the need to plant trees and about the overall improving of the appearance of towns. Enormous space was devoted to the problems of traffic safety and the rush hour.

### *Miscellany*

Plans for the Tashkent metro, the seventh in the Soviet Union, are under way; it will be 22 km. long and will have 14 stations.

A new district of Tashkent has been named Khamzy rayon, and Tashkent's longest street—Gorkiy Prospect—is under construction.

A force 7-8 earthquake was registered in the Kyzylkum desert near Tashkent on 14th March.

The first 20 km. of a railway line between Beynau and Kungrad has been laid (KP 16.2.68). A railway between Samarkand and Karshi is also being built (PV 21.2.68).

On 15 January the leader of the Kazakh and Central Asian Muslims—Muftiy Ziyavutdin Babakhanov—was decorated for his services.

K.F.

## II. ADJOINING COUNTRIES

### **The Indian Subcontinent**

#### *India*

The space allotted to India was roughly equal to the total apportioned to the other countries. January, in particular, was India's month in the Soviet press, the wordage approximating to the quarter's wordage accorded to the runner up, Mongolia. Only what seems salient will be selected for mention below.

On 3.1.68 *Pravda's* special correspondent A. Maslennikov deplored the growing menace presented by fascist youth, describing as an instance of this threat to society the attack made on the headquarters of the Girmi Textile Workers' Union in Bombay. The same journal on 5.1.68 carried an account, over the name of I. Serebryakov, of the proceedings of the Second Conference on the Language, Literature and Culture of the Tamil People. Most papers next day reported Mrs. Gandhi's opening remarks at the 55th Session of the Indian Scientific Congress at Benares.

On 10.1.68 there was a wealth of references to the Tashkent Declaration. The second anniversary of the historic initiative taken by the Soviet Union in the name of peace occasioned full-scale attention in six or seven newspapers; the articles by Erik Alekseyev in PR and by Yu. Popov in IZ being perhaps worthy of record here. On the same date, and also on the two following days, the press covered the 71st Session of the Indian National Congress convened at Hyderabad. Most of the reporting on this was factual, but K. Perevoshchikov in IZ 10.1.68 explained the problems facing the INC now that its majority had been lost in the legislative assemblies of numerous states.

SK 17.1.68 and IZ 20.1.68 reported, the former with illustrations, the 20th birthday of the magazine *Soviet Land*. On 20.1.68 all dailies printed a *Tass* message on the creation of a Defence Committee to take over a subject hitherto dealt with by the Government's Committee on Home

Affairs; and from 21 to 23.1.68 they took adequate notice of "Madras 68", the international industrial exhibition or fair, paying special attention to the USSR pavilion.

On 23 and 24.1.68 the Soviet press began its coverage of the Kosygin visit with the announcement that the distinguished guest would "take part in the celebration of Republic Day on the 26th". Newspaper readers were thus prepared, when they opened their papers on that date, to find a great deal of space consecrated (a) to the significance of the National Fête, and (b) to the touch down at Palam Aerodrome of Airliner IL-18. The special correspondents did full-page honour, and in about equal measure, to the "Years of Formation" and "The Warm Encounter". Next day the press published the address of welcome delivered by Mrs. Gandhi, and Mr. Kosygin's reply. The Indian Premier spoke with candour of India's economic difficulties latterly; and also brought in India's international attitude, and her lasting debt to the Soviet Union. The visitor, after touching on the 20-year relationship, recited the crimes of the imperialists who had unleashed bloody war in Vietnam, who had perpetrated aggression against the peace-loving Arab countries, whose "interest [was] in sowing seeds of discord and animosity, in creating a zone of tension in Hindustan, and—if the possibility arose—in pushing events into a military conflict". Mr. Kosygin was reported as visiting the spot at which Gandhi, Nehru and Shastri had been cremated and as planting, in the Indian custom, a sapling there; and as attending the military parade in company with the Indian President and Prime Minister. It was added that "President Tito of Yugoslavia, in India at the time, was also on the dais". The papers of the subsequent few days relating the rest of the programme, described the luncheon offered by the Indian President on 27.1.68; the civic reception by the Mayor in the Red Fort; and the trip to Hardwar and Rishikesh to inspect the heavy electrical equipment factory at the former, and the antibiotics centre at the latter, both of which had been brought into being with the economic and technical co-operation of the Soviet Union. The concluding two days of the visit, 29 and 30 January, were occupied largely, the press said, with an intensive round of talks on the issues of the hour.

The press of 1 and 2 February published the joint communiqué in the visit. Couched in conventional phrases this contained a résumé of the programme; a common expression of satisfaction that the younger independent nations of the world were opting for non-alignment; a grateful allusion by the Indian side to Tashkent; and the formulation by the Soviet side of the hope that the Indian and Pakistan Governments would exert every nerve to normalizing their relations.

In the early days of February the press covered the opening of the Second UNO Conference on Trade and Development scheduled to sit in Delhi from 1 February to 25 March with the participation of some 130 countries. In the early days of February, too, the VIIIth National Congress of the Indian Communist Party, meeting in Patna, was written up, not to say blown up: particular stress being laid on the presence of A. Ya. Pel'she representing the Central Committee of the CPSU. Pel'she's oration was reproduced *in extenso*. In the remainder of the month there were renewed allusions to the proceedings of the UNO Conference on Trade and Development with special reference to the attendance of a Soviet delegation under N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade, whose speech was carried.

The March reporting went into a diminuendo, and there is neither room nor need to name more than two of its features. The insertions, more or less routine, about the UNO Conference continued, and culminated in the press of 31.3.68 when there was a not very intelligible summing-up of the recommendations adopted. The second, and final, item to remark on here was the formal call paid by ships of the Soviet Navy at Madras and Bombay.

### *Pakistan*

In the opening days of January there were half-a-dozen references to the smallpox epidemic in East Pakistan. A three-line *Tass* message printed in IZ 11.1.68 announced the arrival in Rawalpindi from Kabul of President Tito on a week's official visit. The coverage of his stay was scanty indeed. PR 13.1.68 had 25 lines intimating that F. M. Ayub Khan was discussing with him the dangerous situation in the Middle East and Vietnam; and a *Tass* telegram appearing in SK 19.1.68 and PV 20.1.68 under the heading "Pakistan-Yugoslav Communiqué" quoted a couple of sentences from the document. These were to the effect that both parties condemned Israel's aggression, and considered the instant withdrawal of her forces from Arab territories to be vital to the cause of peace in the Middle East, and that the Vietnam problem must be resolved without foreign interference. Pakistan's disclaimer of any intention to be associated with a defence pact in the Persian Gulf region was reported in PR 26.1.68. Two papers, SK and PR, at the close of the month mentioned that Pakistani and Soviet prospectors had struck oil at Kotsarang.

The unloading at Karachi of a further consignment of "Balarus" tractors was intimated in PR 9.2.68. The same paper on 29.2.68 carried a *Tass* message on the signing at Islamabad of a Soviet-Pakistan Trade Agreement for the years 1968-70. KT 3.3.68 followed suit; and also pursued the matter, though briefly, on 23.3.68.

The last named date, being Pakistan Day, prompted three full-scale articles in PR, IZ and KT. These emphasized the improvement in relations over recent years, and took as their text "fruitful co-operation". In the *Pravda* piece, which was by A. Philippov, the striking of oil at Kotsarang was singled out as an instance of this.

### *Nepal*

There was very little in the press. On the eve of the National Fête, a member of the Soviet-Nepalese Friendship Society, V. Borovoy, writing in IZ 17.2.68, greeted Nepal and referred to the changes of the past 17 years during which the country had said goodbye to isolation and feudal vassalage. *Trud* 18.2.68 referred to a congratulatory telegram which had gone from the Soviet industrial and office workers to their fellows in Nepal. A *Tass* message in KZ 10.3.68 stated that the Nepal Foreign Ministry had described the behaviour of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia over the hanging of three Africans as "outrageous" and "unforgivable".

### *Afghanistan*

In a quarter almost empty of incident, the press had to fasten on three specific items: Mr. Kosygin's brief halt at Kabul at the end of January on

his way back from India; the 47th anniversary at the end of February of the Treaty of Friendship with Afghanistan; and the celebration of Nauruz in mid-March.

There were two lengthy pieces of journalese, "Spring in Afghanistan" and "Mountain Oasis" from the pen of N. Ter-Minasova (IZ 4 and 23.1.68). The first described what "a baker's dozen" of Soviet construction engineers had accomplished since 1965 in the important complex of buildings composing the Kabul Polytechnical Institute; and the second dwelt, in terms familiar enough by now, on the friendly tutelage which had worked the wonder of the Naglu hydroelectric station—that unique monument to the solidarity of the Soviet and Afghan peoples. All papers on 19.1.68 carried unobtrusively the interview accorded by Mr. Kosygin in the Kremlin to Afghanistan's Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Yaftali.

On 1 and 2 February the short halt (long enough, however, for a banquet) of Mr. Kosygin at Kabul on his way home from Delhi was covered very amply by the whole press. The accounts listed the personalities participating in the reception, and alluded to the compliments exchanged. On 28 February the 47th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan prompted two articles of fair length in IZ and KT, recapitulating without false modesty what the Russians had done for their small neighbour in that time.

There was little, if anything else in the period to be classed as news, but a *Tass* message was printed in certain papers on 22.3.68 on the observance of Nauruz. The opportunity was taken in the body of the message to summarize the economic aid which the Afghans had received from Soviet Russia to date.

### Iran

IZ and PV 10.1.68 speculated whether the unexpected journey of Goronwy Roberts (British Minister of State) to Tehran, and his secret talks there, indicated a new pact in the offing. A delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was reported (PR etc. 16.1.68) as visiting Tehran at the invitation of the Iranian Parliament. On 17.1.68 and subsequent days, ample, if rather formal, coverage was given to the delegation's programme which embraced Esfahan, Shiraz, Abadan and other centres.

On 6.2.68 *Izvestiya's* special correspondent, V. Nakaryakov, wrote with illustrations on Iran's 25 centuries of history. On 9.2.68 PR had a *Tass* message recalling the annulment 50 years ago of the Tsarist treaties.

Early in March the press announced the forthcoming visit of Mr. Kosygin, and in the second week reported the laying of the foundation-stone by the Shah of the metallurgical works near Esfahan, to be equipped with Soviet technical assistance. On 19 and 20.3.68 TI published, in two full-page instalments, the impressions of M. Orazmuradov, deputy of the Supreme Soviet, who had been in the delegation invited to Iran. There were also, in March, three more journalistic flights, illustrated with fairly good photographs, from the ready pen of *Izvestiya's* correspondent, Nakaryakov.

### Mongolia

IZ 7.1.68 contained a long article by B. Shirendyb, a member of the Central Committee of the MPRP, "laying bare the chauvinism of Peking"

and describing the ideological warfare being waged by the Mao Tse-tung set against Mongolia. PR 14.1.68 referred to a note of protest which the Mongolian Foreign Ministry had handed the Chinese chargé d'affaires regarding the provocative conduct of civil aviation "red guards" towards the Government-Party delegation from Mongolia *en route* for North Vietnam at the end of the year. All papers on 14, 15 and 16 January spread themselves in acclaiming the 22nd anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid between the USSR and MPR; and as so often on such occasions several of the contributions were over Mongolian signatures. The articles were stereotyped in substance, and call for no particular comment here. On 18 and 19.1.68 certain journals noticed that the Mongolians were getting ready to celebrate the jubilee of the Soviet Army, and that veterans of the Japanese campaign were giving a month's course of instruction on the fighting experience and traditions of the Soviet Forces. Attention was directed at the end of the month to an article in *Unen* emphasizing the importance of the Consultative Meeting of representatives of communist and worker's parties to be held shortly in Budapest.

PR/IZ/KZ 2.2.68 published substantial articles honouring the memory of Sukhe Bator who had been born 75 years before. Between this date (2.2.68) and the actual celebrations attending the Soviet Army jubilee towards the end of the month there was a gap. This was somewhat studiously filled by four or five long articles of a general sort with rubrics such as "Meetings in the Yurtas", "Unquenchable Fire", "Rich Inheritance"; all calculated to advertise the peculiarly intimate Soviet-Mongolian relationship. In the last week of February the Soviet Army jubilee, as celebrated at Ulan Bator, was given extensive coverage in a dozen or so insertions.

Accounts of the Consultative Meeting, with special reference to the Mongolian representation, occurred in all papers in the first week of March. In the middle of the month the Mongolian People's Army celebrated its own 47th birthday. A Soviet military delegation attended, and a shower of allusions to this occasion came out in the press of 16, 17, 18 and 19 March. Gorkiy Day was observed in the MPR in 24.3.68; and next day readers were told that Mongolia was making arrangements for the 150th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx. Russians like anniversaries, and seemingly (though this is not certain) they like reading about them.

### *Sinkiang*

Although there were references under the rubric "Events in China" to stubborn resistance and counter-attack in "the outlying provinces", Sinkiang was nowhere named specifically.

### *Tibet*

In the series "Events in China", Tibet was mentioned twice. The first reference, carried in KP 14.2.68 and KT/TT/PV 15.2.68, ran: "Judging by the rare reports coming from Lhasa in Tibet—which is the most remote region of China—the army is still having to battle with the so-called Tibetan rebels." The other reference was in IZ 2.3.68, and worded: "The drive against the Maoists has been particularly wide-ranging in Tibet, where entire units have been engaged."

H.E.

# A REVIEW OF SINKIANG, TIBETAN AND MONGOLIAN AFFAIRS BASED UPON THE CHINESE PRESS AND RADIO

1 JANUARY-31 MARCH 1968

THROUGHOUT the period there has not been much news from press or radio about Sinkiang, even less about Tibet, but a good deal about Inner Mongolia. Urumchi Radio (the Sinkiang Regional Service—SRS) has almost, but not quite, restricted itself to relays of Peking broadcasts, as have a small number of other provincial stations, of which Lhasa is one. This is not the case with Huhehot which has originated many of its own items.

## *Sinkiang*

The period opened with the news that Wang En-mao, Saiffuddin and Kuo Peng (Deputy Commander under Wang, of the military forces in Sinkiang) were in Peking at the close of the old year attending Chairman Mao's reception for revolutionary fighters. Thus these three key figures in Sinkiang affairs were given official, public recognition. But neither this incident nor any known statement or news item since then has given clear indication of the state of relations between Urumchi and Peking.

On the general political front all that it is possible to record on the basis of published information are the following few items:

1. There was a rally in Urumchi of over 100,000 people on 28 January under the auspices of the cultural revolution and as part of the nation-wide celebration of the "Spring Festival" to express "support for the Army and love to the People", as well as "infinite loyalty to Chairman Mao". An interesting aspect of this rally (as reported in *The People's Daily* but not by NCNA in English) was that it received a congratulatory telegram from representatives of the Sinkiang military establishment then attending meetings in Peking. If it could be known that these belonged to a permanent Sinkiang representation in the capital it would afford an interesting comparison between the present Urumchi regime and former ones, and would suggest that despite improved communications Sinkiang's distance from the centre was still a factor tending to keep its political status somewhat special.

2. A few "factions of the revolutionary mass organizations" have joined together to form "alliances". NCNA in English from Urumchi on 29 January (and *The People's Daily* of the same date) reported "two factions" among Sinkiang's railway workers uniting and pledging to promote "revolutionary three-way alliances". Similar incidents were reported from the "1st August" steel mills in Urumchi (the largest industrial enterprise in Sinkiang) (*The People's Daily*, 20.2.68), and "great alliances formed in two large organizations in the Hami area" (Peking Radio, 27.2.68). In all these instances high percentages of the staff and operatives were participating in Mao's Thought Study Groups.

3. In the Altai area (one among many areas throughout China mentioned in a round-up on "Mao Study" in all Peking papers on 26 December), a

book distributor who had made a five-day trip to mountain pastures found that "Kazakhs from more than 20 km. around [the commune where he was] hurried to get books with great rejoicing". One old man over 70 years of age, kissing the book, said: "What a difference Chairman Mao has made to us poor people." He had helped them to "see through the sinister designs of China's Khrushchev".

Sinkiang, according to the Chinghai Regional Service on 19.2.68, was not represented at a meeting of the "petrol-saving liaison group of the seven [sic] provinces and regions of north-west and south-west China" held on 15 February in Sining.

### *Tibet*

There is no news at all directly concerned with any political and economic conditions inside Tibet. Under the Mao-ist text: "Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor, it is people, not things, that are decisive", NCNA (English) on 11 February carried a moral story on overcoming the geographical difficulties of truck driving on the road to Tibet via the Chinghai Plateau by resort to the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung. In similar vein NCNA (English) broadcast from Lhasa on 13 February a small piece about the "life of Border Guards on the roof of the world." In this "a sentry unit guarding the China-Sikkim border" that had "won merits for defeating Indian troops' provocations on several occasions" drew inspiration from Mao's thoughts. "It was a sweet job to stand guard for Chairman Mao." Even during the Tibetan winter, when their tents had collapsed under the weight of snow, the soldiers sat huddled in their fur-lined coats studying the "Thoughts".

On 18 January all Peking papers featured the achievements of a Chinese scientific expedition in 1966 and 1967 to Mount Jolmo Lungma (Everest). The expedition consisted of over a hundred members. *The People's Daily* editorial note said that "the new achievement was a paean of praise to the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung in science". It also carried a photograph of members of the expedition investigating solar radiation at an altitude of 6,300 m. above sea level. This was claimed to be the highest level ever reached in this field of study, far excelling American efforts. Although imperialists and reactionaries had insisted that it was impossible for man to continue to work for a relatively long period at altitudes above 6,000 m. these scientists had done so since they had "a Red Sun in their hearts" which gave them warmth and strength. Mixed with these mystical claims the articles on Mt. Everest contained accounts of investigations that would seem to have genuine scientific significance. Specialists in the various fields might well agree that they had a real value.

The points that these few items clearly bring out are that the Chinese have a firm hold on Tibet, whatever troubles may afflict its internal affairs, and that the region confronts them with tough physical conditions which, though uncongenial, they are determined to overcome and to exploit to the greater glory of Mao.

### *Mongolia*

#### *A. Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region*

In CAR, No. 1 of 1968, the establishment of "revolutionary" government in Inner Mongolia was recorded. During the period under review it

has become quite clear that the region has had its share of disturbances and of challenge to the new order. The charges against the former ruler, Ulanfu, have been clearly stated and he has been strongly condemned.

There has been very much material on these themes. A few examples will suffice by way of illustration. The Chairman of the new Regional Government, Teng Hai-Ch'ing, contributed an article to *The People's Daily* of 15 January which was concerned with the then problem of the "two opposing camps" in a given revolutionary situation in China. He could, at that time, claim that the "revolutionaries" in Huhehot and other parts of Inner Mongolia were not divided into two opposing camps, but he did admit the emergence of "bourgeois ideas" on the one hand and "ultra-left trends of thought" on the other. There was considerable hindrance, as a result of these two tendencies, to the setting up of "revolutionary great alliances" in the region.

Although such "alliances" have successively been established in various administrative units throughout Inner Mongolia, nevertheless, as the charges against Ulanfu grew in clarity and intensity so there were also increasing references to various sorts of opposition that the new order was encountering. The open declaration of Ulanfu's crimes was broadcast by the Inner Mongolian Regional Service, Huhehot (IMRS) on 12 January. He had a plan since 1940 for a separate party for Inner Mongolia, putting the region on the same level as "China, the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia". He talked about "an organization of Mongolians regardless of class". Later in the month at an enlarged session of the Inner Mongolia Party Committee the new Chairman further charged Ulanfu with wanting to turn the party in Inner Mongolia into a revisionist party—a party of the bourgeois and nationalists. He had put the question of nationalities above the question of class.

By 4 March at a rally in Huhehot to "eliminate Ulanfu's black line and his pernicious influence", it was admitted with growing concern that "political power is still in the hands of the enemy; the struggle must go on". Ulanfu and his followers had "hoisted aloft the tattered banner of reactionary nationalism". However, the thirteen million people of all nationalities in Inner Mongolia had "more clearly seen through Ulanfu's reactionary nature and his diehard followers [who and where are they?] and were smashing to pieces their criminal activities which they carried out under the camouflage of the question of nationalities".

It would seem that there is still much vitality left in the people and former leaders of Inner Mongolia with which they oppose the growing concentration of political power in Chinese hands in the region and the further threats to the Mongolian way of life that this represents.

#### B. *Mongolian People's Republic*

There is no Chinese comment to report. The propaganda initiative lies with Ulan Bator.

W. J. D.

## SOVIET BROADCASTS IN UYGUR FOR SINKIANG

1 JANUARY--31 MARCH 1968

THERE is fairly good available coverage for the period now under review and very little of the material descends to the merely silly, the over sensational or the obviously false. Most of it is in the fairly sensible tone that is now an established feature of these broadcasts. There are no changes in the main themes. It therefore appears that the method is to keep a few easily grasped and broadly credible ideas constantly before the minds of the minority peoples of Sinkiang thereby to aggravate the normal antipathy between them and the Chinese. As previous reviews have brought out, these main themes are: a comparison favourable to the Soviet Union between conditions for minority peoples there and in China—especially Sinkiang; alleged errors of Chinese minority policy (including forcible ethnic assimilation) during the last few years, unrest in minority areas and opposition to Mao as a result of the cultural revolution.

Before citing a few examples from within the period there is one item from an earlier period worth attention because of its unique interest, since it is a broadcast talk given on 12 December 1967 about the Dungans (i.e. Chinese Muslims) living in the Soviet Union.\* The speaker was, to judge from her name, Hatime Maseyeva, herself a Dungan woman. It might have been expected that she would have spoken Chinese, but there is no indication that she did so. The Dungans, said Maseyeva, lived in happy conditions in the Soviet Union together with the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Russians and Uygurs. This was in contrast to the plight of the Dungans in China who were being oppressed, like other nationalities, by the Mao clique. Their sacred places had been desecrated, their schools closed and their leaders persecuted.

A Uygur from Kucha, one Yusupov, spoke on 12 January of having left his homeland, "East Turkestan", as a result of the forcible assimilation policy imposed upon the people of Sinkiang, and of taking refuge in the Soviet Union. The minority nationalities generally, and the people of Sinkiang in particular, had gone through tribulations unprecedented in history—a vast assertion! The Uygurs who had migrated to the Kazakh SSR were leading contented lives. One of them was a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR. Charges of forcible assimilation would be impossible to refute or confirm in the present state of knowledge and references to migrations from Sinkiang to Kazakhstan would be less

\* There are between 20,000 and 30,000 Dungans in the Soviet Union, mainly in the Fergana Valley. They are, for the most part, descendants of refugees who left Sinkiang during or after the Yakub Beg Rebellion in the 1870s. (See CAR, No. 3 of 1956, "The Migration of the Dungans, 1877-82"; No. 2 of 1961, "The Dungans of Semirech'ye" and "The Dungans in China".) A recent Russian "Dungan" glossary of political and economic terms clearly shows that though their language is still basically Chinese the Dungans in the Soviet Union have borrowed many modern words from Russian. The Dungans in China (where they are known as Hui) numbered 3,530,000 in the 1953 census. Though found in all parts of China the main concentrations of them are in the north-west.

tantalizing if they gave some idea from Soviet sources of the time and the numbers involved.

A Uyghur youth's having been awarded a Lenin scholarship to Tashkent University was cited as an illustration of the "favourable conditions under which the Uyghur people live in the Soviet Union [such conditions] are a living example of the treatment national minorities receive in this country". It was not so in China, where millions of youths were dragged into the Red Guards. The most exalted expression of the superiority theme was heard on 7 January. Not only were Uyghurs living a happy life in the Kazakh SSR, but, "thanks to the eternal Lenin's nationalities policy, a sense of true Soviet patriotism and comradeship had been established in Central Asia".

Literary and scientific freedom was stressed. A Uyghur doctor of philology, by name Hemrayev, had compiled an anthology of Uyghur literature which had just been published in Alma-Ata, according to a report on 3 March. This literature was, of course, "nationalist in form and socialist in content", but was banned and had been "trampled under foot" in Sinkiang. Nevertheless there was a hopeful note: "So long as our people exist their national literature is bound to survive." On 9 March there were quotations from an article by a scientific worker in the Kazakh Academy of Sciences—one Iliyeva—contrasting this freedom "with the restrictions imposed on the Uyghurs in Sinkiang by the Mao Tse-tung clique".

There was synchronization with the western press when in January Tashkent in Uyghur mentioned renewed attacks made in Peking wall posters upon the Sinkiang First Secretary and Military Chief, Wang En-Mao. It was pointed out on 17 January that these posters were sometimes contradictory—"some bitterly attacked [Wang] while others supported him". However, some Red Guard posters blamed the military leaders in Sinkiang for "bloody clashes there during the past two months". Chinese news media do little or nothing either to substantiate or to deny the intrinsic probability of these Soviet reports. It is interesting to notice that in these broadcasts, the Soviet authorities hesitate flatly to condemn Wang En-Mao. Sinkiang may be in trouble but, after all, Wang holds on there as a potential anti-Maoist!


Inner Mongolia was bracketed with Sinkiang in the context of clashes. In both regions the people were "fighting Mao's cultural revolution". "The legal organs", a report of 26 January went on, "have been replaced by revolutionary committees, but the national minorities are not represented on these Committees". The only revolutionary committees in Sinkiang, so far as is known, are rudimentary ones in a few enterprises whereas the main organs of government in Inner Mongolia, from the regional level downwards, have for the most part been replaced by revolutionary committees. It is true that so far as can be ascertained the new Regional Committee is entirely Chinese in composition. It is also clear that the new authorities are facing a good deal of opposition in various parts of Inner Mongolia. A Tashkent broadcast said that during January 11,000 Red Guards had arrived in Inner Mongolia.

Comments on the cultural revolution throughout the period found typical expression on 1 February: "Reports from China indicate that Mao Tse-tung cannot consider his position safe, even in the capital city,

where the movement against the Mao dictatorship is growing." "In many provincial capitals of China the anti-Mao movement is very strong." "The policies of Mao Tse-tung and his group have nothing to do with Marx-Leninism, as practically admitted by Chinese newspapers." These and other similar observations indicate a certain careful appraisal and judicious exaggeration of the drift of events, and their propaganda force is enhanced by being embedded in sensible items of genuine news of ordinary interest interspersed with selections of Uygur music.

Quotations from an article by Shirindev, the chairman of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, extolled the benefits of independence and praised support given by the Soviet Union to the Mongolian People's Republic from the time of "the great Lenin—friend of oppressed peoples"—down to the present. The country had suffered from both the Manchus and the Chinese military. The extreme nationalistic policies of the Mao clique had caused a set-back in relations with China.

W. J. D.



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# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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## CONTENTS

Editorial	185
Primary and Secondary Education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan —the Current Situation. By Ann Sheehy	189
Sinkiang: the Land and the People. By W. J. Drew	205
Mixed Marriages in the Caucasus: the Problem as Observed in the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region. By Alexandre Bennigsen	217
Nation-Forming Processes in Iran	223
Recent Soviet Writing on India ( <i>concluded</i> ). By Hubert Evans	229
Recent Soviet Writing on the Mongolian PR: Oriental Studies and Linguistics ( <i>concluded</i> ). By Hubert Evans	244
Book Reviews	249
Soviet Press Comment: I. The Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; II. Adjoining Countries	258
A Review of Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur from Tashkent	267
Summary of Chinese Press and Radio Reports on Sinkiang, Mongolia and Tibet	270
Maps	
Sinkiang-Uyгур Autonomous Region	facing page 206
Ethnographical Map of the Sinkiang-Uyгур Autonomous Region of the Chinese People's Republic	facing page 208

## ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals, etc., employed as sources, are as follows:—

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR					
AN/Kaz.	SSR	..	..	..	..	Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg.	SSR	..	..	..	..	Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad.	SSR	..	..	..	..	Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk.	SSR	..	..	..	..	Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb.	SSR	..	..	..	..	Uzbek SSR
IMRS	Inner Mongolian Regional Service					
IZ	Izvestiya					
K	Kommunist					
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda					
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda					
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana					
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda					
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta					
NCNA	New China News Agency					
NT	New Times					
PR	Pravda					
PV	Pravda Vostoka					
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya					
SRS	Sinkiang Regional Service					
SU	Soviet Union					
T	Trud					
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra					
TRS	Tibet Regional Service					
UG	Uchitel'skaya Gazeta					
VVS	Vedmosti Verkhovnogo Soveta					

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# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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## EDITORIAL

It is sometimes argued, and with considerable logic, that the Middle East and the Muslim southern fringe of the Soviet Union should, from the point of view of culture and to some extent of race, be regarded as a single region; both were part of the Muslim East of the caliphates. It is particularly appropriate to examine this theory now that Soviet Middle Eastern policy is apparently entering on a new phase.

Except for two relatively brief intervals following the invasion of Transoxania by the Kara-Kitays (1125-1210) and of Central Asia and Persia by the Mongols, the whole of Muslim Western and Central Asia remained under Muslim rule from the beginning of the eighth century A.D. until the middle of the eighteenth. In the middle of the sixteenth century Russia had extended her rule over the European Muslim Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, and by the second half of the nineteenth century she held sway over the Muslim lands of the Crimea, the Caucasus and what is now Soviet Central Asia. Today, between a quarter and one-third of all Muslims in Western and Central Asia are under Soviet rule, the remainder, with the exception of the Arab minority in Israel and some 4½ million in the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, being contained in eight independent Muslim states, the two largest of which—Turkey and Persia—border directly on the Soviet Union over a distance of more than 1,000 miles.

In the early years of the Soviet regime there was talk of the Azarbaijanis and Turkmens of Persia and the Uzbeks and Tajiks of Afghanistan being attracted into the newly formed SSRs bearing the names of these peoples. It is not clear how far the Soviet Government saw this as a practicable measure; but in any event the plan, if there ever was one, had been abandoned by 1930. More serious gambits were the Soviet-inspired separatist movement of 1945-46 in Persian Azarbaijan and the simultaneous demand to Turkey for the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan ceded to her by the USSR in 1921. After the signal failure of these two ventures the Soviet Government showed no inclination to re-enter the field of Middle East politics until 1955, when they began actively to espouse the cause of pan-Arab nationalism. During Abdul Karim Qasim's regime in Iraq there was evidently some Soviet disillusionment with pan-Arab prospects; but considerable progress was made in improving relations with individual

Muslim states, and particularly with Turkey and Persia. After the downfall of Qasim's regime in 1963 Soviet writers again began to speak hopefully of Arab unity.

Between 1960 and 1964 there was some significant reorientation of Soviet policy towards the Central Asian republics. The renewed emphasis laid by the 22nd Party Congress on the phases of *sblizheniye* and *sliyaniye* was followed by a spate of Soviet writing pointing to the eventual abolition of the so-called federal system, which would involve the disappearance of the national republics. During 1962 and 1963 there were drastic changes in economic administration which were calculated to tie the Central Asian republics more closely to the Centre. That these changes were personally associated with Khrushchev, even if they were not taken on his personal initiative, can be deduced from the fact that they were annulled almost immediately after his fall from power in October 1964.

It has been suggested that Khrushchev's tightening of Moscow's control over Muslim Central Asia and his open advocacy of the Arab cause during his Cairo visit in May 1964 both resulted from his decision to stand up to what he regarded as the Chinese threat to the Soviet position both in Central Asia and in the Middle East, and that the consensus of opinion in the Presidium that in these as well as in other ways he was unnecessarily exacerbating the Sino-Soviet dispute resulted in his replacement. The view that Khrushchev had gone too far both in Central Asia and in the Third World was reflected in the sudden and almost furtive abolition of the newly created Central Asian agencies and in the distinct note of caution on the subject of economic and financial aid noticeable in Soviet writing during 1965. Very soon, however, the new Soviet leadership was taking just as tough a line with China as its predecessor and, probably attracted by the Syrian leftist *coup* of February 1966, was lavishing economic aid on Syria and adopting a pro-Arab and anti-Israeli attitude much more pronounced than that of Khrushchev and hardly less specific than Chou en-Lai's declaration in the same vein made during his visit to North Africa in May 1965.

It has become a habit of thought with some Western commentators on Soviet and Middle Eastern affairs that all Soviet intervention in the Middle East is the result of careful and knowledgeable calculation and that whatever happens there is in some mysterious way the consequence of Soviet machinations. An extreme instance of this fixation is to be found in the theory advanced after the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 that the war had been deliberately precipitated by the Soviet Government in the full knowledge that the Arabs would suffer defeat and thus be driven into the arms of the Soviet Union. Among the elementary facts which this theory leaves out of account is the perfectly genuine Soviet concern for the security of the Union's long frontier with the Middle East and of the even longer frontiers of the Central Asian

Republics with the largely Muslim Sinkiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. In more than one of its pronouncements on Middle East affairs the Soviet Government has condemned "attempts to destroy peace in an area in such close proximity to its borders". With its difficult national and economic problems in Transcaucasia and Central Asia and a turbulent and hostile China on its borders there can be few countries to which peace in the Middle East is more important than it is to the Soviet Union.

The political and cultural segregation of the Soviet Muslims from their coreligionists in the independent Muslim countries of the Middle East and South Asia has long been an important feature of Soviet Asian policy. How long this situation can be sustained is doubtful. The Muslim national republics now possess an élite which politically, technologically and culturally is at least the equal of many if not most of the independent Muslim countries represented in the United Nations. Soviet Muslim intellectuals must be aware of this, and although there is no public forum in which they can express their views on these and other matters affecting the Muslim world in general, the Soviet Government undoubtedly knows of these views and can be expected to take them increasingly into consideration. How Soviet policy towards the Muslim world will develop in the future must remain a matter for conjecture; but it is fair to assume that growing realization of the facts of Muslim life both inside and outside the Soviet Union will tend to reduce the practice of brinkmanship in which the Soviet Government has so far managed to indulge with impunity.

---

Among the various religions of the USSR Islam is unique in the sense that it is the sole religion practised by over thirty distinct nationalities. These constitute the majority nationalities in five union republics and several ASSRs which bear their names. A similar situation does not exist in any of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, two of which, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, have Muslim communities of approximately the same proportion in relation to the total population as that of the Soviet Union, that of Yugoslavia being slightly larger.

Mainly on account of the official disassociation of religion from nationality precise details of the number and status of the Muslim communities of Eastern Europe are difficult to come by, but a recent study in *Oriente Moderno*\* of the Muslim community in Yugoslavia provides much illuminating information, pointing to certain differences in the conditions of the Yugoslav from that of the Soviet Muslims. The author estimates the total of the Muslim community of Yugoslavia as just over 2 million. Of these only 973,000 were officially classified as "Musulmans" in 1961, the remainder of Strika's total being made up

\* *Oriente Moderno*. January 1967, Vincenzo Strika, "La comunità religiosa islamica della Jugoslavia".

of Albanians and Turks, of whom the great majority can historically be regarded as Muslims. The "Musulmans" are descendants of the Yugoslav Bogomils converted *en masse* to Islam after the Turkish conquest of Bosnia in the fifteenth century. This is in marked contrast to what happened in Russia where, in spite of 250 years of Muslim domination, there has never been any sort of Slav Muslim community. None of the present-day constituent republics of Yugoslavia has a Muslim majority, the highest proportions being in Bosnia-Herzegovina where about one third of the population consists of 850,000 "Musulmans", 3,650 Albanians and 1,800 Turks.

While the official attitude towards religion is broadly the same in all Communist countries, the individual position of the religious communities is considerably better in Yugoslavia than in the USSR. In particular Islam is not singled out as being more backward or as militating more than other religions against productivity and the building of socialism. While there is the same exclusion of religious instruction from the Yugoslav state schools, there appears to be no official objection to such instruction inside the mosques, whose number in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone is given as more than twice the official total of 400 for the whole of the USSR. There is notably more freedom in Yugoslavia in such matters as the pilgrimage to Mecca. In 1967, for example, Islamic records gave the figure of Yugoslav attendance as 1,539 as against only 14 from the USSR. On the other hand, it is observed that whereas in the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia laws have been passed specifically prohibiting the veiling of women, no such laws exist in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

The relatively liberal application of Communist principles in Yugoslavia may ensure for its Muslim population a freer and more dignified cultural life than is enjoyed by Muslims in the USSR. But in a political and economic sense the Muslim nationalities of the USSR occupy a much stronger position. Although the statehood of the republics bearing the names of historically Muslim peoples was originally intended to be no more than notional, it has now in many instances developed into something real and in all probability lasting.

# PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN— THE CURRENT SITUATION

By ANN SHEEHY

This is the second part of a two-part article, the first part of which appeared in the last number of *Central Asian Review*.

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## *Attendance*

Full-time schooling is compulsory in the Soviet Union from the ages of seven to 15, and those who leave school at 15 without having completed the 8th grade are expected to attend evening or shift schools until they reach the requisite standard. But annually some thousands of children in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan fail to attend school, either not turning up at all or dropping out during the course of the year. This occurs mostly in the 6th grade and above, but also in the 4th and 5th, and a few children never attend school at all. Non-attendance is highest in the rural areas, but it is by no means uncommon in the towns. In Ashkhabad, for instance, in one rayon alone 109 children in the 5th to 8th grades failed to turn up at the beginning of the 1967-68 school year, and nearly 130 dropped out of the city's day schools in the following five months.<sup>1</sup> There are several reasons for non-attendance. One is distance. This is not such a major factor at the primary school stage, since the network of primary schools is extensive. But it has been said with reference to the children of *chabans* in Turkmenistan that "it is no secret that many of these children have never once yet sat behind a desk".<sup>2</sup> Distance is more of a problem for the older children living in the remoter areas, and there have been many complaints about the irrational location of rural eight-year and secondary schools. The latter was given as the reason why 1,726 children or 4.8 per cent of those who completed primary school in Tadzhikistan in 1964 were not continuing in the 5th grade.<sup>3</sup> As has been seen, efforts are now being made to deal with this problem by the provision of hostel accommodation and free transport, but there is still a long way to go.

Another reason for children failing to attend school, but one that probably does not affect a very large number, is poverty. Each school

<sup>1</sup> TI. 7.2.68.

<sup>2</sup> TI. 24.1.65.

<sup>3</sup> KT. 6.6.65.

is supposed to have a special fund to help needy families by buying clothes, shoes and school requisites for their children to enable them to come to school. In 1966, for instance, about one and a half million rubles were allocated for this purpose in Uzbekistan.<sup>4</sup> But the money is not always used or used correctly. In some instances it seems that the staff simply cannot be bothered to administer the fund.<sup>5</sup>

Adolescent girls of the indigenous nationalities form a high proportion of those who fail to attend school in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. They are kept at home to do the housework or look after younger members of the family, or forced to drop school when their parents marry them off under age. In one rayon of Kirgiziya alone 27 girls left school in six months because of early marriage,<sup>6</sup> and the number of girls not attending school in any one rayon may run into the hundreds.<sup>7</sup> In some places successful efforts have been made to see that all the girls attend, but far too often the native local authorities and predominantly male native teachers, including many who are Communists, either share the general view that it is the natural order of things that girls should leave school after the 5th or 6th grade or at least are not prepared to do anything to combat it. Many of the native girls who do attend school are still at a disadvantage compared to the boys since they are overburdened with household chores and have no time for homework.<sup>8</sup> The traditional attitude towards women also accounts for the fact that far fewer native girls than boys continue their schooling after the compulsory age. In 1965 in one secondary school in Tadzhikistan not a single Tadzhik girl had matriculated in the whole 21 years of the school's existence.<sup>9</sup>

The schools naturally have their fair share of difficult children who give up school at the first opportunity. A high proportion of these are children who are not doing well in their studies and have to repeat a year. At the beginning of the 1967-68 school year, for instance, 7,000 children in Uzbekistan who were down to repeat failed to turn up.<sup>10</sup> Many teachers are only too glad to be rid of these children, sometimes salving their consciences by seeing they continue their studies in evening or shift schools but sometimes quite content to let them drop out of the educational system altogether. Although large numbers of young people complete their education at evening and shift schools every year, the attendance record of the latter is worse than that of the ordinary schools. Moreover some employers and kolkhoz chairmen make no effort to see that youngsters who have not completed the 8th grade attend night school or even hinder them attending, with the result that the education of some of them stops at the 5th, 4th or even 3rd grade.

As in other parts of the world there are some parents who see little point in school and would rather their children were earning their keep.

<sup>4</sup> PV. 25.8.66.

<sup>5</sup> SK. 19.2.65.

<sup>6</sup> UG. 2.3.68.

<sup>10</sup> PV. 18.1.68.

<sup>5</sup> TI. 24.1.65.

<sup>7</sup> UG. 5.1.67; TI. 18.5.68.

<sup>9</sup> KT. 4.6.65.

Usually this probably involves no more than helping their parents unofficially by, for example, looking after the sheep or serving at a shashlyk stall, but in some places in Tadzhikistan children of 13 and 14 have been enrolled as kolkhoz members.<sup>11</sup>

It is often complained that the local authorities condone these phenomena, and that some teachers have a fatalistic attitude, believing that there will always be a certain drop-out no matter what measures are taken. It is hardly surprising in these circumstances that parents are seldom prosecuted for not seeing that their children attend school. But efforts are being made all the time to reduce non-attendance with, it is claimed, some success. Thus in Kazakhstan over 12,000 children were absent in 1959-60 and less than 6,000 in 1967.<sup>12</sup> Figures given for non-attendance in the other republics range from 2,000 in Kirgiziya to 8,600 in Turkmenistan, nearly 9,000 in Tadzhikistan and over 40,000 in Uzbekistan.<sup>13</sup> However, these figures are almost certainly lower than they should be. For one thing some teachers are not above marking children as temporarily absent when they have in fact dropped out altogether. But, more important, the records of the local authorities, particularly in the rural areas, are seriously deficient. Births or changes of residence go unregistered, and the education authorities are satisfied if the number of children attending school reaches the total of their forecasts, whereas there may be many more children of school age in the area. An idea of the gap between their forecasts and reality can be gauged from the fact that in 1965 in Uzbekistan nearly 48,000 more pupils turned up for the 1st grade than were expected.<sup>14</sup> Where births are not registered it may be that the parents simply cannot be bothered until the third child, when they become eligible for an allowance. On the other hand, there is evidence, from Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan at least, that parents often deliberately refrain from registering the birth of girls, so that they can later fake their ages when they want to marry them off under the legal age. Thus in the Asht rayon of Tadzhikistan it was found that over 1,000 school-children had no birth certificates, the majority of them girls.<sup>15</sup>

### *Teacher training*

To match the vast increase in the number of school-children in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, there has been a big increase in the number of teachers in recent years, and they are, on paper at least, better qualified than ever before. In Uzbekistan, for instance, there are now about 150,000 teachers, or twice as many as ten years ago, and over half of them have higher education,<sup>16</sup> while in Kazakhstan in

<sup>11</sup> KT. 4.6.65.

<sup>12</sup> KP. 16.8.67.

<sup>13</sup> SK. 28.3.68; TI. 18.5.68; KT. 29.6.67; PV. 10.8.66.

<sup>14</sup> PV. 27.8.66.

<sup>15</sup> KT. 4.6.65; Karliyeva Aya. "Lenin, Oktyabr' v sud'bakh turkmenki", *Nauka i religiya*, 1968, No. 4, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> PV. 1.10.67.

1967 there were 146,500 teachers, of whom over 37 per cent had higher education, compared with only 24 per cent in 1959-60.<sup>17</sup> In the other three republics about half the teachers now have higher education.<sup>18</sup>

This increase in the teaching force has necessitated a big expansion of teacher training and a large number of new teacher training institutes and colleges<sup>19</sup> have been opened in the last few years. Six new institutes have been opened in the last three years in Uzbekistan alone, and teachers are now being trained in the republic in two universities, 18 teacher training institutes and 16 teacher training colleges.<sup>20</sup> In Kirgiziya the intake of student teachers has more than doubled.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, the quality of the newly trained teachers has not kept pace with the quantity. To some extent this has been due to inadequate buildings and equipment, but a far more important reason is the low calibre of many lecturers and students. Very few of the teaching staff of teacher training institutes in Central Asia and Kazakhstan have further degrees, and in general there is a shortage of lecturers. Thus there are doctors of science in only two of Uzbekistan's teacher training institutes and none in those of Kirgiziya,<sup>22</sup> while in Kazakhstan all the institutes, except the one in Alma-Ata (where nearly 85 per cent of the doctors and 60 per cent of the candidates of science in the republic work), are extremely short of lecturers.<sup>23</sup> A depressing picture of the situation in Kazakhstan, which is probably no worse than in the Central Asian republics, is given by a correspondent who visited Kokchetav and Petropavlovsk teacher training institutes recently and found that they reminded her of times long past and compared very unfavourably with the Moscow Oblast institute. The lecturers in Kokchetav and Petropavlovsk are described as making heroic efforts, but they are simply not up to the job. It is difficult for them to pursue their own research because of poor libraries, cramped conditions and a shortage of laboratories and equipment even for teaching purposes. Moreover, many lecturers have to live several in one room, which is hardly conducive to study. In general, the correspondent continues, the teacher training institutes do not attract the ablest graduates since lecturers earn considerably less than teachers until they obtain a further degree, which takes at least five years. The seriousness of the situation is recognized by both the Kazakh and all-Union Ministries of Higher Education. In 1966 Georgia, the Ukraine and the RSFSR were ordered to send about 250 holders of post-graduate degrees to Kazakhstan to help out, but they declined to do so. Yet unless Kazakhstan's teacher training institutes receive such assistance in the near future, the correspondent concludes, there is a risk that the schools

<sup>17</sup> KP. 16.8.67.

<sup>18</sup> SK. 28.3.68; TI. 18.5.68; KT. 4.6.65.

<sup>19</sup> The teacher training or pedagogical institute (*pedagogicheskly institut*) belongs to the higher education system and trains mainly for teaching in the secondary school, while the teacher training college (*uchilishche*) offers secondary specialized training for primary school teachers.

<sup>20</sup> PV. 7.1.68. 19.1.68.

<sup>21</sup> SK. 28.3.68.

<sup>22</sup> UG. 7.12.67.

<sup>23</sup> UG. 18.11.67.

"might be filled with hack teachers in the worst sense of the word for decades".<sup>24</sup>

School-children in Central Asia and Kazakhstan do not look on teaching particularly favourably as a career, and many students in teacher training establishments are those who failed to get in anywhere else. This means that they have no real interest in teaching and their educational attainments are not particularly high. In fact there have been many complaints on this score. Thus a lecturer in Fergana Teacher Training Institute writes that it goes without saying that the students should know their own language, but "the elementary literacy of many students is very low". His institute has introduced a short course in how to write and speak correctly in all faculties, and he suggests that the only answer is to continue it for several years at least.<sup>25</sup> A great difficulty for the teacher training establishments is that many, if not the majority, of the applicants for places from the rural national schools are below standard. Yet, as they are the only ones likely to be prepared to work in the rural areas on graduation, the teacher training establishments feel compelled to accept a certain number as students in order not to aggravate the existing shortage of teachers in the rural schools. These students naturally find the course very difficult. Thus Turkmen student teachers of Russian from the rural areas have often been so badly taught at school that they cannot catch up however hard they try.<sup>26</sup> The only solution seems to be preparatory courses or, as Tadzhikistan claims to be doing successfully with student teachers of Russian from the rural areas, special faculties for rural students in the teacher training institutes.<sup>27</sup>

As regards the curriculum in the teacher training institutes the chief criticisms are of the small amount of time (5 per cent) devoted to psychology and teaching methods, shortcomings in teaching practice, and inadequate links with schools. Moreover, very few of the lecturers in the institutes have any worthwhile experience of teaching in schools themselves, since it does not pay teachers with any length of service to switch to teacher training.<sup>28</sup>

It would be unfair to give the impression that there has been no improvement in teacher training in the last few years. But it has probably been most noticeable in the institutes in the republican capitals with their high concentration of qualified staff and relatively good facilities. It is admitted that in general there are still many shortcomings in teacher training, and the diplomas awarded by some, if not most, of the institutes do not have the same value as those awarded in, for instance, Moscow oblast.<sup>29</sup> According to a lecturer in the Fergana Teacher Training Institute, many graduates of pedagogical institutes in Uzbekistan "are poorly prepared for their duties as teachers". There

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> UG. 26.3.68.

<sup>26</sup> PV. 4.1.68, 13.2.68; KT. 25.10.66; UG. 2.2.67, 9.9.67.

<sup>27</sup> UG. 18.11.67.

<sup>25</sup> PV. 4.1.68

<sup>27</sup> KT. 2.4.68.

are gaps in their knowledge of their special subject, their outlook is narrow, and their standard of literacy leaves much to be desired. He gives as one of the reasons the fact that some of the teaching staff are overgenerous with marks in order to bolster their success rate. Moreover "sometimes even the state exam commissions are infected with similar compassion and hand out diplomas to graduates who can bring no benefit to the schools".<sup>30</sup> The standard of most of those who graduate as correspondence students is even lower. In 1965 the staff of Bukhara Pedagogical Institute admitted that only 30 to 40 per cent of correspondence students given diplomas were more or less up to scratch while the rest were "rejects of the first water". In explanation it was stated that the urgent demand for teachers with higher education and the impossibility of expanding full-time training fast enough had led to a very rapid increase in the number of correspondence students without regard to the capacity of the pedagogical institutes. At the same time the knowledge of correspondence students was poor. For instance, students of the maths and physics department often had to repeat the school curriculum in maths and physics. In addition the staff got into trouble if the failure rate was high. They therefore passed inadequate students, justifying themselves by saying that the students had profited even if they knew only one-third of the syllabus.<sup>31</sup> The significance of this state of affairs becomes more apparent when it is realized that in the period 1959-65 3,318 correspondence students graduated from Bukhara Pedagogical Institute against only 2,046 day students.<sup>32</sup> The aim now is to concentrate more on full-time training and it has been suggested that where laboratory work is vital correspondence courses should be discontinued.<sup>33</sup>

It seems very unlikely that any dramatic improvement in teacher training can be expected in the next few years. One proposed course of action which might bring immediate benefits is to expand existing teacher training establishments rather than open new ones, and to eliminate the present duplication of faculties. If the institutes specialized in certain subjects, it would lead to an improvement both in facilities and, probably, staff.

### *The shortage of teachers*

In spite of the big expansion of teacher training and the fact that a considerable number of teachers trained in other republics are still being sent to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, there is still a shortage of teachers in all five republics, particularly in the rural areas. Thus Uzbekistan is currently short of about 10,000 in all.<sup>34</sup> Nor does the

<sup>30</sup> PV, 4.1.68.

<sup>31</sup> UG, 28.8.65.

<sup>32</sup> Khasanov Kh. "O podgotovke kadrov spetsialistov narodnogo khozyaystva v Bukhara (1959-1965)", *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane*, 1966, No. 11, p. 25.

<sup>33</sup> KT, 30.6.67: Ismukhamedov A. "Problemy shkoly", *Partiynaya zhizn' Kazakhstana*, 1967, No. 3, p. 70.

<sup>34</sup> PV, 7.1.68.

situation seem likely to improve radically in the near future. Kazakhstan, for instance, will need about another 100,000 teachers by 1970, but by this date it will get only just over 30,000 from the university and institutes and 14,000 from the colleges.<sup>35</sup>

Living conditions in the rural areas are a major factor in the shortage. This can be seen from Uzbekistan where the urban schools have more than their complement of teachers while the rural schools have great difficulties over staffing.<sup>36</sup> Rural school-teachers are entitled by law to free accommodation and fuel, but often neither is forthcoming since the needs of teachers are accorded a low priority by the local authorities and farms. The cash, usually though not always, given in lieu is frequently not enough and the teachers have to make up the difference themselves. Some progress has been made with housing teachers in recent years, but in 1967 there were still over 5,000 rural school-teachers living in private accommodation in Kazakhstan,<sup>37</sup> and the situation is similar in the other republics. At a school in Aktyubinsk oblast, where they were desperately short of staff, at one time four teachers were having to sleep, cook, eat and work in one cramped hotel room, and even the headmaster was in private accommodation.<sup>38</sup> Elsewhere teachers have reported having to live in primitive tumbledown mud dwellings without water or electricity, which are often several kilometres from the school, no mean consideration when public transport is virtually non-existent. Fuel is sometimes very difficult to obtain, and very expensive. In addition the teachers often have difficulties in obtaining bread, meat, milk and other supplies, since produce sold to teachers does not count towards fulfilment of the plan and there are no local shops. In such circumstances they have to keep their own livestock. A haircut may mean a trip of 20 to 30 miles, with the buses only running during school hours.<sup>39</sup> Sometimes there are delays and irregularities over pay,<sup>40</sup> and in the Surkhandar'ya oblast of Uzbekistan there was even a case when the local education authorities were in the habit of handing out part of the teachers' pay in postage stamps.<sup>41</sup> In some parts of Dzhabul, Kzyl-Orda, Chimkent and Alma-Ata oblasts teachers have had to contribute to the farm's meat and milk plan deliveries and have been made to do agricultural work during the school holidays with obligatory norms for weeding and haymaking.<sup>42</sup> Given such conditions it is hardly surprising that a number of newly trained teachers refuse to take up posts in rural areas, that there is a very high turnover of teachers in rural schools, and that some abandon the teaching profession altogether. In Kazakhstan alone in recent years over 13,000 teachers have switched to other fields, mainly because of rural living conditions.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Ismukhamedov, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>36</sup> UG, 10.6.67.

<sup>37</sup> IZ, 14.1.66; UG, 30.10.65, 13.9.66, 5.1.67; SK, 24.3.68.

<sup>38</sup> KP, 13.11.66.

<sup>39</sup> UG, 10.6.67.

<sup>40</sup> Ismukhamedov, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>36</sup> UG, 25.1.68.

<sup>38</sup> KP, 15.12.66.

<sup>41</sup> UG, 8.1.66.

The shortage of teachers of Russian, foreign languages, maths, physics, chemistry, singing, drawing and PT is particularly acute, and in some instances these subjects are not taught at all or else they are taken by teachers who have no specialist knowledge of the subject. Sometimes the schools are forced to use yesterday's secondary school graduates who have usually, but not always, done a ten months' preliminary training course. In 1966 one-fifth of the teachers in Tselinograd oblast came into this category.<sup>44</sup> In many cases rural teachers in particular are grossly overloaded with work. In Uzbekistan, for instance, a substantial number of teachers in rural schools teach three or four subjects (they are only trained to teach one or two), and have twice or three times the normal load of work.<sup>45</sup>

### *Teacher and school*

Not only are the rural schools short of teachers, but their teachers are also much less well qualified and experienced. In Uzbekistan in 1966 at least five out of seven teachers in the urban schools had higher education whereas only about two out of five had higher education in the rural schools.<sup>46</sup> It must be remembered, too, that the Russian teachers are concentrated in the towns.<sup>47</sup>

There are, of course, a number of excellent teachers, both native and Russian, who bring out the best in their pupils and are continually extending their own knowledge. But many teachers are insufficiently qualified, conduct their lessons in a mechanical, soulless and even primitive manner, and make no effort to improve their qualifications, although they are far from being up to today's standards. Occasionally they display appalling ignorance even of their own subject, like a 10th grade history teacher in Kirgiziya who attributed the events of 1941 to 1918.<sup>48</sup> Some are unwilling or unable to use teaching aids. In Uzbekistan, for example, the use of technical aids is accepted in many schools in Tashkent, Fergana, Samarkand, Bekabad and other towns, but in a considerable number of schools which have them they are not used sufficiently and only by enthusiasts.<sup>49</sup> In Kirgiziya the film libraries are used by an insignificant number of schools since many teachers, particularly in rural areas, are not accustomed to making use of them.<sup>50</sup> A geography teacher in Kustanay has suggested that some teachers are frightened of being shown up before the class if they cannot work the

<sup>44</sup> IZ. 14.1.66.

<sup>45</sup> PV. 25.8.66; Kuchkarov A. "Sovershenstvovot' sistemu narodnogo obrazovaniya", *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, 1967, No. 6, p. 76.

<sup>46</sup> PV. 25.8.66.

<sup>47</sup> Greater indulgence is almost certainly shown to native student teachers than to Russians in awarding diplomas. The fact that less than 40 per cent of teachers in Kazakhstan have higher education compared with about 50 per cent in the Central Asian republics would suggest that standards of teaching were lower in Kazakhstan than in Central Asia, but there is no evidence of this. This is presumably because there is a higher percentage of Russian teachers in Kazakhstan.

<sup>48</sup> SK. 5.4.68.

<sup>49</sup> UG. 25.1.68.

<sup>50</sup> SK. 20.11.66.

equipment.<sup>51</sup> Many of the inefficient teachers are conscientious, but others are not, and some teachers even set a bad example to the children by drunkenness, brawling, and immoral and unworthy behaviour.<sup>52</sup>

The teachers are not entirely to blame for not making greater efforts to improve their knowledge and qualifications. There is a shortage of professional literature, and facilities for correspondence courses are not always available. Moreover many teachers have very little free time. The head of a Kayrakkum secondary school has pointed out that many of them have to take much more than their norm of lessons, often working on both shifts in a two-shift school. In addition they have various extra-curricular duties, have to attend numerous meetings, fill up endless forms, do their stint in the evenings as people's wardens, and—a relic of the time when teachers were among the few literate people—conduct propaganda in local undertakings.<sup>53</sup> Dushanbe education authorities have taken steps to improve this state of affairs by decreeing that all teachers must have one free day a week to catch up with their reading and studies.<sup>54</sup>

There are institutes which conduct refresher courses for teachers, but often they are inadequately staffed and equipped, and their buildings and equipment are much worse than those of the modern schools. Some of the courses also leave much to be desired, and many are in the school holidays when teachers cannot see how things are done in the best schools. Some teachers do not attend refresher courses for 10 or 15 years,<sup>55</sup> while others are sent on courses for which they are totally unsuitable, e.g. in Tadzhikistan a PT instructor was sent on a biology course,<sup>56</sup> presumably to fulfil the rayon's quota.

One of the reasons for poor teaching is inadequate control and perfunctory inspections on the part of school heads and the education authorities. Often the heads are so taken up with administration and meetings that they have no time to visit the classes or to keep up with the latest ideas in their field. There is also a high turnover of heads. In the last three years there was a change of head in 36 of Dushanbe's 86 schools and in half of those in Leninabad and various rayons of Tadzhikistan.<sup>57</sup> Although the majority of heads are said to be good, there are some who are petty tyrants, ignore the opinions of their teachers, demand non-objective marking of pupils, and even abuse their position, drink, indulge in bribery and extortion and commit immoral acts.<sup>58</sup> A particularly disturbing feature is that it is not unknown for heads removed for criminal offences to receive another teaching post on coming out of prison.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>51</sup> UG. 7.12.65.

<sup>52</sup> KT. 10.1.68, 17.4.68; SK. 13.1.68, 6.3.68; UG. 21.10.65, 8.10.66.

<sup>53</sup> KT. 15.3.68.

<sup>54</sup> KT. 24.12.67.

<sup>55</sup> PV. 11.4.67, 26.1.68; SK. 21.3.68.

<sup>56</sup> KT. 10.6.67.

<sup>58</sup> Kuchkarov, *op. cit.*, p. 78; UG. 1.4.65, 8.10.66.

<sup>57</sup> KT. 6.4.68

<sup>59</sup> SK. 19.2.65.

### *Educational standards*

The standards of tuition obviously vary enormously in the schools of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. There are a small number of schools, mostly in the big towns, which have excellent records. For instance, 169 of the 187 who matriculated from Karaganda Secondary School No. 1 in 1966 obtained places in VUZ.<sup>60</sup> Dushanbe School No. 1 produces equally good results. It is particularly strong in physics and maths and its pupils have won places in higher technical institutes in Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Kuybyshev, Riga and Kiev against very strong competition. There is a big demand for places in the school by those wanting to do science.<sup>61</sup> Sometimes an individual teacher gets remarkable results. For instance, a certain physical training teacher Kostyshin in a rural Kirgiz school has done wonders in persuading the usually reluctant Kirgiz children to take up PT and sports with enthusiasm, and virtually none of his pupils are rejected for the army on medical grounds.<sup>62</sup> The number of teachers and schools with 100 per cent success rate is said to be increasing (e.g. in Uzbekistan from 16,000 teachers two years ago to 37,500 now<sup>63</sup>), and the number of children who have to repeat a year is decreasing. The latter now ranges from between 4 and 6 per cent of the total in the different republics.<sup>64</sup> But the number of children having to stay down is still regarded as high, particularly in the rural areas. Taking into account also those who drop out of school prematurely, in 1966 in Uzbekistan only 82 per cent of those who had entered the 1st grade eight years previously completed the 8th grade, and in Syr-Dar'ya oblast and the Karakalpak ASSR the figure was less than 70 per cent.<sup>65</sup>

Although the success rate has gone up, there are constant complaints about the low level of knowledge of many children, particularly those from rural schools. In Uzbekistan it has been said, indeed, that "in recent years the level of the general education of school-children has far from gone up".<sup>66</sup> The deficiencies of the schools show up particularly clearly in the VUZ entrance exams. In 1966, for instance, "a substantial section of the graduates of the secondary schools of Andizhan, Samarkand and Tashkent oblasts . . . were unable to enter VUZ because of their extremely weak knowledge",<sup>67</sup> and the graduates of some Tadzhikistan schools have not passed the VUZ entrance exams for a number of years.<sup>68</sup> A particularly disquieting feature of the VUZ entrance exams is that even many of those who matriculate with gold and silver medals get a "2" (i.e. fail) in the entrance exams, thus showing that the schools' assessments of their pupils are grossly inflated. In 1966 over 100 of the 650 school-leavers with gold and silver medals

<sup>60</sup> KP. 19.8.67.

<sup>62</sup> 8.2.68.

<sup>64</sup> *Narodnoye obrazovaniye v SSSR*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 392, 499; TI. 18.5.68; PV. 2.2.67; SK. 22.3.68.

<sup>65</sup> PV. 27.8.66.

<sup>67</sup> PV. 2.2.67.

<sup>61</sup> KT. 8.12.67.

<sup>63</sup> PV. 18.1.68.

<sup>66</sup> PV. 11.4.67.

<sup>68</sup> KT. 1.10.67.

who sat the entrance exams for Tashkent University did not even get a pass mark.<sup>69</sup> Similarly in Kazakhstan a large number of medal-holders get a bare pass or fail in the VUZ entrance exams.<sup>70</sup> The unjustifiably high marks awarded in the schools are due partly to the inadequacies of the teachers, who genuinely believe their students merit them, and also a lack of control on the part of the education authorities. But in quite a number of cases they are the result of deliberate eye-wash because the schools are under constant pressure to produce high success rates.

There are several reasons for the poor knowledge of many school-children. Unsatisfactory buildings and shortage of equipment, textbooks and other school requisites play a part. Many of the children also lose a month or even two out of the school year on the cotton harvest and other agricultural work, and it is almost impossible to make good the lost time. The use of children for agricultural work during term-time beyond the limits of labour training is repeatedly condemned, but it seems likely that it will only be eliminated by the complete mechanization of cotton-harvesting. The main reasons, however, for the unsatisfactory knowledge of the children are poor teaching and the shortage of teachers. Every year large numbers of children fail in maths and Russian as well as physics, chemistry, foreign languages and their native tongue, and it is in these subjects that the shortage of teachers is most acute. As all these subjects are compulsory in the eight-year and secondary schools, it is all the more serious that sometimes the shortage of teachers is so acute that they are not taught at all. The greatest shortages are of Russian and foreign language teachers in the national schools. For instance, Russian is not taught in 16 out of the 34 schools in the Charshanga rayon of Turkmenistan,<sup>71</sup> in one rayon of the Osh oblast of Kirgiziya there is no one to teach foreign languages in 22 of the 29 secondary and eight-year schools,<sup>72</sup> while in the Ashkhabad rayon of Turkmenistan a foreign language is taught in only six of the 41 eight-year and secondary schools and the situation is similar in other rayons of the republic.<sup>73</sup>

One of the reasons for the poor performance in languages is the fact that in some instances no perfected methods have yet been worked out for teaching them in the national schools. This apparently applies to both Kirgiz and Kazakh for Kirgiz and Kazakh children respectively<sup>74</sup> as well as to Russian and foreign languages. In spite of considerable efforts made in recent years to improve the teaching of Russian in the national schools, the standards achieved, particularly in the rural schools, are still regarded as very unsatisfactory. The textbooks, although improved, still have serious shortcomings, there is a lack of methodological literature to assist the teachers, and no action seems to have been

<sup>69</sup> PV. 11.4.67.

<sup>71</sup> UG. 26.3.68.

<sup>73</sup> TI. 10.4.68.

<sup>70</sup> KP. 19.8.67.

<sup>72</sup> SK. 5.4.68.

<sup>74</sup> UG. 16.1.68.

taken yet on suggestions that a different course, textbooks and aids should be devised for the native children who do not live in a Russian language environment. But the main problem is still the teachers, some of whom, particularly in the primary schools, still have an extremely poor command of Russian themselves. This applies even to those recently trained.<sup>75</sup>

The most widely studied foreign languages are English and German (the latter presumably because of the presence in the area of a considerable number of Soviet citizens of German origin who provide a reservoir of teachers). Other foreign languages taught include French, Spanish, Hindi, Urdu, Persian, Arabic and Chinese. There are some schools, probably all in the larger towns, with a foreign language bias where some of the other subjects are also taught in the foreign language (the more exotic languages are taught mainly in schools of this kind). The quality of the teaching is probably good in these schools, but in general it leaves much to be desired. Thus in Turkmenistan good teachers of foreign languages in Turkmen-language schools are said to be very much in the minority. This is attributed to the fact that they are trained to teach foreign languages according to methods worked out for Russian schools since no method has been worked out yet for Turkmen schools. Moreover the vocabulary in the textbooks is designed for Russian rather than Turkmen children.<sup>76</sup>

In the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan there are already schools with a maths and science bias, and their number is due to increase. For some years now, too, republican olympiads in maths, physics and chemistry have been held annually as a result of which the most outstanding children have been offered places in a special boarding school run by the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. These innovations are having a beneficial effect on standards, but in general they are still low, once again most noticeably in the rural schools. For instance, few Turkmen children from rural schools take part in the olympiads and there are proportionately even fewer among the prize-winners. Altogether nine out of the 12 Turkmenistan entrants for the all-Union olympiad in 1968 came from Ashkhabad.<sup>77</sup> The shortage of school laboratories and laboratory equipment, and the unwillingness or inability of some teachers to do the practical work on the syllabus even when they are available, is partly responsible for the low marks in the sciences.<sup>78</sup>

Other subjects where standards are poor, largely because of the shortage of qualified teachers, are music and singing, art, and PT and sport. In Kirgiziya, for instance, in only one-fifth of the schools are music and singing lessons taken by teachers with specialist training.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>75</sup> SK. 27.3.68. For an earlier article on the teaching of Russian see "The Second Mother Tongue" in CAR. Vol. XIII, 1965, No. 4, pp. 310-22.

<sup>76</sup> TI. 10.4.68.

<sup>77</sup> TI. 22.5.65, 13.4.68.

<sup>78</sup> KT. 14.1.68; SK. 5.4.68.

<sup>79</sup> SK. 28.3.68.

while even in Alma-Ata in 1966 there were only 72 art teachers and 60 singing teachers, less than half with specialist training, in the city's 123 schools.<sup>80</sup> There is said to have been a marked improvement in the teaching of PT and sport in Kazakhstan,<sup>81</sup> but in Central Asia there seems to be a general lack of interest in sport in the national schools, and not surprisingly native girls are seldom allowed to take part. Even prominent figures, who should set a good example, sometimes refuse to allow their daughters to appear publicly in sports dress.<sup>82</sup>

Many of the shortcomings in education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan stem back to the primary school, and teachers in the 5th, i.e. the first post-primary grade, frequently find the children are already behind when they get them. One reason for this is the continuing existence in the remoter areas of very small schools with perhaps only one teacher, who is isolated and lacks any supervision. A more general reason is the shortage of properly qualified teachers for primary schools and the fact that the number with higher pedagogical education is declining. In Uzbekistan, for instance, in 1967 22,301 or close on half of the 46,927 teachers in primary schools had undergone no proper teacher training courses, and 6,686 had no more than ordinary secondary education. Tashkent Pedagogical Institute had taken on no students for full-time training as primary school teachers for four years. Moreover the primary schools were already 1,138 teachers short and were expecting to get only another 621 from the teacher training colleges by 1970.<sup>83</sup> Elsewhere the situation is just as unsatisfactory. Thus in North Kazakhstan oblast the number of teachers in primary schools who have been through teacher training college is not growing because, with the rapid expansion of the schools, they are being used in the senior classes and the 1st and 2nd grades are therefore sometimes left to those who have just matriculated.<sup>84</sup> Investigations have shown that some primary school teachers are simply not up to the job. A study of the teaching of arithmetic and the native tongue in primary schools in Karshi oblast disclosed that many teachers were not themselves up to 4th to 6th grade standards and yet all their pupils were down as making satisfactory progress.<sup>85</sup>

#### *Universal 10-year education and the new curriculum*

Considerable progress has already been made towards universal 10-year education which is due to come in in 1970. The majority of children are expected to complete their 10-year education in ordinary day

<sup>80</sup> Yarenskaya S. "Vospitaniye chuvstv", *Partynaya zhizn' Kazakhstana*, 1966, No. 5, p. 51.

<sup>81</sup> UG. 12.8.67.

<sup>82</sup> UG. 11.3.67; Tyulenev A. "Formirovaniye marksistsko-leninskogo mirovozzreniya u molodezhi—vazhneyshaya zadacha shkoly", *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, 1968, No. 1, p. 57.

<sup>83</sup> PV. 26.5.67.

<sup>84</sup> KP. 13.5.67.

<sup>85</sup> UG. 5.1.67.

schools, but a number will complete it in secondary specialized education institutions, in vocational training schools and in night schools. Of those completing the 8th grade, at present between 67 and 75 per cent are continuing in the 9th grade,<sup>86</sup> and some of the remainder are studying in technical colleges or vocational training schools.

A start has been made on introducing the new three-year primary education in a limited number of schools, and everywhere it has been declared a success in spite of a shortage of textbooks and aids in some places. Contrary to the fears of parents and some teachers that the new syllabuses would be too much for the children, most of them are said to have coped very well, and the change has been more difficult for the teachers than their pupils. It is, however, admitted that some native children in Russian classes who have little or no Russian when they arrive and also those who have not been to kindergarten have had difficulty.<sup>87</sup> In the eight experimental classes in Krasnovodsk, Cheleken, Mary, Tashauz, Nebit-Dag and Ashkhabad it was also reported that some difficulties had been encountered because in each class there were five to ten children (presumably out of about 40) who were educationally sub-normal.<sup>88</sup> It looks more and more as though the success of the new syllabuses will depend on the children having some elementary knowledge of letters and figures when they arrive at primary school. There are two possible ways of achieving this. Either the children can acquire this knowledge in kindergarten, or the schools themselves can hold preparatory classes for six-year olds. For some time it has been noticeable that children who have been to kindergarten, particularly native children whose parents wish them to attend Russian-language schools, are more advanced than those who have not. But the number of pre-school children attending kindergarten is still very low. In Uzbekistan in 1967, for instance, it was only 11 per cent in the republic as a whole and 8 per cent in the rural areas.<sup>89</sup> And it seems unlikely that there will be a dramatic increase in the near future. Moreover most of the staff of the kindergartens in the rural areas are not equipped to prepare the six-year-olds for school. A school in Ashkhabad is already holding preparatory classes with success,<sup>90</sup> but there must be serious doubts as to whether all primary schools, particularly in the rural areas, have the staff and facilities to organize such classes. In fact the USSR Minister of Education hinted at the Tadzhikistan teachers' conference in 1967 that some republics might keep four-year primary education, though the children would start systematic courses in their native tongue and arithmetic in the 4th grade.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>86</sup> PV. 18.1.68; TI. 18.5.68; SK. 27.7.67; KT. 2.7.67; *Narodnoye obrazovaniye v SSSR*, Moscow, 1967, p. 400.

<sup>87</sup> In Kirgiziya special classes were started at the beginning of 1966 to teach non-Russian pre-school age children enough Russian to enable them to attend Russian language schools, (UG. 15.3.66.)

<sup>88</sup> TI. 25.4.68.

<sup>89</sup> PV. 11.7.67.

<sup>90</sup> TI. 13.1.67.

<sup>91</sup> KT. 2.7.67.

The new curriculum is necessitating a vast retraining programme. In Kazakhstan, for instance, over 92,000 teachers will have to be retrained in four years and another 100,000 put through short courses and seminars.<sup>92</sup> Already there are complaints about delays in retraining and fears that the institutes providing refresher courses will not be able to cope on their own.

One of the main innovations of the new curriculum is the introduction of optional subjects in the 7th to 10th grades. Among the optional subjects offered in Uzbekistan are fine and applied art, history of art and music, electrotechnics, radio-electronics, technical drawing, agrotechnics and shorthand. So far optional maths is being taken in 85 Tashkent schools, physics in 61, chemistry in 57, Russian literature in 35, history in 32 and Russian language in 21. A study of the first six months' experience of optional classes in Tashkent showed that in many schools they were well organized, but equally many teachers and headmasters did not understand their significance. In two schools all the 9th grade pupils had been enrolled for optional maths, whether they were interested or not, in some schools unsuitable subjects had been introduced, and in many the children had a choice of only one or two subjects and most of the hours allocated were not used. In quite a number of schools no optional courses had been organized at all. The education authorities put the blame on the lack of qualified teachers, but many teachers were refusing to undertake the optional courses because they already had too much to cope with.<sup>93</sup> There have also been reports from the other republics of teachers failing to understand the nature of the optional courses. In Kirgiziya, for instance, the optional periods are sometimes used for coaching backward pupils. It has been pointed out too that, as it is difficult for individual schools to offer the whole range of optional subjects, perhaps they should be able to take senior pupils from outside their own catchment area.<sup>94</sup> But this can scarcely be a solution in the rural areas where it is hard to imagine the range and quality of optional courses as being anything but extremely limited under present circumstances.

### *Conclusions*

Reports on the schools in Central Asia and Kazakhstan tend to be a catalogue of shortcomings, but these should be seen in the context of the progress already made and the enormous problems created by very rapid expansion of the school population in recent years. It is true that many of the current physical deficiencies of the schools are probably unnecessary and avoidable, but it takes more than one generation, even under socialism, to educate backward peoples to the standards of the advanced. Soviet educationists tend to take the best schools in European

<sup>92</sup> UG. 24.8.67.

<sup>93</sup> PV. 13.3.68.

<sup>94</sup> SK. 6.3.68.

Russia as their yardstick when commenting on the standards of the schools in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and inevitably the worst, and even the generality, of the schools in these republics come badly out of such comparisons. Within the republics themselves there are enormous differences of quality. On the one hand, one has in the large towns of Central Asia and Kazakhstan some very good, well equipped schools which approach or equal the standard of schools in Moscow or Leningrad. The staffs of these schools are largely Russian, but their pupils include many children of the native intelligentsia who prefer to educate their children in Russian. Outside school these children enjoy the general stimulation of the urban environment as well as greater facilities for indulging their hobbies in pioneer palaces and the like, and they are more likely to be taken on excursions to museums and even to Moscow and other parts of the country. At the other end of the scale are the many small rural national schools, often housed in unsatisfactory buildings with no electricity or running water, short of equipment, and with teachers who may be conscientious but are very limited in their attainments and horizons. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the new curriculum will be beyond many of these latter schools and may lead to rural school-children finding themselves, temporarily at least, at an even greater disadvantage compared to their urban cousins than they are now.

# SINKIANG: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

By W. J. DREW

This is the first of a series of articles intended as a background study of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region based mainly on Western source material. Future articles will concern history and the economy. We hope to conclude the series with an article on contemporary political developments from Chinese sources if the rather meagre material available to us permits.

The following account of the land and the people is based on Mr. Drew's own knowledge of the country, derived firstly from residence there and secondly from Western sources and available copies of the Chinese *People's Handbook*. A bibliography of the works on which he has drawn is appended. Previous articles on these aspects of Sinkiang, from Soviet source material, will be found in CAR, 1959, Vol. VII, No. 1; 1958, Vol. VI, No. 1; 1957, Vol. V, No. 2 and 1956, Vol. IV, No. 4.

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## I. THE LAND

THE expression "Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region" is a translation of the Chinese: Hsin-chiang Wei-wu-erh Tzu-chih-ch'ü (a). Hsin-chiang has often been rendered into English as "new dominion" or "new province".<sup>1</sup> The character *chiang* (b) does not properly permit these renderings. The name, more correctly speaking, means "new frontier", though not strictly in the sense of the English word "frontier". The occurrence of the character *chiang* in the name of a very large tract of territory is unusual, if not unique. In this context it illustrates the traditional Chinese attitude to frontiers and frontier zones, especially, in this case, in Central Asia.

In Chinese practice frontiers were not susceptible of precise definition, in the modern sense, as imaginary or clearly marked lines on the ground and, correspondingly, on maps. They lay out in the fringes of empire usually far from the settled and stable parts inhabited by the Han Chinese. They were the line at which, or the belt of territory within which, the power of the empire to maintain its position against the further barbarians reached its fullest extent and beyond which it was not effective. It was, therefore, movable, imprecise and more stable at some times than at others. But it was not, for these reasons, any less real to the imperial authorities.

Hsin-chiang is a part of a much larger entity often referred to in

<sup>1</sup> The letters here and in the text following refer to the Chinese characters listed in the note on p. 216.

Chinese history and literature as Hsi-yü (c)—the Western Regions. The character *yü* also bears in some contexts connotations belonging to our word "frontier". *Hsin-chiang* may be taken as meaning that newly-acquired or newly-consolidated territory beyond the Han-settled parts of north-west China where the empire held the line against the outside world. That it was given a Chinese name of such significant content, unlike other border areas, for example, Mongolia and Tibet, is fair indication of the special interest that the Chinese have had from time to time in Central Asia and the measure of direct action they have exercised for long periods in the control of the affairs of that part of it we know as Sinkiang. Manchuria, the remaining border area, came into modern history as the home of the last ruling dynasty of China. Only later, when Chinese colonisation was altering its original character, did it acquire a Chinese name: "the Three Eastern Provinces", or, simply "the North-East".

Sinkiang as a frontier region is remarkable for the great distance that it penetrates into Central Asia beyond the basic China. Its easternmost point lies some 200 miles away from the western limit of the Great Wall and its westernmost point (in the Pamirs) a good thousand miles beyond that. This is only half as far from the Caspian Sea as it is from the Pacific Ocean. From the centre of Sinkiang the Indian Ocean is about 1,400 miles away, the Pacific 1,600 miles and the Arctic 1,800 miles.

Sinkiang lies between  $73^{\circ}40'$  and  $96^{\circ}20'$  east longitude, and  $35^{\circ}10'$  and  $49^{\circ}20'$  north latitude. Its area is about one-sixth of the total area of the Chinese People's Republic, or more than three times the size of France. The normal approach to Sinkiang from intra-mural China is, of course, by way of the Kansu corridor. This is a long, westward extension of the traditional China away from its natural centre. The corridor consists mainly of a narrow shelf of land which has long been settled by Han Chinese and sinicized natives. It lies between the *massif* of Tibet and the plains of Mongolia. The land then flattens and broadens into almost empty plains characteristic of the Gobi<sup>2</sup> Desert. A road leads off in one direction through a low mountain range into Sinkiang north of the Tien Shan, whilst a more southerly route descends gradually to the level of Sinkiang's great southern basin.

The Tien Shan range cuts Sinkiang into two main, but unequal parts. The smaller, northern, part consists of the Dzungarian basin with its northern rampart, the Altai range, which separates Sinkiang from the Mongolian People's Republic. The Dzungarian basin tends to slope away westwards so that, generally speaking, access to Sinkiang is easier from the Soviet side than from the Chinese side.

The larger, southern, part of Sinkiang forms an oval almost entirely ringed with mountains and is largely composed of sandy desert. The

<sup>2</sup> The term *gobi* (d) is Mongolian and describes rather than locates. *Gobi* generally has a hard, gravelly surface with sparse scrub. It is found notably in Mongolia, but also in Kansu and northern Sinkiang.



plain tends to tilt, unlike that in the north, upwards towards the west until it ends before the barrier of the Pamir plateau. On its southern flank lie the Altyn Tagh and the Kun Lun Mountains, the northern scarp of the Tibetan plateau. Continuing westwards the Karakoram range separates Sinkiang from Kashmir and Ladakh. The southern basin is mainly drained by the Tarim river and its tributaries. This system carries water from the Kun Lun, the Pamirs and the southern Tien Shan in a broad loop round and through the Takla Makan Desert. Such water as is not lost in the sands or through evaporation finds its sluggish way at length into the swampy region of Lob Nor. The Turfan Depression lies some distance north of Lob Nor towards the eastern end of the Tien Shan beneath their southern slopes. The depression, which is excessively dry, dips to several hundred feet below sea level.

The Tien Shan broaden out from east to west and embrace within their inner valleys the upper part of the Ili River system. The main range of the Tien Shan continues westwards from Ili separating the western part of southern Sinkiang from Soviet Central Asia. The climate of Sinkiang is continental with its characteristic extremes. Summer temperatures of well over 100°F. are usual. In Turfan a reading of 120°F. is not uncommon. For this reason many houses there and in surrounding districts are built mainly below ground level. During the long northern winter -30°F. is often registered with heavy falls of snow. Even in the shorter southern winter the temperature is continuously below freezing point. Winds are typical of the Eurasian land mass. These can be an affliction to the northern plains and mountain passes, one of which—Lao Feng Kou ("Old Windy Pass")—owes its name to this often terrifying phenomenon. There are many more bright days than dull throughout the year but the air, especially in the south, is often heavily dust-laden. Both north and south of the Tien Shan the cultivable areas are formed by modest deposits of loess soil.

The habitable parts of Sinkiang present a roughly duplicated pattern of sedentary and pastoral conditions on either side of the Tien Shan. There are the two main routes: Tien Shan *pei lu* and Tien Shan *nan lu*—the roads north and south of the mountains, the latter also known in Uygur as *alte shahr* (the six cities). These two routes link most of the regions of settled population—the oases, each with its urban administrative centre, large or small, where the streams flow out onto the plains. Across the centre of the region the valleys of the Tien Shan, and in the north-east and the south-west those of the Altai and the Pamirs, afford the necessary conditions of pastoral life as also, according to season, does the Dzungarian plain.

Such is the territory over which China exerts her historic authority and such the physical environment of some eight million citizens of the Chinese People's Republic, the greater proportion of whom are typically Turkic and Muslim and non-Chinese in origin and background.

## II. THE PEOPLE

The Chinese Government hold that Sinkiang is populated by thirteen races or "nationalities". There is no figure of undoubted accuracy for the total population of the region nor any known authoritative numerical comparison of the relative strengths of the "nationalities"—the classification of which may, in any case, be arbitrary and unscientific. Without doubt the Turkic element in the population is by far the largest.

From the officially accepted estimate of the total population at the time of the Chinese census in mid-1953 the figure has grown as follows:

mid-1953	4,874,000
end of 1957	5,640,000 <sup>3</sup>
end of 1962	7,000,000 <sup>4</sup>
April 1967	8,000,000 <sup>5</sup>

Relative Numerical Strength of the  
Racial Groups in the Population  
1953 and 1967


Racial Groupings	mid-1953		April 1967		
	Popn. in 000's	%	Popn. in 000's	%	
<i>Turkic</i>					
Uyгур	3,640	74.66	4,943	61.79	
Kazakh	475	9.75	643	8.04	
Kirgiz	70	1.44	95	1.19	
Uzbek	13	.27	18	.22	
Tatar (Nogay)	6	.12	8		
	—	4,204	—	5,707	71.34
<i>Mongolian</i>					
Mongols (of several tribes)	110	2.25	149	1.86	
Daurs	10	.21	14	.18	
	—	120	—	163	2.04
<i>Tungusic (Manchu)</i>					
Sibo	19	.39	26	.32	
Solun	5	.10	7	.09	
	—	24	—	33	.41
Chinese—"Han"		300		1,791	22.39
Chinese Muslim— "Hui" (Dungan)		200		271	3.39
Tadzhik		14		19	.23
Russian		12		16	.20
Totals		4,874		8,000	100.00

<sup>3</sup> *Ten Great Years*, Peking, 1960. (About 6,000,000 was frequently mentioned during 1959 and a figure of 6,480,000 was given at mid-1960.)

<sup>4</sup> Urumchi Radio, 25.10.62. (Frequently repeated until at least as late as December 1965.)

<sup>5</sup> Urumchi Radio, 28.4.67.

# ETHNOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE SINKIANG-UYGUR AUTONOMOUS REGION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLES REPUBLIC.



(Reproduced from *SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA*, No. 2, 1956.)



Although these figures cannot be checked for accuracy and the last two would appear to be broad estimates or guesses they cannot but be given tentative credence. An approximate account of the composition of the population as at mid-1953 and as at April 1967 has been attempted and is shown in the accompanying table. Starting with a list of racial groups and their numerical strength at the earlier date derived or inferred from published Chinese sources an annual net rate of natural increase of 2.25 per cent<sup>6</sup> was applied uniformly. Increases in excess of the resultant figures were attributed to the entry of Han Chinese into the region. This leaves out of account the effect of such unknown factors as, for instance, exodus of Kazakhs to the Soviet Union, Mongolia, etc., or movement into Sinkiang of Dungans (Chinese Muslims—Hui) from other north-western areas of China.

### Chinese

The most arresting feature in the above table is obviously the sixfold increase in the Chinese population. This represents a proportional increase from one-sixteenth to nearly a quarter of the total, with a corresponding drop in the Uygur proportion from three-quarters to less than two-thirds. Before going on to describe the disposition of the native inhabitants of Sinkiang some attention must be given to the important questions of the strength and position of the Chinese, who are themselves a minority in this "minority nationality region".

On the basis of the four figures quoted above for the total population of Sinkiang at different dates the increase in the Chinese population is shown to be as follows:

	Natural Increase	Influx	Total Increase
mid-1953 to end 1957	32,035	253,000	285,035
1958 to 1962	68,991	697,307	766,298
1963 to April 1967	134,083	305,382	439,465
<b>Totals</b>	<b>235,109</b>	<b>1,255,689</b>	<b>1,490,798</b>

If this is a true representation of the rate of Chinese influx (i.e. over a million and a quarter in a little under fourteen years) then there was an annual average intake between 1953 and 1967 of over 90,000, or a daily average intake for the three periods of 154, 380 and 196

<sup>6</sup> All Chinese population figures are difficult or impossible to authenticate. Two per cent has been quoted as the net annual rate of increase for the whole of China, e.g., NCNA 14.1.59 and Premier Chou En-lai at Cairo on 23.12.63. (See Richard Harris in *The Times*, 18.4.68.) This rate is apparently derived from a comparison between the mid-1953 census total and the estimated total as at the end of 1957. There have been occasional allusions, unsupported by firm figures, to a higher rate of increase in minority areas. There seems to be no reason to question the probability of this being so. A rate of 2.25 per cent is therefore taken in this article as valid for Sinkiang.

respectively. These are impressive averages<sup>7</sup> seemingly beyond the limits of inference from the incomplete figures on Han immigration into Sinkiang that have been published from time to time. They argue a high degree of organization both at the sending and the receiving ends and a remarkable absorptive capacity. Nevertheless, a general pattern is discernible which probably accords with the facts. A big increase in the period 1958 to 1962 over the earlier one matches the penetration of the railway into Sinkiang. Passenger services reached the region in October 1958 and thereafter were gradually extended towards Urumchi (see CAR, 1957, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 153a-54 and 1959, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 208). There were, during this period, many references in the news media to immigrants arriving from China's central provinces. A falling off in the most recent period might be connected with the growing tensions of the Sino-Soviet dispute and most certainly would accord with the disruptive effect upon communications of the cultural revolution as well as the strains that this has introduced into relations between Sinkiang and the centre.

It may be accepted upon such meagre evidence as there is that, whereas at the accession to power of the People's Government the Han Chinese population of Sinkiang was under 300,000, by 1967 it had risen to nearly two millions and that this increase included an intake from other parts of China of over a million and a quarter. These figures do not include the armed forces or the para-military Production and Construction Corps. Colonization of Sinkiang at this rate or even a much intensified rate cannot make any perceptible difference to population pressures in the more crowded parts of China proper, but obviously it must have great significance in an area like Sinkiang containing a sparse population of non-Chinese inhabitants.

Prior to 1949 the Chinese population of Sinkiang comprised four main elements. These were the "locals" (*pen-ti jen*) (e) and three other groups from Hunan, Tientsin (or more precisely the town of Yang-liu-ching near Tientsin) and Manchuria.

The "locals" were, for the most part, farmers and artisans in the settled areas along the North Road. They were probably an assimilation of immigrants from Kansu and other north-western provinces with native non-Chinese stock. Sinkiang was formerly sometimes called a Hunanese colony from the fact that Tso Tsung-tang, who recovered the territory a century ago, was a Hunanese and many of his fellow provincials entered the region at that time. The Tientsin community originated in camp-following traders during the Tso Tsung-tang campaign. They

<sup>7</sup> It is true that they cease to look impressive when compared with the figures for Manchuria at the height of the Chinese influx. The population rose from 15 millions to 30 millions in the period 1910 to 1931 (both figures approximate), and in each of the three years 1927, 1928 and 1929 there was an increase of over one million. (Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers*, quoted from *China Year Book*, 1935.) The 1953 census gave 47 millions for the population of all the Manchurian provinces. Sinkiang is not Manchuria!

established themselves in all the towns of the region, continually being reinforced from home and preserving a strong identity. A similar, but smaller, commercial community in the east of the region were the Shansi traders.

The Nationalist authorities had, since 1943, actively promoted emigration to Sinkiang. The People's Government has continued to settle peasants from central provinces on the land—generally marginal land newly reclaimed from near desert conditions. Rather more problematical has been the policy to move to Sinkiang large numbers of surplus youths from the populations of Shanghai and Peking. There has been much evidence in the press and radio that they do not readily take root in Sinkiang and that many have taken advantage of the cultural revolution to return whence they came. Sinkiang's developing industries have absorbed labour from Shanghai.

Increasing transport facilities, the pressure of Mao-ist ideology, rapid changes in social organization and progressive standardization of the Chinese spoken language will all render the hitherto varied elements in the Chinese population of Sinkiang more homogeneous and will acclimatize them to life in this border region. In the face of this process the local races will almost certainly feel increasingly that they cannot compete with the newcomers. Antipathy will, therefore, be strengthened but it does not seem likely that policies of forcible assimilation would succeed, if only because a large and homogeneous Chinese population will not find them attractive. In the long term historical and racial differences are likely to preserve the identity of the local races.

### *Dungans*

The Chinese Muslims (Dungans—Hui) like the Han Chinese are not genuinely native to Sinkiang but originated for the most part from among the Hui of Kansu and Shensi. They are a racial amalgam of Central Asian, Iranian and Arab elements that settled among the Chinese in Tang and Yüan times. Considering their adherence to the Islamic faith the strength of their Chinese cultural affinities (even to the architecture of their mosques) is remarkable. The Dungans belong naturally in the Chinese world. Their native speech is Chinese—albeit with a strong characteristic accent. More often than not they have the Chinese surname Ma to which, for ordinary social intercourse, they add a personal name in the usual Chinese manner. In the family circle they are known by their Koranic names. They are a turbulent people easily moved to an outburst in redress of a real or imagined grievance. There have been notable instances of Hui administrators in Sinkiang—their martial qualities fitting them for a military role.

The Dungans are to be found in all the cities of Sinkiang, but the largest concentrations of them are in the Urumchi area and on the South Road in and westwards of Karashahr. In the absence of statistical evidence on the growth of the Dungan population in Sinkiang it has

been assumed in the above calculations that they have maintained the net rate of 2.25 per cent per annum and have not had any accession to their numbers from outside Sinkiang. Thus at the beginning of 1967 they are believed to number some 270,000 out of a possible six million for the whole of China.

### *Uygurs*

The title Uygur was not applied, at any rate in modern times, to the Turkic population of Sinkiang until Governor Sheng-Shih-tsai first proclaimed in 1933 a policy of racial equality for all the Sinkiang peoples—Chinese and minorities alike. This necessitated the use of a time-honoured term that could be invested with the sense of identity and dignity that the region's most numerous race had hitherto lacked. The Uygurs had been known to the Chinese as *ch'an-t'ou* (g) or *ch'an hui* (h) ("turban-heads" or "turbanned Muslims") and to the Russians and other Europeans as Sarts or Taranchi. All speak the Eastern Turkic dialect with local variations but they are not an entirely homogeneous group. The Mongolian strain becomes more apparent towards Turfan and Hami. It cannot be asserted with any certainty that they are the descendants of the Uygurs whose civilisation and political organization flourished in eastern Sinkiang prior to the Mongol conquests.

The Uygurs' homeland is the Alte Shahr—the oases fringing the Takla Makan Desert, the main ones being centred in Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, Aqsu and Kuchar with outlying Turfan and Qomul (Hami) to the eastward. Ever since Dzungaria was left a void as a result of Chien Lung's reconquest of it in the 18th century the people of the south have been continually populating the oases throughout the entire length of northern Sinkiang. They are good businessmen and hard working peasants. In religion they are faithful Muslims but are not among the most fanatical of that faith. Generally they try to be on good terms with all their neighbours whatever their race or faith.

Not until the regime of Governor Sheng did the Uygurs take part in politics but they have always been very conscious that Sinkiang—especially south of the Tien Shan—was their homeland. They were also conscious of forming a part of the great Turkic world. Whilst they realized that they lived in one of its backwaters, they enjoyed a certain reflected glory in the contemplation of Turkish history and the accomplishments of the modern Turkish state without understanding the degree of departure from traditional Muslim values that Kemal Atatürk's renewal had involved. They have not visualized themselves as part of a viable political entity to which the title "Turkestan" properly applied, neither has pan-Turkism been a vital part of their self-consciousness.

Their traditional attitude towards the Chinese was compounded of conflicting elements. The Chinese were pig-eating idolaters, but their skills in business, the arts and in government commanded a certain

approbation and suggested the wisdom of resignation to their rule. Experience showed that it was better to have the Chinese in command than to face the alternative of strife and disintegration. The rise of Soviet power modified this attitude. Political power and economic progress have told in favour of the Soviet Union, but the materialist Marxist creed has told against it, and the terrors of the Sheng-Shih-tsai regime, as it came to be increasingly dominated by its powerful neighbour, left an indelible and unfavourable impression.

The religious issue is one that Soviet propaganda still exploits to condemn the Chinese handling of Sinkiang affairs—a line that might be thought to be counter-productive. The rationalization of the Uygurs' outlook on the world that has been going on since the 1930s and the increasing asperities of the Chinese cultural revolution probably incline them to a more favourable view of the Soviet Union as an alternative to China.

### *Kazakhs*

The Kazakhs of Sinkiang—amounting to 6–700,000 and accounting for most of the Kazakhs in China, occupy valleys in the northern Tien Shan and the Altai ranges and some of the more hospitable parts of the Dzungarian plain. They are comparatively recent arrivals in these habitats and their numbers received massive augmentation in the present century, particularly during the period of collectivization in the Soviet Union. Many arrived destitute, content only to enjoy the freedom from the effects of communist economic policies that Chinese territory then afforded them. Poverty often drove them to predatory habits and their dislike of external authority beyond the sanctions of the Islamic faith and their own social system based on the family and loyalty within the *aul*, a system weakened if not extinguished on Chinese soil, meant that they came to be regarded as a very unruly and unstable element in the population of Sinkiang. They are a people of great energy and ability that ought, if properly channelled, to bring benefits to any community in which they are found. Official Chinese propaganda dwells upon the alleged advantages that the Kazakhs have derived in Sinkiang from the socialization of the stock-raising sector of the economy. Although the Kazakhs have been given the semblance of political authority in the Ili Kazakh autonomous *chou* (i) it is questionable if such an arrangement has materially added to the attractiveness of life under ultimate Chinese authority.

### *Kirgiz*

A people similar to the Kazakhs in mode of life, language and religion, and of whom there are possibly about 100,000 in Sinkiang, are the Kirgiz. They are dissimilar, it would seem, in that they remain stable occupiers of a traditional homeland in the mountains on the Sino-Soviet frontier from above Aqsu to the high valleys of the Pamirs. Their

territory on the Chinese side is now organized as a Kirgiz autonomous *chou* with its administration at Artush near Kashgar and subject to the regional authority at Urumchi. It adjoins for most of its length the Kirgiz Republic in the Soviet Union.

The social organization of the Kirgiz differs from that of the Kazakhs but is similar to that of the Mongols. Among the Kirgiz, for instance, "right" and "left" wings are the equivalent of the Mongol "right" and "left" banners. They are the only Central Asian people to be organized on this system. The Kazakhs and the Kirgiz are the most Mongolian of the Turkic peoples both in race and way of life.

### *Mongols*

Scattered on the northern plains and in the central Tien Shan are to be found the encampments of Sinkiang's Mongols. In the above tabulation their numerical strength is put at 163,000. This is a calculation that cannot be supported by any convincing data. There are probably nearly two million Mongols altogether in China. As regards the composition of the Mongol population of Sinkiang on a tribal or linguistic basis expert opinions are so varied that nothing very useful can be said in this article. Owing to the decimations associated with the Chien Lung campaign it is open to question whether the present Mongol inhabitants of northern Sinkiang are lineal descendants of those there prior to the 18th century. The present occupants of the valleys above Karashahr are generally held to be the descendants of the remnants of a horde of Kalmuks returning to China at Chien Lung's invitation from a temporary sojourn in European Russia to settle in Sinkiang.

The Mongols are, of course, lamaistic Buddhists, and literacy until recent times meant literacy in the Tibetan scriptures. The Mongols' spiritual loyalty was to Lhasa. Their temporal loyalty was to the Emperor of China. These two loyalties persisted into the life of modern Sinkiang. The Mongols were also trustworthy fighters for the maintenance of Chinese authority in Sinkiang—even when that authority was republican and badly compromised to Soviet Russia. During the Sheng regime attempts were made to detach the Sinkiang Mongols from feelings of solidarity with Mongols elsewhere. It may be supposed that the Sinkiang Mongols look with envy at the political independence and material progress of their brethren in the Mongolian People's Republic. They are, on the other hand, probably a good deal better off than those in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region where the pressure of a massive Chinese population and the rigours of the cultural revolution are keenly felt.

### *Other nationalities*

As to the Daur, neither Chinese nor Soviet authorities are helpful

as to precisely who this small minority are and where they belong.<sup>8</sup> The new edition of *An Historical Atlas of China* (Edinburgh U.P., 1966) shows them inhabiting a small area on the Inner Mongolia-Manchuria borders as a Mongol people. The Sibo and the Solun are small communities living in the Ili Valley—mostly as farmers. They are the descendants of Manchu troops from tribes of these names who fought with Chien Lung. They have maintained their identity and language unlike the Manchus in their own homeland.

There remain to mention two small Turkic groups, also the Tadzhiks and the Russians. The few Uzbeks in Sinkiang do not belong in the region and are to all intents indistinguishable from the Uygur inhabitants. The Tatars—Nogay as they are also known—are found in the main cities of Sinkiang. If the Kazakhs are the most Mongolian of the Turkic peoples in Sinkiang the Tatars may claim to be the most European. The Tatars were traditionally business and professional men and there were some among them of considerable wealth. The Tadzhiks—an Iranian people, speaking an Iranian language—are Muslims of the Ismaili persuasion. Those in Sinkiang live in the region of Sariqol in the Pamirs. They number some 20,000. Their territory—the Tashqurghan autonomous *hsien*—adjoins the Soviet Tadzhik Republic.

It is quite impossible to say how many Russians there may now be in Sinkiang. The figure included in the tabulation of population takes no account of the fact that numbers of Russian families from Sinkiang have, by the assistance of United Nations organizations and religious agencies, been assisted to leave and start life in other countries. There were, broadly, two layers of Russians in Sinkiang. The first was composed of Russian families of the more sophisticated type who had fled from the Revolution, and some, such as a small but hardy group of Old Believers, to whom the ordinary life of the normal Russian Orthodox Christians was too much of this world. These stuck together in poverty-stricken communities scratching a living from the soil. The second wave of Russians in Sinkiang came into Chinese territory to escape the economic effects of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Included among them was a good proportion to whom the religious consideration added another motive for entering Chinese territory. The earlier Russians mostly took out Chinese citizenship—the Chinese expression in use in Sinkiang for them was “naturalized people”, (j) and a regiment was raised from among them in 1932 to aid in the suppression of the Muslim rebellion. Undoubtedly many Russians were stateless but the Chinese authorities could be prevailed upon to issue papers with which it was possible for such as wished, to leave the country.

<sup>8</sup> The map facing p. 208 from *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 2, 1956, places them near Chuguchak.

### Conclusion

No Chinese central authority has ever so far fully taken the measure of the complexity of the Sinkiang population and matched it with a practical policy for the region. Perhaps the present Government has come the nearest to doing so. However, the cultural revolution has, for the time being at any rate, made it more likely that the old errors will be repeated. The current jargon calls for the problem of the class struggle to take precedence over the problem of nationality. This has an ominous ring for the minority peoples. In Inner Mongolia, where it is being put into practice, it is almost certain to have an oppressive effect upon the Mongols. So far this does not seem to be the case for the minorities in Sinkiang though this is not for want of the central authorities' desire for the full effects of the cultural revolution to be felt there.

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### Note

- |            |            |
|------------|------------|
| • 新疆维吾尔自治区 | 1 维吾尔      |
| • 疆        | • 纏頭       |
| • 西域       | 2 纏回       |
| • 戈壁       | 1 伊犁哈萨克自治州 |
| • 本地人      | 3 歸化人      |

## MIXED MARRIAGES IN THE CAUCASUS : THE PROBLEM AS OBSERVED IN THE KARACHAY-CHERKESS AUTONOMOUS REGION

By ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN

SOVIET authors commonly look forward to a rapprochement, or *sblizheniye*, among the peoples of the Union, and thereafter, crowning the process, their complete fusion, or *sliyaniye*. In the attainment of these results several demographic and cultural factors, evidently, are presupposed of which the mixed marriage will be chief. But hitherto the said Soviet sources have been singularly reticent about alliances between persons of different nationalities, and particularly so about marriages between Muslims and Russians. More than usually welcome, therefore, is the short but valuable study by Ya. S. Smirnova, *Natsional'no smeshannyye braki u narodov Karachayevo Cherkessii* (Mixed marriages between nationalities among the Karachay-Cherkess peoples) appearing in *Sovetskaya Etnografiya* No. 4 (July-August) 1967 at pp. 137-142. For the first time in any Soviet academic journal actual facts and figures on this subject have been supplied.

The Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region forms part of the Stavropol Territory (*Kray*) of the RSFSR, where its somewhat modest area of 14,000 square kilometres covers the slopes to the north of the high Caucasian Chain and the elevated valleys of the Kuban' with its tributaries the Taberda, Zelenchuk, Urup and Laba. It was created on 9 January 1957 following the "rehabilitation" and return from deportation of the Karachays who just after the War had been thus penalized for their alleged collaboration with the Germans.

Among the Caucasian territories the Region, according to Smirnova, is second only to the Dagestan Autonomous Republic in the matter of national complexity. The population has a majority composed of Ukrainians and Russians (erstwhile Cossacks of the Kuban, who took up residence in the neighbourhood at the end of the 18th century; settlers from Central Russia in the 19th century; or nondescript urban elements) and a powerful Muslim minority consisting of Turks (Karachays and Nogays) and of Ibero-Caucasians (Cherkesses and Abazas), not to mention some Iranians (Ossetes) and Caucasians, Kabards, Chechens, Dagestanis hailing from the adjacent areas.

According to the 1959 census<sup>1</sup> the population of the Region was distributed by communities as under :

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestiya vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya, 1959 g. RSFSR* (Census Returns of the Population of the Union, 1959, RSFSR), Moscow, 1963, p. 322.

Nationalities	Number	Percentage
Russians	141,800	51.0
Karachays	67,800	24.4
Cherkesses	24,200	8.7
Abazas	18,200	6.5
Nogays	8,900	3.2
Ukrainians	4,000	1.4
Ossetes	3,600	1.3
Others	9,500	3.5
Total	278,000	100.0

The local distribution of these nationalities is as follows: The Karachays are chiefly in the southern and least accessible portion of the area, namely, the highlands; the Cherkesses and the Abazas—nowadays no more than a meagre 15 per cent of the total but formerly the dominant community—occupy the centre and northerly parts; and the Nogays, the one-time nomads, inhabit the plains of the extreme north. The Russians are, roughly speaking, the urban populace. Thus, in the two principal towns of Cherkesk and Karachayevsk they, together with the Ukrainians, in 1959 constituted 81.5 per cent of the population as against 7.3 per cent Karachays, 2.2 per cent Cherkesses, 2 per cent Abazas, 2 per cent Ossetes, and 0.6 per cent Nogays. For the rest, in the northern parts and the centre the Russians have some sizeable rural colonies mainly in the most fertile tracts of the low, or fairly low, valleys of the Kuban' and its tributaries.

Before the October Revolution, Smirnova continues, mixed marriages were comparatively rare even as between the Muslim nationalities. In other words the experience of the rest of the Muslim territories (Middle Volga and Central Asia), where Islam ironed out the racial dissimilarities, was unknown: the gap separating the Ibero-Caucasians from the Turkic peoples was unbridged. The former represented the warrior class, aristocratic and domineering; the Cherkesses, especially, with their complicated feudal structure considering themselves superior to the other Muslim communities, and the Abazas, notwithstanding their own submission in days gone by to the Cherkess feudal aristocracy, lorded it in their own turn over the Karachays and the Nogays. In these circumstances mixed marriages between Ibero-Caucasians and members of the Turkic peoples were exceptional, and restricted to the highest grades of the nobility. As a rule they would even so only be possible where the bridegroom belonged to a "governing", and the bride to an "inferior", community. Thus even though, here and there, a Cherkess male might marry an Abaza or Turkic wife, it would be out of the question for a

Cherkess girl to be given in marriage to an "inferior" outsider like a Karachay or Nogay.<sup>2</sup>

As between Muslims and Russians, mixed marriages were practically unheard of. Admittedly there was nothing in the Shari'at to prevent the marriage of a Muslim man with a Christian woman, but the law in Imperial Russia prohibited such marriages unless the non-Christian partner were first converted to Orthodoxy—which was unthinkable in the Caucasus before 1917. The Shari'at did of course forbid the marriage of Muslim girls with Christians, and the explanation of certain marriages between Cossacks and Muslim women known to have occurred prior to 1865 during the wars in the Caucasus is that the men were deserters who had crossed over to the highlanders and become converted to Islam.<sup>3</sup>

If statistics of mixed marriages in the pre-revolution period are completely lacking, the case is hardly any better as regards the first years of the Soviet regime. All Smirnova can tell us is that until the Second World War the Muslims contented themselves with religious marriages or, if they did choose to forgo the religious ceremony, avoided registering their marriage at an office of the administration: whereas the mixed marriages of partners "belonging to the most advanced sections of the population" would as a rule be declared in front of a civil authority. The consequence is that the statistics on record have no claim whatever to precision until after the Second World War.

Relying on data from the Registrar General's Office (ZAGS) in the Stavropol Territory, Smirnova finds that the number of mixed marriages officially reported has risen appreciably since 1928. She constructs a comprehensive table for the year 1963 (see p. 220).

This table calls for some supplementary remarks.

1. In the first place it is to be observed that Soviet documents take no account of the religious criterion—surely an item of relevance to the enquiry. Consequently the column "With Russians and other non-Caucasian peoples" may contain, besides the Russians and Ukrainians, any Muslims originally from other regions of the USSR; in particular, Tatars of the Volga and Azeris of Transcaucasia who are fairly numerous in the towns of North Caucasus. The actual percentage of marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims must therefore be lower than that indicated in the table.

On the other hand, the column "With other Caucasian nationalities" comprising primarily the Muslims of the Mountain—Adyges, Kabards, Chechens, Dagestanis, Ossetes—can equally well include a certain number of Christians, Georgians, or Armenians.

2. The percentage of mixed marriages is particularly strong in the

<sup>2</sup> It is curious to notice that Cherkesses, who have lived as émigrés in Turkey for more than a century, display the same attitude. They refuse, as a rule, to let their girls marry non-Cherkesses.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. on this subject M. O. Kosven, *Etnografiya i istoriya Kavkaza* (Ethnography and History of the Caucasus), Moscow, 1961, p. 257.

TABLE								
Nationality	Percentage of Mixed Marriages	With Karachays	With Chechens	With Abazas	With Nogays	With other Caucasian nationalities	With Russians and other non-Caucasian peoples	
Karachays m.	6.0	0.0	0.8	0.3	0.2	1.5	3.2	
Karachays f.	3.3	0.0	1.3	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.6	
Cherkesses m.	24.6	3.2	0.0	12.0	0.8	2.9	5.6	
Cherkesses f.	26.0	2.0	0.0	18.9	0.8	4.3	0.0	
Abazas m.	36.3	1.7	26.8	0.0	0.6	2.7	4.5	
Abazas f.	25.0	1.3	19.8	0.0	0.6	2.0	1.3	
Nogays m.	10.1	1.1	2.3	1.1	0.0	1.1	4.5	
Nogays f.	8.0	1.1	2.3	1.1	0.0	2.3	1.1	
<i>Urban population</i>								
Karachays m.	16.3	0.0	4.1	1.0	0.0	4.1	7.1	
Karachays f.	6.8	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	3.4	1.1	
Cherkesses m.	45.5	9.1	0.0	9.1	0.0	9.1	18.2	
Cherkesses f.	53.9	15.4	0.0	19.2	0.0	19.2	0.0	
Abazas m.	56.2	0.0	31.2	0.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	
Abazas f.	41.6	8.3	16.6	0.0	0.0	8.3	8.3	
Nogays m.	44.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.1	33.3	
Nogays f.	28.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	14.3	
<i>Rural Population</i>								
Karachays m.	4.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.1	2.5	
Karachays f.	2.6	0.0	1.1	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	
Cherkesses m.	22.3	2.6	0.0	12.2	0.9	2.2	4.4	
Cherkesses f.	22.5	0.4	0.0	19.0	0.8	2.3	0.0	
Abazas m.	34.3	1.9	26.3	0.0	0.6	3.0	2.5	
Abazas f.	23.6	0.7	20.0	0.0	0.7	1.4	0.8	
Nogays m.	6.3	1.2	2.6	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.2	
Nogays f.	6.3	1.2	2.6	1.2	0.0	1.2	0.0	

towns. To Smirnova, this is adequately explained by the easier contacts there enjoyed by the upper cadres of the different nationalities, by the members of the Party and the Soviets, and by the intelligentsia generally. One might legitimately add that the towns would be the resort of the *déclassés*, and therefore the normal venue of marriages between persons living on the fringe of their respective societies.

3. The behaviour of the Ibero-Caucasians is markedly different from the behaviour of the Turkic peoples. In the case of the former, the incidence of mixed unions between Cherkesses and Abazas is high and corresponds with a known historical process; viz. the assimilation of the Abaza people by the Cherkesses<sup>4</sup>: but the incidence of mixed Ibero-Caucasian and Turkic marriages is low, except in the towns where, because of the numerical weakness of the Muslim minority, the distinction between Ibero-Caucasian and Turkic peoples tends to vanish.

In the case of the Turkic peoples the mixed marriages are less frequent than in the case of the Cherkesses and Abazas; owing, to some extent, to the want of contact between the Karachays living in the southern part and the Nogays in the northern limits of the Region.

4. Mixed marriages of Muslim husbands and Russian wives are more frequent among the socially "superior" Cherkesses and Abazas (5.6 and 4.5 per cent) than among the Karachays and Nogays (3.2 and 4.5 per cent). It is likely that these percentages are not greatly different from those of pre-revolution days.

It is only in the towns that a striking increase in these marriages is revealed; but that does not of course mean that the marriages themselves are usual, for it is precisely in the towns that the Muslim population is thin.

As to marriages between Muslim girls and Russian men, these are still extremely rare: 0.6 per cent among the Karachays, 1.1 per cent among the Nogays, 1.3 per cent among the Abazas and 0.0 per cent among the Cherkesses.

Smirnova then turns to the social status and occupation of the young couples as exhibited by the registers of 1958, this being the latest year for the data in question. She finds that in the towns mixed marriages are just as common among the working class as among employees (47.6 per cent and 47.0 per cent respectively), whereas in the countryside the mixed marriages are more numerous among trained personnel (26.8 per cent) than among the labourers (13.9 per cent) or members of kolkhozes (9.3 per cent).

The article ends with an intelligent look at what happens to the manners and customs of the bi-national families founded by these mixed marriages.

<sup>4</sup> The Abaza language is very close to the Cherkess. In their mode of life and their cultural and historical traditions the Abazas are barely distinguishable from the Cherkesses who were formerly their political masters. In spite of its language having acquired a written form, this little nationality (*narodnost'*) does not seem destined to escape assimilation by the Cherkesses and their cousins, the Kabards.

In the urban environment, the ethnic composition of the mixed family counts for little. On the basis of an enquiry which Smirnova conducted at Cherkesk in 1966 in several Cherkess-Nogay and Cherkess-Russian homes, she is able to state that there is scarcely any difference between them. The cooking is a mixture of Russian and native dishes; the children bear Russian or Muslim first-names indifferently; Russian is the sole language of family life, and the children attend Russian schools.

Quite different is the situation in the rural setting. There the wife as a rule loses touch with her own community and identifies herself entirely with that of her partner. The children tend to take the cue from her in this regard: the father's speech becomes the language of the family, even if the children will frequently acquire and retain a certain knowledge of their mother's native tongue.

The foregoing does not, however, apply to families in which the wife is Russian or Ukrainian. The Russian wife learns her husband's language, but her Russian is not forgotten for all that, and the children are brought up bilingual. Often enough some of the children will be given Russian names and the others Muslim names. Still more often the children receive two names, the first being Russian and the second Muslim but resembling the first; or else the reverse way round, the first, official name being Muslim and the second Russian.

In these mixed rural homes, cooking is a compromise between the Russian and the native style and the same may be said of the furniture and household management generally. Finally, such customs as would, according to Smirnova, still be practised in purely Muslim homes are allowed to lapse. This is the case, for instance, with the "residual rite" of *kalym*, or redemption of the bride; with the ban on her seeing and speaking to her husband's relations, with the wearing of the veil, etc. And in general the whole patriarchal character of the marital relationship, as of that between parents and children, is being rapidly discarded. Smirnova does not say a word about mixed families in which the wife is Muslim, for the very good reason that these "are scarcely to be met with in the rural environment".

None will dispute that the mixed marriage of Muslims and Russians is a factor assisting the different communities to coalesce. But, on the present evidence, marriages of Muslim men with Russian women are rare, and those of Russian men with Muslim women even rarer. This being so, the process of rapprochement must remain slow—and the ultimate fusion, the *sliyaniye*, no more than a piece of wishful optimism.

## NATION-FORMING PROCESSES IN IRAN

The following is an abridged translation of an article by M. S. Ivanov on "Contemporary National Processes in Iran" in *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 7 of 1967.

This article differs markedly from an earlier one on the same subject by S. M. Aliyev (See CAR, Vol. XIV, No. 1 of 1966, pp. 62-70) in the sense that the present author now admits that of the two tendencies observable in Iran—assimilation with the major Iranian nationality and assertion of individual nationhood on the part of the non-Iranian nationalities—the former is much the stronger.

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THE study of national trends in Iran as these have been observable since the October Revolution presupposes some preliminary grasp of the ethnical composition of the country at, say, the turn of the century. The population at that date was heterogeneous and there was little uniformity in the social and economic condition of the component peoples, for all that prolonged residence had instilled into them a certain sense of belonging to one and the same state.

One must take a backward glance to understand how this had come about. According to the usually accepted view the Indo-European tribes of the Iranian group had entered Iran via Central Asia and Transcaucasia somewhere around one thousand years before our era. But that was not the finish of it. Lying as it did athwart the movement of populations, Iran was again and again to be overrun as the centuries evolved: notably there was the Arab invasion in the 7th century; there was the influx of the Turkic tribes in the 11th; there was the inroad of the Mongols in the 13th. Besides which, the ruling houses—Safavids, Nader Shah, the Qajars—were constantly adding to the patchwork by shifting this or that tribe or *narodnost'* (or more commonly fragments of these) from one part of the domain to another in anticipation of too formidable a consolidation.

The biggest *narodnost'* in the land was that of the Persians who inhabited the central and, to some extent, the southern parts. Then there were various minor *narodnosti* and tribes speaking Iranian tongues other than Persian. Thus, in the north-west, to the east and south of Lake Urmiiyeh and in the mountains that marched with the Ottoman Empire including the territory south of Kermanshah, lived the Kurds, speaking Kurdish. Kurds also, to complicate matters, were to be found in north Khorasan, especially Shirvan, Quchan and Bojnurd, where they had been transplanted by 'Abbas I at the end of the 16th century. Again, in the hilly tracts between Kermanshah and Borujerd to the north and Khuzestan to the south, dwelt the Lur and Bakhtiyar tribes

speaking similar Iranian dialects. In the extreme south-east lived the Baluch tribes, having their own speech; and on the Caspian littoral were the Talysh, Gilak and Mazandarani. Finally in east Khorasan were to be found the less numerous groups of Iranian speech: viz. Tajiks, Afghans, Hazaras, Jamshids, etc.

Second numerically to the Persians were the Azarbaijanis, a compact mass in the north-west. Alongside the Azarbaijanis proper, and particularly to the east of the area, was the artificial group known as the Shahseven (Lovers of the Shah) which had been created by the Safavids in the 16th–17th centuries. Under the general designation of Turkic tribes came, too, such distinct unities as the Turkmen inhabiting the south-east shore of the Caspian and the Gorgan valley; the Qashqay (speaking a language akin to Azeri) in the western portion of Fars; and a series of others in the north and east parts of Khorasan and south of Tehran.

Add to all these the tribes speaking Arabic. These, descended from the conquerors who had arrived in the first century of Islam, were principally in Khuzestan, along the Persian Gulf, and at the Straits of Ormuz.

To complete the picture mention must be made of the Armenians in the Esfahan neighbourhood, and also east of Lake Urmiyyeh, who had been transferred to these areas from Armenia in the days of 'Abbas I; and of the Assyrians to the west of the lake.

This ethnical conglomeration was not cemented by religious unity; it was, on the contrary, pervaded by religious differences. The overwhelming majority were Muslims and of these some four-fifths were Shi'a. The Sunnis were mainly encountered among the Kurds, the Baluch, the Turkmen, and the Arabs. The Armenians were Christian of the Gregorian, the Assyrians of the Nestorian, sect. And there was a community, if smallish, of Zoroastrians.

By the 20th century Iran presented the overall spectacle of a backward agrarian society still hampered by the stubborn survivals of feudalism. Roughly one-quarter of the population was either nomadic or semi-nomadic. This was mainly the case with the Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiyaris, Baluch, Qashqay, Turkmen, Shahseven, and several more inhabiting the barely accessible uplands and making a living out of cattle-breeding. The settled rural population conducted its agriculture with primitive equipment, and supplemented its livelihood by a certain amount of stock-raising and by home industries. The peasantry with rare exceptions was landless, cultivating the soil of their feudal masters under conditions of cruel exploitation. In the towns, handicrafts were extensively practised on the guild system carried over from medieval times. Politically and economically Iran was being ground between an upper and a nether millstone; between, that is to say, Tsarist Russia and Imperial England. The great concessions (telegraphs, roads, fisheries,

banking, oil) had gone to the foreigners. In the wake of these, certainly, some minor "national" enterprises had come into being (textiles, sugar, crockery, etc.), and because Iran had become a source of raw materials for the Great Powers named, an expansion of agriculture and stock-breeding had occurred in answer to the export demand. Evidence is not wanting of the impulsion which these tendencies lent alike to capitalist relations and to the crystallization of a national bourgeoisie. But the important point is that there was no country-wide uniformity in the process. In regional terms the north-west showed the most, the south-east the least, progress; and in terms of peoples, the Persians and the Azarbaijanis had advanced furthest towards national solidarity.

The 1905-11 revolution was a landmark; but being essentially bourgeois and anti-imperialist it put the civic issues, and the conflict with foreign dominion, in front of nationalist demands. There were certain qualifications to this, to be sure. For instance, there was already a visible move afoot, around Tehran, to enthrone Persian as the official language, Shi'ism as the state religion; and a countermove was no less observable in Azarbaijan where newspapers began, in the years of the revolution, to come out in Azeri.

The occupation of Iran by Tsarist and British troops in the First World War could not but assist the process of nationalism, and by the eve of the October Revolution the form was roughly this. The Persians were well on the way to being a nation (*natsiya*); the Azarbaijanis were treading the same path; the Armenians and the Assyrians with their separate linguistic, cultural and religious background were next; and the nomadic or semi-nomadic highlanders last. In the two opening decades of the century, that is to say, these mountain tribes were evolving into *narodnosti*, but they were still a long way short of anything resembling national entities.

Because of its world impact on imperialism, Great October bore directly on the national processes in Iran. In 1920 occurred the democratic uprising in Azarbaijan; in 1920-21 the national liberation movement in Gilan against the British imperialists and Iranian feudal reaction; in 1921 Mohammad Taqi Khan's revolt in Khorasan against the same two agencies of oppression. These violent local upheavals attested a strength of feeling which would shortly be channelled into currents of national consciousness in the exacter sense.

Some time in the thirties, it would seem, the process whereby the Persians emerged as the dominant bourgeois *natsiya* reached completion. One must emphasize that adjective "bourgeois" if one is to understand the *natsiya* it qualifies: this was weak in respect of national industry, and chary of opposing either foreign capital or home-grown feudalism. Its nationalist content showed itself in a co-ordinated drive, prosecuted not seldom to absurd lengths, to resuscitate the ancient glory of the land, to purify its speech, and so forth. Nationalism, in effect, as interpreted by the top people of the top *natsiya* in the thirties meant making out

that the non-Persian Muslim *narodnosti* and tribes were really part and parcel of their own (the Persian) *natsiya*: only the non-Muslim Armenians, Assyrians, Zoroastrians and Jews were acknowledged as minorities and accorded certain rights as such. It was even given out that the languages spoken by the *narodnosti* and tribes constituting over one-half of the total population were merely dialects of Persian. These theories were energetically implemented: the administration was centralized, the authority of local chieftains curbed; the tribes were disarmed, shifted from their seasonal camping grounds, compelled to settle.

The Second World War brought these centralizing tendencies to a halt, and after Reza Shah's abdication things went into reverse. The tribes sent the civil and military supervisors packing and rearmed themselves under their old khans. Opposition to the central government was encouraged by Hitler's agents, and the years 1942-43 saw a chain of armed risings designed to embarrass the authorities and the British alike. But as the tide of war turned the khans eased their pressure on the Centre and sought a rapprochement with the British and (later on) with the Americans.

At this stage in the story something must be said about two eruptions of another, and rather special character. Both took place in north-west Iran (one in Azarbaijan and the other in Kurdistan) after the Second World War, and both merit the description of national democratic movements.

Through the pre-war years, as explained already, the economy had been arrested in Iranian Azarbaijan as in the other minority areas; so that by the mid-forties this erstwhile progressive part of the country had been suffered to sink level with, say, Kerman and the backward south-eastern regions. It was incongruous in the extreme, for the Azarbaijanis were intensely conscious nationally, and also alive to the successes achieved by their close neighbours in Soviet Azerbaydzhan. Overtaken admittedly by the Persians, outstripped by their Soviet neighbours, they nonetheless exhibited the marks of an emergent bourgeois *natsiya*, consisting of petty rather than important traders and of working sections. Upon the collapse of Fascist Germany an Azarbaijan Democratic Party was created at Tabriz and a movement launched which led to the proclamation, in December 1945, of the autonomy of Iranian Azarbaijan. The programme embraced the introduction of Azeri as the official language; the equality of rights and obligations as between the Azarbaijanis themselves and all other inhabitants; free compulsory education of children in their mother tongue; a national university; industrial expansion; agrarian reform, etc. In 1946 this programme was put into effect.

North Iranian Kurdistan followed suit. At the end of 1945 the Kurdistan Democratic Party came into being, formed by progressive

tribal chiefs, landlords, merchants, intelligentsia and clergy. The local administration was staffed with Kurds, and Kurdish military units were raised. The schools and press went over to Kurdish. No agrarian reform was attempted, however.

Both these brave ventures in nationalism were undone at the end of 1946 by the Government of Qavam with the help of the British and American imperialists. Note that the insubordination in 1946 of certain of the south Iranian tribes (Qashqay, Bakhtiyari, Arab) was the convenient "handle" which reaction employed in crushing the two movements.

Certain events, as also certain pronounced tendencies, of the two post-war decades must now be noticed for the bearing they had on the national issues. The mass resistance to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1951-53) rallied the peoples of Iran under a common banner. So much so that some of the tribes, e.g., the Qashqay, were among the strongest supporters of the policy pursued by the centre. British and American attempts to incite other tribes, like the Bakhtiyari and the Arabs of Khuzestan, against the Government, came to nothing, and the coup which eventually brought Mosaddeq down in August 1953 was carried out by reactionary generals in concert with the Americans. There was no tribal complicity in it whatsoever.

In the country's economy there were no radical changes before the sixties: Iran continued to be mainly an agricultural country, more than half the population tilling the soil. What did, however, gain ground was capitalism in its contest with the system bequeathed by ages of feudalism. The growth of the textile, sugar and cement industries synchronizing with an expansion of the rail and road network powerfully contributed to the unity of the Iranian market. The 1956 census showed that nearly 50 per cent of the gainfully employed population was wage-earning; it also revealed, significantly, that of the agricultural workers about one-third gave their labour on hire.

The foregoing paragraph is of peculiar relevance: it records the end of exclusiveness (*zamknutost'*) on which the tribal concept had been based. Assimilation, the rival process, had triumphed: and it is a tendency which the educational programme with its insistence on the Persian language as the compulsory medium of instruction at all levels, primary, secondary and higher, has been assiduously fostering since say, 1953.

This active policy of assimilation deliberately ignores the following factors in the case:

- (i) Over one-half of the population actually speaks not Persian but what the 1956 census patronizingly called "local" languages.
- (ii) The standard of economic and cultural development varies greatly from place to place. Thus, industrial progress has been

marked in the Tehran and Esfahan Ostans, and also in Mazandaran and Gilan; but in Azarbaijan, Kermanshah, Kurdestan, Seistan and Baluchestan—all peopled by national minorities—there had been hardly any progress in industry by the beginning of the sixties. The same absence of uniformity applies in the cultural context.

The upshot, therefore, is that the dominant nation (that of the Persians) has made the running. It has been followed, but *longo intervallo*, by the Azarbaijani element in the population. The Kurds come third in the race for national consolidation, and the Qashqai are still at the stage of becoming a *narodnost'*. The Lurs, Bakhtiyaris and Baluchis are even further behind, not to speak of the Arab tribes.

It has to be added that for all these injustices in the matter of national recognition, the discrimination is less rigid than it is in certain other Middle Eastern states. For example, representatives of the social élite of the Azarbaijanis, Bakhtiyaris, Kurds, etc., did in the past, and can now, hold key posts in the central as well as local administration. They have been, and are, ministers, governors, ambassadors: though undeniably the individuals concerned will usually have shed their national characteristics and have merged with Persian society. No doubt, moreover, the march of events outside Iran has modified the attitude of the country's ruling circles. The national liberation movements in Asia and Africa, and the nationalities policy of Iran's neighbour, the Soviet Union, have compelled those circles to think twice about their refusal to acknowledge the very existence of Muslim national minorities. As seen above, the 1956 census implicitly recognized these when it took account of an element of the population using not Persian but "local" languages. The creation, too, in recent years, of distinct administrative units (Kurdestan, Baluchestan, Seistan, Lurestan, etc.) answering to areas in which particular national minorities reside, has been another step in the same direction.

To sum up. There are now two currents in the national stream: first, there is the strong tendency of the dominant *natsiya* to assimilate the minorities; and second, there is the opposite, albeit much weaker, tendency of those minorities—in proportion as they acquire from better education a keener cultural awareness and a sharper national self-consciousness—to assert their right to be treated as basic *elements* (in the strict meaning of the term) of the population as a whole.

## RECENT SOVIET WRITING ON INDIA

(Concluded)

By HUBERT EVANS

This second instalment of Soviet periodical writing on India consists of two sections: I. Political and Ideological, and II. Orientalia.

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### I. POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL

In this section 19 articles and essays have been selected, the aim being to convey their scope and echo their tone rather than to reproduce the substance of each item.

The massive survey entitled *The Working Class in the Countries of Asia and Africa*, Nauka Press, Moscow, 1964, allotted 60 pages to "India". These, the general introduction noticed, were compiled by L. A. Gordon and M. N. Yegorova, and bore all the evidence of patient and accurate research. They set out to describe rather than to interpret and the resultant description was unpunctuated by anything in the nature of political preaching. Comment, where offered at all, was balanced.

The sources on which the authors drew were, as the plentiful annotations showed, English-language publications, the majority of them either official or else based on officially furnished material: chiefly, *Census of India*, 1961; *Digest of Indian Labour Statistics*, 1961; *Agricultural Labour in India*, 1960; *National Sample Surveys*, 1961; *Monthly Abstract of Statistics*, 1963; *Statistical Abstract for British India 1929/30 to 1938/39*, Calcutta, 1942; *Indian Labour Year Book*, 1961; *India: A Reference Annual*, 1961.

To begin with the authors described the strength, the composition and the structure of the working-class ("structure" meaning here not social structure but what the Soviet economists usually term *otraslevaya struktura*, or structure by branches of the economy). This portion of the text, illustrated with 16 tables, acquainted the reader with numbers, castes and communities, territorial dispersal, and types of employment. Next, with the aid of another 13 tables the authors dealt with conditions: that is, wages in the different branches and skills, housing, food standards, seasonal engagement, local variations, etc. And thirdly they constructed a picture of the movement, not so much tracing its historical career as presenting it in terms of today's [i.e. 1964] performance in the domain of industrial dispute, and of potential in the parliamentary elections.

In a concluding passage Gordon and Yegorova observed that notwithstanding the numerous occasions on which the Indian proletariat had held the limelight, the level of its class-consciousness was still poor. This was understandable, since the objective conditions (e.g. the flooding of the proletariat with erstwhile cultivators and small craftsmen; the unsevered ties with rural life; the authority, by this time traditional, of the National Congress) greatly complicated the development of the working-class. However, the fact of the political growth of the proletariat in independent India was incontestable.

One year later M. N. Yegorova, the part-author of the foregoing, was able to append what was tantamount to an elaborate postscript in the volume *The Working Class and the Workers' Movement in the Countries of Asia and Africa*, Nauka Press, Moscow, 1965. The mass campaigns of 1964 had meantime been enacted and in the 25 fresh pages of "Some Questions of the Movement at its present Stage" considerable space was devoted to the causes and course of these latest manifestations. Yegorova's reading of the case was that Mahatma Gandhi's technique of disobedience *minus* the religious and individualistic content of his movement had now been applied in a changed environment: the millions were now advancing from political liberty towards a freedom from the smothering hands of plutocrat and landowner. In the process, the authority and prestige of the CPI and of the All-India Congress of Trade Unions had been enhanced. So much was heartening. But unhappily the trade union movement harboured heterogeneous bodies which danced to the tune of the particular political parties under whose aegis they operated. The All-India Congress of Trade Unions was secure, being directed by Communists, but the Indian National Congress of Trade Unions was Congress-controlled. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha was linked with the People's Socialist Party, and the United Congress of Trade Unions was the creature of the Forward Bloc; and so on.

Somebody, said Yegorova in conclusion, had acutely observed, speaking of Indian trade unionism, that the strength of the All-India Congress of Trade Unions resided in its ability to arouse and inspire the masses to the struggle, its weakness in the organization of its daily routine; whereas with the Indian National Congress of Trade Unions it was exactly the other way round.

The same volume (viz. *The Working Class and the Workers' Movement in the Countries of Asia and Africa*, 1965) contained a 40-page contribution on a particular aspect of this movement. It is accepted doctrine that there comes a time when the working-class will cast about for allies in the long war, and writing under the heading of "Urban Non-Proletarian Strata as Allies of the Working-Class in the National Democratic Revolution", N. A. Savel'yev explained the extent to which this was already occurring in the Indian setting. It was possible, he said, to show that artisans, mechanics,

shopkeepers, hucksters, servants, teachers, students and even the comparatively well-off proprietors of small enterprises were more and more being drawn into the orbit of the movement; the reason being that all of these were in the category of exploited, and hence the natural allies of the proletariat. In the last three years [he was recording this in 1965] the cost of living had climbed, social injustice had become flagrant, and the plans of reaction to encroach on democracy increasingly patent. In these circumstances the working-class had been able to count on an unprecedented access of strength from outside itself.

The documentation was somewhat limited, but the author acknowledged his use of Dhar and Lydall: *Small Enterprises in Indian Economic Development*; B. Singh: *Economics of Small-Scale Industries*; R. Desai: *Recent Trends in Indian Nationalism*; Nigam and Chaudhari: *The Corporate Sector in India*; and of several official reports.

There were three pieces devoted to the reactionary communal parties: the first a brief magazine item of popular tone; the second a more academic discussion by the same writer in a learned journal; and the third a long and detailed study constituting a component chapter in a book on the ideology of the national-liberation movement, running to 50 pages.

1. The magazine article was that by A. Bel'skiy in *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 5 of 1965, headed "The Jan Sangh and its Social basis". It was due to British encouragement, the author said, that such organizations as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh came into being and flourished. Upon Mahatma Gandhi's murder an official ban was placed on RSS activities, "but this did not prevent its leadership from secretly fashioning a political branch" which in 1951 blossomed into the Jan Sangh party. Pensioned rajas and maharajas, zamindars and *mahants* (temple priests) found in it their spiritual home, and it also attracted "clerks, teachers, advocates and policemen". In the cities of Uttar Pradesh "it counted mainly on merchants and manufacturers".

2. More searching was the same author's "Conception of True Nationalism" in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 of 1966. Readers were, of course, supposed to recognize in the words "true nationalism" the pretension of the Jan Sangh that the Hindus alone made the nation in Bharat, that Hinduism alone cemented the 400 million people of India. The article dissected various pronouncements by M. S. Golwalkar, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, and B. Madhok; and included an instructive page or two on what the author termed the indianization of Islam. In one of his major conclusions Bel'skiy appeared to be begging a crucial question. This was where he asserted the ambition of the Hindu communalists to be "a counter-revolution" to bring back religion. The statement made sense only on the assumption—unwarranted by any of the evidence adduced—that religion in India had been dethroned.

3. The full-scale study was by N. P. Anikeyev in the book *Ideologiya Sovremennogo natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya*, Nauka Press,

Moscow, 1966, and called "The Struggle of Internal Reaction against the National-Liberation Movement with special reference to India". Its opening section stated two postulates (it goes without saying . . .). Both, to the uninitiated anyhow, would seem obscure. One was that "the ideology of internal reaction possesses no theoretic [but only a practical?] importance"; the other that "internal reaction hinges on imperialism and exists only through this support". Coming down to Indian earth the author became, if occasionally overheated, at least easier to follow. The principal feature common to the reactionary camp as such, he said, was its hatred of Marxism, scientific socialism and communism. In its midst it counted not simply the landowning class but also that part of the bourgeoisie which, no less than the class mentioned, was irreconcilably opposed to national progress. It denounced the Marxist movement as a "transitory phenomenon" and Marxism as the shallow enthusiasm—M. R. Masani was the offender here—of a few affected intellectual snobs. Communists in India, the reactionary camp alleged, had next to no grip on the bulk of the working-class and the peasantry.

The author found that last statement to be disproved by the results of the 1951, 1957 and 1962 elections; but apparently weakened his own case later on by the unexpected argument that "the extreme right parties—Jan Sangh, RSS, Hindu Mahasabha—deliberately choose for their activities those areas where the level of literacy . . . is lowest". That remark suggested the capacity of the communalists to make headway precisely among the under-privileged—which had not been the contention of Anikeyev (and still less of Bel'skiy)—so far.

In some 18 pages of *Kratkiye Soobshcheniya*, Inst. N.A., No. 75 (1964), A. U. Akhmedzhyanov discussed the "Activity of Muslim Communal Organizations in Present day India". At the date of Partition the Muslims constituted one-quarter of the population, and even after the exodus to Pakistan 10 per cent of India's population was Muslim. The Congress Government on paper did all it could to protect this minority forthwith, and important conferences, inspired notably by Abul Kalam Azad, appealed to the community to liquidate all associations of a communal and religious complexion.

These initiatives failed; antagonism hardened, and 10 years later there was a wave of pogroms. Akhmedzhyanov did not absolve the Muslim community from blame. Discrimination against it there undoubtedly was in practically all walks of life, but the Muslims had invited it by their stubborn backing of such reactionary bodies as the Jama'at-i-Islam-i Hind, the Muslim League, and the Majlis-i-Ittihad-ul-Muslimin. But for this, Akhmedzhyanov thought, the Hindu communalists of the Maha Sabha, the Jan Sangh and the RSS would have been unable to represent the Muslims as a fifth column.

The article reverted in its later pages to the inglorious performance

in all this of the Congress Party, and suggested that Muslim disappointment in its leadership was amply justified. By contrast, the CPI had assumed the only correct position on the Muslim question: it defended the just demands of the Muslim minority, but was uncompromising in its rejection of Muslim—as of any other—communalism. Many Communists, the author added, had laid down their lives in trying to protect Muslims during the pogroms.

The national bourgeoisie came twice into focus. L. Reysner and G. Shirokov described its growth in four businesslike pages headed "The Evolution of the Indian Bourgeoisie" (*Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 2 of 1967), while A. D. Litman interpreted its thought and behaviour in 40 pages forming the chapter entitled "Some Features of the Ideology of the National Bourgeoisie" in the volume of studies *Ideologiya Sovremennogo natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya*, Moscow, 1966. Reysner and Shirokov concerned themselves principally with the emergence of the bourgeoisie out of its first and into "its second phase through which it is now living", namely, the phase in which "growth is so to speak downwards by a process of democratization" resulting in a social and material insulation of the top, or monopolistic, layer from the subsequent accretions.

The exposure of this duality was, in effect, the burden of Litman's profounder pages. From this Indianist one has learned to expect accuracy of expression, and it would be hard to name a more adequate statement than his of what "national bourgeoisie in the countries of the East" has been pronounced to mean in Soviet teaching since the XXth Congress of the Party. The substance, as distinct from the presentation, of this doctrine is of course familiar and calls for no more remark, but it may be worth illustrating quickly the style of criticism that was woven into the text.

The essay contained some examination of the positions adopted by prominent Indians; notably, by Gandhi, U. N. Dhebar, and Sampurnanand. Gandhi could not, Litman thought, "get away with" his non-violence because violence was implicit in the very system which he was willing to tolerate. It ill became him, therefore, "to discredit the revolutionary methods of struggle". Dhebar was among those who envisaged the state as above-class, as an agency fulfilling the will of the whole people. The implications of this thesis, said Litman, were only too apparent in his *Towards a Socialist Cooperative Commonwealth*, where, identifying the State with the Government in power he proceeded "to ascribe automatically to the latter the features properly attributable to the former". This same theory of the State's being above class brought the bourgeoisie into a head-on collision with those who taught "the obvious truth that any political authority in a society made up of conflicting class interests could assert itself only as a dictatorship". Even those who, like Sampurnanand (*Indian Socialism; Meanings and*

*Reflections*), talked of constructing a socialist society without the dictatorship of the proletariat were, it followed, wasting their breath.

*Partiynaya Zhizn'*, No. 7 of 1968, printed under the name of P. Kutsobin an account of the "VIIIth Congress of the Indian Communist Party". The session was attended, as regular readers of *Central Asian Review* will know, by a CPSU delegation led by A. Ya. Pel'she of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and the supposition is that the writer was of the group. At all events he was at Patna at the time.

A graphic opening quoted the Secretary of the Reception Committee as declaring (1) that the peasantry at large "and practically all the working population" had lent active support to the arrangements, and (2) that a threat of interference by the local Jan Sangh had compelled the organizers to take precautionary measures. Some 700 uniformed volunteers armed with bamboo sticks, Kutsobin noted, were guarding the enclosures and marquees in which the proceedings were conducted.

The résumé of those proceedings followed. This, having been widely communicated to English-language publications, both Indian and foreign, need not be reproduced except in so far as the Soviet commentator singled out particular items for remark. Thus, he recorded that speakers were unsparing in their charges of moral and physical inertia on the part of the National Congress, and at pains to demonstrate that in pace with an increase in the State sector a growth in the private sector had been favoured—especially since Pandit Nehru's death. The magnates, it was affirmed by these speakers, in concert with foreign monopolies were nowadays in a position to embarrass the enterprises of the State sector to the point where they were discredited in the eyes, and condemned in the mouths, of the mass of the public. A "swing to the right" might not be an accomplished fact, it was held in one of the debates, but it was unquestionably a tendency, and unless the existing leadership halted it, there would be an end to all hopes of the resources now at the disposal of the propertied classes being made available to the country as a whole.

Secondly, Kutsobin drew the attention of his readers to the problems confronting the Party in the wake of the last elections. The position, he said, was that if the left had scored successes, so had the right; and it was necessary to pronounce whether the Communists ought to go into coalition in "the non-Congress states". On this the discussion was lively, some insisting that there must be no truck with such people as the Jan Sangh. But the majority view was that the Communists by participating would gain in authority and prestige because of the integrity, incorruptibility and selflessness of their behaviour.

Thirdly, the reporter brought out the concern voiced at Patna on the class composition of the Party: of the delegates to this Congress, for example, the overwhelming number were middle-class. The speakers, he said, "dwelled on the necessity to get rid of certain currents of

bourgeois nationalism and *mestnichestvo* (localism) running through the Party”.

Fourthly, Kutsobin alluded to the relationship of the CPI with the “Parallel Comparty”. Apparently the Congress while categorically asserting the need for unity on the left, made plain that “in each country there could be only one Communist party, and that in the case of India that was the CPI.

In recent writing on the spread of international communism to Asia, the achievement of M. N. Roy has usually been dismissed in a few disparaging words. This neglect, in a coldly academic and ungushing way, was repaired in two articles by A. Reznikov—“Lenin on the National Liberation Movement” in *Kommunist*, No. 7 of 1967, and “Lenin’s Struggle with Sectarian Distortion” in *Kommunist*, No. 5 of 1968.

Roy was still the camp-follower rather than the soldier, or at best the nationalist who had taken a jump into communism without letting go of his ideological baggage; was still the misguided adherent of Trotsky against Lenin over NEP. But at least his position was deemed deserving of entry in the record.

The two articles are concerned with the resolution, or rather with the process of arriving at the resolution, on the national and colonial question, at the II<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the Communist International convened in July 1920. In this connexion Lenin made written corrections of Roy’s “Supplementary Theses”, and also voiced oral objection at the actual time of Roy’s Report. Reznikov reproduced the corrections, explaining each of them in its context. Lenin’s argument throughout was that on colonial issues you had to shape your tactics to the real situation in the backward countries. He could not accept Roy’s view that the Comintern must not endorse “the doctrine of nationalism”: on the contrary, that was precisely what it must do in order to assemble the whole national potential against imperialism. But Roy simply would not see, Reznikov said, that the national bourgeoisie at a certain stage had an “historically revolutionary” role to perform. Roy got his perspective wrong, like so many of the “left” revolutionaries of that day. Clinging to the belief that capital development in a colonial country could be stopped only by the coming into power of a Communist Party, he did not ask himself what happened if the conditions were not ripe. “In Russia”, declared Lenin in his oral rebuke, “we supported the liberal freedom movement when it came out against Tsarism. The Indian Communists should support the bourgeois-democratic movement, without merging with it. Comrade Roy goes too far in making out that the destiny of the West depends exclusively on the degree of development and strength of the revolutionary movement in Eastern countries. In spite of the fact that India has a five million proletariat and 37 million landless cultivators the Indian Communists

have not so far succeeded in creating a Communist party in their country. . . .”

“Some Contemporary Features of the Indian Federation” was the title of a soberly argued article by M. M. Sayfullin and L. P. Ul’yanova appearing in *Strany i Narody Vostoka*, No. 5 of 1967. In 15 pages the authors attended to the “historical milestones”—1953, 1956, 1960, 1962 and 1966—which had already receded into the past, and then offered their assessment of the position as it now stood. The material upon which they relied was in the English language, and familiar. One need not, consequently, summarize this piece, but only reproduce some of the running judgments.

The component states of the original Indian Union being the artificially demarcated provinces of the British period, made little allowance for national sentiment. It was therefore inevitable that the “battle of the peoples” should be joined with ferocity from the morrow of independence. Up till now (1967) there had been various surrenders to the principle of nationality [these were named and assessed] but the position still was that the major units brushed aside the minor: “The Federation has continued to arrest the development of the small *narodnosti*; it has not halted the absorption of national minorities by the large nationalities.”

The authors, while admitting that the acceptance of every national demand would spell the fragmentation of India, considered that most Western Indianists (e.g. the Americans Harrison and Carnow) were over-pessimistic in this regard; nor could they agree with certain Indian constitutional lawyers, for example, D. N. Banerjee, D. Sen, that the Indian Union was in fact no more than *quasi*-federal in type. They submitted that flexibility, *gibkost’* in Russian, was the saving grace of the Indian Union. The Centre held the economic levers, doled out the money, controlled the All-India services; but the states had a high degree of legislative and administrative autonomy, and not seldom proved that they could “shove” the Centre into the performance of what they wanted. In this connexion the authors cited a Calcutta High Court decision: “It is wrong to consider the states of the Indian Union simply as administrative units as was the case in the time of British dominion: in the sphere of their plenary powers they are sovereign.”

The legal aspect of the same matter was pursued by L. P. Ul’yanova, part-author of the foregoing, in another journal, viz. *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 10 of 1967, under the heading “Constitutional Machinery for Settling the National Question in India”. She pointed out that the 1956 arrangement of states satisfied only the big “nations”. Even the subsequent additions to “the 14” left a multitude of *narodnosti* and tribes uncatered for; what was accepted in theory as applicable to all, being adopted in practice only in respect of the main linguistic groups. Complicating the problems, she observed, was the division of feeling and allegiance within the bourgeoisie: the upper

sections were interested in the All-India market and opposed to regional markets which would, according to them, disrupt India, whereas the middle and petty bourgeoisie was all for regionalism and the one-nation autonomous state. Over this issue, she said, the big bourgeoisie went in with the feudal landlords, and the rest of the bourgeoisie went along with the popular masses.

She proceeded to discuss the Union-State relationship, drawing on the actual clauses in the Constitution and on such up-to-date commentators as A. Chanda (*Federalism in India*, London, 1965). So elusive, she noticed, was the nature of the Indian Union that Indian jurists themselves had made flatly contradictory pronouncements about it; some calling it a pure federation and others denying it to be a federation at all.

But the virtue of the Indian Union was its adaptability to the changing scene: at one juncture emergency legislation might rob the states of their sovereignty; at another "the autonomy of the Scotland type" would be conceded without reluctance; and always, day in day out, each state enjoyed an imprescriptible right, undefined and therefore limitless, which was its power of protest.

The Report of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission 1965 was subjected to close and very adverse criticism in an article by O. V. Mayev in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3 of 1967. The 10 densely worded pages of "Recommendations of the Commission on Monopolies and their Significance" were intended to prove that the report of this body had been mealy-mouthed, and that its net effect was to leave everything as it was before.

Mayev recalled that certain passages both in the "Second Five-Year Plan 1956" and in the "Third Five-Year Plan 1961" had disclosed the degree to which big business was being monopolized by a handful of influential figures. The public had been profoundly disturbed by these revelations, and pressed for an inquiry. In 1964 a Committee on Distribution of Income and Levels of Living found that measures to combat concentration had failed, and it proposed the formation of a special agency to make recommendations for the proper dispersion of the economic potential. Thus, Mayev said, the Monopolies Commission was set up, which between May 1964 and November 1965 laboriously accumulated the evidence, all of it confirming the worst fears.

The Soviet critic then addressed himself to two questions: (1) What was the Commission's attitude to the proven state of affairs? and (2) what proposals did the Commission make? On the first question one had only to consult Sections II and VI of the Report to know that the authors were actually in favour of monopolies because of their "usefulness" in developing the economy. They acknowledged that big business was a target of detestation and disgust, but they themselves

preferred not to comment on "an issue which would draw them into the path of political contention" (p. 135 of the Report).

On the second question Mayev charged the authors of the Report with being even more pusillanimous. "We are satisfied", he quoted them as saying at p. 140, "that the means at the present disposal of the Government could not halt the growth of concentration of economic power in private hands or remove the harmful consequences of monopolistic practice." The pious hopes the Commission expressed on the prospects for small producers were simply unfounded, and those formulating them were shutting their eyes to Article 39 of the Constitution which provided that the concentration of economic power should not be such as to damage the interests of the community.

The Report, Mayev ended, pin-pointed once again the incompetence of the Indian bourgeoisie even to take steps beneficial to the immense majority of its own rank and file. Unless effective counter measures were adopted, to which the Report gave no pointer of any sort, there was a grave danger that big business would fasten its tentacles on the Indian democratic mechanism itself.

T. F. Devyatkina in *Kratkiye Soobshcheniya* Inst. N.A., No. 75 (1964), traced the "Endeavour of the Indian National Congress to maintain its influence on Youth". During the independence movement, the writer said, the country's youth was a valued asset, but when the victory had been gained it was more or less told to behave itself, settle down to something constructive and not dissipate its energies. Fairly soon, however, the Congress leaders were shrewd enough to see how imperative it was from their standpoint to keep the youth of the nation "in the fairway" (*farvater*) of bourgeois ideology. They therefore inaugurated a Youth Congress with central and state headquarters. The rules and regulations of this network, as also the programme of activities prescribed, were set forth in the article.

Devyatkina pointed out that Youth meant in effect the student population, and that the Congress had in view in this matter—as in all others—the middle classes and, through them, the peasants. "The intensification of work among the rising generation . . . was one of the important links in the chain of measures by which it was hoped to purify the atmosphere within the party . . . and counteract the hold of a non-bourgeois ideology on the Indian people."

Of two discussions on the language problem, one was for the general reader and the other for the student possessing some background knowledge already.

"Our Tower of Babel" by Khoja Ahmad Abbas, in *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 8 of 1967, skated very lightly over the difficulties. A Muslim from the Bombay direction (to judge from his name), the author suggested that it only needed more time for Hindi to be acquired all over the South, and was for his part "convinced that in the future all

Indians will converse with one another in that language". To go by certain of his remarks, e.g. on the origin of Urdu and on the capacity of the classical Tamil to express the most modern ideas, he did not sound like a specialist. Nor perhaps was he too clear in stating that "the example of the Soviet Union has great importance for India".

M. S. Andronov "On the Language Situation in Tamilnad" in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 of 1967, brought his expertise to bear on an aspect of the linguistic problem that has largely been ignored in the political talks. Everybody knows—even if everybody will not admit—that the *shuddhi* Hindi of the "Hindi Imperialists" has little enough in common with the sort of Hindustani which the Mahatma spoke and advocated, but few are aware that the distinction pales into insignificance beside the gap which divides the medieval classical Tamil from the modern speech. As one of the foremost Soviet scholars of Tamil and author of *Spoken Tamil* (Moscow, 1962), and *Grammar of Tamil* (Moscow, 1966), Andronov was well qualified to demonstrate the bearing of this circumstance on the main issue. It had to be grasped, he showed, not merely that the new was divorced lexically as well as phonetically from the old, but that it had no written form. The relevance of this last point is immediately apparent. The literary language does not serve as a vehicle of oral communication and is, moreover, something that postulates a course of classroom study; whereas the "national language of the Tamil people", practical and receptive of scientific and technical terms, is, all said and done, no more than a spoken medium.

Bearing in mind these considerations, the slogan "Hindi Never—English Always!" became, Andronov suggested, more than ever understandable. For the fact was that the student demonstrators marching under that banner preferred English, not merely to the alien Hindi, but to their own difficult Tamil.

I. P. Trufanov wrote (in *Strany i Narody Vostoka*, No. 5, 1967) on "The Question of Indian Emigration Overseas". His 20-odd pages were breaking new ground in Soviet literature where the subject, when touched at all—e.g. by P. M. Shastitko (Moscow, 1963); and D. M. Muhamedova (Tashkent, 1965)—has been narrowly restricted to the South African example. To that extent this wider treatment may have interested its readers, but it will scarcely have impressed the better-informed among them. To be told (at the very end of 1967) that racial discrimination had limited the number admitted into Britain from the entire sub-continent to some ten thousand, was not good enough for an academic journal of standing. Nor can Soviet linguists have swallowed the story repeated here by Trufanov that the European colonizers named the Indian workers "coolies" to insult and humiliate them.

A more serious fault was that these 20 pages were neither this nor that: they did not take an historical look at Indian emigration from, say, 1834 to the end of the British raj; nor yet did they attempt a

portrayal of the actual conditions. Too often a judgment was delivered, or a stricture passed, which mystified simply because its context was so unclear.

## II. ORIENTALIA

The volume called *Strany i Narody Vostoka*, No. 5 of 1967, has figured several times in the present "round-up", and this is perhaps the place to say that its appearance was intended specifically to mark the 20th anniversary of India's independence. It is also the place to say that very many, if not most, of the contents were originally read as papers to the Oriental Commission of the Geographical Society of the USSR.

Appropriately, therefore, I. V. Sakharov, as deputy chairman of that society and general editor of the volume, has opened the miscellany with an account of the origin, scope and up-to-date record of the organization. In "The Oriental Commission of the Geographical Society and its Work on the Study of India", he explained first the genesis and aim. The Commission had come into being in December 1955 for the purpose, apparently, of what in the West would nowadays be termed *vulgarization*. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Russian verb *populyarizovat'* employed in the context extends to areas uncovered by vulgarization. For we read here that it is within the terms of reference of the Commission not simply to acquaint the broad mass of the people more closely with Asia but "to conduct a fight against the reactionary ideology of imperialism and colonialism and to make a contribution to the cause of freedom for the oppressed countries concerned".

Coming secondly to the Commission's performance to date, Sakharov supplied a list of the "reports" presented over the past 12 years. These, as a few examples will show, were of the widest conceivable range. Thus, there was Sakharov himself on the municipal tasks facing the Calcutta Corporation; there was Orbeli's essay on Danibegov; there was Barannikova on Indian religious festivals; and there was Belobrova on India as mirrored in Old Russian art.

Much mystery surrounds the sojourn in India of the Georgian Rafail Danibegashvili, otherwise known as Danibegov. His *Journey to India*, translated by somebody else from the original Georgian, came out in Moscow in 1851 but it was not until the 90s that his name crept into any work of reference. Even then it attracted small notice, and does not occur for instance in Bartol'd's encyclopaedic *History of the Study of the East in Europe and Russia*.

Soviet scholarship has done some further research, the results of which R. R. Orbeli discussed in *Strany Narody Vostoka*, No. 5. His article "The Literary History of Rafail Danibegov's *Journey to India*" adduced the evidence pointing to three separate journeys or rather missions of a diplomatic kind, performed between 1795 and 1827, and argued that for purely literary reasons the first two were telescoped into one in the travelogue as published.

There still entered, however, about as much supposition as evidence into what Orbeli had to say. His surmise was that Danibegov's book was meant to entertain, and that the Georgian nobleman entrusted with highly confidential missions was unable to cross the t's and dot the i's. Certainly no one could accuse him of doing that. His *Journey*, it appears, if quaint and vivid in passages, is often so cryptic as to baffle. *Fanet Georgi* (in Latin characters, incidentally), it is easy to guess, is Fort St. George. But where is *Camber*? Is this perhaps Danibegov's way of writing *Cambeay*? Or *Cawnpore*? And a lot of time—to no very good purpose either—could be spent in deciding (having regard, as Orbeli demonstrated, to the Georgian alphabet) whether *Fadifur* stood for *Fatehpur* or for *Bharatpur*.

"Memorial to Yu. N. Rerikh in Moscow 17 August 1965", by A. N. Zelinskiy, in *Strany i Narody Vostoka*, No. 5, concealed in its title a name which in its Western dress was familiar to Indianists everywhere. For the man whose achievement was here being honoured was none other than the late G. N. Roerich, student at the School of Oriental Studies (of London University) around 1919–20, director from 1930–42 of the Himalayan Research Institute, and author of *Tibetan Painting*, Paris, 1925, *Trails to Inmost Asia*, London, 1931, *The Blue Annals*, Calcutta, 1949–53, etc.

Of a talented family he made his first visit to India in 1923, in the company of his father, Nikolay Rerikh, a painter of note, and it was then that he began the study of Buddhism, and more especially Tibetan culture, which was to occupy his life. In 1929 the Rerikhs, or Roerichs as they should perhaps be called, settled in India, and India was Yuriy Nikolayevich's home for the next 28 years. In 1957 he realized his dream of returning to his native land, said Zelinskiy, and of giving a new impulsion to Orientalism there. In the Soviet Union he was recognized as the leading Tibetologist and given charge of the Section of History, Religion and Philosophy of India in the then Institute of Eastern Studies (now known as Institut Narodov Azii). It was in Russia, too, that he was able to finish his titanic Tibetan-Russian-English Dictionary which was being prepared for the press by his colleagues and pupils, Zelinskiy intimated, at the time of writing.

A. N. Zelinskiy paid homage in the same volume to another Soviet scholar, namely, Academician F. I. Shcherbatskoy, who belonged to the immediately preceding generation. The tribute was entitled: "Fedor Ippolitovich Shcherbatskoy and Some Questions of Kushan Cultural History. (On the Centenary of his Birth.)"

Shcherbatskoy had been in India before the Great War, but on "missions" and not as a resident, and his work, though it crossed the world of scholarship in translation, was all of it done in Russia. He was a product indeed of the old Imperial Orientalism even if the harvest of his toil was gathered in the Soviet period. Three of his permanent

contributions to learning, Zelinskiy noticed, were his *Central Conception of Buddhism and Meaning of the word Dharma*, 1923; *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, Leningrad, 1927; and *Buddhist Logic*, Leningrad, 1932. He had opened by his labours "a new era in the scientific understanding of Northern Buddhism, the fortunes (*sud'by*) of which are closely interwoven with the history and culture of the Kushan State".

Connoisseurs of the Hindi classics are probably more numerous in the Soviet Union than they are in this country, but even so the company competent to appreciate the finer points of an essay on the *rasau* as a medieval literary genre, or another on Rahim's aphorisms in the *doha* metre, must have been fairly select. It happened, however, that in the second of these pieces the technical dissertation was constantly interrupted by observations of intrinsic concern to every Indianist, and on that aspect of an otherwise *recherché* enquiry it will be worth pausing in a minute.

But meanwhile there is the definition of *rasau* offered by N. M. Sazanova in "The Indian Rasaus: A Literary Complex of Medieval Northern India", appearing in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 of 1966.

The meaning of *rasau* in the Braj dialect, Sazanova found, was akin to our lay: the French *chanson* perhaps, in *La Chanson de Roland*, or the Russian *slovo*, in *Slovo o Polku Igoreve*. And this "lay", it seemed to her on grounds of style and content, was in the direct descent of the *kavya*, or fictional epic poems widely current in Indian antiquity. Taking some typical examples like the *Prithviraj rasau* (12th century) and the *Vijaypal rasau* (16th century) she showed how these fitted into the conventional classical moulds of Sanskrit composition as regards preamble, plot, crisis and *dénouement*.

In "The Poetical Aphorisms of Rahim" (*Vestnik* of Leningrad University, No. 2 of 1967), V. I. Balin subjected 30 or 40 couplets of this lesser *Tulsi Das* to close examination for their metre, their artistry, and their thought. The short lecture on the scansion of *doha*, the metre in question, was necessarily technical and, except to those who had met this popular and easy measure in the original, barely intelligible. It was little use informing the reader who had tackled no Hindi verse, that "a long vowel is counted as two *mātras*, or instants". On literary artifice again, Balin's dilemma, though less formidable, was that the various conventions to which this (as in fact any) poet of medieval Hindi was tied, while flavourless to the average reader, hardly required to be brought to the notice of the initiated at all.

But on the content of Rahim's poetry, Balin obviously had something for the general student to ponder. He illustrated how shot through it was with the Vaishnavite interpretation of the Bhakti doctrine. Now this would not be astonishing on the lips of a wandering minstrel in Upper India during the 16th century, but Rahim was not a minstrel of the sort: he was an officer of state close to Akbar and enjoying for his military conquests the resounding title Khan-Khana. The interest was

that a person of his antecedents and his station in the Mogul Empire should have been a mouthpiece of devotion to Krishna as the Supreme Being. Certain of the couplets quoted even posed the question how the speaker could call himself a Muslim. However that might be, the poetry in front of us, Balin considered, was irrefutable evidence of the blend of Islam and Hinduism which had taken place by Rahim's day.

RECENT SOVIET WRITING ON THE  
MONGOLIAN PR :  
ORIENTAL STUDIES AND LINGUISTICS

(Concluded)

By HUBERT EVANS

In our study of Soviet writing on the Mongolian PR in CAR, Vol. XVI, No. 1, we were obliged to omit the section on oriental studies and linguistics owing to lack of space. As this item contains much of value we hoped, as we said, to arrange for its publication in the *Journal* of the Royal Central Asian Society. However, we now find we are able to return to it ourselves and consider it is more appropriate for the survey to be completed in CAR.

For a breakdown of the material received during the past three years, see CAR, Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 26.

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FROM a total of 35,000 words, consisting of eight articles varying in length from 1,500 to 7,500 words, four have been selected for analysis.

A learned description of "Extant Russian Documents on Mongolian Relations in the Thirties, Forties and Fifties of the 17th Century" by M. I. Gol'man and G. I. Slesarchuk appeared in *Kratkiye Soobshcheniya Inst. N.A. No. 76*, 1965. The situation prevailing in Mongolia in those years was adumbrated. A rough delimitation and to some extent a stabilization of the warring feudal groups had occurred: the Dzhungar khanate (represented outstandingly by Batur Khuntaydzhii) had emerged on the extreme left flank; the north-west of Mongolia was held by the Altyn khans (the most prominent among whom was Ombo Erdeni); and further to the east lay the dominions of three powerful chieftains (the Tseten Khan Sholoy, the Tushetu Khan Gombo Dorzhi, and the Dzasaktu Khan Subudi) who had brought that region of Mongolia under subjection to themselves. Each of these khanates was sufficiently on its own politically and economically to establish independent contact with the great neighbouring dynasties of Russia and China. In all the territories concerned Lamaism ruled, the church being liberally subventioned by the khans and accorded an astonishing licence to meddle in public affairs.

The period, the authors said, was one which governed the whole subsequent history of the Mongols, and any documents bearing on it were therefore worthy of close attention. A rich collection of these was happily extant in the Moscow Central State Archive of Ancient Papers

(TsGADA) and the Academy of Sciences Archive (AAN) at Leningrad. For the most part they were diplomatic overtures from the Tsar to particular Mongol khans, instructions to the Siberian *voivodas*, reports from members of different embassies to Mongolia, and the record of the reception of Mongol envoys in Tobol'sk, Tomsk and Moscow itself. In the aggregate they shed considerable light both on the nature of the Russo-Mongolian connexions and on the manners and outlook of the Mongolians of that day. The publication of the material, Gol'man and Slesarchuk explained, was in prospect, but so far only a first volume covering the years 1607 to 1636 had seen the light (1959). There seemed consequently every reason, in anticipation of the appearance in book form of the actual documents, to describe the material pertaining to the much more fertile 30 years which supervened.

To this end the authors took up the tale from 1636 listing the numerous exchanges of courtesies, and sometimes discourtesies, between the Tsars Mikhail Fedorovich and Aleksey Mikhaylovich and the more prominent khans. The lively dialogue was protracted not so much by the physical difficulties of communication as by an equilibrium in bargaining strength. The main issues were (1) the character of the mutual relations desired by the contracting parties; (2) the obligations of local tribes previously paying tribute to the khans but since their transfer to Russian allegiance paying *yasak* (tribute) to the Russian state alone; (3) trade.

The relevant documents, Gol'man and Slesarchuk said, proved that the Tsars had no wish to intervene in domestic disputes nor had they designs on the nomad territories. On both sides the commercial motive was powerful, and among the khans the Dzhungarian Batur-Khuntaydzhi was particularly alive to the advantages of close trading ties.

Pride in the legacy of the older Tsarist oriental scholarship was displayed by L. I. Chuguyevskiy in *Narody Azii i Afriki* No. 3, 1966, in the course of a four-page Note headed "A New Addition to the Manuscript Heritage of N. A. Bichurin". The Note (a) recapitulated the arguments for attributing a Draft History of the Mongol People, hitherto listed as anonymous, to the great Russian authority who donated most of his papers to the Library of the Kazan' Academy some 120 years ago; (b) subjected the actual MS to scrutiny.

A description, purporting to be complete, of the Bichurin legacy which is nowadays housed in the Leningrad Branch of the Institut Narodov Azii came out in *Problems of Orientalism (Problemy Vostokovedeniya)* No. 5 of 1959. It made no allusion to the MS. in debate. Then, very recently, Chuguyevskiy said, his attention was attracted by the fine familiar handwriting of a bulky historical work on Mongolia catalogued as of unknown authorship lying in the same department, and apparently the same room. He went into the case and discovered that although A. Lyubimov who had written on Bichurin's works in 1907 was manifestly unaware of this particular item, a later

scholar, S. A. Kozin, had come to the conclusion that it was from Bichurin's pen and included it (1929) in a list of his unpublished writings, naming it "A History of the Mongol People Derived from the Chinese Chronicle of Thun-Tsyan'-Gan-mu". A third investigator, A. A. Petrov, endorsed Kozin's identification of authorship, and also indicated the chronological span of the historian's theme.

But neither Kozin nor Petrov, said Chuguyevskiy, had submitted the MS. to any close examination. He himself, therefore, proceeded to describe both the MS. (noticing *inter alia* that the paper bore the watermarks 1824 and 1825) and its subject-matter. This was arranged under 10 chronological periods, beginning from "the most ancient times" and ending with the year 1635. Periods VIII and IX were missing, but of each of the others Chuguyevskiy provided a table of contents.

A volume of studies (*Voprosy Istorii stran Azii*, Leningrad, 1965) presented to Professor G. V. Yefimov on his sixtieth birthday, contained an essay by G. S. Gorokhova—"Altan Tobchi as a Source for the Clan Organization of the Early Mongols".

*Altan Tobchi* she clarified, compiled by the 17th-century savant Lubsan Danzan, had the fuller title: "The Golden Code, Being a Concise Narration of the Laws and Regulations of the Khans of Old". Its value was twofold; partly it embodied information totally absent from other works of the sort, and partly it facilitated the interpretation of obscure Chinese texts by its rendering of these in clear Mongolian.

To Ts. Zhamtsaran had been due the first appreciation of *Altan Tobchi* as at once a masterpiece of style and vocabulary and a mine of historical material (1936); and more lately (1953) L. S. Puchkovskiy demonstrated that its narrative matter was traceable to 13th-century originals and that its quoted conversations, precepts and apophthegms had been committed to writing in the lifetime of Chingis Khan. It constituted a compilation, the Russian scholar had pronounced, which corroborated Rashiduddin to the letter.

*Altan Tobchi*, Gorokhova went on, embraced in its pages a sizeable portion of the *Sokrovennoye Skazaniye*, or Secret Story. This classic, known hitherto only in Chinese hieroglyphs of frequently baffling obscurity, was here to be read in the much more intelligible script of 13th-century Mongolian.

At the date of composition—somewhere in the 17th century—Buddhism was exerting a power over the Mongol people so complete that it coloured their historiography. Their historians from the late 16th century onwards were under the marked influence of the Tibetan school which they imitated not simply in manner but in substance, citing copiously the Indian and Tibetan scriptures. This convention, Gorokhova pointed out, the "official historian" Lubsan Danzan had no option but to honour. Thus his work conformed to the accepted Buddhist literary pattern: "First comes the philosophical introductory

portion where the author discourses on the origin of Man in the Buddhist belief; this is followed by a catalogue of the Indian and Tibetan kings with an account of Buddhism in the countries of both; and only then is the history of the Mongols themselves taken up."

The Tibeto-centric standpoint of Lubsan Danzan was further evident, Gorokhova added, in the passages assigned to the provenance of the Mongol khans. They went back, he held, to Altan Sandality, elder son of the first Tibetan Khagan; while a younger son became king of Magada. A common origin (viz. Tibet) was thus ascribed to Indian king and Mongol khan.

In history as distinct from legend there seemed little doubt, Gorokhova thought, that the Mongols began their career with Alan-Goa and her sons in the 8th century. However that might be, they had, as *Altan Tobchi* attests, crystallized into strong tribal unities by the 10th century; and by the early 11th century all the tribes had acknowledged the overlordship of Khabul Khagan of the Bordzhigin family. At the end of that century the Bordzhigins were to be challenged by a rival clan. But victory came to them in 1206, whereupon they chose for the throne Temuchin, or Chingis Khan.

Throughout *Altan Tobchi*, concluded Gorokhova, there was but poor indication of the date when the process of tribal formation started; nor, to complicate matters, was there a clear differentiation between the terms "clan" and "tribe". Nevertheless, the distinction between "our own" and "alien to us" was invariably sharp: "into the complex there entered only the clans which traced their beginning to a single common ancestor;" the other clans, although admitted to the tribal union, could not claim blood relationship, were not "our own" but "alien to us", were not allowed to share the family ritual, had to be content with a subordinate status.

Of interest to linguists was Kh. Yatskovskaya's article in *Vestnik* No. 7, of 1967 on "Recent Research by Mongolian Philologists". The MPR Institute of Language and Literature is engaged in the preparation of a Dialectological Atlas of the republic and attaches primary importance to work in the field. Two expeditions have been performed to date. One, in the autumn of 1965, toured three of the western *aymaks*, and apart from noting local variations of speech was able to record 13 legends, 32 *hylvinas* (ballads) and 250 popular refrains. It also came across, and acquired, 1,500 old books (of the kind handed down within *arat* households from generation to generation) which included many Oyrat MSS. It halted in the home country of a celebrated storyteller, M. Parchina, met his son and friends, and picked up several authentic pieces of his.

The other expedition visited three of the eastern *aymaks* in the autumn of 1966. Of this, Yatskovskaya could write with personal experience, for its members had invited her to accompany them. It was out for 45 days and covered 5,200 kilometres.

The team dealt with much that went beyond the strict limits of dialectological observation. With the help of the hospitable inhabitants and the ready co-operation of local officialdom and public bodies, much was learned about regional customs. The terminology of crafts and skills, and the social organization of the population encountered from place to place, were among the subjects studied.

Within the narrower terms of the "Atlas" programme, a quantity of lexical material was assembled. The dispersal of individual ethnic groups was mapped, and the relevant dialects, as actually heard, recorded.

Yatskovskaya was herself successful in writing down a number of *yerols* (prayers for another's well-being), *magtals* (odes, eulogies) and ritualistic songs.

## BOOK REVIEWS

- BAISHEV, S. B., and CHULANOV, G. Ch. Eds. *The Development of the Economy of Kazakhstan in Fifty Years of Soviet Rule.*
- BALAYAN, B. P. *Iran's International Relations, 1813-1828.*  
*A History of the Mongolian People's Republic.* Nauka Press, Moscow.
- SUSHANLO, M., and STRATANOVICH, C. G. Eds. *Outline History of the Soviet Dungans.*
- SUSHANLO, M., and YUSUPOV, I. Eds. *The Participation of the Dungans in the October Revolution and the Civil War.*
- SVERCHEVSKAYA, A. K., and KUZNETSOVA, A. *Bibliography on Iran. Trade Unions of the Countries of South Asia.* Profizdat.

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**Outline History of the Soviet Dungans** (*Ocherki istorii sovetskikh dungan*).  
Editors M. Sushanlo and G. G. Stratanovich. Ilim Press, Frunze, 1967.  
296 pp. Print order 500. R1.14.

**The Participation of the Dungans in the October Revolution and the Civil War** (*Uchastiye dungan v Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyne*). A collection of documents and reminiscences compiled by M. Sushanlo and I. Yusupov. Ilim Press, Frunze, 1967. 164 pp. Print order 500. 54k.

THESE two books, both produced by the Department of General Turcology and Dungan Studies of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, are devoted to the 21,900 Soviet Dungans (1959 census) who live mainly in the valley of the River Chu in Kirgiziya and Kazakhstan. The first is a collective work by scholars of the Department and of the Institutes of World Literature and Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences and is the first general history of the Soviet Dungans. It adds nothing of substance to recent Soviet writing on the subject.<sup>1</sup> After discussing the origin of the Dungans, the authors go on to describe the conditions in China which led up to the Dungan revolt of 1862-78, the two waves of Dungan settlement in Russia in 1877 and 1882-83, the life of the Dungans in Tsarist Russia, their participation in the 1916 uprising, their role during the Revolution and civil war, and their life from that time until the present day.

The chapters dealing with the period before the Revolution are by far the most satisfactory, although they suffer from a refusal to recognize the importance of their religion in the lives of the Dungans and a determination to visualize everything in terms of the class struggle. Thus the Dungan revolt is seen not as a religious movement but as part of a general peasant rebellion in China against the "feudal yoke", and Dungan participation in the 1916 uprising is put down to exploitation by their own kulaks and merchants.

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, "The Dungans of Semirech'ye" in CAR, Vol. IX, 1961, No. 2, pp. 113-125.

The chapters dealing with "the Dungans in the fraternal family of the peoples of the USSR" consist mainly of an account of the purportedly uninterrupted growth in the prosperity of the Dungan kolkhozes under Soviet rule. The difficulties of collectivization, when a number of Dungans fled back to Sinkiang,<sup>2</sup> are glossed over. Nor are the purges mentioned even though one of the victims (now rehabilitated) was Magaza Masanchin, one of the most famous Soviet Dungans who distinguished himself during the civil war and subsequently held a series of important posts in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. After the endless facts and figures on the kolkhozes it is only in the chapter on the culture of the Soviet Dungans that they come to life at all and one gets a slight idea of their continuing attachment to their traditional ways. The occasional article in the daily press has suggested that behind the authors' image of the model Dungan kolkhoznik the private-enterprise market-gardener par excellence of pre-collectivization days is still very much alive, but there is not a hint of this in the work under review. The reader is given no clear picture of the distinctive contribution of the Dungans to the society in which they live or of how they are regarded by their neighbours. And as to their attitude towards, or any recent links with, their fellow Dungans in China, not a single word is vouchsafed.

The book would have gained considerably from the addition of maps, e.g. of the 1862-78 revolt in China and the Dungan settlements in Russia. There is no index or bibliography, but there is a useful summary of Dungan studies in the Soviet Union in the body of the work.

The collection of documents and reminiscences on Dungan participation in the Revolution and civil war is slight but interesting, particularly for the light it throws on the Dungan Cavalry Regiment since the question of the formation of native military units in Central Asia at this time has been little studied. Many similar collections of documents and reminiscences have been published in Central Asia in recent years and their careful perusal is usually well worth while even though one knows that they have been judiciously selected to support the current Soviet version of events at the time in question. Almost invariably, it seems, a truer and less flattering picture emerges than is found in the recent histories.

The present collection consists of an introduction, 63 documents, many of them previously unpublished, and 20 brief reminiscences, mainly by former soldiers of the Dungan Cavalry Regiment including its commander Magaza Masanchin. Fifteen of the 20 reminiscences have been taken down by the compilers, Sushanlo and Yusupov. The evidence the documents provide of Dungan support for the Revolution and Soviet rule in Semirech'ye up to the time of the appointment of the Turkestan Commission in October 1919 is slender in the extreme. It consists of a footnote to document No. 5 which states that three Dungan peasant delegates attended the Second Semirech'ye Oblast Congress of Peasant Deputies in Vernyy (now Alma-Ata) in early January 1918 and expressed support for the October Revolution; a newspaper report that, on the establishment of Soviet rule in Vernyy in early March 1918, a body called the "Dungan Committee" sent a letter recognizing Soviet rule; and a decision of the

<sup>2</sup> Large numbers also took refuge in Sinkiang after the 1916 uprising, which explains why the Soviet Dungan population dropped from just over 18,000 in 1905 to about 15,000 in 1939.

board of the "Dungan Ploughman" union, an organization of Dungan peasants in Pishpek *uyezd*, of November 1918 that prosperous local Dungans should be called on to supply warm *khalats* for the Red Army. The reminiscences offer slightly more evidence of support, albeit limited, for the Soviet cause. Before the Revolution Dungan peasants were not liable to be called up, but the Dungans in the towns were, and many served at the front during the First World War. Here they came into contact with the disaffected Russian soldiery and on their return to Pishpek (now Frunze) and Vernyy a number of them fought on the side of the Reds in Semirech'ye in 1918 and 1919. Whether they did so entirely out of political conviction, however, is open to doubt. As for the Dungan peasants, at best their attitude seems to have been neutral, which is hardly surprising given "the outrageous and savage deeds" (document No. 40) committed by the Semirech'ye Bolsheviks against the native peoples. According to the introduction, the wealthy Dungans and clergy supported the Whites.

The bulk of the documents in the book concern the formation and activities of the Dungan Cavalry Regiment and its commander Masanchin. Two long reports by the Semirech'ye Oblast Military Commissar Kovrov-Goller (documents Nos. 22 and 40) are of particular interest not only for their information on the Regiment but also for their frank description of the general situation in Semirech'ye in the three or four years after the Revolution. One of the policies pursued by the Turkestan Commission in its efforts to win native support was to encourage native enrolment in the Red Army and to set up specifically Muslim units. This policy met with bitter resistance from the Russian settlers in Semirech'ye, who tried to thwart in every way measures designed to give the natives a fair deal after the excesses of the local Soviet regime over the previous two years. When the Turkestan authorities decided that a healthier atmosphere could only be achieved by demobilizing some of the locally recruited Russian soldiers and transferring others to Fergana, there was a mutiny in Vernyy in June 1920. It is known from other sources that among the demands of the rebels was an end to the creation of Muslim units. The revolt was soon put down and the soldiers disarmed or sent away from Semirech'ye. But with the Russian settler population largely hostile and the natives distrustful the Turkestan Soviet authorities felt the need for a force in Semirech'ye on whom they could lean, and Frunze and Kuybyshev called on Magaza Masanchin, a Dungan Red Army commander, to form a Dungan Cavalry Regiment as a matter of great urgency. It is not clear why the Dungans were chosen rather than one of the other native groups. It may have been simply because a ready-made commander was to hand in Masanchin, a Tsarist conscript stationed in Tashkent at the time of the Revolution who had fought on the Soviet side from the beginning, had come to Semirech'ye in November 1919 as deputy commander of the Muslim Battalion, and had played a prominent role in the suppression of the mutiny in Vernyy in June 1920.

The order for the formation of the Dungan Cavalry Regiment was issued on 14 September 1920, and mobilization began in mid-October. Those Dungans already serving in other Red Army units were allowed to transfer to the new regiment. With the unpleasantness they had suffered in an earlier mobilization of the Muslim population fresh in their memories, the Dungans were at first not very enthusiastic about being called up again.

Some of the richer ones fled to Kuldja, and others resorted to bribery to avoid being conscripted. But things went somewhat better later as they became convinced that at last the authorities were genuinely on their side. The regiment was formed by early December 1920 and after rapid training was already in action in Semirech'ye later that month. Meanwhile other native groups began to show an interest in having their own units to protect their interests, and recruitment of another Muslim regiment on a voluntary basis began. In the middle of all this Tashkent decided for some reason to call a halt to the formation of native units, but matters had gone too far to go into reverse without disastrous effects on the newly won native confidence in the regime.

Kovrov-Goller's reports are interesting on the difficulties of training the Muslim recruits. The commanders of the Dungan and the other Muslim regiment (which also contained a number of Dungans) included a high proportion of Europeans who did not know the native languages. But this did not create such great difficulties as did the continuing wall of national suspicion between the natives and the Europeans. In this respect things were much easier in the Dungan regiment with its Dungan commander, than in the Muslim which had a Russian commander to start with. The native psychology made it difficult for them to understand certain aspects of army life—for instance, that it was desertion to go home for a few days without permission when they were doing nothing in camp, or that service in the army involved doing certain menial jobs as well as learning how to fight. The natives regarded music as a leisure pastime and on one occasion when they were working and a military band was playing they objected that the musicians were enjoying themselves while they themselves worked. But on the whole the natives responded well to military training, and the existence of the Muslim units provided the authorities with a golden opportunity to carry out concentrated propaganda among the recruits away from the reactionary influence of their elders and clergy.

The Dungans, in particular, proved to be apt cavalymen, and did valiant service in Semirech'ye in spite of the continuing hostility of the settler population. After trying unsuccessfully to disrupt the formation of the regiment, the settlers deliberately spread false rumours about its reliability and that of its commander, Masanchin. In September 1921 both the Dungan and the Muslim regiments were transferred to Fergana to fight the Basmachi. Before they left, the Dungan population gave Masanchin various gifts including a famous horse and some things which had belonged to Bay Yan-khu, one of the most popular leaders of the Dungan revolt in China. Various old men insisted on joining the regiment to act as watchmen. On their way to Fergana the Dungan Regiment paraded in Tashkent and is reported to have reminded onlookers of crack Tsarist cavalry units. The Dungans fought with distinction against the Basmachi in Fergana, the Hungry Steppe, the Zeravshan valley and Eastern Bukhara, and everywhere seem to have behaved in an exemplary fashion towards the local population, unlike many Red Army units which were completely undisciplined and treated the native peasants badly, destroying and plundering their property (documents Nos. 45, 46 and 59). The regiment was disbanded in early 1923.

The compilers have permitted some surprising errors of chronology. The most glaring concerns document No. 22 (one of Kovrov-Goller's reports) which is dated March 1920 although it was clearly written some months

after the formation of the Dungan Regiment and should probably have been dated March 1921. Similarly, document No. 48, which concerns the valour of Masanchin and his units in fighting the Basmachi *kurbashi* Maksum in Fergana, is dated August 1921 although the Dungan regiment did not reach Fergana until October of that year.

A. S.

**Iran's International Relations, 1813-1828** (*Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya Irana v 1813-1828 gg.*) By B. P. Balayan. Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. Yerevan, 1967, 297 pp. Print order 1,000. R1.20.

No man, the lawyers say, is a fit judge of his own cause; he may nevertheless be a good chronicler of it. As an historian who moves as easily among the Persian-language sources as among the official Russian archives, Balayan is well equipped technically; as an Armenian, he has brought to his research the pride and prejudice of his background.

The dates in the title of this vigorous and eminently readable study are respectively those of the Treaty of Golestan and the Treaty of Torkaman-chay. They enclose, that is, the years of feverish activity in which Iran, having lost the greater part of her Caucasian possessions to Russia attempted by every sort of diplomatic ruse and, this failing, by actual force of arms, to win them back; only to be humbled a second time, and to be forced to put her signature to a document that would govern her relationship with the Russians until 1917.

Balayan's text is that although Iran was coveted by the European Powers in their competing designs of colonial aggrandizement, she at her level preyed greedily on Transcaucasia, the Afghan principalities, Western Armenia, Kurdistan and Mesopotamia; and that there is much need to correct the prevailing opinion that Iran at that time (sc. the first part of the 19th century) had no foreign policy of her own and was simply being tossed about like a cockle-shell in the fairway of great vessels. In giving currency to this fashionable interpretation, the modern Iranian scholars are, according to Balayan, the worst offenders, but their Western teachers and mentors are also to blame for having brought them up badly. Nor, as it appears from these chapters, does the standard view conform to an ideology, bourgeois or other. "Historical literature" as such is awry in the context, and so reputable (one would think) a work as Ye L. Shteynberg's "History of British Aggression in the Middle East" (*Istoriya britanskoy agressii na srednem vostoke*), Moscow, 1951, heads Balayan's list of those arraigned. The Iran of the Qajars, he sets out to prove, had no right—no more than had the Turkey of the Sultans—to Transcaucasia and Dagestan, and her presence in those places was motivated by pillage and maintained by violence. The revolt of the oppressed peoples of the Caucasus from an alien yoke was righteous, their voluntary association with the Russians, who alone (seeing that Britain and France were standing over the shoulder of Iran) could turn the scales against the inveterate enemy on their soil, a counsel of patriotism as well as common sense. There might be, there were, plenty of traitors—mostly among the Khans—who went over to the Qajars; but the bulk of the people, Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaydzhanis, as the contemporary documents now held in the Soviet archives attest, were for, and often in the ranks of, the Russians.

In present-day Iranian historiography, Balayan finds, the nation's expansionism is in fancy dress. It takes his breath away. All the surrounding peoples are either already part and parcel of Iran, or cannot wait to be so. Thus, to believe Sa'id Nafisi, India is nothing other than "Iran's Indian Colony"; the Afghans have always spoken Persian, have always felt the pull to Iran; and so on. The pages of one who can romance in this style will evidently not contain any proper estimate of the predatory impulses of Iran, of her thirst, in the particular years under examination, for revenge. No less untrustworthy, Balayan thinks, is Professor 'Ali Akbar Bina (*Tarikh e siyasi wa diplomasi ye Iran*). Take his account of the Tiflis Convention of 1825 on an agreed frontier line, whereby Russia was to retain the Sevan shore and Iran to get the Kafan region. Bina's audacious comment here is that "the Russians had consented to exchange one Iranian territory for another, inasmuch as both Sevan and Kafan *already* belonged to Iran". History? Geography? What, Balayan asks, are these to the Professor?

The same class of tendentious writing, the author complains, obscures the causes responsible for the second Russo-Iranian War. "The occasion was indeed offered by disputes on the frontier. However, these were not a *casus belli* for Russia who on the Iranian version had obtained England's sanction and moved her frontiers to the Araks. No, these frontier quarrels were fomented by Iran with the set intention of an attack on Russia." Alexander I had sedulously avoided hostilities with Iran from the moment of their cessation in 1813, and one of the first injunctions issued to Yermolov by his successor, Nicholas I, dated January 1826, reads: "Maintain the peace concluded with Iran on the basis of the Golestan Treaty unless that power itself break it."

England of course (on Balayan's argument still) had from the date of the Golestan Treaty been scheming to get it revised, and her own Tehran Treaty with Iran, signed in 1814, was a standing incitement to the Iranians to pick a further quarrel with Russia. In conversation with Canning in January 1827, Lieven, the Russian Ambassador in London, was to allude to this; pointing out that the 1814 treaty "encouraged the Iranian Court to have at Russia, since the Shah was convinced that British subsidies would not fail to fetch up at the Iranian Treasury, and in case of danger Iran could hide behind England."

Turning to the Torkamanchay Treaty of 1828, Balayan calls attention to the biased verdict of Iranian historians that the Shah and his advisers were the victims of European high politics, hidebound, hampered, ignorant of diplomacy. He suggests that this reading of the matter is borrowed from Morier and deliberately put about to cover up a most aggressive and tenaciously pursued foreign policy on the part of the Qajars towards Transcaucasia. In point of fact, he says, the behaviour day-in, day-out during all these years, of the Shah, of the Crown Prince, of the Ministers, argued precisely the opposite. So far from betraying the slightest sign of helplessness they showed themselves to be men of inexhaustible resource and sly capacity, and it is plain, in particular, that the tortuous talks leading to the Treaty were conducted by the Iranian side with quite astonishing skill.

Balayan's loyalty to the cause of his people was noticed in the opening sentences of this review. It is perhaps in keeping with the zeal of his

approach that his reliance should very largely be on Armenian initiative in the field of scholarship. His obligations most notably are to Z. T. Grigoryan, author of *The Union of Eastern Armenia with Russia at the beginning of the 19th century*, Moscow, 1959, and editor-in-chief of this present study; to M. Nersisyan: *History of Russo-Armenian Relations*, Yerevan, 1956; to A. R. Ioannisyan: *The Union of Transcaucasia to Russia, and International Relations at the beginning of the 19th century*, Yerevan, 1958; and to the innumerable documents which he himself has come across in AKAK (Akty Kavkazkoy arkheograficheskoy komissiyey, Tiflis, 1875).

The fly-leaf of this publication sponsored by a minority academy is, in accordance with normal practice, printed in the two relevant languages—Armenian in addition to Russian. What was unexpected was to find at the end of the volume a page-length synopsis in Persian. This advertised Balayan's full critical analysis (*tajzieh o ahlile kamel*) of the imputations of the Iranian historians in the light of the incontrovertible evidence of the sources. Presumably the idea here was to bring, or increase the chances of bringing, the author's stinging strictures to the attention of the Tabriz and Tehran Universities.

H. E.

**A History of the Mongolian People's Republic** (*Istoriya Mongol'skoy Respubliki*). Second Edition. Revised and Enlarged. Nauka Press, Moscow, 1967. pp. 538. Print Order 5,500. R2.35.

In 1954 the joint endeavour of a mixed team of Soviet and Mongolian scholars, working under the auspices of the USSR and the MPR Academies of Sciences, was crowned by the publication of a one-volume, and therefore reasonably concise, history of Mongolia from the earliest times until the present day. It was entitled—not too accurately considering that rather more than half the page allotment had been exhausted before the date of 1920 was reached in the narrative—*A History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, and the Mongolian version (for it was done in both languages) became, it seems, an accepted textbook in the secondary schools and the higher institutions of the MPR. For this educational use it was, thanks to its methodical lay-out in two Parts, 11 Sections and 33 Chapters, admirably adapted. In the Russian version it met, one supposes, the requirements of the student specializing in some related field and those of the general reader; both of whom would be grateful for a coherent, lucid story, and satisfied with no more documentation than an occasional footnote plus an ample bibliography.

It was decided 12 years later that the time had arrived for a second edition: mistakes had been spotted, discoveries (archaeological especially) had been made, and the panorama of events had unrolled since 1954; in the interval, moreover, the XX Congress of the Soviet Union CP had adopted its pertinent resolutions. There were also the pronouncements of the XIII, XIV and XV Congresses of the MPRP to take into account.

The new volume embodies the appropriate changes.

H. E.

## SHORTER NOTICES

**The Development of the Economy of Kazakhstan in Fifty Years of Soviet Rule** (*Razvitiye narodnogo khozyaystva Kazakhstana za 50 let sovetской vlasti*). Edited by S. B. Baishev and G. Ch. Chulanov. Nauka Press of the Kazakh SSR, Alma-Ata, 1967. 464 pp. Print Order 4.250. R2.05.

THIS is the third book of a series devoted to current problems of the Kazakh economy published by the Economics Institute of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences. It is a collective work dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Revolution and reviews economic progress in the republic over the previous half-century. The first chapter gives a general description of the development of the economy under Soviet rule, while the second deals with changes in the structure of industry over the years. The remaining chapters deal with individual industries (non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy, coal, oil, chemicals, engineering, power, construction, light and food) as well as agriculture, transport and communications, and standard of living. In each case the development of the individual sector of the economy over the last 50 years is described with particular emphasis on the recent period and the present Five Year Plan. The style is matter-of-fact, the book is stuffed with facts and figures and tables, and current problems are discussed in a dispassionate manner. It should prove a useful work of reference.

A. S.

**Bibliography on Iran** (*Bibliografiya Irana*). Literature in Russian, 1917-1965. Compiled by A. K. Sverchevskaya, and edited by N. A. Kuznetsova. USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1967. 392 pp. Print Order 1,800. R2.54.

BEING the first bibliography of Soviet publications about Iran, this volume is not simply important, but indispensable to all who occupy themselves with Iranian matters. In contemplating the prodigious output, evidenced here in nearly 400 pages, it may be tempting to interpose that a lot of it is ephemeral, or else tendentious and warped. It would be foolish in the extreme having yielded to that temptation, to succumb to another and wonder whether the rest is much good either. The way perhaps to judge Soviet, as to judge any, literature is to get acquainted with it in the departments corresponding to one's own calling or recreational tastes. This bibliography, admirably arranged and indexed, will permit any person able to read Russian to know not indeed what is "on offer" (for Soviet literature is not, alas, to be ordered by a postcard addressed to the local bookseller) but at least to know what has come out in his own field of interest. It will then be for him to try, with the co-operation of the available agencies, to obtain it.

H. E.

**Who's Who in Public Life in Afghanistan** (*Gosudarstvennyye i obshchestvenno-politicheskiye deyateli Afganistana*). USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1967. 57 pp. Print Order 8,000. 12k.

THIS little handbook contains the biographies of 70 or 80 of Afghanistan's more prominent political and official personalities. It includes the list of provincial governors as this stood on 1 April 1967, and the composition of the Government as on 1 August 1967 with a postscript inserted after the booklet had gone to press, intimating that Muhammad Hashim Mayvandval had retired for health reasons in October last, handing over his functions as Prime Minister temporarily to the Minister of Planning, M. Abdulla Yaftali.

H. E.

**Trade Unions of the Countries of South Asia** (*Profsoyuzy Stran Yuzhnoy Azii*)  
Profizdat 1967. 64 pp. Print Order 3,300. 18k.

THIS brochure is the last in a series called "Trade Unions of the World" which Profizdat has been publishing since 1964. It describes factually enough the Trade Unions of India, the Workers' Movement in Nepal, the Trade Unions of Pakistan, and the Workers' Movement in the Maldivé Islands.

H. E.

# SOVIET PRESS COMMENT

1 April-30 June 1968

## I. THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND KAZAKH SSRs

DURING the period under review a good deal of press coverage was allotted to various anniversaries, interrepublican arts festivals, agricultural topics and foreign affairs. Much space was also given to reports on sessions of the Supreme Soviets of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Tadzhik and Turkmen SSRs. Reviews of the past year's work in the Party schools and the problem of political education also occupied many columns.

### *Party and government*

It was a busy quarter for Party and government bodies.

Oblast, rayon and town Party conferences were held in support of the April plenum of the CC CPSU, which was devoted to the international situation and the struggle of the CPSU for the unity of the world communist movement, and a plenum of the Tadzhik Central Committee discussed ideological work in Dushanbe city and Dangara rayon and measures to improve capital construction in the republic (KT 5.6.68). With the end of the Party school year there was the usual flood of articles on the importance of political education and the need for further improvements in political propaganda.

Supreme Soviet sessions were held in Uzbekistan (PV 15.5.68, 16.6.68), Turkmenistan (TI 13.6.68, 14.6.68), Tadzhikistan (KT 6.6.68, 8.6.68) and Kazakhstan (KP 19.6.68, 20.6.68). Among the topics discussed were the need to improve retail trade and services in connexion with the introduction of the five-day week (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan), increasing the production of consumer goods (Kazakhstan), libraries, clubs and other cultural institutions (Tadzhikistan), the preservation of ancient monuments (Uzbekistan) and nature conservation (Tadzhikistan).

Many articles were devoted to methods of ensuring better implementation by soviets of government and Party decisions and the work of local deputies, and also to the importance of paying attention to complaints from the public.

By a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 30 May 1968 (VVS No. 23 (1421) of 5.6.68), those Turks, Kurds, Khemshilis and Azerbaydzhanis who had previously resided in western Georgia and now live in the Uzbek, Kazakh and other union republics were granted permission to reside anywhere in the USSR. (These peoples were presumably deported from Georgia during the Second World War. According to the 1959 census there were 38,000 Azerbaydzhanis and 6,000 Kurds in Kazakhstan and 41,000 Azerbaydzhanis and 21,000 Turks (PV 31.7.60) in Uzbekistan.)

S. G. Sazonov has been appointed Chairman of the Committee of State Security of the Tadzhik SSR in place of M. M. Milyutin, who has been transferred to other work (KT 8.5.68).

*Political anniversaries*

The quarter was remarkable for its numerous anniversaries. The 98th anniversary of Lenin's birth and preparations to celebrate the centenary received their usual attention in the Central Asian press. The 150th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx was widely celebrated, and often nearly the whole of an issue was devoted to historical and economic analyses stressing the advantages of the communist system based on Marxist philosophy.

In the wake of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution have come the 50th anniversaries of various landmarks of the early days of Soviet rule. Among those celebrated were the organization of the Turkestan Military District (SK 4.5.68, KT 4.5.68, 6.5.68), Lenin's decree on irrigation in Turkestan (PV 18.5.68), the founding of the Soviet health service, the First Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party (SK 16.6.68, PV 16.6.68), and the founding of the Uzbek Telegraph Agency (PV 7.6.68) and the newspaper *Sovet Uzbekistoni* (PV 11.6.68, 21.6.68).

*Foreign affairs*

Central Asian press coverage of foreign affairs was a more or less condensed version of that in the metropolitan press. In April reports of events in Greece took much space and somewhat overhauled those of the Vietnam war. Several meetings in different parts of the Central Asian republics were held in support of the Greek people's struggle against fascism (SK 16.4.68, TI 19.4.68, KP 21.4.68). Developments in Czechoslovakia were reported in much the same way as in the metropolitan press, and several workers' meetings were held in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan reaffirming Soviet-Czech friendship (KP 26.6.68, KT 28.6.68, TI 26.6.68). There were fairly regular reports entitled "Events in China".

Foreign visitors included a DDR friendship delegation to Alma-Ata and Chimkent (KP 1.5.68, 9.5.68), a Finnish CP delegation to Kirgiziya (SK 11.6.68, 12.6.68), and Indian M.P.s and Moroccan Muslim leaders to Tashkent (PV 26.6.68, 28.5.68). In Tashkent an agreement on cultural collaboration between the Punjab and Uzbekistan was signed (PV 19.6.68).

*Agriculture and irrigation*

As might be expected much was written about the forthcoming grain harvest and the state of the cotton crops. In May and June local newspapers regularly reported on the condition of agricultural machinery and some kolkhozes were criticized for inefficiency in the preparation of harvesters. A lack of spare parts hampered machinery repairs.

An early and successful grain harvest was reported from southern Kazakhstan where sovkhoses in the Chardara and Saryagach rayons fulfilled Plans and sold 30,000 tons of grain to the state. In the Vakhsh rayon of Tadzhikistan farmers had the highest yield (30 centners a hectare) ever achieved there, but the Kirgiz Central Committee summoned a special meeting of kolkhoz and sovkhos managers and Party executives to discuss the poor state of the grain crops on irrigated land in the Chu valley where yields look like being disappointing because of insufficient watering (SK 20.6.68).

Because of unfavourable spring weather many cotton fields had to be replanted and some irrigation works had to be repaired (TI 22.6.68, PV 25.6.68, KT 22.6.68). Much was written about inadequate irrigation of the cotton crops. In Tadzhikistan, for instance, apprehension was expressed that some kolkhozes would not fulfil their cotton quotas because of negligent watering and poor work organization (KT 20.6.68, 23.6.68).

Other agricultural topics were the early crops of vegetables in Kazakhstan (PR 28.5.68) and reports of a generally good hay harvest, assuring sufficient winter supplies of fodder for livestock.

The most noteworthy event in the field of irrigation took place on 18 May when water from the Vakhsh flowed for the first time into the Yavan valley through a tunnel under the Karatau range (see CAR, No. 4 of 1967, pp. 343-4). Long articles discussed agricultural prospects and the proposed chemical industry development in the hitherto waterless Yavan valley (KT 18.5.68, 19.5.68, PV 21.5.68). The 27-km. Mulkush canal in Gallyaaraal has been completed and will water 10,000 ha. in a particularly barren part of the Zeravshan valley (PR 16.6.68).

### *Industry and construction*

The last section of the 220-km. Ashkhabad-Tedzhen high-voltage power transmission line has been put under load, and the Tedzhen oasis is now assured of power supplies from the Bezmein power station (IZ 16.4.68). The highest high-voltage power transmission line in the country is now in operation from Frunze to Naryn and an extension to At-Bashi is due for completion by the end of the year (IZ 2.6.68). The Kyzylkumy-Krasnovodsk gas pipe-line, which brings gas over 200 km. from the Nebit-Dag area for processing at the Krasnovodsk oil refinery, has been completed. This means that all the natural gas deposits of western Turkmenistan are now linked together (Kom.P. 9.6.68).

Problems of the building industry figured prominently in this quarter, and this was a direct echo of the many construction industry meetings and conferences which took place in Moscow. In Kazakhstan by 1 May two million flats had been built since 1945 (SK 1.5.68). But in general there was much criticism of poor quality work, inefficiency and delays. Rushing work to finish buildings on schedule often affects quality, and sometimes urgent repairs have to be undertaken soon after completion. In Kirgiziya only 68 per cent of the building programme for educational institutions for the first five months of the year was carried out (SK 22.6.68). Much attention was directed to improving rural construction. Here the main criticism was of a lack of planning in villages (SK 21.6.68).

Leningrad architects have won first prize in a competition for the rebuilding of the centre of Alma-Ata, where multi-storey earthquake-resistant buildings are already going up (PR 9.6.68).

### *Law and order*

Discussion of the new draft Principles of Marriage and Family Legislation occupied many pages in this quarter. A Party meeting in Tashkent on 16 May was devoted to the prevention of crime and hooliganism in Uzbekistan (PV 18.5.68).

*Education and cultural affairs*

The forthcoming all-Union Congress of Teachers in Moscow was preceded by the congresses of teachers of the Kirgiz and Turkmen SSRs (UG 6.4.68, TI 18.5.68). These events, together with the 50th anniversary of Lenin's decree on education, were the occasion for various articles on the role of the teacher in modern education.

Several festivals of culture took place during this quarter. Many pages were devoted to the festival of Tadjik culture in Uzbekistan, Armenian culture in Kazakhstan and Uzbek culture in Estonia. There were also several film festivals—Estonian in Kazakhstan (KP 7.6.68), Latvian in Uzbekistan (PV 23.5.68), and the 7th Festival of Central Asian and Kazakh Films in Frunze (SK 21.4.68). The 25th anniversary of the Kirgiz Ballet and Opera Theatre was noticed in numerous lengthy articles.

The prominent Uzbek novelist and dramatist Abdulla Kakhkhar died on 25 May 1968 after a long illness (PV 26.6.68).

*Everyday life*

The introduction of the five-day week and the problem of extra leisure continued to excite discussion on the need for more cultural amenities for the workers and the necessity of developing tourism. There were appeals to transport officials to arrange railway time-tables to suit weekenders (PV 22.6.68, KT 21.6.68, TI 29.5.68, KP 2.6.68, IZ 1.6.68).

The sale of consumer goods and the building of modern self-service stores received quite a lot of attention in the Central Asian press, and there was criticism of the inadequacy of canteens, the shortage of restaurants, especially in the big towns, and menus lacking in variety. Catering establishments were accused of frequently neglecting the importance of pleasant surroundings. In a letter to *Pravda* (8.6.68) a master-cook in Alma-Ata criticized the catering establishments of the Kazakh capital, where no attention is paid to culinary problems. "Last year the entire public catering in Alma-Ata did not use even three tons of root and leaf vegetables, although we could have handled perhaps as much as 100 tons."

The approach of the summer season together with the 50th anniversary of the Soviet health service brought forth appeals for the better exploitation of natural resources for resorts and spas in Kirgiziya (SK 18.5.68) and Tadjikistan (KT 31.5.68).

J. C.

## II. ADJOINING COUNTRIES

**The Indian Subcontinent***India*

Reporting fell far short of the quarterly average of recent years.

Early in April the formal call, the first in history, by ships of the Soviet Navy at Madras and Bombay was briefly featured. (It was the subject, five weeks later, of a lengthy piece of journalistic prose from the pen of an officer who was present.) On 7.4.68 IZ, etc., carried the ceremony at which the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, laid the first stone of the large metal-lurgical works in Bihar, about to be constructed with Soviet assistance. In

the middle of the month there were snippets on the strike of some 3,500 Madras dockers who were demanding a guaranteed minimum wage, paid holidays and a limited working day. About the same date (IZ 17.4.68) President Zakir Husain was reported as having signed the decree of dissolution of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. In PR 19.4.68 the paper's special correspondent, I. Serebryakov, wrote up the Indian Triennale which had just opened in Delhi. The inhabitants of the capital, he said, had been introduced to contemporary art as exemplified in the work of artists from 32 countries. He had been impressed by the keenness of Indians not simply to look at the exhibits but to interpret them, and thus to express what the modern man demands of art. Two or three lines in the press of 21.4.68 intimated that Mr. Kosygin was making a short halt at Delhi that day, at Mrs. Gandhi's instance, on his way back from Pakistan to Moscow.

In May there were several signed contributions in PR and IZ of a kind to which the Soviet reader is fairly hardened. In PR 3.5.68 I. Serebryakov under the heading of "A Tale of the Communists of India" related a conversation he had been having with two characters, one a man of 70 and the other about half that age, at a meeting in Tanjur "for the protection of Vietnam". The older man recounted his experiences in and out of gaol, and described in particular how (it was in February 1946) "the people of Madras rose in support of the mutineers of the Royal Indian Navy and within 24 hours became masters of the city". The younger man, chairman of a village panchayat, and also a Communist, held forth on agrarian reform; not, it might seem, optimistically: production cooperatives were still a dream and "as against 600,000 villages in India there are only about 4,000 such cooperatives". In IZ 5.5.68 K. Pervoshchikov ("The ship has sprung a leak") wrote with satisfaction of "the crack up of the coalition in Madhya Pradesh". It had been "knocked together" hastily on the morrow of the elections and had attracted a poor type of Congress politician who had accepted Rajmata's leadership for the sake of office. Now that she had thrown in her hand these renegades did not know where to turn. In PR 23.5.68 A. Maslennikov, who is over-prone to mistake the pages of the *Patriot* for gospel, described at second-hand a seminar on South Asian Foreign Policy arranged at Jaipur. The article was called "Philanthropists from CIA pack their trunks". Maslennikov believed that the purpose of the discussion was to advertise, and urge the implementation of, a South Asian union against Communism. The speakers, who included a certain S. P. Varma, were "shameless", but fortunately the majority of those participating were able to give "the transatlantic teachers" what they deserved, and the American master of ceremonies left not only the hall, but Jaipur, in a hurry. The whole affair had been staged, Maslennikov asserted, by the CIA and their paid hands, and it was high time these philanthropists packed their bags.

A few miscellaneous items appearing in May can be noticed: the signing in Delhi of the protocol to an accord on cooperation in harnessing atomic energy to peaceful ends; the announcement that one of the Lenin Peace Prizes had been awarded to an Indian, Romesh Chandra, General Secretary of the World Council of Peace; the strike of 150,000 government employees in West Bengal that paralysed the administration of Calcutta; the Haryana elections resulting in a victory for the National Congress and a shattering defeat for the Jan Sangh and Swatantra.

The presence of a delegation from the Indian parliament which toured Russia in June occasioned a dozen or so insertions in the metropolitan and provincial press. Led by Dr. N. Sanjiva Reddy, the delegates visited Moscow, Irkutsk, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Leningrad where their programme was followed in reasonable detail through the latter half of the month. Otherwise, India was hardly in focus, and readers had to be content with a delegation from the Indian Red Cross Society received by the Red Crescent Society of Tadzhikistan (KT 21.6.68); and a pharmaceutical symposium held in Tashkent to study the possible exchange with India both of research specialists and—with a view to acclimatization—of medicinal herbs (PV 19.6.68).

### *Pakistan*

Pakistan nowadays competes for position with the favourites in the field, and on present form may soon be challenging India. A couple of years ago in this series it was a case of using almost every one of the filed cuttings; it is now a case of concentrating on major, or somehow representative, items to the exclusion of much else.

In April the feature of the month was Mr. Kosygin's visit. Taking in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi between the 17th and 20th, this was accorded a coverage as sustained as it was generous. It also occasioned, or was made to justify, through the subsequent days a crop of journalistic pieces, among which "After the Visit" (PR 23.4.68) by V. Mayevskiy and A. Filippov was a good example. The arrival on 17 April was conveyed in more than usually animated paragraphs. Mr. Kosygin's words to pressmen at the Airport were cited: he was in Pakistan for the first time in his life, but his encounters with the President had been so many that he felt he knew his way about already. Entire pages in most organs on 18.4.68 reproduced the text of the speeches delivered at the banquet in Rawalpindi the previous evening. F.M. Ayub Khan declared that the cooperation, not simply formal but in terms of real business, between the two peoples had come to stay. Turning to the international scene, he commented on the need for give as well as take among peoples. History taught that when a country, even a small country, got above itself, there was trouble. This had happened in the Middle East where UNO and world opinion alike were being flouted outrageously by a contemptuous Israel. Coming nearer home, he said he looked at long last "to the finding of an equitable and honourable adjustment with India on the Jammu and Kashmir issue". Mr. Kosygin in his twice as long reply, after alluding to the healthy record of Soviet-Pakistan cooperation—due largely, he insisted, to President Ayub Khan's personal enthusiasm—contrasted the foreign policy of the colonizers with that of the USSR. The former were still bent "on sowing discord among the peoples who had freed themselves"; the latter was pledged to harmonious cooperation with those peoples "without any idea of harming the particular country's relations with third parties". He made a bitter reference to American behaviour in Vietnam, and predicted "an inglorious end, notwithstanding the backing of the imperialist patrons, to Israeli *aventurisme*". The press of 20 and 21.4.68 carried in extenso the various addresses of welcome, and Mr. Kosygin's response to each of these, at the other centres visited.

At least three events in May kept Pakistan in the news. The first of the month marked the 20th anniversary of Soviet-Pakistan diplomatic relations, and was a good opportunity to take stock of "the positive results" of which the recent Kosygin visit was an outward and visible symbol. The special correspondents let themselves go with their interpretations of Pakistani admiration for the Soviet Union and all it stood for.

Secondly an exhibition of precision instruments which the Russians had organized at Karachi was, according to PR, leading to important contracts. Side by side with this, the deliveries of tractors, bulldozers and heavy machinery of all sorts were establishing a record, and so was the export of jute and rice in Soviet ships. V. Kondrashov of IZ, summarizing this encouraging state of affairs in an article entitled "With full holds", remarked that the volume of trade with the Soviet Union had been multiplied by 10 since 1957. It seemed an undeniable endorsement of what President Ayub Khan had said about real business.

The warm welcome accorded two ships of the Soviet Navy visiting Karachi for five or six days at the end of the month and into June provided the press with a third chance to underline the solidarity of the two peoples.

The only item in June calling for inclusion here was the reporting of the bumper crop. This showed an increase of 45 per cent on the previous year, the papers pointed out, and Kondrashov, writing it up in IZ 18.6.68, observed that a situation in which Pakistan these several years had actually been obliged to import grain from abroad ought now to be eased.

### *Nepal*

The sole reference to Nepal seen this quarter was a Tass message carried in KZ 20.4.68 describing a Lenin festival in Katmandu. The Nepalese public, the message stated, were able to watch films depicting the life and achievement of the great revolutionary leader, as also to inspect a collection of his writings and a display of books written about him.

### *Afghanistan*

The event of the quarter was the royal visit to Russia at the beginning of June. This received ample, if not spectacular, coverage amounting to some three-quarters of the total allotment of space in the period. The routine reporting before and after this central feature was not in itself very significant, but had an accidental and rather forced claim on the reader's attention, as being about the country whose monarch would shortly be paying, or alternatively had just paid, a state visit to the Soviet Union.

The Independence Day celebrations in May prompted some half-pages of potted history. The links, spiritual and physical, with Afghanistan had been forged by Lenin himself and the two powers looked back over a half-century of mutual esteem and fruitful cooperation. They looked forward to the benefits which would continue to result from an association geared alike to the interests of the two peoples and the interests of world peace.

On 4 June and following dates the programme of the King and Queen of Afghanistan was carried in all papers. The account of the arrival in Moscow the previous day was expansive, and the pilgrimage to Lenin's Mausoleum, where the royal couple laid a wreath and observed a minute's silence, carefully recounted. The speech of Mr. Podgorny at the official

banquet, and H.M. King Zahir Shah's reply, were reproduced in full in the leading journals. The former, after complimenting the King on the wisdom and realism by which his reign of 35 years had been distinguished, applauded the foreign policy consistently pursued by the Afghan people. The Afghan position on the fundamental problems of the day, he said, coincided, "or very nearly", with that of the Soviet Union. In contrast he deplored the attitudes of certain others, condemning in turn, and in the now mechanical paragraphs, the American enormities in Vietnam and the Israeli aggression against the Arab peoples. He also denounced the lust for revenge for some time manifest in Federal Germany where the issue of *Lebensraum* was being agitated afresh. His Majesty in reply expressed his country's indebtedness to the Soviet Union, and echoed his host's sentiments on Israeli expansionism. He hoped that the Paris talks would lead to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict, but did not allude to Western Germany.

On 5 June the King and Queen left Moscow for Tbilisi. In the Georgian capital the programme was reported as mainly cultural, and after a brief stay the visitors moved to a Black Sea resort for rest and recreation before departing homewards on 13 June.

The joint communiqué recapitulating the time-table of the itinerary, and dwelling at considerable length on the identity of views entertained on the Vietnam and Middle East aggressions, was printed in all papers (14 or 15 June).

### Iran

Thanks to the visit of Mr. Kosygin at the beginning of April, Iran was favoured with intense, if rather short-lived, attention during the early dates of this quarter. The coverage of the event resembled that accorded in Pakistan's case [vide Pakistan above] except that it was somewhat less gushing and that the journalistic echoes died down more quickly. Two reasons explain the difference: first the formal circumstance that no head of state was involved, the host being the Prime Minister; and second, a certain constraint deriving from a past that still rankles. While, therefore, the reporting could hardly have been more thorough, the language used was a shade more guarded than that employed in the Pakistan setting. Mr. Kosygin in his discourses dwelt "on the happy consideration" that "at the present time" the relationship rested on a firmer basis of mutual understanding than previously. It was an improvement, he more than once reminded his audience, that stemmed from the visit to Iran by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1963, and the Shah's visit to the Soviet Union in 1965. For the rest, little enough beyond the names of local persons and places served to distinguish the press account of this visit of 2-7 April to Iran from that of the Pakistan visit a couple of weeks later which has been discussed already.

The International Conference on the Rights of Man, sitting in Tehran for three weeks with effect from 22 April, was adequately, if quietly, covered. Convened at the instance of the General Assembly UNO and attended by the Secretary General, Mr. U Thant, it was opened, the papers reported, by the Shah, and Princess Ashraf was unanimously voted to the chair.

A Soviet military delegation led by Marshal Zakharov, in Iran for 10 days in May, earned brief insertions in half a dozen papers on and after 20.5.68.

In June scarcely more than a couple of items related to Iran. A permanent Soviet-Iranian Commission on Economic Cooperation had been set up, readers were told, and was holding its first session in Tehran from the 5th to the 13th. And two ships of the Soviet Navy were reported as calling at Bandar Abbas.

### *Mongolia*

In the period under review Mongolian affairs were nearer to the margin than to the centre of attention, and the folder of cuttings was much less bulky than usual.

The principal item featured in April was the consideration by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the MPRP of a report on the Budapest Consultative Meeting laid before it by the Central Committee's Secretary, D. Molomzhamtsa. A lengthy oration on "The Results of Budapest" delivered by Mr. Tsendenbal on 5 April was carried verbatim in PR next day, and in abbreviated form in the remainder of the press. It was not made very plain what had actually been done at Budapest: "the main result of the Meeting", Tsendenbal said, "was the unanimous agreement of the participants to call a new international conference of Communist and Workers' Parties at the end of this year in Moscow". This would knit together the movement. "Life underlines", he continued, "that it is impossible to conduct the fight with imperialism separately and severally; the fight postulates the concerted, agreed action of the entire revolutionary potential."

The isolated references to Mongolia in May were of cultural concern and occasioned by translations of the works of Karl Marx, and of books on Marxism, into Mongolian.

In June *Pravda*, under the rubric "Brotherly Solidarity", carried a resolution adopted by the Grand Khural of the MPR calling on the USA to desist from its colonial war in Vietnam. The only other allusion to Mongolia arose from the making in that country for the first time of a violin which, the Soviet press guaranteed, was "both elegant in finish and smooth, pure and beautiful in tone".

### *Sinkiang and Tibet*

In the running series "Events in China" (IZ 7.5.68) it was mentioned in one sentence that "according to the foreign press the Maoists have not up to date managed to establish effective control in Tibet and Sinkiang".

In a survey entitled "The Anti-Popular Course of the Peking Rulers" (PR 22.6.68) Sinkiang and Tibet were specified in the list of provinces where "from the beginning of this year serious clashes have occurred".

Finally, falling just outside the quarter, the "Events in China" series (IZ 2.7.68) stated that bloody incidents [in named provinces and also] in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, had attained such proportions that the Maoists could no longer conceal them from the knowledge of the world at large.

## A REVIEW OF SOVIET BROADCASTS IN UYGUR FROM TASHKENT

APRIL-JUNE 1968

THE latest of these broadcasts that it is possible to comment upon was made on 27 May, whereas there are some, made in March, that did not come under review in the previous quarter but of which notice has been taken in the present review.

The usual themes have been repeated—the unorthodoxy of Maoism, especially in regard to minority affairs, and the advantages of life in the Central Asian republics in comparison with the sufferings of the people of Sinkiang. A theme that has not come to notice before is the willingness of the Soviet Union to aid the peoples of Sinkiang in Kuomintang times and the resistance set up by the then Chinese authorities. There has also been some defensive counter-propaganda and a little on the treatment of Tibet by the Chinese Communists. As has been noticed before, the present Soviet line on China's treatment of her minorities is to praise what was being done up to about 1957 and to condemn everything since as increasingly harmful to the minority peoples. Some examples of these themes are given below.

### *The anti-Mao theme*

The "Mao Tse-tung group" had admitted that due to events arising from the so-called cultural revolution there was considerable shortage in the production both of many goods and of electric power. Disillusioned workers and farmers showed little enthusiasm (26.3.68). There was news from China (28.3.68) indicating resistance to Mao Tse-tung. The frenzied efforts of his group to discredit those who stood for the interests of the people in defiance of Mao were meeting stubborn resistance in many parts of China. Mao's policies were being forced through purges and control of the new revolutionary committees by the military (1.4.68). Disorders and resistance continued (3.4.68). The so-called "Study-the-works-of-Mao" Movement was causing havoc with production in China (2.4.68).

A brief statement clearly expressing the Soviet condemnation of Chinese minority policy occurred in a commentary by Iliyev (who has been heard before) on 25 April. Iliyev outlined Lenin's policy on nationalities and then went on to contrast them with "the situation in Mao Tse-tung's China of today". He continued: "But in China in areas inhabited by minorities in general, and in Sinkiang in particular, individual freedom has practically disappeared. It is obvious that Mao's policy is aimed at forcibly sinicizing the national minorities". He added: "If we carefully examine the attitude of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Government on nationalities which have successfully implemented Lenin's policy, we conclude that Mao and his partners are pursuing an anti-people's policy." On the same day another talk contended that "penal units" of the army and "the national guard" which had been brought from inner China had established a dictatorial regime in Sinkiang. Despite that, workers and

peasants continued to oppose Mao's policy. The people in Tibet also opposed the criminal cultural revolution of Mao Tse-tung, severe clashes having taken place in the city of Lhasa, the organizers of the false movement known as the cultural revolution having stationed troops in that city. Armed with automatic weapons they had attacked unarmed workers and peasants who opposed Mao's policy.

A talk on 14 May on "Mao's Betrayal of Marxist-Leninist Principles" argued that his so-called thoughts were totally contrary to such principles. It then went on to bring in the change that had taken place since 1957. "Guided by Lenin's principles, the Uygur people and their leaders enjoyed freedom until 1957. They published books and magazines in their own language, and their cadres were trained in the nationalist spirit. But from 1958 the Maoists began to deprive the people of Sinkiang of the right of producing their books, magazines and films in Uygur". The speaker then stressed that the people of Sinkiang remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism despite Mao's restrictions.

### *The comparison theme*

This is simple, direct and oft-repeated. One or two examples will suffice. There had been great progress in Uzbekistan, "birthplace of one of the oldest civilizations". During its years of occupation by Tsarist Russia its progress had been completely arrested, but after the October Revolution it began to flourish in cultural, industrial and agricultural fields (26.3.68). Thousands of Uygur settlers in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya read papers, books and magazines in their own language. They all took an active part in the economic and political life of the republics where they lived (31.3.68). There was a report (5.4.68) of a kolkhoz near Tashkent, where people of various nationalities, including Uygurs, were working in harmony. An interview with some Central Asian geologists on 7 April, emphasizing the great progress in geology in the Central Asian republics, brought out that in the party being interviewed there was a Uygur. He praised the Soviet Government for the opportunities for education, in contrast to Mao Tse-tung's suppression of minority nationalities in Sinkiang. One of the beneficial effects of the building of Communism in the Soviet Union had been progress in the arts and literature. Native composers in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya were writing operas and symphonies! On 16 May, "a Uygur scholar", Rakhimov, gave a talk in which he asserted that thanks to the implementation of Lenin's nationality policy the Soviet Union had achieved immense economic progress in half a century and cited Uzbekistan as an example of such progress. He went on: "Dear Listeners, have the Mongolians, the Uygurs, the Tibetans and other national minorities living in China made any economic progress under Mao and his clique?" During the first five-year plan the Chinese Communist Party, according to Rakhimov, had attached importance to economic progress in the regions inhabited by national minorities. Towards the end of 1957, however, the position in these regions deteriorated. This calamitous situation was the outcome of the ultra-nationalist policy of Mao Tse-tung. Rakhimov was on the air again on 19 May in a talk "National in Form—Socialist in Content". A policy of this sort was a prerequisite for the happiness of nations, and was operating in the Soviet Union. Mao, on the other hand, was pursuing with his collaborators a nationalist policy towards

all non-Chinese peoples in China. It could be argued that they were engaged in sinicizing the culture and education of all these peoples.

*The Soviet Union and Sinkiang theme*

The Mao Tse-tung group were bent on the eradication of the cultural influence upon Sinkiang of the Soviet Union's Central Asian republics (29.3.68). But the nationalist authorities had been equally uncooperative. An article (26.3.68) describing the past history of Soviet efforts to establish mutually beneficial economic and cultural exchanges between the people of Sinkiang and the Central Asian republics made the assertion that the old regime in China had resisted these friendly gestures. The Soviet Union, according to another item on 29 March, had always responded with friendship to the needs of the Sinkiang people, helping in the development of local education, sending doctors and geologists, especially in the 1938-39 period. This had always aroused the resentment of the Chinese chauvinists who did not wish a window to be opened for the Sinkiang people to modern civilization and world realities. It is, of course, true that the Soviet Union did provide a great deal of assistance to Sinkiang in the 1930s. It is also not to be forgotten that at the same time their grip upon the area practically amounted to a severance of it from the rest of China. There were, therefore, good reasons for the Chinese Government not viewing Soviet activities with much approbation.

*The defensive counter-propaganda theme*

Two examples of this occurred at the beginning of April. The Mao Tse-tung group were spreading lies and slander about the Soviet Union's aid to young nations. Mao's own oppressive tactics, ineffectual assistance and interference in the internal affairs of nations receiving aid from China came in for adverse comment (1.4.68). A commentary was broadcast on 3 April on the numerous articles that had been appearing in the *Peking People's Daily*, attempting to discredit the Budapest Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. Unfortunately, the text of this commentary is not available. If it had been, it might well have thrown some light on ideological aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The examples cited above do not constitute an exhaustive treatment of the items on the various themes. It should also be remembered that they occurred well interspersed among normal items of news and current affairs.

W. J. D.

# SUMMARY OF CHINESE PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS ON SINKIANG, MONGOLIA AND TIBET

1 APRIL-30 JUNE 1968

## I. SINKIANG

*People's Daily* up to the last date of reading (5 June) carried only one item of news about Sinkiang. Throughout the period Urumchi Radio's Sinkiang Regional Service (SRS) has been broadcasting only relays of Peking broadcasts, among which was only one item of local interest. Public news media, therefore, were more than usually uninformative about events within the region.

The one item of interest from SRS occurred on 6 April, and was repeated in *People's Daily* the following day. It reported that "the revolutionary workers of Karamai", "one of China's major oil-fields", overfulfilled the first quarter's targets for crude oil production, for drilling new wells and for the processing of petrol, kerosene, diesel oil and lubricants. Unfortunately, not only were no quantities mentioned, there were not even the usual tantalizing percentages. No indication was given of how much of the processing was done in Sinkiang (e.g. at Tushantze) and how much elsewhere (e.g. at Lanchow). On the political side the Karamai oil workers had "frustrated the schemes of the capitalist-roaders and class enemies to split their ranks". The two groups of workers in the oil-field realized their revolutionary great alliance on 25 March.

The opposition from counter-revolutionaries in Shanghai to the sending of youths to the countryside, border areas, factories and mines was still a theme in the Shanghai *Liberation Army Daily* on 10 June. However, there had been rallies among middle-school graduates at which oaths were taken to go to these spheres of work. There were no other references during the period under review to Han immigration into Sinkiang.

It is fair inference from the almost total lack of news from or about Sinkiang that the state of stalemate between Urumchi and Peking remains unresolved. The few instances of "revolutionary alliances" reported as having taken place in various social and industrial organizations in the region constitute a factor the significance of which is hard to judge but which must in some degree modify the situation.

One small incident which, if truly reported in a Kwangtung *Red Flag* Bulletin on 26 May, indicates the willingness and ability of the centre to intervene directly in Sinkiang affairs occurred when Premier Chou En-lai firmly called to order a "revolutionary" organization under the 2nd Red HQ. for having ransacked the residence of the Governor, Saifuddin.

## II. MONGOLIA

### *Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region*

The political evolution of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region has continued to receive full coverage from both IMRS and Peking Radio. The

main themes constantly reiterated were the condemnation of Ulanfu, with increasingly clear indication of the nature of his alleged crimes, and the need unceasingly to combat those in the region who are still his supporters.

The most explicit statement of the case against Ulanfu came in an IMRS broadcast on 2 May. He "deserved the death sentence for his crime of scheming national disintegration". In particular, he is alleged to have used the Tumet Banner in 1965 as his base for "wrecking national unity" under the cloak of defending the national interests and serving the interests of the minority nationals. Tumet Banner belonged, he asserted, "to the Mongolian nationals but was seized by the Han nationals to develop agriculture by eliminating the Mongolian nationals' grass-land". The Mongolian nationals in Tumet Banner were alleged to have been "landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists represented by Ulanfu himself".

Ulanfu's allies had allegedly been identified in all sections of the population in Inner Mongolia. They were "blind and deaf to the shocking realities of the class struggle". Some comrades in the revolutionary ranks were "seriously afflicted with the stubborn disease of right 'splittism', right capitulationism and right conservatism". Ulanfu and his allies had "created nationality disputes by 'waving the ragged banner of reactionary bourgeois nationalism' to cover up the class essence of nationalities" (IMRS 17.5.68). There had been a public trial attended by over 100,000 in Huhhot on 27 April (IMRS 27.4.68) at which 31 persons had been condemned. This was part of an intensifying campaign for a "life and death struggle against Ulanfu's followers planted in the Inner Mongolia Regional People's Council". A meeting of the Standing Committee of the Regional Revolutionary Committee at the beginning of May (IMRS 8.5.68) had "revealed wavering and opposition to efforts in the struggle to win an all-round victory for the great proletarian cultural revolution and the people's war against Ulanfu". Measures decreed by the regional authorities to deal with the situation were published in the *Inner Mongolia Daily* and broadcast by IMRS between 12 and 15 May. They included the following:

Mao Study Groups throughout the region, repudiation and criticism meetings and getting educated youths out of the cities into the rural and mountain areas (evidently there is a reluctance to "roughing it" similar to that apparent in Sinkiang).

On the economic side great claims were made for coal output in the region (NCNA 14.4.68). It had increased steadily since September 1967. The mines run by the regional authorities had fulfilled their quota for first quarter, 1968, three days early. The state-run mines had raised their daily average output in March 8.5 per cent over the February average. Punctuality of trains, both passenger and freight, had been raised (IMRS 30.4.68).

Anxiety was being shown at the end of May on the possible effects of drought in the region (IMRS 24.5.68). The "masses" and army men were being called upon to step up spring sowing and to protect the seeds from drought. It was, of course, also "imperative to wage struggles against the sabotage activities of the class enemy".

*Mongolian People's Republic*


Nothing to report.

## III. TIBET

Lhasa Radio (TRS) continued to broadcast only Peking relays. There was extremely little in radio reports and nothing in the *People's Daily* on Tibet. Peasants at a location 4,300 m. above sea level at the foot of the Himalayas (Pali in Chinese transliteration) had succeeded in the face of great physical odds in reclaiming land and raising crops. The area was said to enjoy only 30 frost-free days in a year. They had felled timber from the mountain side and devoted part of the proceeds to buying seeds. Frontier guards of the People's Liberation Army had organized propaganda teams for the study of "the thoughts" and were studying together with the "emancipated peasants" of Pali (NCNA Chinese 8.6.68).

There was nothing in Chinese sources either to confirm or to refute reports of unrest broadcast from New Delhi in May.

W. J. D.



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# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

## *Editors*

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## CONTENTS

Editorial	273
Phases in the Economic Organization of Soviet Central Asia: Central, Regional and Republican Interests in Conflict. By Ann Sheehy	278
Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental and African Historical Study. By Hubert Evans	294
Co-ordinating Conference for the Organization of Research on the History of Oriental Culture	299
Oriental Scholarship at Leningrad Yesterday and Today	305
The Khorezm Communist Party 1920-1924. By Ann Sheehy	308
Indian Revolutionary Organizations in Central Asia. By Hubert Evans	322
India's Population Problem	328
British Behaviour Towards Pakistan: A Soviet Interpretation. By Hubert Evans	333
Economic Co-operation with Iran: the Immediate Future	338
Book Reviews	342
Soviet Press Comment: I. The Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; II. Adjoining Countries	345
A review of Sinkiang, Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs based upon the Chinese Press and Radio	356
Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur for Sinkiang	360

## ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals, etc., employed as sources, are as follows:—

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	" " " " " " " " Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	" " " " " " " " Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	" " " " " " " " Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	" " " " " " " " Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	" " " " " " " " Uzbek SSR
IMRS	Inner Mongolian Regional Service
IZ	Izvestiya
K	Kommunist
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta
NCNA	New China News Agency
NT	New Times
PR	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SRS	Sinkiang Regional Service
SU	Soviet Union
T	Trud
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
TRS	Tibet Regional Service
UG	Uchitel'skaya Gazeta
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

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# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

Vol. XVI, No. 4

## EDITORIAL

THE recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia is one more instance of Soviet and Russian misunderstanding and disregard of the strength of national sentiment, and it must inevitably have repercussions on the victims of the Soviet nationalities policy inside the Soviet Union. The nationalities most obviously and immediately affected are those of the Ukraine and the other western republics; but reaction will also be felt in the eastern republics, particularly since history shows that Russian over-involvement in Europe often results in a switch of attention to Asia.

Russian exasperation with those nationalities within the Soviet orbit who insist on trying to preserve their own individuality and who dispute the infallibility of Russian (*Russian* rather than Communist or Soviet) economic, social and cultural prescriptions must be attributed at least partly to a sense of failure—of failure to impress others with the superior qualities of Russian culture and leadership. The fact is that while during the past fifty years the Russians have developed a dynamism and opportunism which have enabled them to reassert and maintain their material domination over the nationalities of the old Russian empire and over the Slav and other peoples on its western borders, their own culture and what may be called civil sophistication have not developed correspondingly. The brilliant Russian cultural efflorescence of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was skimmed off by the Revolution before it had had time to penetrate much below the surface, and what remained was cut off from all contact with western Europe. By contrast, the cultures of such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary remained in close contact with the West for a further twenty years before they fell under the dead hand of Communist Russia. Although compelled to accept the communist system of government and the drabness that inevitably accompanies it, they have disdainfully rejected what nowadays passes for Russian culture and have begun with varying degrees of success to impart to communism a national flavour of their own. From the Russian communist point of view this is the last straw, for in the whole of Soviet demonology there is no spectre more menacing than that of "national communism".

The Soviet success in creating a chain of Communist controlled satellites on the western borders of the USSR was due partly to the

presence of large Soviet armed forces and partly to what was then the effective Soviet domination of the world communist movement. The Soviet Union unquestionably wished to create a similar chain of defensive satellites on its Middle Eastern and Central Asian frontiers, but circumstances were much less propitious: there was no Soviet military presence or potential communist fifth column in any of the limitrophe countries except the Mongolian P.R. and Persia; and in the latter, communist influence was limited to the unrepresentative and, as it turned out, ineffectual Hezb-e-Tudeh. The Mongolian P.R. is in fact the only satellite the Soviet Union has been able to create along the whole length of its Asian frontiers—of whose vulnerability it has never ceased to be acutely conscious.

Apart from the development of national communism in Yugoslavia after 1948, the European satellite system stood the Soviet Union in fairly good stead until 1956 when national consciousness and anti-Russian feeling began to reassert themselves. Very soon, too, the world communist movement fell into a slow decline, which was later accelerated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. It was at this stage that the Soviet Government began to devote serious attention to the problem of developing good relations with the Middle Eastern and South Asian states lying on or near the southern frontiers of the USSR. The only hope for the success of such a policy lay in the cessation of reliance on local Communist parties and on the old techniques of subversion, threats and hostile propaganda. The Soviet Government has good reason to be satisfied with the dividends so far paid by its new policy: in the Arab countries and in Afghanistan, Soviet prestige stands higher than that of the West; with Turkey and Persia its relations have greatly improved; and in the Indian sub-continent relations with India are still good in spite of some disillusionment caused by the recent Soviet rapprochement with Pakistan.

On balance it would seem that Soviet policies are doing better in Asia than they are in Europe where the effect of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia has been widespread and profound compared with the relatively slight impact on the countries of Asia. Similar phenomena in the past have resulted in a swing of the pendulum of Russian endeavour from the West to the East. What form such a swing might now take is a matter for conjecture, but it could well include a much more determined assertion of Soviet claims to the leadership of the whole Afro-Asian world. This in Russian eyes will be rendered progressively easier by the continued reduction of the British presence east of Suez. It is also rendered necessary by the need to counter Chinese claims in the same direction, of which the Soviet Government has clearly expressed its apprehension.

The possibility that the Soviet Union now aims at cashing in on its improved prestige in the Middle East and South Asia by acquiring an influence there amounting to tutelage cannot be ruled out, and it is

certainly causing considerable foreboding in the West. The main reason for this rise in prestige is that the Soviet Union is not now presenting the countries involved with the concrete demands affecting their independence of the kind which, whether from East or West, have proved so offensive to them in the past. It may be that the Soviet Government believes that it can achieve a political, strategic and commercial stranglehold on the Middle East and South Asia simply by dint of economic and technical aid and of giving moral support against the chimera of western imperialism. Sooner or later, however, the concrete demands will come and it remains to be seen whether the one white power still ruling over an Asian empire which it acquired by force and only retains by force can without the use of force impose its will on the still independent countries beyond its imperial borders.

The Russians are a people of determination and ingenuity. In their treatment of the 30 million Muslims of the USSR they have to some extent balanced ruthlessness and regimentation with great advances in education and social services. Quite recently they have adopted a much more realistic attitude towards Islam and other specifically Asian problems. Their potentiality as the future leaders of the Afro-Asian world can only be thoroughly apprehended by careful and cumulative study of their voluminous writing on all aspects of Asian and African affairs, and there has never been a time when such study was more necessary.

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At the beginning of 1968 the Central Asian Research Centre was faced with a financial crisis which at one time threatened to result in its closure at the end of the year. Appeals for support made to academic and other bodies both in Britain and abroad have so far produced a sum only sufficient to maintain the Centre's activities at about one-fifth of their present level. Rather than jettison completely the fruits of fifteen years of unique research and thus lose all continuity in a field scarcely touched by any other organization, it has been decided to carry on the work of the Centre on a greatly reduced scale at least for the present.

It will be appropriate at this juncture to give some account of the aims of the Centre and of how far it has succeeded in achieving them. In 1953 when the Centre began its present activities, the process of modernizing and developing the Soviet eastern republics, which had received a serious setback during the War, was again in full swing. The only source of detailed information on the economic, cultural and political affairs of the region was afforded by Soviet publications in the shape of local newspapers, periodicals and books all of which were at that time difficult to obtain. In Britain, systematic examination of this writing was confined to newspapers and this only in order to high-light for propaganda purposes the negative aspect of the Soviet handling of economic and social problems.

With an initial staff of three the Centre's first concern was to ensure a regular supply of newspapers and periodicals and to begin recording the results of its research in *Central Asian Review*. With limited resources it was only possible to cope with a few among the vast range of problems arising from the Soviet Central Asian experiment, and the Centre's main preoccupation was with cultural developments and irrigation. It was at pains to make as accurate an assessment as possible of positive achievements, and its criticisms of Soviet methods and shortcomings were derived entirely from Soviet sources. This departure from old-fashioned methods was at first disapproved of for widely different reasons. On the one hand, the new method was stigmatized as relying entirely on Soviet sources without the introduction of what was called "balancing material" from the reports of refugees from the regions. *Central Asian Review* was thus found to be viewing the rigours, inhumanities and blunders of Soviet rule in Central Asia through rose-tinted spectacles. On the other hand, Soviet sympathizers regarded as "unfair" the use of Soviet "self-criticism" intended for internal Soviet consumption. In a few years, however, these western criticisms died down and the Review came to be widely accepted, particularly in the United States, as the most reliable authority not only on the situation actually prevailing in Central Asia, but on Soviet policy towards the immediately adjoining countries, a subject to which it began first to direct its attention in 1956.

Criticism from the Soviet Union itself took some time to materialize, but when it did it was hostile in the extreme. The Soviet authorities' objections to being hoist with their own petard have been expressed with great naiveté and reveal exactly where the shoe most pinches. Although the Centre's many positive descriptions of Soviet material achievements have been totally ignored, it is known that its analyses and reviews of Soviet writing on such subjects as history, linguistics and archaeology have been eagerly and appreciatively examined by Soviet scholars.

In 1958, the Centre's by this time evident proficiency in appraising Soviet policies by the study of Soviet published writing attracted the attention of certain commercial firms with Middle East interests. This resulted in *Mizan*, which later added to its original preoccupation with the Middle East the examination of Soviet writing on Africa and South-East Asia.

The Centre's fixed determination not to confuse genuine information with propaganda has proved very much to the liking not only of Asian and African students but also of its research staff. This has consisted mostly of young people coming direct from the universities with no specialist qualifications apart from a knowledge of Russian. With hardly any exceptions they have displayed keen interest in the work, some of them staying many years in spite of the comparatively very low

salaries and the lack of prospects. The opportunity of writing for the Centre's publications has also been an attraction.

Both sides of the Centre's research activities as reflected in *Central Asian Review* and *Mizan* will inevitably suffer from the crippling reduction in its resources. But since the greater part of the funds available in 1969 will come from quarters primarily interested in the Middle East, it is the *Mizan* side which will have to be given priority. For this reason it will in all probability be necessary to discontinue *Central Asian Review* as an independent publication and to include in *Mizan* the results of such research work on Central Asia as it is possible to continue.

There are some grounds for hope that at the beginning of the next university quinquennium in the autumn of 1972, funds may be forthcoming for the support of the Centre. Meanwhile, however, even if the Centre can continue to exist, the drastic curtailment of its activities must seriously, if not fatally, impair their continuity, particularly in respect of Central Asia. Apart from the few remaining western objectors to the Centre's principles described earlier, the only beneficiaries from this curtailment would appear to be the Russians. Judging from the manifest irritation which *Central Asian Review* has caused them they will view its demise with delight tempered, perhaps, with suspicion that some means will be found of prolonging the Centre's previously vigorous existence. One can only hope that their suspicion will prove well founded.

## PHASES IN THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA : CENTRAL, REGIONAL AND REPUBLICAN INTERESTS IN CONFLICT

By ANN SHEEHY

WHEN the Central Asian Bureau of the CC CPSU and the joint Central Asian economic agencies, set up nearly two years earlier by Khrushchev, were abolished in December 1964 shortly after his downfall, no reasons were given, and indeed only the abolition of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz ever seems to have been formally announced in the press. Some light on the subject has now been shed in a recent book, *Gosudarstvenno-pravovyye problemy vzaimopomoshchi sovetskikh narodov* (Constitutional Questions of the Mutual Assistance of the Soviet Peoples) (Alma-Ata, 1967), by M. A. Binder. Binder's information, together with some earlier material (including Khrushchev's own speeches and reports to the Presidium in 1962), makes it possible to piece together a reasonably comprehensive account of how the joint agencies came to be set up, their organization and why they were abolished. While recognizing the defects of the joint economic agencies set up by Khrushchev following the November 1962 plenum, Binder is nevertheless convinced that the Central Asian republics do constitute a single economic region and that some form of organization is necessary to co-ordinate their economic activities. The present article gives an account of the joint Central Asian agencies set up by Khrushchev and of Binder's suggestions as to the organizational form economic co-operation between the Central Asian republics should take today. By way of comparison it begins with a brief description of the earlier Central Asian Bureau and Central Asian Economic Council which existed from 1922/3 to 1934.

### *The Central Asian Bureau and Central Asian Economic Council 1922/3-1934*

The predecessors of the first Central Asian Bureau and the Central Asian Economic Council were the Turkestan Bureau of the Party and the Turkestan Commission. The Turkestan Commission was set up in October 1919 as a joint RSFSR government and RCP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] body to consolidate Moscow's rule in Turkestan. In April 1920 the RCP(b) decided to set up oblast Party bureaux to provide guidance where the local parties were inexperienced, the area remote, communications bad, and the civil war still on or only recently over. The Turkestan Bureau was one of these oblast bureaux

(the others included the Siberian, Far Eastern and Caucasian).<sup>1</sup> At first it was virtually identical with the Turkestan Commission, but in time the Turkestan Commission became a purely governmental body and primacy passed to the Turkestan Bureau.

For political and propaganda reasons the Soviet government recognized the republics it set up in Khiva and Bukhara in 1920 as sovereign states, and the Bukharan and Khivan Communist Parties, unlike the Turkestan Communist Party, did not form part of the RCP(b). In fact, however, the Soviet government, through the Turkestan Commission and the Turkestan Bureau, interfered constantly in both Party and government affairs in the two republics. As time passed, it became more and more exasperated with the Bukharan and Khivan governments, which both consisted of members of the merchant class, and tolerated them only because it had no one to put in their place. The situation in Central Asia at this time was not easy, with the Basmachi movement, continuing economic dislocation and a largely hostile European settler population. In November 1921 Enver Pasha went over to the Basmachi and with him some prominent members of the Bukharan government. Alarmed at the threat to Turkestan, as one of its measures to get closer control of the situation in Bukhara Moscow decided on 1 February 1922 that the Bukharan Communist Party should become part of the RCP(b). It was also decided that the Khivan Party should follow suit. Representatives of the two parties were appointed to the Turkestan Bureau, which in April 1922 became known as the Central Asian Bureau. As constituted in May 1922 the Central Asian Bureau had nine members: four representatives of the RCP(b), of whom one was the chairman, three from the Turkestan Communist Party, and one each from the Bukharan and Khivan parties. Since at least one of the Turkestan representatives was always a European, this meant that Europeans outnumbered the natives by at least five to four.<sup>2</sup>

Moscow encountered resistance in both Khiva and Bukhara to the absorption of the Khivan and Bukharan parties and the creation of the Central Asian Bureau, but not such fierce resistance as it encountered over the question of the economic unification of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva. This had first been proposed in October 1921 and the question was brought up continually throughout 1922; but it was not until March 1923, when the Basmachi threat was much reduced and Moscow's position consequently stronger, that it was achieved. A Central Asian Economic Council was set up, which was responsible

<sup>1</sup> N. Ye. Petukhova. "Sozdaniye oblastnykh byuro TsK RKP(b) i nekotoryye storony ikh deyatelnosti (1920-1922)", *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1965, No. 4, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> K. Khasanov. "Rol' V.I. Lenina v sozdanii i rukovodstve deyatelnost'yu Sredazbyuro TsK RKP(b)", *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane*, 1967, No. 4, pp. 13-14; V. M. Ustinov. "K voprosu o sozdanii Sredazbyuro TsK RKP(b) i yego roli v organizatsii ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva Turkestana, Bukhary i Khorezma (1922-1923 gg.)", *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1964, No. 7, p. 95.

for the overall management of the economies of all three republics, whereupon, as previously planned, the Turkestan Commission ceased to exist.<sup>3</sup> The monetary and tax systems, foreign trade, transport and communications of the three republics were unified and various joint bodies established, including banks and scientific and educational institutions. The Central Asian Economic Council was headed by a representative of the RSFSR, who was simultaneously a member of the Central Asian Bureau.

The first Central Asian Bureau and the Central Asian Economic Council were thus originally devices to bring the nominally independent republics of Bukhara and Khiva under closer Soviet control. As Alexander Park says, "the economic unification of Central Asia was in practice equivalent to an indirect incorporation of Bokhara and Khorezm into the administrative system of the USSR".<sup>4</sup> This course culminated in the national delimitation of 1924, in which the Central Asian Bureau played a major role. During the course of the delimitation discussions it was decided in June 1924 that the Central Asian Bureau should continue in being to supervise the activities of the Party organizations of the new republics. It was also decided, not without some local opposition, that the Central Asian Economic Council should be retained in a reconstituted form. At the time of the delimitation the assets of most of the existing joint Central Asian institutions were divided between the new republics, but a number of joint educational and scientific institutions remained.<sup>5</sup> The new Central Asian Economic Council had under it a Central Asian State Planning Commission, a Central Asian Water Resources Committee and several other agencies. The Central Asian Bureau and the Central Asian Economic Council and other joint economic agencies functioned until the end of 1934 when they were abolished,<sup>6</sup> the need for them presumably being considered no longer to exist. The Central Asian Bureau was the last of the oblast Party bureaux to go, the others all having been disbanded by the end of 1927. According to a recent Soviet writer the oblast bureaux, being appointed rather than elected bodies, were "temporary limitations of inner-Party democracy which were dictated by the objective circumstances", and once the local Party organizations became strong enough it was possible to do away with them.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> M. Kh. Khakimov. *Razvitiye natsional'noy sovetskoy gosudarstvennosti v Uzbekistane*, Tashkent, 1965, pp. 178-179; T. K. Kasymov, "Iz istorii organizatsii i deyatelnosti sredneaziatskogo ekonomicheskogo soveta (K 40-letiyu obrazovaniya SredazEKOSO)", *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane*, 1963, No. 2, pp. 20-21; A. I. Ishanov. *Sozdaniye Bukharskoy narodnoy sovetskoy respublikl*, Tashkent, 1955, pp. 154-155; Ustinov, p. 96.

<sup>4</sup> Alexander G. Park. *Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917-1927*, New York, 1957, p. 77.

<sup>5</sup> R. Vaidyanath. *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics*, New Delhi, 1967, pp. 173, 186 (footnote 112), 195, 202.

<sup>6</sup> M. A. Binder. *Gosudarstvenno-pravovyye problemy vzaimopomoshchi sovetskikh narodov*, Alma-Ata, 1967, p. 120.

<sup>7</sup> Petukhova, p. 81.

Some joint Central Asian institutions continued to exist for a time after 1934, but gradually each of the republics acquired its own industrial and agricultural enterprises, university, institutes and research organizations, and took pride in so doing.

*The Central Asian Coordination Council 1961-63*

To understand the circumstances in which Khrushchev's Central Asian Bureau and joint Central Asian economic agencies were set up, it is necessary to go back to 1957. It was in this year that Khrushchev decided that the control of industry and construction in the Soviet Union needed to be decentralized. Accordingly he abolished most of the industrial ministries, both at the centre and in the republics, divided the country up into economic administrative regions, and set up a *sovnarkhoz* (Council of the National Economy) in each region to administer the industrial and construction enterprises which had formerly come under the ministries. In the case of the Central Asian republics Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan each constituted a single economic administrative region, while Uzbekistan was divided up into four, and in January 1958 five, such regions, each with its own *sovnarkhoz*. In July 1960 the five Uzbek *sovnarkhozes* were merged into one. The *sovnarkhozes* were subordinate to the republican Councils of Ministers, and this had the effect of giving the republics a greater say in industrial matters than they had previously enjoyed.

At the same time it led to a certain parochialism, and in order to remedy this, in May 1961, following a CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers' resolution of 26 April 1961, most of the economic administrative regions were grouped into major economic regions, and a Council for the Coordination and Planning of the Work of the *Sovnarkhozes* (hereinafter called a Coordination Council) was set up in each major economic region. Three of the major economic regions embraced more than one republic: the Central Asian (Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan); the Transcaucasian (Armenia, Azerbaydzhan and Georgia); and the Western or Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Kaliningrad oblast of the RSFSR). In the Coordination Councils of these three major economic regions each republic enjoyed equal status and had an equal number of representatives including the First Secretary of its Central Committee, the chairmen of the republican Council of Ministers, Gosplan and *sovnarkhoz*, the president of the republican Academy of Sciences, and leading industrial, scientific and other personnel. The inter-republican Coordination Councils met at least once a quarter in each republican capital in turn, with a representative of the host republic in the chair. Each council had a full-time Deputy Chairman, whose appointment had to be approved by all the republican governments concerned, and a small staff of specialists. It also had a number of permanent commissions for individual sectors of industry, transport, communica-

tions, manpower, and so on, whose members included representatives of all the republics involved. Representatives of organs of the USSR state administration took part in the quarterly meetings of the inter-republican Coordination Councils, and in some instances representatives of other Coordination Councils also attended. The Coordination Councils concentrated mainly on the problem of the specialization of industrial production within their major economic regions and, according to Binder, "did important work and enjoyed well-deserved authority in the republics of Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the Baltic region".<sup>8</sup>

*The setting up of the second Central Asian Bureau, the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz and other joint bodies*

In late September-early October 1962 Khrushchev paid a visit to Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan, and it was then that he seems to have first put forward the idea of setting up a new Central Asian Bureau, a single Central Asian Sovnarkhoz and other joint agencies, to the Presidium CC CPSU. Indeed his speeches and memoranda to the Presidium at that time give the impression that he only formulated his ideas during his visit, largely under the impact of what he saw in Turkmenistan.

Khrushchev started his visit to Central Asia in Turkmenistan, and on 29 September 1962 he passed on his impressions to the Presidium. He appeared to be reasonably impressed with the republic's oil industry, and suggested that to eliminate duplication 'Turkmenneft' should be put in charge of all prospecting for and extraction of oil and natural gas in the adjacent areas of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well as Turkmenistan. As for industry in the Central Asian republics as a whole, he commented on the large amount of unnecessary duplication and the poor quality of the output, and said he was becoming more and more convinced that a single sovnarkhoz was necessary. As regards agriculture he declared that there was an urgent need to amalgamate the republican research institutes for cotton-growing, since only the Uzbekistan one was any good. Khrushchev told the Presidium how horrified he had been by the barbarous way in which land along the Karakum canal was being reclaimed and planted to cotton, particularly when compared with similar reclamation in the Hungry Steppe in Uzbekistan, which he had seen the previous year. The very low agricultural standards in Turkmenistan as compared with Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan suggested the need to set up a single agricultural production directorate for the Central Asian republics, whose main task would be to supervise cotton-growing.<sup>9</sup>

Khrushchev seems to have discussed all these proposals with local officials before putting them to the Presidium. It was apparently in

<sup>8</sup> Binder, pp. 170-73.

<sup>9</sup> N. S. Khrushchev. *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitiye sel'skogo khozyaystva*, Vol. 7, March 1962-March 1963, Moscow, 1963, pp. 197-206.

talks with Party and other workers in Ashkhabad, after he had sent the Presidium his first memorandum, that he first suggested that, if inter-republican economic agencies were set up, then an inter-republican Party agency, namely a Central Asian Bureau of the CC CPSU, ought also to be set up. At the same time he made the point that, since the circumstances had changed, this would not be a replica of the earlier Central Asian Bureau.<sup>10</sup>

On the eve of his departure from Tashkent at the end of his visit Khrushchev sent a second memorandum to the Presidium, in which he set forth his suggestions for the new joint Central Asian bodies he would like to see established. On the agricultural side his proposals included: a Union (*soyuznyy*) production directorate for agriculture, particularly cotton-growing, with headquarters in Tashkent, which would embrace not only the Central Asian republics, but also the cotton-growing areas of Kazakhstan; a single all-Union cotton research institute in Tashkent serving Central Asia, Azerbaydzhan and Armenia; joint Central Asian bodies for irrigation and land improvement; and a Union Chief Directorate for Land Reclamation and the Construction of New Sovkhozes based on the existing Hungry Steppe and Turkmen Sovkhoz Construction organizations, with its headquarters in Yangi-Yer. As regards industry he proposed to abolish the republican sovnarkhozes and the Central Asian Coordination Council (which he said had done useful work but was only a consultative body and had not eliminated localism and duplication) and put all the industry of Central Asia under a single Central Asian sovnarkhoz. The latter should be situated in Tashkent, both for geographic reasons and because Uzbekistan's industry was the largest; but its departments could be in any republic, for example the one for the oil industry might be in Turkmenistan. He mentioned the possibility of the industry of the Chimkent oblast of Kazakhstan bordering on Uzbekistan coming under the new sovnarkhoz. On the question of planning and supplies he suggested that the sovnarkhoz should work out the plan for industry and, after clearing it with the republics, submit it to USSR Gosplan; and that all resources should be allocated direct to the sovnarkhoz. If the sovnarkhoz did not have broad powers and rights, it would not be effective.

Finally, Khrushchev turned to the question of setting up a Central Asian Bureau of the Party to assist the production directorate for cotton-growing and the Central Asian sovnarkhoz in their work. He envisaged the Central Asian Bureau not as an elected body, but as a subsidiary body of the CC CPSU appointed by the Presidium. It should be headed by a figure of standing in the Party, and should have a small staff to maintain links with the different sectors of the economy in the republics; otherwise it would be useless. Khrushchev stressed that in no circumstances ought the Central Asian Bureau to take on itself the functions of the republican Central Committees. He ended by proposing

<sup>10</sup> Khrushchev, pp. 215-16, 232.

that staff for the Central Asian Bureau, the Central Asian sovnarkhoz and the production directorate for cotton-growing should not be sent from Moscow but should be drawn from the Central Asian republics themselves.<sup>11</sup>

Throughout his visit to Central Asia, in putting his proposals to audiences in the Central Asian republics Khrushchev made a great show of consultation, saying that he was watching them to see their reactions so as not to make a mistake and would report to the Presidium only after he knew their views. He showed that he was well aware of offending republican sensibilities by his proposals, assuring his listeners that the Central Asian Bureau and other new organizations would not diminish the powers of the republics or their Central Committees in any way. To the Presidium, talking of the proposed production directorate for cotton-growing, he made the point that it ought to be a Union body. "Otherwise one or other of the republics will claim a special role and special rights . . . And one must not give any of the republics priority since this would be taken ill by the other republics."<sup>12</sup> Khrushchev forestalled objections from local officials by telling them that, if any of them suggested that the joint Central Asian agencies would restrict the rights and sovereignty of their republics, then they were not sufficiently mature communists, since true communists would want "to find such organizational forms as would allow us to make the best possible use of the material and spiritual forces of society to raise the economy, science and culture". He also pointed out that the capitalists were setting up EEC and the Soviet people would never attain communism if they sat inside their national republics.<sup>13</sup>

We do not know the real reactions of the republican leaders and officials to Khrushchev's proposals, but Khrushchev assured the Presidium that these had received universal approval. Party and other leaders were said to have produced many arguments in favour of the creation of a Central Asian Bureau, and without exception all the chairmen of the republican sovnarkhozes had come out in support of a single Central Asian sovnarkhoz and the abolition of the republican sovnarkhozes.

After further discussions in Moscow, Khrushchev revealed the final decisions on the joint Central Asian agencies in his report to the CC CPSU plenum on 19 November 1962. These were that they should set up a single Central Asian sovnarkhoz, a Central Asian directorate for cotton-growing, a chief directorate for irrigation and the construction of sovkhozes, a single agency for the management of capital construction in Central Asia, and finally a Central Asian Bureau of the CC CPSU. The main task of the latter would be to offer assistance to the Party organs of the Central Asian republics in improving the guidance of

<sup>11</sup> Khrushchev, pp. 249-260.

<sup>12</sup> Khrushchev, p. 204.

<sup>13</sup> Khrushchev, pp. 225, 228.

industry, construction and agriculture, and the coordination and harmonization of the activity of the Party, soviet and economic organs of these republics. Khrushchev emphasized once again that the Central Asian Bureau would not take over any of the functions of the republican Central Committees.<sup>14</sup>

The Central Asian Bureau was duly set up and met for the first time on 28 December 1962 in Tashkent under its chairman, V. G. Lomonosov; and the joint Central Asian economic agencies announced by Khrushchev were established in February 1963. In addition, on the orders of the USSR Ministry of Transport, the Tashkent and Ashkhabad railways were merged into the single Central Asian Railway, a Council for the Coordination of the Work of the Transport Organizations of the Central Asian Economic Region was established, and some moves were made to coordinate the research activities of the Central Asian republics.

The setting up of the Central Asian Bureau and joint Central Asian economic agencies was inevitably given a warm welcome in the Soviet press and journals. It was stressed that they had been established by "mutual agreement and strictly on an equal and voluntary basis",<sup>15</sup> and they were hailed as a clear illustration of the thesis of the drawing together of the nations of the USSR and as a possible prelude to the merger of the Central Asian republics and changes in the federal structure of the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> Later writers even went so far as to claim that the initiative for their creation had come in the first place from the republics themselves.<sup>17</sup>

### *The Central Asian Bureau*

Very little has appeared in print about the organization and activity of the Central Asian Bureau, although it is a fair assumption that it cannot but have belittled the role of the republican Central Committees, in spite of all Khrushchev's assurances to the contrary. The Central Asian Bureau had a chairman (V. G. Lomonosov), and at least two deputy chairmen (V. K. Akulintsev and S. M. Veselov), and its members included the First Secretaries of the four Central Asian republics, the First Secretary of the Chimkent obkom of Kazakhstan, as well as the heads of the joint economic agencies. It also had a number of inspectors.

### *The Central Asian Sovnarkhoz*

About the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz there is a good deal more information. It was set up on 5 February 1963 and was subordinate

<sup>14</sup> Khrushchev, p. 332.

<sup>15</sup> A. I. Lepeshkin, "Nekotoryye voprosy leninskoy teorii sovetskogo federalizma v sveta novoy programmy KPSS", *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1963, No. 5, p. 68.

<sup>16</sup> Lepeshkin, p. 68; B. L. Manelis, "Yedinstvo suvereniteta soyuza SSR i suvereniteta soyznykh respublik v period razvernutoy stroitel'stva kommunizma", *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1964, No. 7, pp. 17-26.

<sup>17</sup> V. Akulintsev, "Kontsentratsiya sil na reshayushchikh uchastakakh", *Partiyaya zhizn'*, 1964, No. 2, p. 9; Manelis, p. 25.

to the USSR Council of Ministers or the USSR Sovnarkhoz. It was based in Tashkent and had over 40 centralized departments. It had no territorial departments in Uzbekistan, presumably because it was based there, but in each of the other three republics it had four territorial departments: for cotton-ginning, light industry, the food industry and the construction materials industry in Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan, and for the food, meat and milk, construction materials and light industries in Kirgiziya. These territorial departments had a dual subordination—to the sovnarkhoz and the republican Councils of Ministers. Otherwise all industrial undertakings, including all those of heavy industry, were subordinated directly to the sovnarkhoz and the republics had no jurisdiction over them whatsoever. For example, the Turkmen Council of Ministers could take no decision on its own on the republic's important oil and natural gas industry.<sup>18</sup>

The Chairman of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz was S. I. Kadyshev, who had been a member of the Uzbek Central Committee since at least 1960. The sovnarkhoz was headed by a Council of 59 members, whose appointments were ratified by the USSR Council of Ministers, and a Board (*kollegiya*) of 14. The members of the Council included the deputy chairmen of the republican Councils of Ministers responsible for industry, and the chairmen of the republican Gosplans and trade union organizations, as well as leading sovnarkhoz officials and the heads of various undertakings and organizations. The chairman of the sovnarkhoz was also chairman of the Board, whose other members were the deputy chairmen of the sovnarkhoz and the heads of certain of its departments. By mid 1964 no statute had been drawn up defining the competence of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz, and there had still been no regulation of the precise roles of the Council and the Board. In practice the Board was acting as the executive body. It used to meet twice a month to deal with current business, whereas the Council seldom met at all.<sup>19</sup>

The sovnarkhoz was responsible for working out the plans for industry for the whole region, which it did in close collaboration with the republican Councils of Ministers and Gosplans. The draft plan was sent first to the republican Councils of Ministers for scrutiny and then submitted to Gosplan USSR. Considerable difficulties were caused to the sovnarkhoz by the fact that industry continued to be financed from the republican budgets, which meant that the sovnarkhoz could not make changes in its plan if it affected the republican budgets without their agreement. For example, if the sovnarkhoz wanted to switch resources from an undertaking in Turkmenistan to one in Uzbekistan, it had first to obtain the approval of both republican Councils of

<sup>18</sup> Binder, pp. 138–39; Manelis, p. 25.

<sup>19</sup> Yu. M. Bagdasarov. "Dal'neysheye sovershenstvovaniye upravleniya promyshlennost'yu v Sredney Azii", *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1963, No. 6, p. 50; Yu. M. Bagdasarov. "Nekotoryye pravovyye voprosy organizatsii i deyatelnosti soвета narodnogo khozyaystva Sredneaziatskogo ekonomicheskogo rayona", *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1964, No. 5, pp. 34–35.

Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Finance. This entailed complicated and lengthy negotiations and had an adverse effect on individual undertakings and whole sectors of industry.<sup>20</sup>

References to the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz in the Soviet press and journals during its existence were in general favourable, and spoke particularly of the benefits of rationalization and specialization. But some also mentioned the difficulties caused by the lack of a statute and by the budgetary arrangements. It was suggested that the sovnarkhoz should be given greater freedom to make changes in its plan, perhaps by getting the USSR Ministry of Finance to make the necessary adjustments in the republican budgets *ex post facto*.<sup>21</sup> Yu. M. Bagdasarov, writing in May 1964, also called for a more important role for the Council of the sovnarkhoz vis-à-vis its Board. To start with he suggested that the Council should meet more often and at least once a quarter. He also considered that the Board should be subordinate to the Council and account for its work periodically to the Council, and that the Council should be able to countermand or alter instructions issued by the Board or the sovnarkhoz management. So far, he wrote, there had been no instances when the Council had given the Board specific instructions, and some officials were of the opinion that the Board was not subordinate to the Council. Bagdasarov disagreed with this view and declared that the very nature of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz, expressing in like measure the interests of the four union republics, demanded that the Council should be the supreme organ as regards the Board.<sup>22</sup> In other words Bagdasarov felt that the republics should be given more say in the running of the sovnarkhoz by strengthening the role of the sovnarkhoz Council.

A. M. Aminov<sup>23</sup> and Binder, writing after the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz had been abolished, both made the same point about the republics being excluded from the management of industry on their territory. Binder declared that a system whereby the republics could not even transfer equipment from one factory to another restricted their rights, which was in opposition to the general course of the Party towards the extension of the rights of the republics proclaimed at the XX Party Congress and in the new Party Programme. "The concentration of the management of the industry of Central Asia in the hands of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz belittled the role of the Party and Soviet organs of the republics in the guidance of industry and in a substantial measure took away from them responsibility for its development."<sup>24</sup> This situation was aggravated by the fact that the executive organs of the sovnarkhoz (its management and Board) did not include

<sup>20</sup> Bagdasarov, "Nekotoryye pravovyye voprosy . . .", pp. 33, 36; Binder, pp. 140-41.

<sup>21</sup> Bagdasarov, "Nekotoryye pravovyye voprosy . . .", p. 39; *Iz.* 3.4.64.

<sup>22</sup> Bagdasarov, "Nekotoryye pravovyye voprosy . . .", pp. 34-35.

<sup>23</sup> A. M. Aminov. "Ekonomicheskaya teoriya—nauchnaya osnova khozyaystvennoy politiki". *Obschestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane*, 1965, No. 11, p. 16.

<sup>24</sup> Binder, p. 140.

representatives of the republics. This was all the more unjustified, wrote Binder, in that there were well-qualified people available in each republic. Other defects of the Central Asian *sovnarkhoz* were that the area it controlled was too large to be able to be run efficiently by it, and that its existence meant that a republic's industry was divorced from the administration of other sectors of its economy, such as housing, living conditions and education, which produced an unworkable situation. All these defects, wrote Binder, outweighed the gains from the measures taken by the *sovnarkhoz* towards specialization and cooperation in industrial production in the Central Asian republics.<sup>25</sup>

### *The other joint Central Asian economic agencies*

The other three joint Central Asian economic agencies set up in February 1963 restricted the rights of the republics to a far smaller degree than did the Central Asian *Sovnarkhoz*. The State Committee for Cotton-Growing in Central Asia came under USSR Gosplan at first, but was subordinated to the State Committee of Irrigated Agriculture and Water Resources of the USSR (*Goszemvodkhoz USSR*), when the latter was set up in October 1963. Its chairman was V. N. Kulikov, previously chairman of the famous Pakhta-Aral cotton-growing *sovkhoz* in the Hungry Steppe. The State Committee made scientific recommendations, carried out preliminary reviews of plans for the development of cotton-growing and so on. In certain instances its activities extended beyond the frontiers of the Central Asian republics and it served as a scientific and organizational centre for all the cotton-growing republics and *oblasts* of the Union, including the Chimkent *oblast* of Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan. However, writes Binder, the State Committee for Cotton-Growing in Central Asia had "very limited rights. It was essentially a consultative organ, whose powers amounted to working out recommendations of a scientific-organizational nature in the field of the development of cotton-growing. Moreover, its relations with the administrations of the Central Asian republics were not clearly defined. The Central Asian union republics were not represented on the State Committee's executive organs. Therefore it did not become, nor indeed could it become in such circumstances, the organizer of the development of cotton-growing, and of the collaboration and mutual assistance of the Central Asian republics in this sector of the economy which is so important to them."<sup>26</sup>

The State Production Committee for Construction of the Central Asian Economic Region (*Gossredazstroy*) subordinate to *Gosstroy USSR* was headed by V. M. Gushchin. It had territorial departments in each of the four republics, which were subordinate both to *Gossredazstroy* and to the relevant republican Council of Ministers, but the rights of these territorial departments were very limited. The Chief Central Asian

<sup>25</sup> Binder, pp. 138, 141-42; Aminov, p. 16.

<sup>26</sup> Binder, pp. 142-44.

Directorate for Irrigation and the Construction of Sovkhozes (Glavsredazirsovkhodzstroy) at first came under Gosstroy USSR, and from October 1963 Goszemvodkhodz USSR. Its chairman was A. A. Sarkisov, who had previously been head of the Chief Hungry Steppe Construction Organization. Its task was to accelerate the reclamation of large areas of land, primarily for the cultivation of cotton. According to Binder, both Gosredazstroy and Glavsredazirsovkhodzstroy did substantial work towards uniting the efforts of the Central Asian republics in their respective fields. "But their activity would have been more productive if they had been organically linked with the whole system of administration of the Central Asian republics and if these republics had been represented in them."<sup>27</sup>

#### *The abolition of the Central Asian Bureau and other agencies*

One can only speculate on what might have happened to the joint Central Asian agencies if Khrushchev had remained in power, but they would almost certainly not have been abolished so soon. On 23 December 1964, two months after his downfall, it was announced in the press that the decree of 5 February 1963 establishing the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz had been rescinded. In place of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz sov-narkhozes were set up in each republic as before. From oblique references in the press and the fact that leading members of the Central Asian Bureau and other joint agencies were identified in new appointments it very soon became clear that the Central Asian Bureau, Gosredazstroy and the State Committee for Cotton-Growing in Central Asia had also been disbanded. No real reasons were given at the time apart from allusions to Khrushchev's besetting sins of "voluntarism" and "subjectivism", but there was little doubt that hostility to the joint agencies in the republics themselves played a, if not the, major role in their abolition, and this has been confirmed by what has been written since. The second Central Asian Bureau, like the first, was an appointed rather than an elected body and therefore a "limitation of inner-Party democracy", and must have been resented by the republican Party organizations; and the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz, which effectively removed all control of industry from the jurisdiction of the republics, was obviously a bitter blow to their pride.

#### *The Planning Commission of the Central Asian Economic Region*

Not all the joint Central Asian economic agencies announced by Khrushchev at the November 1962 plenum were, in fact, abolished, since Glavsredazirsovkhodzstroy continued to exist. Nor was the amalgamation of the Tashkent and Ashkhabad railways into the single Central Asian Railway reversed. In addition the Central Asian Planning Commission (Sredazgosplan), which had been established in May 1963, continued to

<sup>27</sup> Binder, pp. 144-45.

function. Sredazgosplan was one of the Planning Commissions subordinate to Gosplan USSR which were set up in all the economic regions of the country including Transcaucasia and the Baltic by a decree of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers of 30 May 1963. The Planning Commissions, which replaced the previous Coordination Councils, had more extensive functions than the latter since they were concerned with the whole economy and not just industry and construction. According to Binder, although Sredazgosplan did not really come into being until the autumn of 1963, had only a small staff of specialists, and had no special research institute attached to it as the republican gosplans did, it carried out a number of important measures. These included valuable proposals on specialization and cooperation among the Central Asian republics in, for instance, the development of non-ferrous metallurgy and the repair of agricultural machinery, and on the distribution of productive forces, and also an important study of population trends as well as plans for the development of the Central Asian economy for 1966-70. Binder points out that, since Sredazgosplan did not enjoy administrative rights, its creation did not in any way diminish the rights of the republican organs of state administration, including their planning organs.<sup>28</sup> In this it obviously compared favourably with the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz. Nonetheless it does not seem to have been entirely popular in the republics themselves, for the Chairman of the Tadzhik Council of Ministers, A. Kakharov, asked for its abolition at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1965.<sup>29</sup>

At the same session of the USSR Supreme Soviet the Chairman of the Turkmen Council of Ministers, M. Gapurov, called for the re-establishment of a separate Ashkhabad Railway.<sup>30</sup> The Central Asian Railway was not broken up and remains in existence today, but Sredazgosplan and the other inter-republican gosplans seem to have disappeared from the scene within months, presumably as a result of the abolition of the whole sovnarkhoz system which had been announced at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in October 1965 and the preceding CC CPSU plenum. With the abolition of the sovnarkhozes there was a return to the previous centralized set-up of union, union-republican and republican ministries. This had the effect of once again curtailing the powers of the republics over the industry on their territory, but the Central Asian republics suffered no more from this than did the other union republics.

#### *Future possibilities in economic collaboration*

Although it is admitted that Khrushchev's joint agencies were not a success, more than one Soviet commentator has stressed that the Central Asian republics do constitute a single economic region and that there

<sup>28</sup> Binder, pp. 167-69.

<sup>29</sup> *IZ.* 3.10.65.

<sup>30</sup> *TI.* 5.10.65.

ought, therefore, to be some form of economic collaboration between them. In November 1965 A. M. Aminov, writing in an Uzbek academic journal, called for a restoration of the Coordination Council which had existed until the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz was set up<sup>31</sup>; and Binder, who considers that the two-year existence of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz and other joint agencies made the Central Asian republics into even more of a single economic complex than they were before, has suggested that Sredazgosplan should be revived and an inter-republican Council for the Coordination of the Development of the National Economy and Cultural Construction, similar to the earlier Coordination Council, set up. He would also like to see zonal USSR Gosplan agencies and inter-republican Coordination Councils re-established in the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics. In Binder's view the existing USSR Gosplan organs for territorial planning are no substitute for special agencies of USSR Gosplan in Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the Baltic states, which would be able to examine problems thoroughly on the spot. He envisages such regional gosplans, which would function as departments of USSR Gosplan and not enjoy any administrative powers as regards the planning or any other state agencies of the republics, playing an important role in deciding questions of the distribution of productive forces and specialization within the economic complexes. To assist them in their work they should be given special economic research institutes. Binder sees the inter-republican Councils for the Coordination of the Development of the National Economy and Cultural Construction as dealing in the first instance with economic problems whose solution demands the joint efforts of all or some of the republics represented on the Council. Questions of specialization, which had been the chief concern of the earlier Coordination Councils, would now be dealt with by the regional gosplans, but the new Coordination Councils could let USSR Gosplan have their considered opinion on these matters too. They could also take agreed decisions on such questions as the joint construction of power stations and irrigation systems and cooperation in the training of specialists.<sup>32</sup>

Binder divides the government agencies (Party agencies do not concern him) embracing two or more republics into two categories according to three criteria: the manner of their formation, their membership, and their subordination. The first is the zonal agency, which is set up by the competent USSR agencies, has its members appointed by the agency which set it up, and is subordinate in all its activity to the appropriate USSR agency. Representatives of the republics concerned may be members of the zonal agency, but in practice only in an advisory capacity. The second type of agency is the inter-republican agency, which is formed by the republics themselves

<sup>31</sup> Aminov, p. 17.

<sup>32</sup> Binder, pp. 167, 170, 173-74.

(either on their own or on USSR initiative), whose members consist of representatives of these republics on a basis of parity, and which has no direct subordination to USSR agencies.<sup>33</sup> According to this classification the Central Asian Economic Council of 1923-34, the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz, Gossredazstroy, the State Committee for Cotton Growing in Central Asia, Glavsredazirsovkhosstroy and Sredazgosplan were all zonal agencies, and only the Coordination Councils were genuine inter-republican agencies, being formed (albeit on USSR initiative) and operated by the republics themselves on a basis of parity.

There can be little doubt that the inter-republican agency is much less offensive to the republics, particularly the smaller ones, than the zonal agency, even when the personnel for the latter are largely drawn from the republics themselves in the first place, as they seem to have been for the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz and some other joint bodies. In so far as one can judge from the very meagre evidence available, Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan seem to have objected more to the joint bodies than Uzbekistan. This would be only natural. The sovnarkhoz, for instance, had its headquarters in Tashkent, its chairman was a former member of the Uzbek Central Committee, and Uzbek interests almost certainly dominated because of the greater size of the republic's industry.

There is, to date, no sign of a revival of the zonal gosplans or inter-republican Coordination Councils. Since they appear to be desirable on economic grounds, there are presumably other reasons why they have not been re-established. Opposition from the republics could possibly be hindering the restoration of the zonal gosplans, but not, presumably, the Coordination Councils if, as Binder says, they "enjoyed well-deserved authority in the republics of Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the Baltic region". Binder himself is in favour of direct links between the republics as exemplified, for instance, in the Coordination Councils, arguing that having to go through USSR agencies is liable to make things unnecessarily complicated, cause delays, and shackle the initiative of the republics, but he points out that "of course such links can only take place on questions coming within the competence of the union republics". Up to now, Binder complains, all Soviet constitutional experts without exception who have made a study of federal relations in the Soviet Union have considered them solely in vertical terms, i.e. in terms of the relations between the USSR and the union republics, completely forgetting about the horizontal relations between the republics themselves by-passing USSR bodies.<sup>34</sup> Perhaps one reason for the constitutional experts' neglect of direct horizontal relations between the republics is that they cannot visualize

<sup>33</sup> Binder, pp. 99-100.

<sup>34</sup> Binder, pp. 162-66.

these assuming any real importance in such a highly centralized state as the Soviet Union. There must always be a danger that, if inter-republican bodies such as the Coordination Councils were effective, they might take on a political reality of their own, and it is hard to imagine the Party relishing the existence of dynamic inter-republican bodies not directly subordinate to USSR agencies. On the other hand the reason why no new zonal gosplans and inter-republic Coordination Councils have been set up may be simply that the present rulers of the Soviet Union are not convinced of their utility or are unwilling to resurrect organizational forms identified with their predecessor, Khrushchev.

## FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN HISTORICAL STUDY

By HUBERT EVANS

At the very end of 1966 the representatives of more than 30 universities or institutions of equivalent status performed a sort of stock-taking of historical studies as applied to the countries of Asia and Africa. The 145 delegates from all over the USSR who deliberated from 20 to 22 December in Moscow's Institute of Eastern Languages had come together for the purpose of assessing what the Soviet achievement in this field, going back now nearly half a century, amounted to.

The proceedings, as summarized by Z. Lapina and M. S. Meyer, were made known, with a certain time-lag, in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 of 1967, and it is perhaps unfortunate that space has not been found in *Central Asian Review* for some account of this conference without a second time-lag almost as long. But better late than never; for the academic attitudes struck in Moscow with some formality nearly two years ago most certainly deserve to be entered in our Western diary for current and future reference. Of the 38 addresses delivered and debated, those which were of general application or else concerned with territories strictly within the purview of this Review will alone be listed.

1. A paper by L. R. Gordon Polonskaya entitled "The Methodology of Contemporary Orientalism: its main direction in 1956-1966" not only had priority of place but sounded the note which was to be sustained throughout. The writer, and those who joined in the discussion that followed her paper, dwelt "on the upsurge of Soviet oriental study with effect from the 20th Party Congress of 1956"; registered the breakaway from the dogmas which had till then hampered the advance of scholarship; told of the earnest and profound approach to many problems now afoot and of "further differentiation in orientalism to come"; and recorded with satisfaction the arrangement of general courses on the history of the countries of Asia and Africa which had materially improved the standard of instruction on this subject nowadays available. At the core of her paper, as of the Conference itself, was "the consideration of Soviet historiography as illuminating the revolutionary and national-liberation movement of the countries of the East".

2. M. S. Ivanov, speaking on the study in the USSR of the Iranian Revolution 1905-1911, showed that in sharp contrast with the initial

works published on this theme in the twenties the historiography of the post-war days was of high grade, the recourse to a wide range of sources having permitted a more satisfactory elucidation of the part played by democratic organizations and the popular masses.

3. I. A. Ibragimov pointed to the inadequate interpretation in Soviet writing of the importance of Iranian Azarbaijan, and of the share taken by various nomadic tribes in the revolutionary cause.

4. A. S. Aliyev noticed that the work of M. S. Ivanov on the Iran Revolution, while it was a monograph of substance, contained errors (characteristic of the date of writing): especially, the incorrect assessment of the role of the national bourgeoisie, and of the classes in Iranian society; as also of the policy of Imperial Russia implemented in Iran.

5. This last matter was elaborated by F. M. Atsamba and M. L. Kulagina, both of whom stressed "the importance of exposing the policy of imperialism pursued in Iran".

6. A note of actuality, the reporters said, was audible in the papers read by P. S. Komlyar and A. A. Tikhonova, who emphasized the necessity of research on the mutual ties between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan "as a concrete example of an essentially modern approach to colonial and dependent countries".

7. Some heated discussion followed a paper by V. N. Nikiforov on the treatment of the Asiatic Mode of Production in Soviet historiography, and another by I. A. Stuchevskiy entitled "Soviet Historical Science and the Question of the Three Types of Primary Class Societies". With the conclusions drawn in the latter paper, M. N. Pak voiced his disagreement: he considered that Stuchevskiy's "position as regards the absolute equality of pre-capitalistic formations" implied a denial of "the progressive replacement of socio-economic systems in the pre-capitalist phase".

8. Several further papers dealing with the economic systems operative in the East in ancient and medieval days bore directly on the vexed question of the Asiatic Mode of Production. E.g. (a) Ye. M. Medvedev, who traced the evolution of the views of the Soviet Indianists on the system obtaining in antiquity, arrived at the conclusion that the postulated dominant influence of slave labour in the sphere of production was unproved. (b) L. B. Alayev emphasized that initially Soviet historians had been satisfied with isolated extracts from Karl Marx on the Indian community, and it was only since the fifties that they had embarked on a really close and comprehensive investigation of the problem. The researches of I. M. Reysner, K. A. Antonova, N. I. Semenova and E. N. Komarov, he said, based on 18th-19th century sources, had brought to light the greatest variety in the pattern of society as between different areas of the subcontinent, which by no

means fitted into the frame of the so-called "typical" Indian community. Further study would have to be of all-India scope, and proceed region by region. (c) A. I. Chicherov examined the findings of Soviet historians regarding the level of economic development in India in the 18th century. The earlier scholars, he asserted, had merely echoed the ideas of Marx on "the stagnation" of medieval India, and forgot that the extremely limited documentary evidence on which Marx and Engels had to rely "lent a certain one-sidedness to their conclusions about India". Much had, however, been done in the post-war years by such Indianists as, to begin with, I. M. Reysner and, subsequently, A. P. Levkovskiy, V. I. Pavlov and E. N. Komarov in their studies of India as she was at the turn of the 18th century, to demonstrate the presence of the rudiments of capitalist relations in all forms of handicraft production even in those times. Soviet Indianists, Chicherov was sure, were coming round to the belief that on the eve of the British conquest, India was already well inside the opening manufacturing stage of a capitalist system. (d) A. Ya. Levin and V. A. Tyurin agreed with Chicherov, although Tyurin considered he ought to have attached more weight to the acceleration in the growth of commodity-money relations which resulted from the overall European commercial impact and British colonial dominion in particular. This same speaker (Tyurin) reviewing the trends and fashions in South East Asian studies over the past 50 years alluded to a common and very dangerous pitfall—which was to transfer to the neighbouring countries conclusions about the level of development valid only in an Indian environment.

9. N. A. Smirnov took stock of Soviet study on the sources of Islam, on sectarianism in Islam, on muridism,\* on modernization, and on the accommodation of an Islamic ideology to the interests of the national bourgeoisie. And I. M. Smilyanskaya commented that "for the failure up to now to solve the riddle of the social and economic roots of Islam, an indifferent grasp of the social organization of the Arabs is responsible".

10. N. K. Belova spoke on the portrayal, in Soviet historiography, of the late medieval town in Iran. She thought that Soviet Iranists were now fairly well agreed upon the absence of municipal self-government in Safavid Iran, and upon the feudal character of the Safavid *Kar Khane*; also that the explosions of the artisan class and the urban poor against the tyranny of the feudal rulers of the cities were purely local and unaccompanied by political demands.

11. Among the important matters taken up at the Conference, Lapina and Meyer proceeded, was "the assimilation of the heritage of native (*otechestvennoye*) and Soviet orientalism, whether bequeathed

\* *Myuridizm* is used in Russian to describe violent activities by the murids (disciples) of an Imam (leader) with special reference to Shamil's revolt in the Caucasus.

by corporate bodies or by individual scholars". In this connexion Z. N. Stepanova and L. M. Kulagina read papers on the All-Russia Association of Oriental Study and its organ *Novyy Vostok* (The New East). This association performed a positive service "on the whole" and "strengthened our ties with Eastern states". N. A. Smirnov, as a one-time official of the said society, was able to impart some of his reminiscences. N. A. Kuznetsova similarly pleaded for a more energetic exploitation of the public and private archives known to exist, specifying among the latter the collected documents of B. N. Zakhoder, I. M. Reysner, N. M. Gol'dberg and G. N. Il'inskiy which had not so far been made available to scholarship by the legatees concerned.

12. Many of the addresses, the reporters noted, commented on the tendency of Soviet scholars, in their exposition of the genesis and development of the social classes in the lands under study, to rest content with "the classical opposition of proletariat and bourgeoisie". Their sympathy with the popular masses battling against colonialism, capitalism and imperialism carried them away, and led them to exaggerate both the political consciousness and the organizational maturity of the given working class. Too often, stray items of information and uncoordinated statistics were quite uncritically pounced on by these "progressive historians", who were prone to confuse their wishes with the hard facts. Soviet orientalists, it was suggested in these addresses, ought in general to pay more heed to productive resources; to "describing the superstructure"; to ethnical relations; to the peculiarities of state apparatus, and to the education of the rising generation.

13. Teaching, as well as research, came under review, and here a paper by N. M. Sukhareva explaining the extent to which "historiographical ingredients" were embodied in the courses on modern and contemporary history, was singled out for praise.

14. F. A. Toder spoke on the acclaim which Soviet historical study was winning abroad, and argued the great responsibility of orientalists "in the unmasking of anti-Soviet propaganda". She emphasized the need of "a proper presentation of authentic information about the works of foreign orientalists" and of "an improvement in the output of Soviet literature on the problems of the Asian and African countries".

15. The Conference adopted a resolution advocating (i) the periodic renewal of textbooks; (ii) the programming of lecture courses; (iii) the preparation of monographs and "generalizations"; (iv) the editing of source material, including translations from Oriental languages. It also proposed, as an immediate project to mark the centenary of Lenin's birth, the assembling and publication of literature illustrative of his achievement in working out the theoretical problems of the Asian and African countries and the relationship of the Soviet State with their

peoples. It was felt there was room for a press organ, so far lacking, to facilitate the systematic presentation of the historiography of the Asian and African countries; and it was recommended that the journal *University Papers*, as also the bulletins of the various institutes of similar standing, should carry a series specifically devoted to oriental studies. Finally, for the purpose of bettering contacts between research workers and the teaching staff of the higher educational establishments throughout the country, the creation of a permanent forum was urged, which should bring together all Soviet historians engaged in the study of *Zarubezhnyy Vostok*, the East beyond the borders.

## CO-ORDINATING CONFERENCE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH ON THE HISTORY OF ORIENTAL CULTURE

The proceedings of the above-named Conference were summarized by L. R. Kontsevich in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 of 1968, and the summary itself has been ruthlessly pruned for presentation here. The rendering below is therefore at two—and possibly more—removes from *oratio recta*, and the speakers concerned might, if confronted with the version now offered, occasionally fail to recognize their own voices. The substance of the debate, however, has probably been reproduced faithfully enough, and since this is likely to interest the Western orientalist it has seemed worth devoting some space to it.

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THE Institute of the Peoples of Asia [INA hereafter], The Scientific Council on the Coordination of Research in the Oriental Field, and The Council of the History of World Culture were joint conveners of a conference in March 1967 to consider the main issues of theory and practice implicit in the study of the culture of the peoples of the East. Sitting in the Leningrad Branch [LO hereafter] of the INA from the 14th–17th of the month, and attended by some 200 orientalists and historians, this first coordinating conference in effect inaugurated what will undoubtedly become the methodical deployment of all the resources of Soviet orientalism along a front much broader than that envisaged hitherto. Five papers were read and debated, and two reports were considered.

In an opening address Ye. M. Zhukov (Department of History USSR Academy of Sciences) said it was impossible to appreciate the vistas of the historical process in the East without studying the philosophic systems and religious creeds that bear so directly on ideology and culture there. He dismissed the notion of the inherent lag of the East, as though the East were at any given moment simply the intellectual and moral rehash of Europe. On the contrary, the speaker insisted, the East was the cradle of the world religions: many of the ideas conceived and maturing there had become universal, providing the splendid models of Eastern art and religion which were of world renown and relevance. The principle of historical method, he went on, comes to the rescue when these manifestations are under analysis. The orientalist will initiate the research, but he cannot advance very far without the cooperation of scholars specializing in other departments of humane study. The speaker therefore expressed the hope that in the near future orientalists would progress from the all too commonly

isolated approach to the monuments of culture, towards a synthetic investigation of the cultural-historical process as a whole.

A paper was then read by N. I. Konrad (INA) on the principal problems involved in the study of the culture of the East. The lecturer had drafted his arguments in the form of a reply to Arnold Toynbee (for whose "letter" on this subject vide *Novyy Mir* No. 7 of 1967).

B. B. Piotrovskiy (Gos. Ermitazh) spoke next of "The principles on which exhibits relating to the history of culture are arranged for display in the State Hermitage". Dwelling on the vexed concept "culture", the speaker criticized various definitions of this hard-worked term from the 19th century Evolutionist school down to the meaning assumed in the most modern Western research. He found, in so much that was conflicting, at least this common ingredient in all the definitions: culture is something distinct from the biological properties; it is the peculiar activity of man and the manifestation of his spiritual beginning. As a practising archaeologist, Piotrovskiy understood by "culture" the aggregate, or totality, of the material and spiritual "valuables" created by man and determining the progressive development of his behaviour. Such an understanding of culture differs, he said, in principle from that to which Arnold Toynbee and other adherents of the theory of the cyclic process in culture, subscribe. Of culture as understood by him (Piotrovskiy) the distinguishing qualities were: (1) that active measured influence which man exerts on his surroundings; the organization by him of production; and the "staging" (*ofornleniye*) by him of the corresponding productive relations; (2) that shaping of scientific thought which literally "remakes" the encompassing reality and guides technique as this evolves; (3) the obligatory utilization of the progressive ideas of the past which facilitates continuity; (4) that intercourse between the various ethnical and historical groups which enriches the components and the composite alike; (5) the constructing (*ofornleniye* again) of systems whether of ideology, language or style in the varied forms of artistic expression; (6) a class character; (7) the diversity, which is national colouring, thriving in the unity of internationalism. All these characteristics had been respected in arranging the lay-out of exhibits in the History Section, the Archaeological Section and the Oriental Section of the Hermitage. The Hermitage as such, he concluded, was eager to cooperate with the Conference in implementing all its recommendations as to such items as the mounting of thematic exhibitions, the preparation of catalogues and guides to oriental collections, and the bringing out of monographs and surveys on the culture both of the East as a whole and of its several areas.

V. A. Karpushin (Institute of Philosophy) delivered the third lecture, which was on the philosophical issues involved. Noting that Marxist sociology was only now in the making he emphasized the wisdom of retaining whatever was of value in pre-Marxist sociology; for example, a recognition of the profound contradictions inherent in

the development of culture, an awareness of culture as the embodiment of the principles of humanism, and so forth. Spiritual culture, he said, which embraces the entire field of social consciousness, must be approached not only from the historico-descriptive, evaluative point of view but from the sociological angle as well. The concept of "spiritual production" had been introduced into science by Marxism as being an activity extending to all that is political, religious, moral, scientific, artistic, lawful etc.; and spiritual culture is the vital social process of the production, distribution and consumption of the spiritual values in the community.

Yu. A. Petrosyan (LO INA) followed with a paper entitled "Research on the Cultural Past of the Peoples of the East". Much preparatory work had already been undertaken, he announced, on this subject whose study was germane to any understanding of the modern age; germane likewise to the Marxist explanation of the problems of the history of world culture, and to the comprehensive elucidation of the history of the culture of the Soviet multi-national State. "The rich traditions of native [meaning Russian, *otechestvennoye*, fatherland] orientalism adorning the study of the culture and contemporary ideologies of the East beyond our borders were almost broken with, three decades ago." Therefore, till now the story of Eastern culture had not been treated as an indivisible complex; the cadres of competent specialists had not been prepared, nor had any properly directed bibliographical work been carried out. And what had been achieved was uneven. Literatures, religions, philosophical doctrines and law, where not totally neglected, had been inadequately treated; and the same could be said about the history of Islam, Muslim law and aesthetics in the context of the Arab East; and about Zoroastrianism, Hellenism, and the post-medieval culture in the context of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Comparatively scant attention had been paid to the *popular* contribution to ancient Indian literature and art, and to the culture of the non-Aryan *narodnost's* [communities not yet qualifying as national entities]: even the classics of medieval Indian literature had been almost ignored. And one could lengthen the sad tale of missed opportunity, Petrosyan said. The need now was for sustained cooperative effort by the specialists in each particular field; their programme to comprise the study, and then the editing and translation, of the chief works of imaginative literature as also of philosophy, historiography, science, and aesthetics. In conclusion the speaker proposed several measures in furtherance of all this, and notably the creation of a Coordination Commission with headquarters in Leningrad. The function of this body would be: to arrange and supervise the training of the appropriate experts in the Oriental Faculties of the universities; to enable the libraries to improve their stock of relevant literature; to bring out a quarterly journal, styled "History of Culture: Peoples of the East";

and finally to organize composite expeditions to the actual countries concerned.

Ye. P. Chelyshev (INA) wound up with an assessment of the state of the cultural study of the East "in our own country and abroad." Western scholarship had, he thought, underestimated the said culture in the modern and contemporary periods. Its exposition of the process of development of culture in the East was not seldom tendentious. There was deliberate praise of the conservative traditions, there was no truck with social problems, there was no apprehension of the interlinking of cultures. Worse than all, there was an inbuilt dishonesty: although the accent and tone were Europocentric throughout, there was a strange pretence that world culture now stood in need of spiritual refreshment which the religio-idealistic philosophy of the East is alone capable of injecting into it. In sum, Western orientalism in its study of the contemporary culture of the East was often committed to the service of neocolonialism. It would be a mistake of course to suggest that Western bourgeois orientalism had failed to achieve anything of serious consequence in the domain under discussion. Certain authors had been outstandingly successful in the matter of the factual information they commanded, but the carelessness, *nechetkost'*, of their ideological positions was only too apparent. "Many Western scholars endeavour, for instance, in their portrayal of modern culture in the East, to bring out its humanistic tendency, but in doing so they push into the foreground the religious, the passive, the contemplative side." Turning to the home front, Chelyshev said: "While we can legitimately speak of our record as regards oriental languages and literatures, in the study of the other branches of contemporary culture we are but taking the first hesitant steps". The case was fraught with problems, and he paused to formulate the most pressing of these: (1) The battle of progressive versus reactionary trends in modern culture in the countries of the East is proceeding under social and political conditions of extraordinary complexity. For that reason one must be chary of any resort to the conventional labels. "Modernism", for instance, is a term to be employed in the context with caution. (2) In examining the interaction of cultures one must attend to the place of *Western* culture in the given areas. (3) No comprehension of the regulated march of the contemporary historico-cultural process will be possible until tradition on the one hand and innovation on the other have been accurately defined, and their respective strengths correctly assessed. (4) For the full exposition of this regulated march the place of each national culture within the whole process has to be discovered, the evolution of aesthetic thought has to be traced, the interaction between the different fields of culture has to be ascertained. (5) The Soviet orientalist who would grasp the meaning

of man and his culture in the setting of the East must never shift his gaze from the paths along which an active humanism develops.\*

All five papers provoked lively discussion in which some 20 members of the audience participated. To select from these: N. V. Pigulevskaya (LO INA) spoke on the need to treat the development of philosophic thought as an integral part of the cultural life of the country or countries under study. She further pleaded the cause of the pseudo-sciences, e.g. alchemy, healing; it was wrong, she maintained, to exclude these. She mentioned, too, a long cherished plan of hers to study the subject at issue in relation to the highways of commerce, especially The Silk Road. S. A. Arumyunov (Institute of Ethnography) envisaged cultural "monads" on different planes whose essence (*sul'*) did not change. He challenged the interpretation of culture as something invariably contributing to progress: it could equally well serve reaction. I. M. Fil'shtinskiy (INA) called attention to a marked divergence in the views on culture expressed by the speakers: Petrosyan viewed it as an aggregate; Konrad—and to some extent Karpushin—as a self-contained domain; and so on; whereas surely the horizons of culture were really to be seen as the evolution of the community ideal. This got a mixed reception from the audience. O. G. Bol'shakov (LO INA) saw culture as the Weltanschauung, or the attitude of the epoch, as expressed in written monuments or material objects. G. M. Bongard-Levin and A. M. Pyatigorskiy (both of INA) alluded to specific problems confronting the student of Buddhism, the case of which was complicated by there being no one, unified, system. Very rich collections of texts had come out of Central Asia and there had been recent architectural finds. This argued energy and enterprise, but the fundamental defect "in most of our work on Buddhism" was a failure to understand what Buddhism is about. In Buddhism the important consideration is not that man produces or consumes; it is the way he stands in relation to things and to himself. R. E. Pubayev (Buryat Branch of the Siberian Section AN) sharply disagreed with the foregoing. He maintained that any study of Buddhism must be combined with atheistic propaganda designed to obliterate the survivals of this religion among the Mongols, Buryat and Kalmyks. Yu. V. Maretin (LO Institute of Ethnography) reminded his listeners that in studying religion and philosophy it is dangerous to forget the *specific* either of the logical thought or of the system of ideas obtaining among the different peoples: this neglect had led to many a faulty interpretation, e.g. that appearing in *Science and Religion* 1967 No. 2, pp. 85–87. The same speaker also joined issue here and there with Konrad, Karpushin and Fil'shtinskiy. A. G. Lundin (LO INA) said that to his thinking the fundamental problem of culture-study was on the one hand the inter-influence of cultures in a region say, like the

\* The word-for-word Russian of this obscure sentence runs: The problem of the investigation of the conception of man in the contemporary culture of the East, the search for the paths of development of an active humanism must be at the centre of attention of Soviet orientalists.

Near East, and on the other hand, their internal spontaneous development in a region such as China. The commonly accepted theory of the cultural "monad" coinciding with the "ethnos" simply would not do. He quoted cases where one cultural complex contains more than one ethnos, and, conversely, cases where one ethnos occurs within the framework of various cultural unities. P. G. Bulgakov (Institute of Orientalism, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences) recounted what had been accomplished in the Central Asian Republics, and pleaded for greater popularization of the works of Soviet scholars on the matters under discussion.

The two reports were on the agenda of the concluding day. The first was read by the secretary of the editorial board of "The Culture of the Peoples of the East", O. L. Fishman (LO INA), who explained that the component volumes of the series so-named would comprise monographs, collected articles, translations into Russian of the more useful works of foreign orientalists, and *vulgarisation*, in the best sense, of the cultural past and present of the East. The Leningrad Branch of the INA would handle publication, and the chairman of the editorial board was N. I. Konrad. The second of the Reports related to another series: viz., "The Written Heritage of the East". [*Pamyatniki Pis'mennosti Vostoka* is difficult to put into concise English because the words apply both to inscriptions and to manuscripts.] Over the past seven years, Yu. Ye. Borshchevskiy (LO INA) the general secretary said, some 50 books had been published and more than 100 made ready for the press. He appealed to representatives of the republics of the Soviet East to send in their proposals as to the publication of oriental MSS.

The proceedings closed with remarks by Konrad and Petrosyan. The former touched on some of the salient points brought out in argument; in particular the need for careful definition of what was intended by "culture" and "culture-study." He took up the exclamation of one speaker, How is it possible to be an optimist! Existentialists might talk like that, he said, but surely we others who were alive to the emergence in our day of the new socialistic type of society, in which there were no classes, were by our very understanding of this phenomenon committed to historical optimism.

Petrosyan performed the formalities of closure.

## ORIENTAL SCHOLARSHIP AT LENINGRAD YESTERDAY AND TODAY

A Conference at Leningrad in June 1967 not only considered the organization and conduct of oriental studies there both in earlier years and nowadays, but also listened to a large variety of papers which reported original research of very recent date. These latter were classified and delivered in the appropriate sections into which the gathering split.

Notwithstanding that the business of two other conferences has been reproduced in this issue, a summary of the transactions of yet a third body appears justified having regard to the useful light which is shed, on these occasions, upon the whole precept and practice of oriental scholarship in Russia at this moment.

The proceedings were written up by N. V. Yeliseyeva in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 of 1968. In the rendering of the business of the session offered in the following paragraphs, only such of the items on the agenda as were of general application or else had some direct bearing on the areas with which *Central Asian Review* is concerned, have been included.

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THE third session of the Leningrad Branch of the Institut Narodov Azii, which took place on 1-3 June 1967, was dedicated to the Jubilee of the Revolution. It was opened by Yu. A. Petrosyan, the Director of the Branch, who briefly recapitulated the chief landmarks in the progress of orientalism in the USSR since the October victory.

*Plenary Session.* D. Ye. Bertel's addressed the session on "The Asiatic Museum of the Russian Academy of Sciences—the Institute of Oriental Studies AN, USSR—The Sector (Museum) of Oriental MSS at the Institute of Oriental Studies". He traced the lines along which this institution, on the evidence of the files in the record room, had functioned and advanced between 1917 and 1956.

E. N. Tamkina brought the story up to date in a paper entitled "Ten Years at the Leningrad Branch". Dealing with the past decade (1957-1967) this narrated, step by step, the achievement of the Branch's collective from the day of its inception till now. L. N. Men'shikov then gave a talk on "Academician V. M. Alekseyev in the Asiatic Museum (Institute of Oriental Studies)", describing what Alekseyev had done both as scholar and administrator within the walls of the Museum where he worked from 1912 to 1951.

*Historical Section.* O. G. Bol'shakov read a paper called "Turning points in the growth of the Central Asian town: 7th-12th centuries". He remarked distinct periods in its evolution. (1) In 7th-8th century

towns were almost always small habitations belonging to feudal rulers, trade and handicraft being of merely incidental importance. (2) After the Arab invasion many towns lost their erstwhile limited status as no more than feudal homes, and acquired a new significance as centres of commercial activity. (3) In 9th century everywhere save in Sogd—the number of additional towns grew, and the old ones expanded. (4) In 10th–11th centuries the characteristic appearance of the Central Asian town crystallized, and the tempo of economic growth slowed down.

S. G. Klyashtornyy lectured on “V. V. Bartol'd and the History of the Turkic Peoples”. This great scholar, he said, accomplished a critical review of the works of his predecessors, and then made the fullest use of their legacy. But he did much more than simply protract the performance of his forerunners. He broadened the whole scope of the sources, and set about constructing a thorough, detailed and entirely reconstituted picture of the life of the Turkic peoples. The speaker discussed two intensive phases of Bartol'd's work: viz. 1892–99 when isolated, albeit crucial, problems of Turcology were in the focus of attention; and 1925–30 when he transferred his energies to the preparation of a series of generalizing surveys of the vast field to which his career had been devoted.

*Linguistic Section.* L. Yu. Tugusheva chose the very technical subject of “Word order as a syntactical sign in nominal constructions, as illustrated by the Turkic languages”. She maintained that “to convey syntactical constructions, a simple list of the component elements, with an indication of their consistency, is often inadequate”. The inherently syntactical nature of word order as the connecting link in syntactical constructions is brought out, she said, when various types of binary constructions (in which word order acts as one of the semantic signs) are subjected to experimental/functional analysis. I. I. Tsukerman followed with “The variant (variantnost') considered as a diachronic limit in a linguistic system”. This paper was the fruit of its author's exhaustive examination of texts in Kurdish. He claimed that study of the variants in linguistic unities enabled one to establish the tendencies operative in the development of a language's system.

*Literature Study Section.* M. B. Rudenko discoursed on “A Kurdish Literary Version of the Poem: Yusuf and Zulaykha”. Until now it had been assumed that the story of Yusuf and Zulaykha was current among the Kurds only in their folklore. The lecturer's researches, however, had led to the discovery of a Kurdish *literary version*. There was one “list” (*spisok*), he said, in the A. D. Zhaba collection of Kurdish MSS, attributable to the 17th century Kurdish poet Selim ibn Sleman—a person till quite recently unheard of in Kurdish literature; and a second one, ascribed to the pen of the 18th century Kurdish poet Haris Bitlisi. The literary version of the poem filled a gap in the history of Kurdish medieval letters, and was of interest both to scholars

of Kurdish and in the whole context of the literary connexions between the Near East and Transcaucasia.

M. Khaznadar spoke on "The Great October Socialist Revolution in the Works of the Contemporary Kurdish Poet Ahmad Dilzar". Ahmad Mustafi Agi Dilzar, the lecturer explained, who was born in 1920, had consecrated the major part of his output—patriotic verse, poems and "civic lyric"—to the victory of Great October. He stood *par excellence* for the Kurdish poets who first interpreted the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

*Section of Source Studies.* Z. N. Borozheykina read a paper on "The Tales Inserted in the Novel of Abdullah Ansari, Friend of the Novices, Sun of the Assemblies". This novel, a very early Persian elaboration of the famous Yusuf and Zulaykha legend, had come down only in two manuscripts—one in the collection held by the Leningrad Branch of the Institut Narodov Azii, and the other in the India Office Library. Borozheykina had done much research on the parables introduced into the romance, and she showed how these contained in an easy, intelligible dress the essential code of Sufi morality. She suggested that the tales thus inserted should be regarded as an effective literary device calculated to spread the understanding, and encourage the acceptance, of the Sufi ethic among the people at large.

N. D. Miklukho-Maklay on "Recensions of Khwandamir's General History, The *Habib us Siyar*", addressed himself to the diverse revisions which had been made of the work named. He was able to establish what had been redone in each volume; and concluded that without taking account of the existence of different variants put into the text by the author himself it was impossible correctly to assess the worth of the numerous MSS of this work that have come down to us. And without that assessment it would in turn be impossible to prepare a critical edition of this most valuable compilation.

N. N. Turmanovich, speaking on "The Domestic Chronicle of the Herat Feudal Rulers; 15th to 19th centuries", gave a provisional account of a rare manuscript, LO INA C—402, The *Tazkire* (Memoirs) of Muhammad Riza b. Muhammad Kazim Barnabadi. This MS was of consequence (1) as a narrative source, containing as it did descriptions of the feudal internecine wars in the Herat neighbourhood at the close of the 18th and opening of the 19th century; (2) as a mine of documents, in which were copies of charters, settlement deeds, testaments, and epistles from members of the author's family to the high officers of state. The MS deserved attention, too, from the literary angle, one-quarter of the volume being occupied by the verse compositions of poets belonging to the Barnabadi clan.

# THE KHOREZM COMMUNIST PARTY 1920-1924

By ANN SHEEHY

At the time of the Revolution the khanate of Khiva was probably the most backward part of the old Tsarist empire. Remote, with a population that was 98-99 per cent illiterate and with no industrial proletariat to speak of, it hardly provided the soil for a Marxist party. Moreover, unlike Bukhara, its Russian population was insignificant. The Khorezm Communist Party (KhCP) only came into being in 1920 after the Red Army invasion of the khanate and the establishment of the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic (KhPSR). It was a completely artificial creation of the Soviet authorities in Turkestan and, in spite of constant efforts on the part of the latter, the vast majority of its members during the whole four years of its existence were never more than Communists in name. The following is an outline of the history of the KhCP drawn largely from recent Soviet sources.

## *The First (Constituent) Conference of the KhCP*

The only Khivan political party of any description at the time of the Revolution and immediately after was the Young Khivans, who were a very small, predominantly Uzbek group of merchants, young mullas and intelligentsia who had fled to Turkestan after a short-lived attempt to establish a majlis in the khanate in mid 1917. The Young Khivans, who were based in Tashkent, aimed at no more than a constitutional monarchy based on the shariat, but in the absence of an orthodox revolutionary party they received Soviet support. At the same time the Soviets tried to persuade the Young Khivans to adopt a more revolutionary programme. According to recent Soviet histories, a Khivan communist group was first set up at the beginning of 1919 as a communist faction in the Petro-Aleksandrovsk Young Khivan Committee. Its members included representatives of almost all the nationalities of the khanate and several Russian communists, and by the spring of 1919 it had already set up an underground group on Khivan territory.<sup>1</sup> It is clear, however, from the subsequent history of the KhCP that, apart from the Russians, the members of these groups were no more than refugees from the khanate and their contacts who were prepared to fall in with Soviet plans.

After the overthrow of the khan at the beginning of February 1920, the Red Army commander G. B. Skakov, who had acted to a large extent

<sup>1</sup> *Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsii Sredney Azii*, Tashkent, 1967 (referred to hereinafter as IKOSA), p. 459.

on his own initiative in invading Khiva, set up a provisional revolutionary government or Revolutionary Committee, which was headed by Dzhumaniyaz Sultanmuradov, the chairman of the Petro-Aleksandrovsk Young Khivan Committee, and included two Turkmen clan leaders.<sup>2</sup> When the Turkestan Commission learnt what had happened, it immediately decided to send to Khiva an Extraordinary Commission led by G. I. Broydo, whose main task was to organize the 1st All-Khorezm Kurultay of People's Representatives to decide on a new constitution for the khanate and to set up a Khivan Communist party. Broydo was accompanied by the Tashkent Young Khivans, who had not taken part in the invasion, a Red Army detachment consisting mainly of Tatars and Bashkirs who knew the local languages, and a large group of Bukharan Communists "who from the first day of their arrival . . . conducted an active struggle for the creation in Khorezm of a genuinely revolutionary regime and above all for the creation of a Khorezm Communist party".<sup>3</sup>

To start with, Broydo decided to set up a joint Party and government body. At a meeting on 4 April 1920, a few days after his arrival, the Young Khivans announced the dissolution of their party and the entry of its members into the Communist ranks, whereupon the Revolutionary Committee was replaced by a seven-member Council of the People's Nazirs which was simultaneously the Committee of the Communists of Khorezm. The new body, which consisted entirely of Young Khivans and Turkmen clan leaders, was headed by Palvanniyaz Yusupov, the chairman of the Tashkent Young Khivan Committee. As with the Revolutionary Committee, none of the so-called Khorezm Communists who had joined the Party before the overthrow of the khan were included.<sup>4</sup> Preparations went ahead for the kurultay, which was duly held on 27-30 April 1920 and proclaimed the former khanate the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic. A new, larger Council of People's Nazirs was elected which was once again an uneasy coalition of Young Khivans and Turkmen clan leaders with no representatives of the toilers included. Ten of the 15 nazirs were Young Khivans. Yusupov retained his post as chairman of the Council, and Sultanmuradov and the Turkmen clan leader Gochmamed-khan were appointed his deputies.<sup>5</sup>

As soon as the kurultay was over, with the assistance of the Bukharan communists sent to Khorezm by the Turkestan Commission, and Communists in the Red Army units stationed in the republic, preparations began for the First (Constituent) All-Khorezm Party Conference, which met in Khiva on 28 May 1920. Representatives of the Turkestan Commission, the Central Committee (CC) of the Turkestan

<sup>2</sup> For an account of the invasion of Khiva see "The End of the Khanate of Khiva" by Ann Sheehy in *CAR*, Vol. XV, 1967, No. 1, pp. 5-20.

<sup>3</sup> K. Mukhammedberdiyev, *Kommunisticheskaya partiya v bor'be za pobedu narodnoy sovetsoy revolyutsii v Khorezme*, Ashkhabad, 1959, pp. 150-51.

<sup>4</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, pp. 154-56; IKOSA, pp. 471-72.

<sup>5</sup> G. Nepsosov, *Iz istorii khorezmskoy revolyutsii*, Tashkent, 1962, p. 190; Mukhammedberdiyev, pp. 165-66.

CP and the Bukharan CP took part in the conference, which formally set up the Khorezm Communist Party. In the absence of any Khivan Communist who could be entrusted with the post, Alimdzhan Akchurin, a Tatar member of the Bukharan CP who had formerly worked at the Kizil-Tepe cotton-ginnery in Transcaspia, was elected chairman of the KhCP Central Committee, and the former Young Khivan Sultanmuradov was made deputy chairman. The Central Committee also included some other members of the Bukharan CP. The newspaper *Inkilob kuyeshi* (Sun of the Revolution), which had been published in Khiva twice a week in Uzbek since shortly after the overthrow of the khan, was made the official organ of the CC KhCP.<sup>6</sup>

*Purkhiv \* and the overthrow of the Young Khivan government*

Once the KhCP had been set up it grew very fast. By the summer of 1920 it already had 600 members, and by September 1920 over 1,000, who were organized in 22 cells covering nearly the whole of the republic, including the Turkmen areas. Over 80 per cent of Party members at this time were said to be dekhkans and urban artisans, but about ten per cent were "class-alien elements", for example, members of aristocratic families, senior clergy, merchants and so on. Komsomol and trade union organizations were set up at the same time as the KhCP and their membership grew just as rapidly.<sup>7</sup>

In keeping with the Soviet government's recognition of the KhPSR as an independent and sovereign state, the KhCP was not made part of the RCP(b) and was a member of the Comintern in its own right. A KhCP delegate addressed the II Comintern Congress in mid 1920.<sup>8</sup> But the independence of the KhCP, like that of the Khorezm republic, was in reality very circumscribed, and its Central Committee constantly received "guidance" and "assistance" from the RSFSR representative in Khiva, who simultaneously represented the Turkestan Bureau of the CC RCP(b) and the Comintern, and from the Communists of the Red Army units in Khorezm.<sup>9</sup> But the Soviet authorities did not have everything their own way. From the very beginning it was clear that the transformation of the Young Khivan leaders into Communists was only nominal. The Chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs Yusupov, for instance, declared that "as long as I am alive the wakfs will remain inviolate and will be spent on the maintenance of mosques, madrasahs and mullas, in accordance with the shariat".<sup>10</sup> In June 1920 the Turkestan Commission reported to Moscow: "Two parties exist in Khiva. One is the party of the Khivan Communists, and the other that of the Young Khivans. The first is supported by the soldiers and farm

<sup>6</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, pp. 150, 183-84, 197; IKOSA, pp. 474-75.

<sup>7</sup> The Political Department of the Khorezm (Khivan) Red Army.

<sup>8</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, p. 185; IKOSA, pp. 475-76; Nepesov, p. 251.

<sup>9</sup> IKOSA, pp. 628-29.

<sup>10</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, pp. 184, 186; IKOSA, p. 476.

<sup>11</sup> Nepesov, p. 197.

labourers, and the second represents the merchant class. The Communists are more numerous, but the Young Khivans are much stronger personalities".<sup>11</sup>

The situation in the KhCP deteriorated in August 1920, when many of the Turkestan and Bukharan communists in Khiva, including the chairman of the CC KhCP Akchurin, were recalled in connexion with the forthcoming overthrow of the Emir of Bukhara. The leadership of the KhCP passed entirely into Young Khivan hands, with Sultanmuradov subsequently becoming chairman of the CC and Mulla Bekchan Rakhmanov a deputy chairman.<sup>12</sup>

Although the Khorezm government was composed of Young Khivans and Turkmen clan leaders, it was to all intents and purposes a Young Khivan affair. The Turkmen clan leaders had only cooperated with the Red Army to overthrow their rival, Dzhunaid-khan, and had no intention of abandoning their former existence as virtually independent feudal lords and their tradition of raiding the Uzbeks. In fact, right up until the mid 1920s the Turkmen clan leaders kept their armed followers and largely ignored the measures of the KhPSR government. The Young Khivans shared the traditional Uzbek distrust of the Turkmen (it was Sultanmuradov's view that they "were bandits and always will be"<sup>13</sup>), and they managed to convince the RSFSR representative and RSFSR Red Army commander in Khorezm of the need to disarm them, including those who had collaborated in the overthrow of the khan and defeat of Dzhunaid. In mid-September 1920, by a ruse they seized and shot Gochmamed-khan, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs, and about 100 Turkmen leaders and their men, and immediately afterwards RSFSR Red Army units were sent to disarm the Turkmen tribes—by force if need be. The result was to increase Turkmen raids and swell the ranks of Dzhunaid-khan's supporters.<sup>14</sup>

The Turkestan Commission was aghast at this episode, which ran counter to all its efforts to improve Uzbek-Turkmen relations. The RSFSR representative and the Red Army commander were immediately relieved of their posts, and on 19 October 1920 a new Extraordinary Commission, consisting of a large group of tried Party and Soviet workers under M. V. Safonov, the new RSFSR and Comintern Turkestan Bureau representative in Khorezm, was sent to Khiva. Safonov was instructed, in Mukhammedberdiyev's words, "to find and organize in Khorezm forces which, unlike the Young Khivans, could become a reliable support of Soviet rule".<sup>15</sup> He set about isolating the Young Khivans by setting up a rival Party organization in the nascent Khorezm Red Army, which consisted of a few small units controlled by the Soviet Red Army. This new organization was Purkhiv, which

<sup>11</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, p. 196.

<sup>12</sup> IKOSA, p. 476; Mukhammedberdiyev, pp. 197, 206.

<sup>13</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, p. 201.

<sup>14</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, pp. 202-8; IKOSA, pp. 476-77, 628.

<sup>15</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, p. 208.

was staffed with experienced political workers, mainly Communists of the eastern nationalities, headed by Makhmud Musayev.<sup>16</sup> As a recent Soviet history states, Purkhiv "resolutely took on itself the leadership of Party work in Khorezm . . . and from this moment . . . two party centres began to function".<sup>17</sup>

At the end of December 1920 Purkhiv summoned a conference of Communists of the Red Army and the rayon KhCP committees which supported Purkhiv. This conference decided to entrust Purkhiv with the conduct of all Party work in Khorezm. The newspapers formerly published by the CC KhCP were taken over by Purkhiv, which also set about reforming local party organizations. On Purkhiv's insistence the local party committees in Khodzheyli, Kungrad, Gurlen and Kunya-Urgench were dissolved altogether and new elections held because they were so badly infested with "alien elements". Purkhiv also began to set up committees of the poor as rivals to the *shuro* (local soviets), which were dominated by Young Khivan henchmen.<sup>18</sup> Undoubtedly with the encouragement of Purkhiv, new Communist supporters joined not the KhCP but the Komsomol. As a result there were many men of 40-45 in the Komsomol, and "in many instances the most serious problems were decided in fact through the Komsomol". The trade unions also had close links with Purkhiv as well as with the trade unions of Turkestan.<sup>19</sup>

The Young Khivans strongly objected to the activities of Safonov and Purkhiv, including their overtures to the Turkmens. Pointing out that Khorezm was a sovereign state, they asked the Turkestan Commission to recall Safonov and, when the Turkestan Commission refused, sent a special delegation to Moscow with the same request, but to no avail. It is alleged that in desperation the Young Khivans even tried to murder Safonov.<sup>20</sup> But in fact it was Safonov who was soon to get rid of the Young Khivans.

In early 1921, on the instructions of the Turkestan Commission and the Turkestan Bureau, Purkhiv and local party organizations made preparations for the 2nd All-Khorezm Kurultay of People's Representatives. The Young Khivans, sensing that they were to be ousted at the kurultay, on 5 March 1921 dissolved the Central Bureau for Elections to the kurultay, whereupon a mass meeting in Khiva, on 6 March 1921, of toilers, Red Army men of the Khivan garrison, soldiers of the Turkmen Red Squadrons and Uzbek volunteer militia to a total of over 5,000, declared the government deposed. The Young Khivan leaders fled to Dzhunaid-khan's camp, and a new government, a Revolutionary Committee of five, was appointed to function until the 2nd kurultay. The Revolutionary Committee was headed by Dzhafarbergen Kuchkarov.

<sup>16</sup> IKOSA, p. 629; Mukhammedberdyev, pp. 211-12.

<sup>17</sup> IKOSA, p. 630.

<sup>18</sup> Mukhammedberdyev, pp. 212-14; IKOSA, p. 630.

<sup>19</sup> IKOSA, p. 631.

<sup>20</sup> Mukhammedberdyev, pp. 209-11, 227.

who had joined the volunteer Khivan detachment in Petro-Aleksandrovsk in 1919, and all its other members were "toilers".<sup>21</sup> According to Mukhammedberdyev, all the activity of the Revolutionary Committee had to be conducted with the assistance of Purkhiv because not one of its members was in the slightest degree trained for the complicated business of state administration. Even the local Communists in the Revolutionary Committee differed little from the non-Party members in the level of their consciousness.<sup>22</sup>

*The First Congress of the KhCP (December 1921)*

The situation in Khorezm in the months immediately following the overthrow of the Young Khivan government was tense, with Young Khivan supporters allying themselves with feudal-clerical elements and plotting against the new government and increased raids by Dzhunaid and the Turkmens. At the beginning of April 1921 the Turkestan Bureau sent a special commission to Khorezm under D. Yu. Gopner, an experienced Party worker and expert on the East. Purkhiv and Safonov, having brought about the overthrow of the Young Khivan government, had simultaneously got rid of the Young Khivan leadership of the CC KhCP, including Sultanmuradov and Rakhmanov, chairman and deputy chairman respectively. But the KhCP was still in a very unsatisfactory condition. One of the main tasks of Gopner's commission was to restore the health of the Party and make it fit to cope with the tasks facing the republic. The commission brought with it to Khiva a draft Minimum Programme for the KhCP.<sup>23</sup>

After certain difficulties over the elections in the Turkmen areas had been overcome the 2nd kurultay was held, on 20 May 1921, and it adopted a new constitution. A new government was elected which consisted mainly of toilers, about whom Yusupov, the former Chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs, remarked scornfully that none of them "had ever seen a blanket or a cushion in their lives."<sup>24</sup> Almost immediately after the kurultay, at the end of May 1921, a meeting of active Party and Soviet workers was called in Khiva "at the suggestion of an initiative group supported by Purkhiv".<sup>25</sup> The meeting, held under the slogan "An End to the Lack of Organization and Ideological Weakness of the KhCP", was attended by representatives of Purkhiv, the Turkestan Bureau, the Turkestan Commission and the Comintern. It discussed a draft Party programme and Party rules, prepared with the assistance of the Comintern and Turkestan Bureau representatives for submission to the forthcoming Party congress, and decided to streamline the Party by reducing the number of rayon Party organizations from 22 to eight, re-registering all members. To head the KhCP until

<sup>21</sup> Mukhammedberdyev, pp. 225-30; Nepesov, p. 211; IKOSA, pp. 632-33.

<sup>22</sup> Mukhammedberdyev, p. 232.

<sup>23</sup> IKOSA, pp. 633-34; Mukhammedberdyev, pp. 233-34.

<sup>24</sup> IKOSA, p. 635.

<sup>25</sup> IKOSA, p. 637.

the Party congress a provisional Central Bureau of five was set up, on 5 June 1921. The continuing dearth of Khorezm Communists capable of holding positions of responsibility was evidenced by the fact that the Chairman of the Central Bureau was Mukhammetzhan Izzetdinov (or Gizzatdinov), described as a representative of the Turkestan Bureau of the Comintern. The other members were: the head of Purkhiv; Mirkamov Mirsharapov, a Tashkent Communist who had taken part in the suppression of the Osipov revolt in January 1919 and was War Minister of the KhPSR; and "two local political workers". The Central Bureau, which received constant assistance from Purkhiv, decided on 10 June 1921 to re-register all Party members, eliminating all unreliable elements. This resulted in a very drastic purge, and membership of the KhCP fell from over 2,000 ("to a large extent existing mostly on paper") to 60, including 18 Turkmens.<sup>26</sup>

In no time at all, however, the Party ranks began to swell again. Members of the dekhkan committees, Komsomol and trade unions were encouraged to join, and lectures were given by representatives of the Turkestan Bureau, Turkestan Commission and Central Committee of the Turkestan CP to raise members' ideological level. By August 1921 the number of rayon Party organizations had doubled to 16 and membership had shot up to 731, including about 80 Turkmens. At the beginning of December 1921 it had reached 1,200.<sup>27</sup>

The First Congress of the KhCP met in Khiva from 4-11 December 1921 and was attended by 37 delegates representing the 1,200 Party members. Representatives of the Turkestan Bureau and the Central Committee of the Turkestan CP were also present. The agenda included the internal and international situation, national and land and water relations, education, taxation policy, the creation of a Khorezm Red Army, and Party construction. While approving the decisions of the 2nd All-Khorezm Kurultay of People's Representatives, the Party Congress was forced to admit that the toilers were not yet fit to run the government on their own. "The Congress considered it 'impossible at the present time to form the government exclusively from representatives of the poor' . . . and permitted the inclusion in it of loyal 'honest bay and semi-bay elements under the vigilant control of the Party' ".<sup>28</sup> The Congress adopted the new Party Programme and elected a Central Committee of 13 members and two candidate members as well as a three-man Secretariat. A certain T. Sharafutdinov was chosen as Responsible Secretary of the Central Committee.<sup>29</sup>

#### *The entry of the KhCP into the RCP(b) and the Second Party Congress*

Although Moscow and the Turkestan Bureau never hesitated to tell the KhCP what to do, the KhCP remained nominally independent of

<sup>26</sup> IKOSA, pp. 637-39; Mukhammedberdyev, p. 251.

<sup>27</sup> IKOSA, p. 640; Mukhammedberdyev, p. 252.

<sup>28</sup> IKOSA, p. 641.

<sup>29</sup> IKOSA, pp. 640-43.

the RCP(b) until 1922. The actual decision of 1 February 1922 to incorporate it in the RCP(b) seems to have been a by-product of the serious situation at that time in the Bukharan PSR and the decision to make the Bukharan CP part of the RCP(b) in order to get a closer grip on affairs there. Representatives of both the Khorezm and Bukharan CPs were appointed to the Turkestan Bureau, which from April 1922 was called the Central Asian Bureau. From now on "the entire activity of the KhCP took place under the guidance of the Central Asian Bureau of the RCP(b) Central Committee, which took a constant interest in the activity of the Party organizations of Khorezm and directed their work along the correct path".<sup>30</sup> The prominent Central Asian Party worker Nizametdin Khodzhayev was appointed Central Asian Bureau representative in Khorezm.

The Khorezm Communists are said to have repeatedly requested that the KhCP should become part of the RCP(b),<sup>31</sup> but not all members welcomed the loss of their Party's independence. The Second Congress of the KhCP, which met not long afterwards in July 1922, found it necessary to "condemn the position of certain workers of the CC KhCP who had committed nationalist errors, infringed the Leninist principles of democratic centralism and striven to carry out a chauvinistic policy. The line aimed at isolating the KhCP from other Communist parties and in particular from the RCP(b) received a decisive rebuff".<sup>32</sup> The Second Congress also made an effort to assert its control over the Komsomol and other mass organizations, which still showed a tendency to act independently of the Party, a relic probably of the days when Purkhiv encouraged them to do so in opposition to the then Young-Khivan-dominated KhCP Central Committee. A Central Committee and Central Revision Commission were elected by the Congress, and T. Sharafutdinov was again made Responsible Secretary.<sup>33</sup>

#### *The Third Congress of the KhCP and the 4th Kurultay*

The number of KhCP members apparently varied little between the end of 1921 (1,200) and early 1923 (1,157), but the Party seems to have contained very nearly as many undesirable elements as before the drastic purge of June 1921. Given the illiteracy or semi-literacy of local Communists of humble origin and the general conditions prevailing in the KhPSR, it was only to be expected. According to one CC RCP(b) report on the KhCP (unfortunately the exact date is not given), "the membership of local Party organizations is thoroughly confused. Social position is not taken into account at all. Anyone who can be bothered to enrol is considered a Communist. In the Urgench party organization there were Tatar millionaires. In the Gurlen organization more than half are clergy. In the Party in the towns

<sup>30</sup> IKOSA, p. 647.

<sup>31</sup> IKOSA, p. 563.

<sup>32</sup> IKOSA, p. 648.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

there are profiteers. Only in some places are roughly one-sixth of Party members poor people".<sup>34</sup> Another report said that up to mid-1923, the interests of the bazaars, family and tribal ties and so on were typical of the Khorezm Party, which was not a mass organization. In the towns the CC carried out its functions mechanically, while in the rural areas control was in the hands of the *shuro*, which were composed of rich and influential personages.<sup>35</sup> A very high percentage of Party members were completely illiterate,<sup>36</sup> in spite of efforts to deal with this problem. A second Party purge, carried out from April to June 1923 with the assistance of the Central Asian Bureau, reduced the number of members and candidate members from 1,157 to 709. At the same time there was an amalgamation of town and rayon committees. This is said to have been accompanied by a substantial improvement in the work of the Central Committee itself, which began to meet much more frequently. But in spite of the purge, in July 1923, when the Third Party Congress took place, only 15 per cent of Party members were dekhkans, while 50 per cent were merchants and as many as ten per cent mullas.<sup>37</sup>

On the formation of the USSR in December 1922 Stalin had declared that the Khorezm and Bukharan PSRs had not been included solely because they were not yet socialist, but he added that he had no doubt that they would eventually join the union. At the 4th Conference of the CC RCP(b) with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, held on 10 June 1923, he returned to the question and declared that neither Bukhara nor Khiva could be admitted to the USSR unless they radically changed their policies, which were neither socialist nor popular.<sup>38</sup> Taking its cue from this conference, the Third Congress of the KhCP, which met in mid-July 1923, decided to work energetically for the transformation of the KhPSR into a socialist republic, which meant in effect breaking the power of all exploiter elements and excluding them from positions of authority. The Congress called for a third purge of Party members and the recruitment of dekhkans and farm labourers, and also of representatives of the revolutionary-minded intelligentsia.<sup>39</sup> Precise figures are not available for the numbers affected by the third purge, but it would seem that at least two-thirds or more of the KhCP members were expelled, reducing membership to around 200 or even less.

<sup>34</sup> Nepesov, p. 252.

<sup>35</sup> R. Kh. Abdushukurov. *Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya, rastsvet uzbekskoy sotsialisticheskoy natsii i sblizheniye yeye s natsiyami SSSR*, Tashkent, 1962, p. 175.

<sup>36</sup> *Istoriya sovet'skogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana*, Vol. I (1917-1924 gg.), Tashkent, 1960, p. 129.

<sup>37</sup> IKOSA, pp. 650-51.

<sup>38</sup> R. Vaidyanath. *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics*, New Delhi, pp. 134-35.

<sup>39</sup> IKOSA, p. 651.

The Central Committee elected by the 3rd Party Congress began to work out a new draft socialist constitution for submission to the forthcoming 4th kurultay. There was also a rapid build-up of Party membership with special emphasis on the recruitment of dekhkans. By the autumn of 1923 the KhCP had 547 members, including 415 dekhkans (77 per cent), 40 workers, 46 craftsmen, 15 employees and 31 others. There were 379 Uzbeks among the Party members, but, as before, few Turkmens, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks. There were practically no women members. The first woman member, Aysha Abdusalyamova, had joined the Party only on the eve of the Third Congress.<sup>40</sup> The new members who joined the Party in the second half of 1923 were apparently no more true Communists than their purged predecessors, whatever their origins. Of the 600 or so Party members and 1,600 members of the Komsomol at the beginning of 1924, it has been reckoned that there were not more than 100 effective members.<sup>41</sup>

In its campaign for the elections to the 4th All-Khorezm Kurultay of Soviets in October 1923 the Party put forward the slogan "not to admit any exploiter elements". All those put up for election by the KhCP were elected, the result being that 200 of the 234 delegates to the kurultay were dekhkans, and 161 members of the Party and Komsomol. The 4th kurultay proclaimed the KhPSR the Khorezm Soviet Socialist Republic, and adopted a new constitution to accord with its new socialist status. The new constitution abolished private ownership of land, confiscated all the property of the former khans and leading khanate officials, and deprived of the vote all those resorting to hired labour for purposes of profit, those living on unearned income, and also merchants, clergy, khans and their relatives, officials and notorious counter-revolutionaries. The kurultay removed from office all the existing nazirs, the majority of whom had been merchants and clergy, and replaced them with Communists, Komsomol members and non-Party poor peasants and workers. The former chairman of the All-Khorezm Central Executive Committee Khodzha-Bobo was accused of supporting the Basmachi and pronounced a counter-revolutionary, while the Chairman of the Economic Council Nurullayev, a former official of the khan's, was charged with embezzlement and counter-revolution and handed over to the courts. The kurultay also passed a law "On wakf lands" under which all wakf lands were declared state property and a tax of one-tenth of the harvest was imposed on them. As a result 1,272 religious institutions were deprived of wakf land to a total of about 500,000 tanaps.<sup>42</sup>

The transformation of Khorezm into a socialist republic and all it involved proved to be far too precipitate. The new laws affected

<sup>40</sup> IKOSA, pp. 651-52.

<sup>41</sup> N. Kutuyakov. *Krasnaya konnitsa i vozduzhnyy flot v pustynnyakh. 1924 god.*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930, p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> IKOSA, pp. 652-54; Mukhammedberdiyev, p. 256; Kutuyakov, p. 33.

not only the clergy and the rich merchants, but also many of the peasants and craftsmen who employed outside labour, and opposition mounted. On 6 January 1924 the Central Asian Bureau recommended that the CC KhCP should show special care in carrying out measures touching the interests of the middle peasants, craftsmen and loyal section of the intelligentsia, so as to avoid the possibility of alienating broad strata of the population from the Soviet regime. The Central Asian Bureau recommended in particular that they should not be in too much of a hurry to implement the article of the new constitution depriving the exploiting classes of the vote. In view of the strong influence of the mullas on the peasant masses the CC KhCP was urged to conduct extensive explanatory work among the peasants tilling the wakf lands to explain the new law to them. The KhCP and Khorezm government were also told to carry out a flexible policy towards the Turkmen leaders, who still enjoyed great influence with their tribes.<sup>43</sup>

But it was too late. Dissatisfaction increased and there were demands for, among other things, the expulsion of the Bolsheviks. Almost all the leaders of the KhCP and government were absent in Moscow at the II Congress of Soviets of the USSR, when a revolt of peasants in Khanki, Khazarasp and Pitnyak, sparked off by new, inordinately high taxes, finally broke out on 15 January 1924. Soon the peasants were joined by Dzhunaid and his bands and Khiva was under siege. The siege was lifted in early February, following the despatch of a Red Army Cavalry Column from Turkestan. After a number of further engagements the revolt was over by the end of the month.

In the aftermath of the revolt, in which very large sections of the population had participated, a special commission of the Central Asian Bureau arrived in Khorezm on 2 March 1924 to offer practical guidance and direct assistance to the KhCP. On 4 March 1924 the Executive Bureau of the CC KhCP decided to make concessions by reducing the taxes on the dekhkans and craftsmen and diverting part of the income from taxes on wakf lands to the maintenance of reformed religious schools in order to win over some of the clergy. On 10 March 1924 the Central Asian Bureau adopted a resolution on the report of the special commission on its trip to Khiva. This stressed the danger of the KhCP being divorced from the masses and pointed out that the purely-class political line, abruptly taken by the CC KhCP from the time of the Third Party Congress, had been premature. In particular, given the extreme weakness of the Party and Soviet apparatus, the electoral and wakf legislation adopted at the 4th kurultay had alienated not only the intelligentsia, clergy and middle strata of the towns, but also a very substantial stratum of the peasants. As a result, when an agricultural tax was imposed on the peasants double that under the khans, a large section of the population had temporarily

<sup>43</sup> IKOSA, pp. 654-55.

allied itself with Dzhunaid-khan's bands. The Central Asian Bureau suggested that the electoral law should be relaxed to allow those hiring labour but also working themselves to vote, and that more middle peasants and townsmen should be brought into Soviet agencies. To help the KhCP to carry out these proposals the Central Asian Bureau sent responsible Party workers from Tashkent to supplement the staff of the CC KhCP.<sup>44</sup>

The commission of the Central Asian Bureau was followed to Khiva by one from the CC RCP(b) headed by Broydo. On Broydo's arrival an All-Khorezm Party Conference, which ranked in importance with a Party congress, was held from 1-4 April 1924. The conference discussed the reports of the Responsible Secretary of the CC KhCP Kalandar Adinayev on party construction and of Broydo on the situation in Khorezm and the main tasks of the Communist Party. The conference recognized that in Khorezm there was still a need to establish temporary alliances with representatives of the exploiter classes, and stressed that the tactics of the KhCP at the present stage should be determined "in accordance with the correlation of class forces: the almost complete absence of a proletariat, broad masses of the peasantry who have scarcely emerged from the state of medieval serfdom, and an old and comparatively powerful merchant bourgeoisie and clergy closely knitted with the population". The conference came to the conclusion that "the Khorezm Communist Party is a peasant party", and called for a systematic purge of alien elements with an emphasis on quality rather than quantity, extensive educational work among Party and Komsomol members, and a resolute struggle against Communists assuming privileges or indulging in nationalistic policies.<sup>45</sup>

As a result of the conference, the KhCP adopted theses on party construction which stressed that it was better to have 100 staunch members than 1,000 devoid of principles, and declared that there must be no representatives of the clergy, bays or merchants in the Party.<sup>46</sup> At the end of July 1924 the KhCP had 774 members. They included 98 workers, 613 peasants and 19 employees. The vast majority of members were Uzbeks (649), with 37 Kazakhs, 30 Russians and other Europeans, and 58 of other eastern nationalities.<sup>47</sup> By this time, following the establishment of a Turkmen Autonomous Oblast in the KhSSR, a Turkmen oblast organization of the KhCP had been set up. This led to an increase in the number of Turkmen Party members, but in some cases clan leaders joined with their supporters, or poor people were only able to enrol with the permission of their clan leaders.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>44</sup> IKOSA, pp. 657-58; *Istoriya sovetskogo gosudarstva . . .*, pp. 134-36.

<sup>45</sup> IKOSA, pp. 658-60.

<sup>46</sup> IKOSA, pp. 661-62.

<sup>47</sup> Abdushukurov, pp. 205-6.

<sup>48</sup> Mukhammedberdiyev, pp. 257-58; IKOSA, p. 665.

### *National Delimitation and the Dissolution of the KhCP*

By the middle of 1924 the discussions on the national delimitation of the Central Asian republics were in full swing and, considering recent events, the KhCP leaders were taking a surprisingly independent line. The question had been first brought up at a session of the KhCP CC in February by a member of the Central Asian Bureau. In mid March a meeting of the "party and soviet aktiv" in Khiva had expressed its approval of delimitation, but the CC KhCP had refused to commit themselves. Although a large number of KhCP members favoured the secession of the Turkmen areas of the republic, they did not want the Uzbek areas to be incorporated in the future Uzbekistan. On 8 May 1924 the Responsible Secretary of the CC KhCP Adinayev, a member of the Executive Bureau CC KhCP Abdusalyamov, and two leading government officials handed the Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau a note insisting that Khorezm should remain as it was. On 2 June officials of the Khorezm CC sent a telegram to the Central Asian Bureau reiterating their views. A week later the Executive Committee of the CC KhCP did formally acknowledge the necessity of delimitation, but put off its implementation for an unspecified period. Moscow decided not to press the matter for the moment and the Politburo decree on delimitation of 12 June 1924 announced the retention of the Khorezm republic with the exception of the Turkmen areas, which were to become part of Turkmenistan. The CC KhCP continued its resistance, and on 16 June 1924 even passed a resolution forbidding leading and rank and file communists to rally support for delimitation on penalty of expulsion from the Party. Finally Moscow decided to put an end to the CC KhCP's defiance. The Deputy Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau Karklin visited Khorezm in the latter half of July 1924 and apparently by using economic threats persuaded the Executive Bureau of the CC KhCP to adopt a resolution on 26 July 1924 in favour of Khorezm being included in the delimitation after all.<sup>49</sup>

The redrawing of the boundaries in Central Asia meant the dissolution of the Turkestan, Bukharan and Khorezm CPs and the setting up of new Party organizations. At the time of the national delimitation the KhCP was still a predominantly peasant party (88 per cent against 11 per cent workers and farm labourers<sup>50</sup>). A substantial number of Communists were still politically and culturally backward, and there were many who were illiterate.<sup>51</sup> The KhCP held its Fourth and last Congress in October 1924. The agenda included the

<sup>49</sup> IKOSA, pp. 730-34; Vaidyanath, pp. 116-17, 180-83; A. A. Gordiyenko, *Sozdaniye sovet'skoy natsional'noy gosudarstvennosti v Sredney Azii*, pp. 161, 169.

<sup>50</sup> The actual figures given are 613 peasants against 98 workers and farm labourers, which does not correspond with the percentages.

<sup>51</sup> IKOSA, pp. 760-62.

international situation, the report of the Central Committee, Party construction, cotton-growing, irrigation, cooperation and work with young people.<sup>52</sup> The Congress presumably also discussed the Party's imminent demise. The new provisional republican Party organizations were set up at the end of October 1924, and the CC KhCP was dissolved at the end of November or beginning of December 1924, its personnel, documents and property being divided between the new Party organizations.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup> IKOSA, p. 665.

<sup>53</sup> IKOSA, p. 762.

## INDIAN REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA

By HUBERT EVANS

AN article by G. L. Dmitriyev appearing in *Materialy k izucheniyu istorii Uzbekistana* (1966) on the revolutionary activities of various Indian émigrés immediately before, and during, the Great War was dealt with in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. XV, No. 4. The same author, this time in *Istoricheskoye Znachenije Pobedy Oktyabr'skoy Sotsialisticheskoy Revolyutsii v Uzbekistane*, Tashkent 1967, carried the story up to and through its second, rather brief, phase in which the Indian revolutionaries established contact with, and to some degree were even identified with, the bolsheviks. Dmitriyev's 16 pages under the heading "The History of the Indian Revolutionary Organizations in Central Asia (1919-1921)" struck one as carelessly drafted and repetitive, but they were interestingly authenticated by 87 references to sources on which for the most part the Western student cannot draw.

The opening pages recapitulated the first phase of activity on the wider stage: 1913 (USA); 1914 (Berlin); 1915-1917 (Afghanistan). This ground, having been traversed in the previous article, need not be retraced: the real point of departure now was the clarion call of a victorious Russian proletariat to the colonial and dependent peoples to rise and follow in its footsteps, and shake free from the bondage of imperial dominion. It was in response to this thrilling message, Dmitriyev said, that the heroes of local national-liberation movements began to feel their way, physically as well as intellectually, towards the Soviets. Thus, Muhammad Barakatullah and Zakariya, both of "The Provisional Government of Free India in Exile", arrived in Tashkent early in 1919, and proceeded to Moscow. Shortly afterwards Mahendra Pratap, the head of the "Provisional Government", turned up there from Berlin; and likewise to Moscow at that juncture travelled Abdurrab, former official of the British Consulate at Baghdad, and the south Indian Trimal Achariya who had joined one of the revolutionary groups whilst an undergraduate in London before the war.

Mahendra Pratap in his talks with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs asked for recognition as President of the Indian Republic. The Soviet Government, Dmitriyev remarked here, "true to the principles of proletarian internationalism"—and not less true, he might have added, to those of the old diplomacy—expressed its readiness to accord legal recognition to any Provisional Indian Government formed by Indian revolutionaries on Indian territory, provided the said government enjoyed the support of the revolutionary movement

as such and gave formal notification of its formation in that sense. The source here is TsGA UzSSR R.17. This "brotherly backing", according to Dmitriyev, "though necessarily uncorroborated by paper formalities gave profound moral encouragement" to the Indians assembled in Moscow; and what was even more important it paved the way to that first hand familiarity they would presently gain with the theory and practice of the Russian revolutionary movement. In conversations which Pratap, Abdurrah and Barakatullah had with Lenin himself in July 1919 they were able to appreciate that "the reins of Government throughout the vast spaces of Russia and Turkestan had been entrusted to the hands of the workers, peasants and soldiers; that national, religious and race distinctions had been obliterated; and that all classes and orders were acknowledged as having a uniform claim to life and freedom" (TsGA R.1792).

Dmitriyev next discussed the *Weltanschauung* of these Indian émigrés, and his verdict, coming so close on what he had just been saying, sounded unexpectedly adverse. These people condemned the European and American capitalist system, and were properly contemptuous of bourgeois parliamentary procedure. Also they perceived private property to be the root of all evil. But the "communal and national property" with which they proposed to replace it was "conceived in a typically bourgeois spirit". They did not succeed in lifting themselves out of the ruck of the West European socialists. They thought always in terms of the bourgeois socialism with its "levelling theories", and had no comprehension whatever of the place and importance of Marxism-Leninism in the history of mankind. It seemed to them that Marx and Lenin had borrowed from Plato. To crown everything, they believed socialist doctrine to be contained almost ready-made in all the great world religions, which in the first place (as they supposed) sincerely strove to banish need, poverty and unhappiness from among the children of men and to introduce instead the rule of peace, freedom and equality. Most of the émigrés were Muslim, and consequently it was Islam that found favour in their revolutionary preaching. Abdurrah was quoted from the newspaper *Ishtrokiun* (Ishtirakiun) of 12 October 1919 as declaring at a public meeting convened in Old Tashkent that "Islam is the foundation of liberty, the enemy of tyranny, and the executioner of autocracy". Clearly, therefore, concluded Dmitriyev, the Communists of Soviet Russia and Turkestan had an up-hill task in front of them, but they nevertheless gave generous publicity to Indian émigré views in the columns of the press. There was, of course, advantage in so doing, for it acquainted the Central Asian public with Indian happenings and promoted a certain cohesion of thought and endeavour.

In the autumn of 1919, with the blessing and active assistance of the CP Turkestan, there was founded at Tashkent, and with headquarters there, a Union of the Freedom of the East for the purpose of

co-ordinating the work of national cells in the different countries covered. Into the central office of this organization the revolutionary exiles from India (alongside others from Kashgar, Turkey and Iran) were taken to advise on ways and means of creating abroad that climate in which, as the statutes of the Union put it, the peoples concerned might "step over the heads of the feudal rulers from a precapitalist system straight into socialism" (TsGA R.1792). The Union, it seems, encouraged the émigrés to organize themselves locally, and *Ishtrokiun* 24 December 1919 extended a formal welcome to the Indian association thus resulting, viz., *Jam'ati Ozodikhokhon (Azadikhahan) i Hind*.

There was soon another development when, early in 1920, the Indians were brought into the Soviet of International Propaganda in the East. This "Soviet", or Council, functioning under the aegis and indeed guidance of the Turkestan Branch of the Comintern, had been formed by the Turkestan Communists in collaboration with the revolutionary émigrés from a number of Asian countries, and consisted of Sections operated by nationals of the places concerned: Iran, Turkey, Kashgar, Bukhara, Khiva or wherever it was—and now, India. The Indian Section thus created had for office-bearers the following: President—Muhammad Ali; Secretary—Muhammad Shafiq; Treasurer—Ibrahim; and its principal job was the preparation of literature in English and Urdu for dissemination in the subcontinent. A specimen of the brochures put out is "To our Indian Brothers", Tashkent 1920, which explained Soviet Russia's attitude towards the colonial and dependent countries of the East. "The brotherhood between Russia and revolutionary India", this brochure pronounced, was "dictated by history". Two giants had "risen up against imperialism—one of them the proletarian revolution in the West and the other the national revolution in the East . . . and British imperialism, knowing how infectious the Russian example, the Russian method", was proving to be, was "attempting to isolate the Russian and Indian revolutionaries physically and morally from each other". Alluding to an Indian legend that the land would be liberated by newcomers to the scene from the North, the brochure proclaimed that the time was at hand: "Now will your hopes be realized, if you fix your gaze on the Soviet North even as this turns its gaze upon the East".

The sympathy and understanding lavished on the Indian revolutionaries by their hosts on Soviet soil, Dmitriyev continued, heartened the émigrés in Afghanistan (whither Pratap and Abdurrah had returned), and a resolution adopted at a gathering of 120 revolutionaries in Kabul on 17 February 1920 ran: "Gratitude to Soviet Russia for having hearkened to the cry of agony uttered from 315 million crushed breasts of India, whose population endures unheard of sufferings beneath the heel of imperialism" (Reported in *Izvestiya Turtsika*, 17 April 1920). A telegram of similar purport was addressed to Lenin, who in reply noted "the significance of the fact that the principles

promulgated by the Workers and Peasants Republic . . . had found so lively an echo among self-conscious Indians battling heroically for their freedom”.

Through the spring and summer of 1920, handfuls of Indian Revolutionaries continued to arrive in Soviet Turkestan and were drawn into the machinery of the Soviet International Propaganda. Abdurrab came back from Afghanistan to Tashkent and was elected president of the *Jami'at*. The Party agencies meantime did all they could to associate the Indians with their own activities, thus providing them with a practical introduction to their work, including the implementation of the Nationalities Policy.

The line taken by the communists of Turkestan—and Dmitriyev were here citing a Resolution of the 1st Congress of the Turkfront Political Workers dated June 1920—was “to concentrate more especially on the class organization of all proletarian, semi-proletarian and middle-peasant elements in the countries of the East, no matter how weak or few they might be in the given case, and bring the activities of such organizations into the closest touch with those of the advanced communist elements”. From this date, that is the summer of 1920, the uphill efforts, to repeat the adjective employed already, of the Turkestan communists began to bear fruit, and there was evidence that the Indians were at last convinced of the validity of the principles of the Third International. They sent their delegates to the 2nd Congress of the Comintern, at which Abani Mukerji and Trimal Achariya possessed the right to vote. It was at this moment, too, that the Turkestan hosts were able to harness to their own endeavours the energy generated by the Khilafat movement. Dmitriyev quite properly assumed the reader's familiarity with this, as also with the degree to which, by the date in question, it was losing its impetus. Using the extreme left of the émigrés, personified notably by Abdurrab and Achariya, the Turkestan Communists succeeded in diverting the zeal of the *muhajirs*, or volunteers, arriving in Afghanistan en route for Anatolia into a worthier channel: in other words, they succeeded in interesting them in events in Central Asia. Fired with this newer enthusiasm, nearly 100 of the volunteers—prominent among them the former Peshawar student, Muhammad Akbar Khan and one Rafiq Ahmad who afterwards wrote his memoirs—got through, not without cruel hardship, to Tashkent.

Towards the end of the year, courses were arranged for these volunteers, superintended by an American “military specialist” whose name appears in the Soviet record as Vobbli Dzhon\*; the training consisted of political doctrine, drill, machine-gun and artillery practice, and even flying. Meantime a second group from India arriving via

\* Dmitriyev did not explain, and probably did not know, that this is a nickname. The I.W.W. (International World Workers) were called by those who had no high opinion of them, “The Wobblies”.

Kabul was greeted and housed in Bukhara, where a People's Republic had recently been inaugurated. Its members, being useful linguists and technicians, were presently absorbed in the Nezaret (Ministry) of Foreign Affairs as translators, telephonists, etc. This Bukhara group set up a Provisional Indian Revolutionary Committee headed by Ghulam Muhammad which received by mutual consent the status of a regular outpost of the main *Jami'at* at Tashkent. Side by side with these activities the Indian revolutionaries were approaching, and influencing, their compatriots resident in Central Asia from pre-revolution days, chiefly the contingent from Sind settled in the Fergana Oblast, and others in Samarkand.

Up to date, of course, as Dmitriyev was careful to remind the reader, very few of the Indian revolutionaries were communists. And though M. N. Roy who arrived in the autumn of 1920 was instrumental in founding in Tashkent an "Indian Communist Party", this numbered, apart from himself and Mrs. Roy, only the Secretary, Muhammad Shafiq, plus four members: viz. A. Mukerji and his German wife, Muhammad Ali and Achariya. Nor did it prove feasible by the close of the year to enrol more than another ten. However, "the transition to Marxism of the advanced émigrés could not but have an effect on the remaining Indian revolutionaries" who gradually came to see that it was not simply a question of accepting Soviet Russia's assistance but of becoming self-reliant in the contest with Western imperialism and their own country-bred capitalists. These sentiments were trenchantly expressed by M. N. Roy in a speech of welcome to a delegation from Khiva reported in *Izvestiya Turtsika*, 3 October 1920. The petty-bourgeois concept of revolution, that eminently respectable process sanctioned by a wealth of Koranic precept, it was at long last appreciated, stood no chance of getting anywhere, and a realistic clear-cut manifesto was therefore agreed which was released to the Turkestan press under the rubric "Extract from Draft Programme of the Provisional All-India Central Revolutionary Committee". This insisted on the need for the great mass of the Indian people to assume its share of responsibility, for only then could the British raj be overthrown and replaced by a dictatorship resting on the support of a revolutionary army and of the soviets of workers and peasants. While these attitudes were evidence of distinct headway, it would be an error to imagine, Dmitriyev added, that ideological maturity was evenly spread. There were painful inadequacies of outlook not only in the rank and file but at the top, and the unedifying squabble for leadership which now occurred between Abdurrah and Achariya on the one side and Shafiq and Roy on the other—resulting in the defeat and withdrawal from RSFSR altogether of the former pair—was damaging indeed.

The events above narrated, which occupied the autumn and early winter of 1920, coincided with the talks that eventually led to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 16 March 1921. As part of that

agreement the British demanded the cessation of all Russian-sponsored agitation hostile to them in Asia Minor, Iran, Afghanistan and the North West Frontier of India; themselves undertaking to refrain from the conduct, *outside their own territorial limits*, of propaganda against the Russian Soviet Republic. A clause to that effect went into the convention as eventually drafted, and it was this, on Dmitriyev's argument, that explained the abrupt closedown of Indian revolutionary activity within the confines of Central Asia. There could be a different explanation, namely that the weakly charged batteries failed to keep the light burning any longer; for the Russians were clearly not debarred by the clause in question from conducting anti-British propaganda within their own borders, but only "abroad"—*vne sobstvennykh predelov*. Be that as it may, the Tashkent training school was closed in May and its pupils transferred to the Communist University of the Peoples of the East at Moscow. To Moscow similarly repaired the entire Indian communist organization headed by Shafiq, Mukerji and Roy. On the termination of their classes at the Communist University in 1922 certain of the Indian revolutionaries returned to India through Tashkent, but Central Asia was never to be their nursery again.

Summing up, Dmitriyev said that the emergence of an Indian Communist organization in Central Asia did not mean that its founders became real communists overnight. In most cases that did not happen to them till much later, and in India itself when their ideas of scientific socialism had been purified in the fire of the national-liberation struggle. This did not lessen the importance of the Central Asian experience, and of the fact that the pioneers of Marxist-Leninist teaching in India were precisely those Indian revolutionaries who had learned their abc of communism in Soviet Turkestan.

## INDIA'S POPULATION PROBLEM

The question how India is to feed herself has been receiving the close study of Soviet Indianists and economists these many years, but in few or any of their publications has the population explosion of the mid-20th century been treated as the most appalling among the several factors that make the situation what it is. Because Marxism-Leninism dwells so consistently on the proper (meaning socialistic) harnessing of the existing material resources,<sup>1</sup> and perhaps too because Lenin in certain of his specific references to India was inclined to speak of the hundreds of millions of Indians as though they were there to give triumphant implementation to his hopes of Communism,<sup>2</sup> birth control has not hitherto been preached with any noticeable vigour.

Thus, among the Soviet experts, Ya. Guzevatykh, quondam Scientific Adviser, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, declares: "... It does not follow that the modern world in its anxiety for the future of mankind need concentrate on measures to restrict the birth rate, shutting its eyes to the actual problem of to-day: viz., the question of war or peace. Quite the reverse. Without bridling aggressive imperialism . . . mankind will *have* no future, or present either." And Professor V. Ovsienko, holding the Chair of Statistical Theory at the Moscow Economic Institute, writes: "In my view it is necessary to pay more attention to the main problem, which is that of social and economic development. Demographic processes are exceedingly sensitive to, and in the final analysis governed by, change in the social and economic environment. Artificial measures aimed at curbing the birth rate cannot of themselves make for economic and social improvement." Even Professor B. Uralnis, formerly of the Institute of Economics, USSR Academy of Sciences, who admits "the expediency of family planning", is surprisingly luke-warm in his pleading. Notwithstanding industrialization, better education and the larger participation of women in the workaday life of the community, he says, the wisdom of reducing the birth rate does assert itself in some of the developing countries. "One must allow that in a number of countries a fixed demographic policy envisaging the prevalence of the small family can be a matter of great importance."

<sup>1</sup> "The abstract population law exists only for plants and animals: for the time being mankind does not intrude historically into this field." Karl Marx.

"The abstract possibility of such a growth of the human race as to occasion a need to set a limit to it, does, admittedly, exist. . . . But should a Communist society at any time be obliged to regulate the production of people, just as by then it would be regulating the production of things, that said Communist society, and, of course, only such, will have no trouble in carrying this out." F. Engels.

"We are unconditional enemies of neo-Malthusianism." V. I. Lenin.

<sup>2</sup> One of his rebukes to M. N. Roy can be paraphrased: You hold the cards (hundreds of millions of teeming half-starved Indians), why can't you play them? Vide M. N. Roy, CAR No. 3 of 1968, p. 235. Ed.

There are signs that the climate of opinion is altering. At all events an article in a very recent number (No. 4 of 1968) of *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, by M. Sidorov, entitled "The Demographic Problems of India", suggests—if with some prevarication—that in Soviet thinking (a) it has become imperative to reduce the Indian birth-rate, and (b) population control is now bracketed first (with social and economic advance) as a precondition to India's being able to feed herself.

A rendering of the article, slightly shortened in the interests of space, follows.

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THE 20th century, which has brought mankind social revolution, the liberation of the colonies and the mastery of atomic energy, has also confronted it with a population "explosion". The world is now witnessing an increase in its inhabitants at a pace unimaginable in the past, and it looks as though in the course of the three decades separating us from the year 2,000 the globe's population will have doubled its present size and attained the figure of six or, it may be, seven milliard souls.

A correct forecast is in these circumstances vital to everybody, and particularly to the young developing states of Asia and Africa where the population is already outstripping the economy and posing a problem insoluble under the conditions of capitalistic society. By 1975, according to expert opinion, the food problem will assume such immense proportions as to dwarf all the other questions with which the world is faced.

Let us take the example of India. In 1911 the population of the peninsula was 252 m., and by mid-1967 India alone counted 512 m. inhabitants. In the decade between the 1951 and 1961 Census there had been an increase of no less than 78 m. Recently published estimates of the Planning Commission indicate that even at the existing rate of increase the population in 1971 will have grown by another 120 or even 150 m.; i.e. will have reached 650-700 m., a figure sufficiently staggering to compel serious consideration of what must be done here and now to afford the rising generation a life worth living.

### *The Causes of Explosion*

The immediate cause is the change in the ratio of mortality to birth rate. Since independence, thanks to improved health and hygiene, there has occurred a sharp decline in the death rate—especially that for children, which having been around 250 per thousand at the beginning of the century stands now at 98 and is expected to fall in the near future to 75 or 70. The maladies of the colonial period—malaria, small-pox, cholera and plague—which formerly carried off millions of lives, are in retreat. But meanwhile the tempo of industrialization and literacy has not been quickened enough to bring home to the masses the necessity of controlling the high birth rate and so stabilizing the population's growth.

The operation of demographic laws has of course not been confined to countries such as India. From 1946 to 1965 the average annual increase of the population of the globe was 1.9 per cent. But the point to be made is that in the developed capitalist societies it ranged from 0.9 to 1.6 per cent, whereas in the developing countries it ranged from 2 to 2.4 per cent. (In the last few years it has further climbed to 2.8 per cent in the latter.)

At the present date, according to the rough, or rather the conservative, Indian statistics, the birth rate is 40 and the death rate 16 per thousand. And the growth of the population in India today is from 2.4 to 2.5 per cent per annum.

### *The Task : To Increase Food Production*

The danger resides not in the growth of the population but in the low level of food production. To go by official data, the monthly expenditure on food in a family of five ought not to be less than R.100; but in fact 120 m. families are spending under R.10. The poverty of the Indian people, for centuries downtrodden by the colonizers and their own rulers, has become proverbial. And now after two decades of independent development the Indian poor are the poorest poor in the world; the majority of the population lives, as before, on the starvation line.

To date, this problem of production has not been solved: India experiences a chronic food shortage, and the threat of famine hangs perpetually over the heads of tens of millions of her people. A vast agrarian country with untold possibilities of agricultural expansion is falling into an ever-increasing reliance on arrivals of foodstuffs from abroad. In 1956-60 she imported approximately 3.4 m. tons of grain annually, and in the subsequent five years the figure came to be as high as 4.8 m. (These last years, the disastrous climatic conditions have immeasurably worsened the case.) In 1965 and 1966 grain import exceeded 6 m. tons; even so, by the beginning of 1967 the country was face to face with an acute food crisis. The Government is planning to guarantee the population its food by 1976—that is, by the end of the fifth Five Year Plan—by raising the annual grain harvest to 152 m. tons. But those foreign specialists who know the Indian reality best, question the feasibility of this programme.

To feed herself, India must at least treble the pace of her agricultural productivity. On the calculation that in the pendency of three Five Year Plans the average annual production of food has amounted to 80 m. tons, and that the annual increase in productivity has been 2.4 per cent, then by 1976 India will be capable of producing not 152 but only 99 m. tons. This means that the gap between the estimated level of consumption and the maximum level of production will widen to between 40 and 50 m. tons; consequently the dependence on *import*—and primarily import from the USA, for over 50 per cent of the wheat

reaching the internal Indian market is American—will grow. Already deliveries of food account for more than half the value of the economic aid to India, and an agreement concluded with the Americans last year provides for the import, over the period of the fourth Five Year Plan, of about 8 m. tons of grain per annum. The conditions of supplying this form of aid, be it added, are becoming increasingly severe. Washington insists on payment not in rupees as hitherto but in hard currency, requires that agriculture shall be “put in order”, and stipulates the right of direct participation in drawing up plans for an intensification of the economy.

Considering that the solution of the food problem by economic and social methods will take decades, an impressive array of experts hold that the only chance of escaping catastrophic starvation and distress at the present juncture is to control the birth rate.

### *Control of the Birth Rate*

From the very start, all arrangements to restrict the birth rate in India encounter formidable difficulties. Backwardness, ignorance, illiteracy, caste and religious prejudice—all these set public opinion stubbornly against any interference whatever with what is termed “the intimate life”. It was quite in character that even India’s first Minister of Public Health was a convinced opponent of the use of any modern contraceptives whatever. The legally prescribed age-qualification for marriage is in practice ignored, since Hinduism sanctions the betrothal of children; and the early marriages which are thus the rule facilitate the founding of large families. [The opposition to “family planning” has since begun to lessen. To this, scientific propaganda and open discussion of overpopulation in the press have, no doubt, contributed. Investigations conducted latterly reveal the attitudes of different social groups to restriction of the birth rate. They show that 70 per cent of parents would wish to limit themselves to three or four children, but simply don’t know how to do this.]<sup>3</sup>

In these circumstances, family planning is nowadays being elevated to the status of administrative policy on a country-wide basis. The whole range of modern methods is being tried out. For instance, free sterilization of men and women who have three or more children, and voluntarily apply to undergo this operation, is widely advertised; and in most of the States a reward varying from \$5 to \$8 is payable to every individual so coming forward. Advocates of this method believe that by thus anticipating fourth or fifth pregnancies it will be practicable in 10 years to lower the birth rate from 40 to 20 per thousand.

<sup>3</sup> The sentences within square brackets seem inserted in the wrong place. They are anyhow at variance with the author’s main contention, which is that the bulk of the population is at present intellectually and morally unable “to ponder”, *zadumyat’sya*, the problem at all. Ed.

However, the actual state of affairs warrants no such optimism. It is indeed quite obvious that the measures so far adopted to bring down the birth rate will not within the next decade exert any appreciable effect on the natural increase of the population. The illiteracy of the enormous majority coupled with their poverty precludes all possibility of their giving proper thought to the problem—the thought of a mouthful of bread is a more urgent concern. This is why Shripati Chandra Sekhar (known to be a disciple of Malthus) admits that at times it seems to him absolutely imperative for India to resort to compulsory methods. “Sometimes”, he says, “I dream of the day when Parliament will pass a bill—only I imagine it will be declared null and void as contravening the Constitution—to the effect that after the birth of a second child every person shall submit to sterilization.”

By common consent the concomitants of radical social and economic development (urbanization, female equality, literacy, etc.) of themselves regulate the growth of the given society. A most striking instance of this is Japan<sup>4</sup> where, since the war, the rise in population has been successfully controlled. The statistics are these: the death rate descended from 25·4 per thousand in 1920 to 10·9 in 1950, and to 8·16 in 1954; and the birth rate came down from 34·3 in 1947 to 25·3 in 1951, and again to 19·9 in 1954. The absolute figure of the birth rate dropped from 2·7 to 1·8 million per annum.

By this standard India's performance since independence has been dismal. Between 1950/51 and 1965/66 the income per head of the population rose only by 20 per cent and does not exceed \$80. The fight against poverty has not only not been won—it simply has not been engaged.

<sup>4</sup> Remembering the writer's opening statement that the problem is insoluble in a capitalist setting, Soviet readers may find it odd that the only Asian country to manage things properly is Japan. Ed.

## BRITISH BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS PAKISTAN : A SOVIET INTERPRETATION

By HUBERT EVANS

To be dazzled by the brilliance of the Russian achievement these last several years in certain specialized fields of oriental scholarship such as linguistics, the editing of classical texts etc. (in fact, in the older "orientalism"), is excusable provided the bedazzlement is not accompanied by a corresponding blindness to the turgid and drab flow of Soviet Asian studies as a whole.

In choosing material for inclusion in *Central Asian Review* the temptation is to prefer what seems valuable intrinsically to something incredibly tedious but undoubtedly more representative. It is by way of resisting this temptation that space is being given below to a summary of some 60 pages constituting the chapter on Pakistan in *The Policy of Britain in South and South-East Asia* (Politika Anglii v stranakh yuzhnoy i yugo-vostochnoy Azii), Nauka Press, Moscow, 1966. The introductory part was by G. P. Kolykhalova and the chapter itself by R. M. Mukimdzhanova.

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### *Introductory*

The collapse of the colonial system was brought about by a change in the correlation of forces as between the socialist and the imperialist camps, and since the British had been second to none in the exploitation of Asia it was the break-up of their empire that signalled, as it conditioned, the crumbling of the system as a whole. The change in the balance of forces was a consequence of a war in which the Soviet Union had led the anti-fascist coalition to victory, but in which the British had never had clean hands, being indeed the sworn enemies of the very freedoms to which the Soviet Union was pledged in Asia as elsewhere. This was why, during the war, the British colonial army proved a useless liability; this was why, by the time it ended, the popular leaders and their patriotic following in the British territories overseas realized that their economy had been wrecked and their very future as national entities threatened. The British at this juncture would, other things being equal, have resorted to brute force, but the gathering power of socialism said a firm "no" to the application of the old technique.

Such was the background against which the governing circles in Great Britain had to acquiesce in a "peaceful" process involving the deliverance from colonial rule of two-thirds of the Empire's population in the space of four-and-a-half months. The transfer of authority was effected to the accompaniment of much hypocritical talk about a free

association of white and coloured peoples having replaced the obsolete mechanism of empire, and so on. But gainsaying the cant of this sort, every effort was made to foment disagreement and implant discord. Thus an attempt, unsuccessful in the event, was made to preserve a special relationship with the Princes even to the extent of excluding their territories from the scope of the Transfer of Power. Then the spark of Hindu-Muslim hatred was blown into flame [*razdvaniye* is the Russian word used here] and the India-Pakistan conflict engendered. It was reckoned important, too, to retain many of the high civil and military officers of the Crown in their posts where they could pose as impartial arbitrators uniquely competent to restore law and order. The slaughter of hundreds of thousands is the grim measure of the competence of these men, and it was the two sides themselves who eventually brought the carnage to a halt.

But an even more dangerous trap was laid for these countries which had wrested a formal independence from their masters. It was hidden in the economic arrangements which, being untouched by the 1947 Act, remained as imperial as before. In the scheme of empire "new style", India and Pakistan were to serve as a giant laboratory for the invention and practical application of methods calculated to conserve the essentials of colonialism. But here, clever as they were, their lordships overreached themselves. In simply leaving India and Pakistan to fret through the initial years in the old economic strait-jacket to the total disregard of the crying needs of the case, they had made a fatal miscalculation. They slowly came to see their blunder, and that if they passively relied on past controls they could not hope to "hang on" to the Indian subcontinent. In the mid fifties therefore they scrapped their former ideas in favour of a really active penetration of the economy.

The other thing they were compelled to realize was that their policy of setting India and Pakistan at each other's throats was not paying off; it was on the contrary *jeopardising the British Commonwealth*. And upon the continued existence of that Commonwealth, the rulers argued, hinged England's position in the capitalist camp.

If then in the earlier phase (i.e., until around 1950) the circumstances in which the countries of Asia had attained their independence were such as to nourish various illusions about "a voluntary un-shouldering of the white man's burden", British imperialism from now on demonstrated quite openly its resolve to deny those countries—and by the most barbarous and cruel means—the enjoyment of their rightful freedom.

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Britain's policy in regard to Pakistan has altered repeatedly. The first phase was that of "the maintenance of political and economic positions". This was characterized by an endeavour to keep the new state in the Commonwealth at all costs. It was of unique strategic

importance because of its proximity to the Soviet Union and to China alike, and moreover the British reckoned that with Pakistan on their side they could exercise control over India. Pakistan was consequently encouraged to believe that the British could both help with administrative and military know-how and, besides, bring invaluable support to bear in the Kashmir dispute. "London began to display an interest in the annexation of Kashmir not to India, but to Pakistan", and to associate itself with "the militarization of a country exposed to a threat from India". Unfortunately for Pakistan, perfidy was a quality innate in the British. It presently dawned on the latter that "all said and done, India was more vital from the point of view of their economic and political interests than Pakistan". Moreover an India-Pakistan military alliance by this time commended itself as a counterpoise to the great victory of the Chinese people. The British therefore dropped Pakistan, and Pakistan turned to the USA. Liaquat Ali Khan visited America in the summer of 1950, and from that moment began the gradual but steady weakening of the British, and the strengthening of the American, hold. The several arguments on economic and technical assistance from 1951 onwards testify to the manner in which America was undermining the British positions.

No sooner had the British transferred their affections to India than they began to have misgivings. The fact was that the "old" members of the Commonwealth who were addressing themselves just then to the Kashmir issue were strongly anti-Indian in their approach, and there was also a check to the pendulum when the Conservatives (who never liked the Hindus) recovered office from the Labour Party in November 1951. Yet another reason asserted itself for flirting again with Pakistan. She had to be enticed, said British diplomacy, into the Middle East Defence organization then on the anvil. In the event, however, Indian opposition to this organization was so determined that the British had to choose between it and the Indian-Pakistan alliance just referred to, which they wanted even more. The diplomatic initiative was therefore stolen by the Americans who, as the world knows, bought Pakistan over with an offer of food supplies at a moment of acute shortage: "it was this that overcame the resistance of the Pakistan leadership to the military pact" desired. Pakistan was thus, by the close of 1953, committed "in respect of the Near and Middle East aggressive bloc now knocked into shape" to a pro-American, not a pro-British, policy.

To revert to the economic picture. Nobody need be misled by British publicity in the early post-war years about the ebb of British capital from the newly created states such as Pakistan. In reality this hardly happened: only the petty enterprises like hotels, restaurants, etc., sold out, their proprietors going off to England. Big undertakings were unaffected: such giants as Royal Dutch Shell, Imperial Chemical Industries, Vickers and Imperial Tobacco actually broadened the base of their operations, cashing in on the plight of a Pakistan geared to the

production of agricultural raw materials but cut off, literally overnight, from the centres of industry. Foreign trade continued to be the unchallenged monopoly of powerful English firms (e.g., Ralli Brothers). Further, the British were able to step into the shoes of the departing Hindus and Sikhs who had performed most of the work in banking, in insurance, and in such industry as there was. In the British press of the time the benefits Pakistan was getting from the Colombo Plan were much advertised as evidencing the transmutation of Empire into Commonwealth, but the hampering and humiliating stipulations which the recipient had to fulfil scarcely endorsed what was said.

From 1954 onwards the Americans were still more successful in prising apart the iron bands in which the British had encircled Pakistan—and, it goes without saying, in clamping on their own. The USA-Pakistan Agreement of 19 May 1954 was for regional defence, which meant that Pakistan could count on American *military* assistance. The British were dismayed at a move which levered Pakistan away both from themselves and from the Indians, and countered, to the unconcealed annoyance of the State Department, by going into the Baghdad Pact in which Turkey and Iraq, but not Pakistan, participated. It was then the move of the Americans again, and what they did was to turn on the heat in Pakistan and compel her to subscribe to the said Pact so as to neutralize the British influence within it.

During, and because of, these events Pakistan's attitude to Great Britain became very different from what it had been in the earlier phase, and the question of her staying in the Commonwealth began to be debated. The Suez affair was another damaging blow to British prestige in Pakistan, and such gestures of good intent as the British could exhibit—like the ceding of Gwadar or the grant of £100,000 for the Quetta-Karachi road—were insufficient to stem the tide. Pakistan had ceased to be Britain's *provodnik*, steward almost, in Asia.

Over the past decade [the author was counting backwards from 1966] this erosion of influence has been just as marked in the economic as in the political context, British capital being replaced by Pakistani capital in all the key industries: jute, cement, cotton, foodstuffs, paper; and suffering too "from an expansion of the monopolies of other developed capitalist countries viz., the USA, Federal Germany and Japan".\*

In an effort to retain its grip the British Government resorted to something new in its colonial policy, namely the provision of aid (as distinct from loans). But here again it had little success: the Colombo Plan was "no barrier to the USA penetration of South East Asia". The value of technical assistance found for Pakistan between 1951 and 1964

\* This paragraph was contradicted in a later one which argued "the growth of British capital investment over the past decade". British capital, the reader was there told, was "built-in" as compared with other foreign capital: it had "old-fashioned connexions in Pakistan"; and that was why in 1964 "British capital investments were still in excess of all other foreign investments put together".

was a pathetic £10m., and Barbara Castle on a visit in 1965 told a dissatisfied audience that assistance could not be stepped up.

As remarked already, the initial policy of poisoning Pakistan's relations with India was reversed, having been seen to be mistaken. Thereafter, British imperialism clutched at any excuse for the unification of the subcontinent. The Chinese behaviour in 1959 was a heaven-sent opportunity enabling it to sound the call to unity in the face of a communist menace, and the Royal visit to both states in 1960 was designed to advertise the tightening of the Commonwealth bonds in this area. To repair the rickety Commonwealth edifice has, indeed, been the motive behind most of the subsequent steps of the British Government. When Pakistan cooled off towards the USA in 1959 the British tried to take advantage of the chance to ingratiate themselves once again. Disturbed as they were by the Pakistan trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1961-62, they nevertheless pressed upon Pakistan their good offices in connexion with the Kashmir question; allowing Karachi to believe that the Indians would budge if concessions on that issue were to be demanded by the Western Powers as a precondition to the continued supply of military and economic aid. The talks broke down because of Nehru's flat refusal to modify the stand he had taken for 15 years. Pakistan swung away now from the West as such, and made overtures to the Chinese People's Republic. A disconcerted America blundered in with all sorts of pressures on Karachi, but the British were pliant enough to profit by "American hamhanded diplomacy which had thrown Pakistan into the arms of the enemy". In the discussions of the Kashmir problem in the Security Council they adopted what Ayub Khan in the summer of 1960 described as "a much more helpful position than before".

It must be noticed what Britain was trying to do here: she was trying to patch up the Commonwealth and simultaneously steal a march on America. In the event she was cheated of these hopes: the relations of the two young states worsened, and an armed collision supervened. London's anxiety during that crisis was not because hostilities on the Indian subcontinent imperilled the peace and security of Asia, but because a conflict between two member states of the Commonwealth was a staggering blow to that Commonwealth and to the whole of British policy East of Suez.

There were fortunately others in the world whose acute concern was disinterested. The Tashkent Conference arranged by the Soviet Union and the resulting Declaration opened the path to a peaceful adjustment of differences. With that Declaration reactionary forces in both states are displeased, and Imperial diplomacy is now bent on making the most of this "in the hope of rebuilding its tumbledown positions in the countries of Hindostan".

## ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH IRAN: THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

The following is an abridged translation of an article by A. Z. Arabadzhyan on "Soviet-Iranian Economic Co-operation" in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 of 1968.

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ON 15 September 1962, when the Iranian Government pledged itself not to allow foreign rocket bases on its soil, the horizons of Soviet-Iranian co-operation brightened. The possibilities of a mutually beneficial partnership had been obvious from the start, and as long ago as the 1920s a number of Soviet-Iranian mixed societies had been formed with the object of furthering the smaller country's cotton and silk cultivation, its fisheries, and so forth. Later on, during the world economic crisis of 1929-33, it was no mean role that the Soviet Union was actually able to play to Iran's benefit, for it became the principal, and sometimes the sole, customer willing to buy the main articles of Iranian export. In the years specified, the USSR purchased all the rice, 99 per cent of the cotton and 65 per cent of the tanning raw-materials exported, and supplied in the required amounts all the main items of import.

Unhappily the close relationship was transitory, for by the mid-thirties Iran's rulers were involving themselves heavily with Fascist Germany in trade as in politics. During the war and just afterwards, events were scarcely conducive to a resumption of commercial dealings, and these were not restored to a normal footing until 1950. Only from that year onwards could measures be attempted to bring about some degree of economic and technical co-operation.

2. What was the situation prevailing by 1962—the year described above as the turning point in Soviet-Iranian relations?

It has to be confessed that the position occupied by the Soviet Union in Iran's trade turnover for the decade beginning in 1950 (10 per cent on the average) was modest; and although the USSR more or less held its place (a fluctuation between 13 per cent and 23 per cent) as regards Iran's exports, it steadily lost ground in respect of imports to Iran. By 1960 the Soviet share in the latter was right down to 3.3 per cent. Nor did the first years of the sixties bring a change for the better, the USSR share in Iran's imports being still around 3 per cent and in the exports hovering at 13 per cent.

3. This state of affairs could not but confirm the need to expand the scope of two-way economic co-operation. Such co-operation had been

initiated, admittedly, but it was somehow lacking in impetus; and what was called for now was the nourishment which the financial and technical aid of the Soviet Union could contribute—especially in the matter of heavy industry. Negotiations were opened in this sense, and culminated in the “Agreement on supplies of natural gas from Iran to the USSR, and of machinery and equipment from the USSR to Iran in the period 1970–1985”, signed in Moscow on 13 January 1966. This document sanctions co-operation of the requisite kind.

4. The natural gas in question is nowadays being burned as waste by the International Oil Consortium, but is potentially available to the annual amount of 10 milliard cubic metres. Under the Agreement, six milliard cubic metres will be supplied in the first year of performance (1970), seven in the second, and so on to 10: which will meet the Soviet Union's requirements. At the intended price of six rubles per 1,000 cubic metres this will bring in 60 m. rubles (= \$66 m.); and the problem then to be solved will be how to cover this with goods from the opposite direction. The plan is to clear payment by deliveries to Iran of the machinery and heavy equipment so badly wanted, on the evidence of the last years, in the different branches of industry. In 1965–66, for example, Iran imported those items to the figure of \$243 m. The Agreement will permit her to get them from the USSR to a value of \$66 m. without spending a single dollar. And if at some future date the volume of gas supplied were to be increased, this would be accompanied by a parallel rise in the value of the machinery and equipment passed to Iran. Clearly, therefore, the implementation of the Agreement will be attended by a radical change in the structure of Soviet export to Iran: the main items of which will be machinery and equipment, constituting anything up to 80 per cent of the total, whereas these same items have latterly represented no more than a small fraction: 5·8 per cent in 1964; 8 per cent in 1965; and 9·7 per cent in 1966.

5. Another significant step in the same direction was taken in Tehran on 2 March 1967 when a five-year trade agreement was concluded, calculated to raise the commodity circulation between the two countries by two and a half times as compared with the 1966–67 position. According to the announcement by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade on the spot, which was printed a few days later in *BIKI (Bulletin of Foreign Commercial Information)* 7.3.1967, the volume of commodity circulation will expand by 1970 to \$125 m. (= 112·5 m. rubles). Since the intention is to hold the trade figures in balance, this means that by 1970 USSR export to Iran must reach a value of 55 m. rubles, as compared with 20 m. in 1963–64.

A simple calculation will show the share which the USSR will have in Iranian import by the mid-seventies (by which time gas deliveries will be at the level of 10 milliard cubic metres). On the safe assumption of a 5 per cent annual increase, Iranian import should by 1974 be at about 107 milliard rials. But put it at 100. Seeing that gas deliveries will be

earning 60 m. rubles, and the machinery-cum-equipment deliveries the same, then our second assumption will be that the export of other goods from the Soviet Union to Iran will rise (from approximately 55 m. rubles) by 50 per cent, and thus attain the figure of some 80 m. rubles. Consequently we can reckon that the overall value of Soviet export to Iran by 1974 will be 140 m. rubles (or 11.76 milliard rials) while the overall value of Iranian import should, as estimated a moment ago, be 100 milliard rials. On that calculation the Soviet share in Iranian import becomes about 12 per cent (compared with about 3 per cent, as noticed in para. 2 above, in the first half of the sixties).

6. The problem here touched on, of increasing Soviet exports to Iran, is complicated because even a climb to 12 per cent in the Soviet share of Iranian imports presupposes, as shown, the multiplication of Soviet exports to Iran by four. Remembering that trade will be conducted on the net balance principle, this implies a multiplication of the value of Iranian export to the USSR also by four—which is no easy thing for Iran to achieve, and will only be possible at all through a substantial stepping up of the productive potential of agriculture and industry alike. Hence the crucial significance of the technical and economic assistance which the Soviet Union has undertaken, in the terms of the Agreement of 13 January 1966, to provide.

7. The technical and economic aid as programmed is for the construction of a metallurgical works having a production cycle of 500 to 600 thousand tons of steel per annum increasing eventually to between 1,000 and 1,200 thousand tons; of a machine-building plant with a productive capacity of 25 to 30 thousand tons per annum; and, thirdly, of the Save-Astara section of the gas main from Iran into the USSR. For the payment of the technical assistance rendered on these projects the Soviet Union is giving Iran credits amounting to 250 m. rubles at 2.5 per cent for a term of 12 years.

The first of these projects is of course vital. Iran, exceedingly rich in metal ores, has to date been ill-equipped to develop its resources; such enterprises as exist being both primitive and geared not to home demands but to the foreign market, and therefore at the mercy of the circumstances prevailing in that market. Foreign capital has displayed no real interest in Iran's mining industry, and private national capital has not had the strength—nor, incidentally, has it seen any reason—to create a modern metallurgical industry as an organic part of the economy. By the early sixties it became apparent that the consent of foreign monopolies to the provision of technical help in building a metallurgical complex did not imply a genuine intention to furnish it, and so the individual Iranians at the helm of economic policy turned to the Soviet Union.

The metallurgical works will come into being in 1971; the gas main in 1970; and the machine-building plant will be phased over four and a half years from the date of contract. Payment for the machinery and

equipment, as for the technical services furnished in carrying out these projects, Iran will effect by means of gas deliveries. This interconditionality (*vzaimoobuslovlennost'*) of goods and services will be a feature of Soviet-Iranian co-operation, though it will not of course exhaust it.

8. Those who share a frontier share the problems that occur on either side of it. It is unfortunate that the practical recognition of this simple proposition was withheld until these last years. An agreement on economic and technical co-operation dated 27 July 1963 provided for the construction of a dam and hydro-electric station on the river Araks; for sturgeon breeding beds in Iran; for improvement in the Pahlavi Gulf; for the preparation of a technical-economic report on conserving the edible fish reserves in Iranian waters; and for the erection of 11 granaries of an aggregate capacity of 80 thousand tons.

Among these five projects the hydro-electric scheme was the most striking example of common-frontier co-operation. Agricultural tracts on each side suffer, according to the season, from the extremes of drought and flooding. A dam 38.5m. in height, containing a lake of 70 square kilometres, will permit the irrigation on Soviet territory of 30 thousand hectares of new lands and improve the irrigation of another 250 thousand hectares. On the Iranian side of the frontier 70 thousand hectares of new lands will be irrigated. Looking ahead a bit further (1975-1980) the area of new lands under irrigation will reach 118 thousand hectares on the Soviet and 74 on the Iranian side—with an eventual prospect of these totals being raised to 164 and 80 thousand hectares respectively. Meantime the power house will have a capacity of 44 thousand kilowatts, and an output of 150 million kilowatt hours. As to finances, the USSR has offered the Iranian partner credit in the sum of 35 m. rubles at 3.6 per cent repayable in 12 years, being payment of half the value of services (meaning the actual installations and the expert know-how) rendered.

9. The quittance of the credit just mentioned will, obviously, be effected now (thanks to the subsequent, that is 1966, arrangement) in the form of supplies of natural gas, the grand total of credits to be discharged under the two agreements coming to 295 m. rubles. Deliveries of machinery and equipment will account for only a part (albeit the major part) of this sum. But even supposing these items accounted for the entire amount, the value could be expressed as 50 milliard cubic metres of gas—a quantity which Iran will supply to the Soviet Union in the course of the first six years starting from 1970.

10. In the instances here discussed, one of the constant factors in Soviet-Iranian economic co-operation is well brought out: viz., a mutual calculation of the advantages to the economy of the partners which will flow from the co-operation in view.

## BOOK REVIEWS

BOGOUTDINOV, A. M. Chief ed. *The History of the Communist Organizations of Central Asia*.

KOR-OGGLY, Kh. G. *Uzbek Literature*.

VAGABOV, M. V. *Islam and Women*.

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**The History of the Communist Organizations of Central Asia** (*Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsii Sredney Azii*). Chief editor A. M. Bogoutdinov. Uzbekistan Press, Tashkent, 1967. 784 pp. Print order 20,000. R1.75.

THE present work, although it covers a much longer time-span (from 1903 to 1924), inevitably invites comparisons with *The Triumph of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan* (Tashkent, 1967), reviewed in CAR, Vol. XVI, 1968, No. 2, pp. 161-5. Both books cover the Revolution in Central Asia as a whole, both were written by a large collective of writers, and they are both much the same length. But one comes from the academic stable and the other from the Party stable. *The Triumph of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan* is a product of the all-Union and republican Academies of Sciences, whereas *The History of the Communist Organizations of Central Asia* appears under the auspices of the Institutes of the History of the Party attached to the Central Committees of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. The first work is much better produced and printed than the second and, as is the way with academic publications, costs very much more (R4.0 against R1.75). In the quality of the scholarship there does not seem to be much to choose between them, although the Party work, perhaps surprisingly, scores on readability. The print order of the latter is four times that of the academic work. One can only suppose that this is because there are a large number of local Party officials who will feel that it is a must for their shelves.

The Party worker will probably not be dissatisfied with his purchase, which will provide him with a comprehensive account of political developments in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva from the time of the formation of the first social-democratic groups in 1903-05 until the national delimitation in 1924, with particular emphasis naturally on the Communist parties of the three territories, all of which were formed only after the Revolution. Our Party worker will find that much of the information in the book has already appeared elsewhere, but he will be glad to have it in one, albeit rather heavy, volume, and may read with some interest the detail added in many instances from archive sources. Providing he has been keeping abreast of Soviet historiography in recent years he will not be surprised to learn that, although Lenin and the Bolshevik Party were, of course, always right, there were enormous difficulties in Central Asia and the local Bolsheviks made a number of serious errors. If he is a Russian, it will probably not worry him much that very little is written about the political aspirations and activities

of the indigenous peoples, and as one of the converted he will probably not notice that, as usual, the authors do not succeed in making a very convincing case for native support for and participation in the Revolution. It would no doubt be too much to ask him to disbelieve all the old myths which the book perpetuates about British intervention and support for the Basmachi (on p. 452 the number of British army instructors in Bukhara in 1919 reaches the glorious total of over 400).

One of the undoubted virtues of *The History of the Communist Organizations of Central Asia* is that it is clearly written and much more coherent and better put together than most histories published in Central Asia. Events are related chronologically and follow on logically one from the other, and the dates and sequence of many events are clarified. For this we presumably have largely to thank the literary editor, P. B. Lebedev, who had to cope with contributions from 26 different authors. Another welcome feature of the book, and one which reinforces a growing trend, is that it includes very many more names than usual, particularly of those who were at one time in disgrace. It is all the more a pity, therefore, that there is no index.

A. S.

**Islam and Women** (*Islam i zhenshchina*). By M. V. Vagabov. Mysl' Press, Moscow, 1968. 232 pp. Print order 10,000. 54k.

MR. VAGABOV was the author of a recent article in *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 12 of 1966), which showed a realistic appreciation of the continuing strength of Islam among the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union and called for the establishment of chairs of Islamic studies in Soviet universities. The same realism is apparent in his book when he deals with the position of women in the Soviet Muslim republics today.

In the first part of his book Mr. Vagabov deals generally with the status of women in Islamic society. He points out that although women enjoyed a position of respect in the early matriarchal societies, this had changed long before Islam, which reinforced the existing inequality of women in the countries of the Muslim East. He examines the teachings of Islam on the place of women in society, the social and juridical nature of Muslim marriage and family relations, and the position of the Muslim woman in a class society. Mr. Vagabov argues that, although there have been some improvements recently in the position of women in the non-Soviet Muslim countries as regards the vote, education and so on, no radical changes can ever be expected where private property and exploitation continue to exist.

In the second, and what he regards as the main, part of his book, Mr. Vagabov examines the progress made in the Soviet Union towards the emancipation of Muslim women, the situation today, and ways of overcoming the remaining social inequality of the sexes in the Soviet East. His examples are taken mainly from Dagestan. As regards the situation today, Mr. Vagabov notes the strong persistence of shariat marriages, kalym, the seclusion of women, and opposition to the education of girls. Two of the reasons he gives for their persistence are that the women accept them and that they are claimed as national traditions. Unlike those who declare that kalym has been abolished in the Soviet Union, the author regards it as far from being a thing of the past and says that it was a mistake to make it no longer a criminal offence in Azerbaydzhan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as "numerous instances of the payment of kalym exist in these republics"

(p. 142). Similarly, in suggesting ways of overcoming the continuing inequality of the sexes (these are the usual ones of involving women in public production, education, improvements in living conditions, remoulding public opinion, and atheistic education), Mr. Vagabov argues that the dissolution before the war of the women's departments in the Communist parties of the Soviet Muslim republics was premature.

The evidence the author provides on the present status of women of the Muslim nationalities in the Soviet Union does not suggest that socialism is any more able to effect a rapid change than non-socialist society. Indeed there is surely a danger that, as long as the Muslim nationalities in the Soviet Union do not enjoy independence, they will cling to the traditional Islamic way of life as an assertion of their national identity. A. S.

**Uzbek Literature** (*Uzbekskaya literatura*). By Kh. G. Kor-Ogly. "Vysshaya shkola" Press, Moscow, 1968. 292 pp. Print order 5,000. 51k.

THIS book is based on the author's lectures on Uzbek literature in the philological faculty of Moscow University over a number of years and is the first textbook in Russian on Uzbek literature for non-Uzbek speaking VUZ students. After some brief remarks on the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks, the author describes the Uzbek oral tradition, including the folk epic "Alpamysh", early works written in Turkic languages in Central Asia, literature in "Old Uzbek" (i.e. Chagatay) with particular attention to Alisher Navoi, and the development of Uzbek literature under Tsarist and Soviet rule. The Soviet period takes up 161 pages or well over half the book, and 126 of these pages are devoted to studies of eight leading Uzbek Soviet writers (Khamza Khakimzade Niyazi, Abdulla Kadyri, Gafur Gulyam, Aybek, Uygun, Abdulla Kakhkhar, Khamid Alimdzhan, and the poetess Zul'fiya).

The book is clearly written and reasonably informative, as a textbook should be, although because of his opposition to socialism and unfavourable remarks on the Soviet regime "the undoubtedly talented writer" Cholpon only merits two brief paragraphs (pp. 135-6). As regards Uzbek literature today, really good writers seem to be rather thin on the ground and one cannot but agree with the author that "longwindedness is a major failing of many Uzbek Soviet novels. . . . Often the characters in the works of Uzbek Soviet writers are stereotyped. The same heroes go from one novel to another. In almost every work with the arrival of the new raykom secretary it is as though a magic wand has been waved. All shortcomings are eliminated and the whole situation changes" (p. 161).

There is a bibliography of 101 titles.

A. S.

# SOVIET PRESS COMMENT

1 JULY-30 SEPTEMBER

## I. THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND KAZAKH SSRs

THIS quarter was unexceptional with regard to domestic affairs in the Central Asian republics. Agricultural topics, teaching problems, cultural festivals and the usual daily portion of "Leniniana" occupied most of the four pages of the local press. Much attention, especially in KT, was given to the visit of the Indian President Zakir Husain. The coverage of foreign affairs, especially in September, was dominated by the events in Czechoslovakia. As might be expected, there was not much difference between local and metropolitan press comment on the development of Czechoslovakia's January reform programme. Direct and indirect condemnation of Czechoslovak "counter-revolutionary" forces were expressed in long articles, which, by quoting the authority of Lenin, tried to argue that the interest of the world socialist system was the ultimate determining factor in deciding to send troops to Czechoslovakia. Plenums of the Kazakh, Uzbek and Turkmen Central Committees and a Supreme Soviet session of the Kirgiz SSR were held.

### *Party and government*

During the period under review, local party organs were put to work to explain Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia. Following the July plenum of the CC CPSU which discussed the Warsaw meeting on events in Czechoslovakia, the Kirgiz, Turkmen, Kazakh and Uzbek Central Committees passed declarations of solidarity with its decisions, which were published in the Central Asian press under the slogan "The Will of the Party is the Will of the People" (TI 25.7.68, SK 25.7.68, PV 27.7.68).

The only Supreme Soviet session was held in the Kirgiz SSR. The delegates discussed the development of rural construction, technical progress in agriculture, the improvement of trade, public services and cultural facilities in the villages, and Party-Komsomol relations. The new law concerning the rights of local soviets was ratified (SK 30.7.68).

The IV plenum of the Kazakh Central Committee was devoted to the cotton and grain harvest and the problem of fulfilling the planned agricultural quota for sale to the State (KP 1.8.68). The XII plenum of the Turkmen Central Committee discussed preparations for the celebration of Lenin's birth (TI 7.9.68). The XIII plenum of the Uzbek Central Committee, held in Tashkent, discussed ways of increasing grain production, the Uzbek dairy industry and preparations for the Lenin Centenary (PV 27.9.68).

Articles on primary party organizations and their role in all spheres of production continued to appear (KP 5.9.68, PV 20.9.68). Many specific enterprises were discussed in this respect (KT 22.8.68, 24.7.68, TI 2.8.68).

Much was written about the functioning of the local soviets, particularly

in the Kirgiz SSR, where the Supreme Soviet discussed this problem. The local soviets have acquired the right to take decisions on all kind of problems at the local level. They should investigate shortcomings, make recommendations and see that their recommendations are carried out (TI 5.7.68, SK 30.7.68, PV 25.7.68). Local soviets held many debates where rural construction, cultural amenities in villages, and harvest problems were discussed (SK 14.8.68, TI 5.7.68, PV 9.8.68, 11.7.68).

S. G. Moiseyev was released from the post of Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kirgiz SSR and from the post of Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) Kirgiz SSR. S. Begaliyev was appointed in his place (SK 18.8.68).

### *Foreign affairs*

Throughout the period under review, news coverage of foreign countries was about the same as that in the central press. The most widely covered events of the period were the visit of the Indian President Zakir Husain to Central Asia, and the Czechoslovak crisis. The visit of Zakir Husain to the Tadzhik SSR received considerably more attention in the Central Asian press than it did in the metropolitan press. Articles on India and her friendship with the Soviet Union and with the Tadzhik SSR occupied many pages. Zakir Husain visited Tashkent, Samarkand and Dushanbe. Detailed reports of these journeys appeared in KT (KT 14.7.68, 16.7.68, 20.7.68).

The republican press faithfully echoed the reports of events in Czechoslovakia which appeared in the central press. In addition to coverage from TASS, much space was given to local rallies and other demonstrations in support of Soviet intervention (KP 24.8.68, 23.8.68, PV 24.8.68). During the first days after the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia there was relatively less coverage in the Central Asian press than there was in the metropolitan press, but after Dubcek's return from Moscow all the newspapers featured the crisis with a flood of articles trying to justify Soviet policy against "anti-socialist forces" in Czechoslovakia. Demonstrations in Central Asian cities approved the sending of Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia to restore the unity of the Communist bloc, threatened by "elements hostile to Soviet Union". Local party committees passed resolutions of solidarity with the July plenum CC CPSU (TI 24.7.68, KT 23.7.68, KP 20.7.68).

The local press celebrated Pakistan's Independence Day (PV 15.8.68, SK 14.8.68, KT 14.8.68). The Ambassador of the DRV in the USSR paid a three days' visit to Ashkhabad, and many meetings took place in support of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam (SK 28.8.68).

Foreign delegations and visitors were particularly active in the Uzbek SSR. The UAR Minister of Water Resources was shown Uzbek achievements in irrigation (PV 27.8.68), and Pakistan's Minister of Agriculture, during a short visit to the Uzbek SSR, discussed further agricultural co-operation between Pakistan and Uzbekistan (PV 1.8.68). Uzbekistan welcomed a delegation of Italian communists (PV 1.8.68), a delegation of Belgian communists (PV 1.8.68), and a delegation of trade-unionists from Denmark (T 6.7.68). A Muslim delegation from Afghanistan visited the Tadzhik SSR (KT 12.9.68) and the Governor of West Pakistan came for a short visit to Tashkent (PV 18.9.68).

### *Agriculture and irrigation*

As usual at this time of year, the state of the crops and harvesting featured daily in the press. Agricultural problems were discussed by oblast and rayons party committees. A plenum of the Kazakh Central Committee was entirely devoted to the grain and cotton harvest (KP 1.8.68, 2.8.68), and the subject was also discussed by the Uzbek Central Committee (PV 8.8.68), the Turkmen Central Committee and Council of Ministers (TI 26.7.68, 24.7.68) and the Kirgiz Council of Ministers (SK 5.7.68).

The grain harvest was generally successful in all Central Asian republics. The weather for harvesting was good and the grain yield unexpectedly high. Uzbekistan produced 165 per cent of the planned harvest and sold 323,000 tons of grain to the State (PV 12.7.68), while Turkmenistan fulfilled its plan by 100.4 per cent. The Kirgiz and Kazakh SSRs also completed the harvest plan ahead of schedule. Some kolkhozes in Kazakhstan sold twice or three times the planned amount of grain to the State (KP 17.8.68, 16.8.68, 17.8.68). But, as every year, in Uzbekistan there were not enough elevators, and there was a shortage of skilled labour at the grain receiving centres (KP 25.7.68). The newspapers reported a rich hay crop, and farmers were encouraged to speed up the preparation of winter fodder for livestock. Thanks to good weather, kolkhozes in the Ura-Tyube area harvested twice the usual hay crop and produced enough fodder for two years (KT 2.8.68).

Reports on the cotton crop were far less optimistic. The spring weather was unfavourable, and very often farmers had to replant part of their crop. The usual shortcomings, of negligent preparation of cotton crops for harvesting and inefficient utilisation of irrigation water, were frequently criticized. Northern Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan have the best prospects for a successful cotton harvest. In these areas the farmers have on the whole taken better care of cotton crops, and the preparation of machinery was reported to be satisfactory (KT 22.8.68). In Kirgiziya and Uzbekistan many kolkhozes were well behind in repairing harvesters, and the delays were often caused through lack of spare parts. A new, highly efficient cotton-harvester was operated for the first time in the Uzbek cotton fields (PV 28.7.68).

Irrigation works which have been completed include the Sokuluk reservoir, with a capacity of 13 million cu.m. (SK 6.7.68), and the first stage of the Madaniyat pumping station on the Naryn (PV 15.8.68). Work started on Pumping Station No. 1 on the new Karshi pump-operated canal (KT 14.8.68) and on the laying of the 250 km Shakhriyabz-Karaulbazar water main which will bring water to the Karshi steppe (PR 11.8.68).

### *Education and culture*

The All-Union Conference of Teachers held in Moscow in the first days of July was widely reported in the local press. Much was written about the new school syllabus and about the difficulties with which schools and teachers will have to cope. It seems that many schools, especially those in the villages, face the new syllabus with a lack of suitable textbooks and qualified teachers (PV 25.8.68, TI 11.8.68). Many articles were concerned with the preparation of school buildings for the new school year. Delays in the construction of such buildings, shortages of school equipment and the failure to carry out repairs came in for criticism as in previous years (KP 28.7.68, TI 7.8.68, KT 23.7.68). The worst situation appeared to be in

the Tadzhik SSR, where not a single school building was completed this year (KT 7.7.68).

The 525th anniversary of the birth of the famous Uzbek poet Alisher Navoi was celebrated in both the Uzbek and Tadzhik SSRs (KT 8.8.68), while the 75th anniversary of the birth of Mayakovskiy, in July, was marked by several articles on his life and work (KT 19.7.68, PV 18.7.68, KP 19.7.68). The Central Asian republics are preparing to celebrate the 150th anniversary of Turgenev's birth (KP 3.8.68, 11.8.68, SK 18.7.68), and in Alma-Ata a Kazakh translation of his *House of Gentlefolk* has been published (KP 13.8.68).

Much was written about the Uzbek Cultural Festival in Tadzhikistan. During this several Uzbek films were shown, and the Uzbek theatre performed in several Tadzhik towns (KT 7.8.68, 6.8.68, 9.8.68). Readers of KT were introduced to the development of Uzbek culture and to the work of the creative intelligentsia in the Uzbek SSR (KT 23.7.68, 6.8.68, 9.8.68). Other cultural exchanges within the Soviet Union included performances in Moscow by the Lermontov theatre from Alma-Ata (KP 31.7.68), visits to Turkmenistan by artists from Moldavia and the Ukraine (TI 15.7.68, 20.8.68), and the participation of the Turkmenistan dance ensemble in the all-Union Festival of Song and Dance in Minsk (TI 20.8.68).

Many pages in the local press were occupied by reports of the Afro-Asian Conference of Writers held in Tashkent at the end of September (PV 21.9.68, 22.9.68). A symposium on the history of the Kushans, which is part of a UNESCO project on Central Asian civilization, took place in Dushanbe (KT 28.9.68, PV 20.9.68, KP 22.9.68). Kazakhstan welcomed artists from India during a festival of Indian culture in the republic (KP 26.9.68, 27.9.68), and a festival of German art and literature took place in Uzbekistan (PV 29.9.68).

The prominent Uzbek writer Aybek (Musa Tashmukhamedov) died on 2 July after a long illness (PV 2.7.68), and on 29 August the death also occurred of the Tadzhik poet, Mukhamed Rakhimi (KT 29.8.68).

### *Construction and electric power*

The problems of the building industry, especially in rural construction, received considerably more coverage than usual in the quarter under review. Apart from the annual problem of unfinished and unrepaid school buildings, much was written about slow and inefficient work in the building industry in general. A general summary of progress in construction appeared in the local newspapers in September (KP 11.9.68, KT 11.9.68, SK 11.9.68). It was reported that the Kazakh SSR had carried out 104 per cent of its construction plan, but there were many complaints about unsatisfactory work on the building sites. Progress in school-building in the republic was lower than last year (KP 27.7.68, 3.8.68, 28.7.68).

The press urged both the local soviets and local party organizations to exert their influence on building enterprises to speed up capital construction in the rural areas (KT 6.8.68, 22.8.68, SK 1.8.68). There was a call to invest more in rural planning institutes, which could play an important role in bringing villages up to the standard of towns (KP 10.8.68).

The Uzbek Central Committee and Council of Ministers have announced plans to develop Charvak and Chimgan as major holiday resorts, and a new

plan for building more nurseries and cultural establishments in the rural areas (PV 18.7.68, 13.8.68).

Work has started on the high voltage line Iolotan'—Sandy-Kachi (PR 18.7.68). KT carried reports on Nurek GES (KT 3.8.68, 11.8.68). Numerous inefficiencies were discovered, and the project engineers and directors held a conference to discuss improvements (KT 31.8.68).

### *Miscellany*

On 24 September the VI Conference of Kirgiz women was held in Frunze to discuss the problem of better work organization among women employed in production, and improvements in the Health Service as it affects women (SK 24.9.68).

A plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Komsomol in Tashkent discussed preparations for the Lenin Centenary (PV 27.9.68).

Many articles in the Central Asian press were devoted to the 50th anniversary of the death of the 26 Baku Commissars, and on 20 September a solemn meeting, at which the Turkmen First Secretary spoke, was held at the place of their execution (TI 20.9.68).

J. C.

## II. ADJOINING COUNTRIES

### **The Indian Subcontinent**

#### *India*

The reporting on India was profuse, even if the subjects that were brought to attention were few. The event of July—and indeed of the quarter—was Dr. Zakir Husain's visit to the Soviet Union, an item in itself claiming as much space as was allotted to India's close runner up, Mongolia. August had, of course, its annual feature, the Independence Anniversary (which was covered, however, more briefly than usual); and in the same month there was a good deal about the spies of the C.I.A. up and down the country. There was also something about the Indian C.P. But in September, perhaps because of the heavy accent on Indian affairs in the preceding eight weeks, India was practically given a miss.

The Indian President's visit to the Soviet Union, occurring from 8 to 18 July and taking in Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi, Dushanbe, Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara, was well heralded. Typical of the preliminary notices was V. Skosyrev's "Strong Ties" in IZ 7.7.68. Remarking that Dr. Zakir Husain's presence would be in "a healthy tradition", the writer reminded his readers that the friendship of which it was the outward sign was founded on the common determination of two peace-loving peoples to fight colonialism and aggression: a determination of the first concern at this hour when the American warlords were stepping up the onslaught on Vietnam and when the Israeli extremists egged on by the Western Imperial Powers were augmenting the tension in the Near East. India was confronted by dire difficulties deriving from the colonial legacy, but at least she could lean on the strong support of the Soviet Union. This co-operation was not, evidently, to the taste of some, and the US press had latterly published many an article by writers "who measured the corn of Soviet-Indian relations by their own bushel". Most papers around the same date carried biographies

of the visitor which emphasized his resistance to the British authorities as a young man.

On 9.7.68 the papers gave half-page coverage to the ceremonial reception arrangements in Moscow; and next day full-page coverage to the programme of the 9th July with special attention to the speeches delivered by Mr. Podgorniy and the Indian President at a dinner on that date. After seven or eight stereotyped paragraphs Mr. Podgorniy declared that the urgent task of all who are wedded to peace was, first, to stop American aggression and, second, to liquidate the consequences of the recent Israeli attack on the Arab states. "History teaches", he went on, "that all who are concerned to preserve peace on earth must watch with special care the situation in Europe, since it is precisely there that German imperialism unleashed two world wars which carried away millions and millions of human lives. That is why we consider it dangerous to tolerate any growth in Federal Germany of militarism, dreams of revenge, and neo-nazism. The Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that nobody who holds dear the interests of peace and security 'must pass by on the other side' when he detects aggressive behaviour and breeding-grounds of conflict." Every country, on whichever continent, could and should make its contribution to the normalization of the whole international arena. Dr. Zakir Husain, replying, paid some highly flattering compliments to the Russians. "The principles and ideas", he said, "inspiring the Soviet people had made a unique addition to the prosperity of mankind." In a lengthy speech only one sentence sounded ambivalent: "We march resolutely against colonialism in all its forms and manifestations."

More discourses were reproduced in the press of 11.7.68. These had been pronounced at the luncheon which the distinguished guest himself offered at the *Dom Priyemov* on the 10th. Dr. Zakir Husain dwelt on the warmth of his welcome and on the facilities given him to acquaint himself with the richness and variety of the life which the Soviet peoples were building for themselves and for the future: "We are simply carried away by their energies just as we are carried away by the creative genius of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Gogol and Gorky." He had also become convinced during his short stay that the Soviet Union placed as much value on India's friendship as did India on that of the Soviet Union. Reply was made by Mr. Kosygin at no great length and in conventional phrases except for one paragraph which echoed Mr. Podgorniy's remark about the hope of peace depending on two things: viz. an end to American aggression in Vietnam and a return to the *status quo ante* in the Middle East.

It will be needless to comment in any detail on the coverage of the rest of the tour, but it can be said quickly that the emphasis was laid on the Tadzhikistan itinerary, where the visitor's appreciation, expressed in such ejaculations as "most impressive", "fabulous", "fantastic", was understandably given much prominence. It was in Tadzhikistan (where the host was the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of that republic, Mr. M. Kholov) that the talk turned on the local cultural heritage; it being mentioned in this context that great classics of literature by world standards, such as the poetry of Rudaki, had been produced there. Today the republic was enjoying complete equality of rights within the USSR. Education in the schools (this in answer to a question by Dr. Husain) "was conducted through the medium of the mother tongue". Speaking at

a dinner on 15 July the Indian President touched (albeit very lightly) on the affinity of the Tadzhik people with his own. He remarked how the first words addressed to him on Tadzhik soil had been *Salam aleikum*; adding that not a few, *nemalo*, Muslims lived in India where they have the full privileges of citizenship.

The communiqué resuming the visit was carried in all papers. It recorded the strong conviction shared by the parties that cardinal importance at this time must be attached to safeguarding the security of Europe. Both parties were also at one, "or exceedingly close to each other" on the salient international issues of today.

In this massive coverage readers were told next to nothing about India herself. The omission was repaired in certain articles constituting a sort of appendix to Dr. Zakir Husain's visit. Chief among these was a full-scale piece in PR 29.7.68 by the paper's Political Observer, Viktor Mayevskiy, framing the charges against the reactionary organisations, Jan Sangh, Swatantra, etc., which were ready to commit all manner of outrages—insults to the Consulate General in Calcutta and to the Information Office in Delhi—if only the Soviet-Indian friendship could somehow be wrecked. These disturbances had been timed to coincide with the talks which a USA delegation was conducting in the capital.

Indian Independence Day in mid-August prompted articles that were trite as to style and substance, but in smaller quantity than usual. A. Maslennikov in PR 18.8.68 was prominent among the contributors, but there is no occasion here to cite either from him or from his fellow journalists.

Yu. Gotlover in PR, V. Baykov in KP, and V. Simonov in TI were among those who on various dates in August wrote of Central Intelligence Agency operations in India. Although the branch in India of the mysterious Fund of Asia had been obliged, at the Government's insistence, to close its doors, the spies—diplomats, specialists and experts, volunteers, missionaries, tourists—and their jackals were still at large. It behoved Indians to be on the watch now more than ever against the veritable network in which their country had been enmeshed by the C.I.A.

In September it was reported that an extraordinary plenum of the National Council of the Indian Communist Party, discussing the events in Czechoslovakia, had welcomed the Moscow agreement, "the aim of which was the most rapid normalization of the situation". The National Council took note how the power of imperialism and anticommunism "had jumped at the entry of Soviet and other allied troops in order to stoke up a campaign of slander against the Soviet Union, against the unity of the socialist countries, against the whole cause of communism".

### *Pakistan*

It was predictable that Pakistan would drop behind in this quarter: the allotment of space last time was disproportionate, and it was now, as seen above, India's turn. The salient items were Independence Day in mid-August, and three visits to Russia by the country's military or civil representatives.

In the opening week of July, a delegation led by the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, General A. M. Yahya Khan, was received in Moscow by, amongst others, Generals Pavlovskiy, Sidorovich and Dagayev, and

Admiral Sergeev. The delegates were also greeted in the Kremlin by Mr. Kosygin who was reported, in rather short Tass messages, as having had a cordial conversation with General Yahya Khan.

At the end of the month, much lengthier Tass telegrams covered the visit, from 23 to 29 July, of the Pakistan Minister of Commerce, Abdul Ghaffar Khan. It was explained that the USSR Minister of Foreign Trade, N. S. Patolichev, had organized this tour (which embraced Moscow, Leningrad and Tbilisi) in pursuance of the programme formulated (a) in the joint communiqué of 5 October 1967 at the moment of F. M. Ayub Khan's presence in Moscow, and (b) in the communiqué of 22 April last in connexion with Mr. Kosygin's own visit to Pakistan. The two Ministers were said to have studied the progress to date in the implementation of the recent agreement on commodity circulation, 1968-70, and to have signed on 29 July a fresh protocol on credit deliveries to Pakistan of machinery, over the period named, in the sum of 60 m. roubles; machinery meaning in the context electrical engineering plant, road-building and mining equipment, tractors and agricultural machines of all sorts.

The reporting on Independence Day was, if comparatively frugal in terms of wordage, almost cloyingly sweet in flavour. The gist of the articles was that "the road now 21 years in length had taken two very salutary turns." The first turning had been in the autumn of 1958 when F. M. Ayub Khan put a stop to the rot; to the initial phase, that is, of total inertia at home coupled with a happy-go-lucky reliance on USA generosity. And the second had been around 1965 when Pakistan woke up to the fact that an "exclusively Western orientation (*sic*)" was holding everything up. Co-operation with the Soviet Union was sealed by the President's visit, and from that time forward Pakistan had seen eye to eye, or almost, with the USSR on the major issues of the day.

In the second half of August the Governor of West Pakistan, Mohammad Musa, was reported as being the guest of the Soviet Union in the person of V. N. Novikov. The latter offered a luncheon in the visitor's honour and also introduced him to various official personalities.

### *Nepal*

No reference to Nepal was noticed in the press of the quarter.

### *Afghanistan*

In this quarter there was really only one straw for the press to clutch at, namely the entry of Afghanistan into the 50th year of independence: for the rest it was very much a case, readers must have felt, of making bricks without any straw at all.

In July (10.7.68) KT carried an expansive account of a 30-day tour by the Tadjik Academy Theatre during which 18 performances and 26 concerts were given to audiences totalling 30 thousand. The arrival itself was also something of a performance, witnessed by the officials and public of the Kunduz Province, for the buses disembarked from barges on the Panj river in a deluge of rain and only just managed to ascend the slippery bank of the Afghan side.

There had been in 1964 a first, though minor, visit to Kabul by this same Company, when 40 players presented "Rudaki", "Romeo and Juliet" and other pieces. But this time the 53 members of the party visited not only

the capital but Jalalabad and "distant Qandahar and Herat". They were introducing "Tadzhik Soviet Art" the paper said "to an audience which found the national sources of that art to be close to its own and completely intelligible".

Heading from the Salang Pass towards the interior, the actors were of course travelling along the magnificent highway gifted to the Afghan nation by the Soviet Union. From the windows of their three-storeyed hotel in Kabul they had the impression that they were surrounded by skyscrapers glittering with lights; but morning revealed that the lamps had been those of tiny dwellings on the mountain face. The great moment (marked by block capitals) was after the première of "Rustam and Sohrab" when the visitors were escorted back to their hotel by an Afghan doctor clad in a red shirt with LENIN embroidered on the breast-pocket.

On 18.7.68 TI published a review by Z. Sitdikov of a volume called "Afghan Pages". The author of these collected essays, Rahim Esenov, was a Turkmen journalist who had been Pravda's correspondent accompanying the delegation led by Mr. Kosygin in 1964. A great deal of the book seems to have been concerned with the magnanimity of the USSR, but there were also passages, and these seemingly more interesting to the average reader, about "the Turkmens inhabiting the land of our Southern neighbour" as compared with those on Soviet territory. The summing-up was that Turkmen manners and customs, language and dress, were preserved, "though naturally with an Afghan bias". Most men affected a snow-white turban; but the *aksakals*, the greybeards of the village, wore a small lambskin cap instead—in fact the head dress of the respected *yashli* (elders) of the Turkmenia countryside.

Apart from an item on the teaching of Russian, the August allusions hinged on the Anniversary of Independence. IZ 13.8.68 wrote up the courses conducted these several years under the aegis of the Afghan-Soviet Society of Friendship, whose present chairman is Professor Mohammad Asghar, the Minister of Justice. Of the articles on the theme of independence, Ter-Minasova's "When they revitalize the deserts" (IZ 22.8.68) and Filippov's "In the Jalalabad Valley" (PR 24.8.68) can be singled out. The former's thesis was that it was thanks to the October Victory that Afghanistan was restored to independent status, thanks to that grand overture to the new era that a changed existence had suddenly become possible "to these Afghans who are so akin in their national characteristics and traditions to the inhabitants of the Central Asian republics". The birth of the Soviet Land was attended by the snapping of the imperialist chain in which Afghanistan had been cruelly confined. Filippov for his part emphasized that Lenin's Soviet Government had been the first to recognize free Afghanistan, annulling the Tsarist "agreements" which had wounded the country's sovereignty. The step thus taken was to lead to many more along the path of friendship, and no instance of the fruitful relationship of today was perhaps more striking than the opening up of the Jalalabad Valley, which had been "mastered" with the help of Soviet material and Soviet expertise.

### Iran

The Kremlin does not like Iran, to judge by the pages of the press it controls, and even as 1968 draws to a close—which is some five years after

the outward reconciliation—a royal visit to the Soviet Union and a terrible earthquake in Khorasan are featured with little display of fellow feeling.

In July the sandstorms and hot winds in the Ahvaz neighbourhood were given a snippet, and there was one report of recent improvement in the book exchanges between the Turkmenia educational authorities and the Iranian Ministry of Public Instruction.

In August no reference was made to Iran.

Early in September all journals reported (but summarily by comparison with say, the London or the Paris papers) the earthquake in Khorasan "causing the loss of at least 8,000 lives and rendering 100,000 persons homeless".

To the visit of the Shah and his queen the Soviet press accorded no prologue, no stage effects, and no curtain. In the papers of the 25th announcing the arrival of the royal pair "on the track of friendship and co-operation" there was nothing resembling the gush which was thought appropriate in Dr. Zakir Husain's case some ten weeks previously. PR of that same date carried extracts from the speeches delivered by Mr. Podgorniy and the Shah at the dinner table in the *Dom Priyemov* on 24th, but IZ evidently decided that these could wait until the issue on 26.9.68. According to the extracts both speakers alluded to the metallurgical works, the gas main, and the hydro-electric scheme implemented with Soviet assistance; and the host in addition surveyed the international horizon with particular reference to the militarism of the USA in Vietnam, and the open threat to European security constituted by Federal Germany's policy of revenge. His Majesty in his reply dwelt on the commonsense advantages that must accrue from "goodneighbourliness" (as between USSR and Iran) but avoided all reference to other Powers. The papers of 27.9.68, reporting the dinner given by the Iranian Ambassador, contented themselves with lists of names and complicated designations, and the concluding sentence that "the Shah and Mr. Kosygin exchanged toasts".

The press of 28.9.68 told readers how on the preceding day the Shah had left for Irkutsk (whence he was to proceed to Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Yerevan and Tbilisi), and how on the same date the queen had taken the 'plane back to Tehran.

There were rather laconic Tass messages from Irkutsk dated 28 September, and from Khabarovsk dated 29 September, but otherwise the reporting petered out. A short paragraph appearing in IZ 29.9.68 under the heading "Enormous Interest" alluded, and no doubt accurately enough, to the interest evinced by the Iranian press. It did not relate, nor could it correctly in such words, to the Soviet press coverage of the Shahinshah's visit.

### *Mongolia*

Early in July (8.7.68) PR carried the address delivered by Mr. Tsendenbal at the XXII Army and Party Conference, in which he spoke of imperialism as "our class enemy" and of the crucial need "to approach the most important phenomena of international life from the class point of view". The workers have to be brought up, he declared, "in a spirit of heightened vigilance and class hatred of the imperialist aggressors" headed by the USA.

A few days later all journals covered amply the celebrations marking the 47th anniversary of the people's revolution in Mongolia, as also the

opening, timed to coincide with that date, of a *Dekada*, or Ten Day Festival, of Soviet-Mongol Friendship. Most papers had their half-page or even lengthier pieces on the topic of the special relationship under such rubrics as "The Fruits of Indissoluble Unity", "The Growth of Co-operation" and the like. IZ 11.7.68 carried *in extenso* an interview granted to the paper's special correspondent, V. Vernikov. The sentiments, as recorded, were purely formal and stereotyped. More relevant to the issues of the present hour was Mr. Tsedenbal's speech to the Ulan Bator Town Party Organization as published in PR 18.7.68. This "analysed the Prague situation" in some detail. Forces hostile to socialism had moved into the attack on the working class and its protector, the Czech Communist Party, "adroitly taking advantage of the presence of turncoats and time-servers" inside that party. It was now for the sound elements to give a knock-out blow to anti-socialist intrigue in the country. Everybody in Mongolia knew that they could, and would, do this.

In August under the now hackneyed heading of "Where stood the Yurtas", the press wrote up the appearance of a new ferro-concrete bridge on the outskirts of the capital, as also of an all-service centre in one of its hitherto "godforsaken corners". Both these enterprises had been achieved, the reader was informed, with the aid of Soviet technical advice and practical know-how. The bridge was a fine example of modern engineering, and the centre afforded the local residents every imaginable convenience—shops, restaurant, tea-room, cinema, and so on. In somewhat similar tone was the item depicting the scheduled (*po grafiku*) services of that latest amenity of nomadic life—the autoclub. However remote from civilization the pastureland might be, the Soviet press said, these vehicles would arrive punctually and arrange film shows and lectures, distribute books and newspapers, and generally keep the Mongolian herdsman *au fait* with the affairs of the great world.

On 25.8.69 PR carried the statement by the Central Committee of the MPRP and the Government of the MPR on the events in Czechoslovakia. This endorsed in more formal language the phrases already employed by Mr. Tsedenbal five weeks previously, to which allusion was made above.

Early in September all papers reported that Mr. Brezhnev had received Mr. Tsedenbal in Moscow, and discussed with him matters affecting not only Soviet-Mongolian relations, but the world communist movement as such. For the rest, the press of September was concerned with the visit to Mongolia of a Party and Government Delegation from the German Democratic Republic. As this is no more than marginal so far as the present survey goes, no summary of the coverage is in point.

### *Sinkiang*

There was no specific reference to Sinkiang in the quarter under review.

### *Tibet*

In the series "Events in China" Tibet was named now and again (e.g. PR 7.7.68; TI/KT 9.7.68; IZ 10.8.68; and PV 13.9.68) as a region, among several others, in which "revolutionary committees" were still in being, in which clashes were continuing, and in which "servicemen" had been involved in armed attacks on the Maoists.

H. E.

# A REVIEW OF SINKIANG, TIBETAN AND MONGOLIAN AFFAIRS BASED UPON THE CHINESE PRESS AND RADIO

1 JULY-30 SEPTEMBER 1968

## SINKIANG

It was inferred in the last summary of the news about Sinkiang, covering April to June, that a state of stalemate existed between Urumchi and Peking. No regional revolutionary committee had at that time taken the place of the Government and Party organizations. There remained, besides Sinkiang and Tibet, Yünnan, Kwangsi and Fukien that had still not established new administrative structures. On 13 August Yünnan fell into line and was quickly followed by Kwangsi and Fukien. Then, finally, came Tibet and Sinkiang simultaneously on 5 September.

On 6 September in the Peking Home Service and many subsequent bulletins the news was broadcast that both these regions had established regional revolutionary committees the previous day. N.C.N.A. (6.9.68) said that "this extremely magnificent spectacle—the whole country red—was an important event in the seizing of all-round victory in the great proletarian cultural revolution". Proletarian revolutionaries had stood firmly on the side of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, come through "repeated trials of strength" and finally "dug out" the agents of China's Khrushchev—"a handful of renegades, U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek special agents, special agents of the Soviet revisionists and of Britain, counter-revolutionary revisionists and national splittists". The reference to Britain was presumably brought in with particular application to Tibet and Britain's alleged imperialist interest in the affairs of that region. Revolutionary Committees were now established everywhere in China except Taiwan. The establishment of the Sinkiang Revolutionary Committee "signified that the dictatorship of the proletariat in this north-western border region had been further consolidated and the unity of all nationalities in China further strengthened". This was a "crushing blow to Soviet revisionism, U.S. imperialism and the Indian reactionaries".

A rally of 200,000 people from the different nationalities of Sinkiang gathered in Urumchi on 5 September to celebrate the founding of the Revolutionary Committees of both the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region and Urumchi Municipality. The N.C.N.A. report of this event named some of the "agents of China's Khrushchev" who had "over a long period in collusion with the enemies at home and abroad, tried in vain to restore capitalism in Sinkiang". Among them were Iminov, a

vice-chairman of the former regional government who had been in good standing prior to the cultural revolution, and Burhan Shahidi, the Governor of Sinkiang from pre-Communist times up to 1955. It is no surprise that Burhan should be thus condemned for, though previously he had been head of the Chinese Islamic Association and China's roving ambassador to Islamic countries, he had been "out of circulation" for some years.

At the inaugural rally the Chairman of the new Revolutionary Committee, Lung Shu-chin, spoke at length in current Maoist terms of the new order. Saifuddin, the Chairman of the former regional government, appeared on the platform as second vice-chairman (according to the N.C.N.A. version) of the new organization and addressed the gathering. Wang En-mao's position is not clear. At any rate he has not been thrown out. He was at the rally and is not left without office. The appointment of Lung, who since 1962 has been commander of the Hunan Military District, to the new chairmanship at least indicates that the central leadership had its reservations about giving Wang the top post. However, whereas the N.C.N.A.'s report of the proceedings gave Wang third place in the list of vice-chairmen, Urumchi Radio three days later put him first. Lung, it may be noted, has not escaped the lash of Madame Chiang Ching's tongue. Nevertheless, since April this year he was first vice-chairman in Hunan. He would not have been sent to Sinkiang at this juncture if he were not trusted as a good Mao-ist. However, until it can be seen that the new management has effectively divested the old of its power the new situation in the region has the appearance of a formal change that could not have been longer postponed but which possibly leaves the old personnel to a large extent as it was before. The names of the office-bearers so far known show a heavy preponderance of Chinese.

#### TIBET

As noted above, Tibet's revolutionary transformation was simultaneous with Sinkiang's. The Tibetan Region and Lhasa Municipality both set up their revolutionary committees on 5 September. In the N.C.N.A. report of the proceedings (6.9.68) some "50,000 Army men and civilians" were said to have attended an inaugural rally in Lhasa. "When the two revolutionary committees were declared established a thunderous cheer arose and the people shouted again and again: 'Long live the victory of the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung. Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!' . . . On this day of rejoicing the million or more emancipated serfs of the region danced and sang: 'The Himalayas, though high and the Tsangpo, though long have their limits. But Chairman Mao's goodness is limitless and no song can fully express our gratitude'".

The choice of the officials for the new committee of the region suggests the possibility of a *modus vivendi* having been reached in

Peking during August on the problems of factionalism in Tibet. The Chairman, Tseng Yung-ya, had been Deputy-Commander of the Tibet Military Region for the last four years. Of the thirteen vice-chairmen there is a preponderance of military figures and only four are Tibetan, among whom is one woman. Surprisingly, perhaps, the much criticized former chairman of the now defunct Tibet Regional Government, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, has survived as a vice-chairman of the new committee.

## MONGOLIA

### *Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region*

The burden of the news from Inner Mongolia has been a maintained barrage of criticism and repudiation of Ulanfu and accounts of the reactions of the population to the emphasis upon the thoughts of Mao and intensive group study of the "Works".

An example of the former which is useful in that it makes further specific charges against Ulanfu occurs in an appeal to the young people of Inner Mongolia to be armed with the "thoughts". This appeal took the form of an article in the *Inner Mongolia Daily* of which the I.M.R.S. gave a broadcast précis on 18 July. It is worth quoting from at some length.

"Following in the footsteps of China's Khrushchev, Ulanfu had for some time frenziedly opposed Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, desperately promoted a counter-revolutionary revisionist and national splitting line against the Party and against the State and deceived the young people into alienating themselves from proletarian politics, the 'three major revolutionary movements' and the masses of workers and peasants in a vain attempt to mislead them into opposing the Party and the State and turn them into successors of the bourgeoisie."

Ulanfu tried to deflect public interest from the study of Mao's works when the movement to do so was gaining momentum in the spring of 1966 under the pretext of promoting the Mongolian spoken and written language.

"Ulanfu and his ilk prevented the young people from studying Chairman Mao's works. . . . They also adopted fascist measures to force young people to study the Mongolian spoken and written language. . . . Simultaneously with debasing the importance of studying Mao Tse-tung's thought . . . Ulanfu even went so far as to vilify Mao Tse-tung's thought as dogmatism, which could not solve the specific problems of Inner Mongolia".

There then followed alleged quotations from Ulanfu to support these charges. Further charges are brought regarding Ulanfu's attitude to questions of "nationality" and "class".

“Chairman Mao has taught us: ‘In the final analysis, national struggle is a matter of class struggle’. However, Ulanfu has used the nationality question as an instrument to negate the classes, class contradictions and class struggle in Inner Mongolia in an effort to maintain the rule of feudal princes, the nobility, herd-owners, landlords and the bourgeoisie in Inner Mongolia”.

That all the charges brought against Ulanfu are almost certainly justified from the Mao-ist viewpoint is borne out by an article: “Ulanfu versus Mao Tse-tung” in the Chinese Nationalist periodical *Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features*, 12 June 1968. This gives the 3rd meeting of the 2nd Session of an enlarged Plenary of the Inner Mongolia Party Committee as the occasion when Ulanfu promulgated with unanimous support his “Three Basic Theories” of politics, economics and culture in opposition to Mao’s “Three Great Revolutionary Movements”. If the article indeed gives a true account of Ulanfu’s platform then it is not surprising that the Mao-ist leadership could not tolerate the continuance of his domination of Inner Mongolian affairs.

As late as 22 August the *Inner Mongolia Daily* as reported on Huhehot Radio was developing new charges against Ulanfu. He had tried to take all the credit for the liberation of Inner Mongolia and had wanted to replace the Chinese Communist Party in the region with his “Great Mongolian Empire” that he had planned to establish as a “so-called unified autonomous region of the Mongolian Nationality”. The influence of this “contemporary overlord had not yet been repudiated thoroughly”.

Reporting on the progress of the Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia, Peking Home Service on 26 September said that “among a population of 13,000,000 in the Region, more than 8,000,000 workers, poor and lower-middle peasants, poor and lower-middle herdsmen, revolutionary teachers and students and revolutionary cadres of all nationalities had participated in all types of Mao Tse-tung’s thought classes”. The first group of workers’ propaganda teams in compliance with Chairman Mao’s instructions had entered schools and other units by the end of August (*Inner Mongolia Daily* editorial 28.8.68). “This was an earth-shaking big event!”

*Mongolian People’s Republic*

Nothing to report.

W. J. D.

## SOVIET BROADCASTS IN UYGUR FOR SINKIANG

1 JULY-30 SEPTEMBER 1968

THE only examples of the Tashkent Uygur language broadcasts available for comment during the period July to September were some that were made between 5 and 11 September. These consisted of:

A talk on Mao's treatment of the Uygurs;

A talk on Tibet;

Two talks on the bad effect on the national minorities in China of the revolutionary committees.

The first refers to what it calls "the valuable contribution of the peoples of Sinkiang to Mao Tse-tung's successful struggle against the Kuomintang"—presumably a reference to the Ili Rebellion—and contrasts this with his "present hostility against their current national struggle". The "Mao clique was taking every possible step to block the political, economic and cultural progress of the Uygurs and other peoples living in Sinkiang". There then followed an assertion that Mao's policy was one of forcible assimilation of the national minorities—a policy attributable to his extreme nationalism and his hostility to them.

The talk on Tibet was given by a "candidate for a degree in historical sciences" by the name of Dardzhayev under the title: "Forcibly Sinicizing a National Minority". It was, for the most part, a sober recital of the main facts of recent Tibetan history. It charged the Chinese Government with having violated the 1951 Agreement, with eliminating the local Tibetan "organs of sovereignty", dispensing with all Tibetan leaders and replacing them with people of Chinese origin, and causing the Dalai Lama to flee from his country. The talk then went on to assert that hundreds of thousands of Chinese have since been brought into Tibet "for sinicizing purposes", the numerical strength of the Chinese now equalling that of the Tibetans. Tibet had been converted into a military camp with the Chinese Army, about 300,000 strong, everywhere. The Chinese even killed any who dared to oppose forcible sinicization. During the period March, 1959 to September, 1960 (that is, during and immediately after the 1959 Rebellion) some 80,000 persons, it was alleged, had been killed.

The broadcasts dealing with the revolutionary committees described them as restricting the national life of the minorities in China. Revolutionary committees were "illegal, unconstitutional, militaristic, bureaucratic and dictatorial organs". They had one aim only: to consolidate the personal domination of Mao. The claims of Mao's

propagandists that the establishment of revolutionary committees in Sinkiang and Tibet were spectacular events in the life of these regions were "pompous statements about a false movement". In other places where revolutionary committees had been established they had brought "tragic incidents" and "destruction and misery to tens of thousands of citizens".

These four samples are remarkable for their sober and unsensational tone. If it could be known that they were typical of the whole range of the Uygur language broadcasts from the Soviet Union they would demonstrate that at any rate in this part of their programme of anti-Chinese propaganda the Russians were now prepared to let the quiet approach, utilizing selected facts, distorted and over-emphasized here and there, make its appeal to their hearers. This is probably more telling than gross exaggeration and sensational invention. The minority peoples can check the facts for themselves and the Chinese, who are currently devoted to a style of expression wild and exaggerated in the extreme, are poorly placed to offer an effective rebuttal.

W. J. D.



## INDEX

- Abadan, Iran, 177  
 Abaza people, 217ff.  
 Abbas I, 223ff.  
 Abbas, Khoja Ahmad, 238-9  
 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 352  
 Abdullah Ansari, 307  
 Abdurrab, 322ff.  
 Abdurrashid Mehdi, 21  
 Abdusalyamov, 320  
 Abdusalyamova, Aysha, 317  
 Abdushukurov, R.Kh., 316  
 Achariya, Trimal, 322, 325  
 Achuthan, M., 82  
 Adhikari, G., 83, 110, 111  
 Adinayev, Kalandar, 319, 320  
 Adyges in Karachay-Cherkess A. R., 219ff.  
 Afghanistan, 7ff., 36, 69, 96, 102, 274, 295, 301, 322ff., 346  
   books on, reviewed, 168-9, 170  
   foreign visitors to, 352  
   Independence Anniversary, 353  
   Soviet press comments on, 82, 176-7, 264-5, 352-3  
   Uzbeks in, 185  
   Zahir Shah's visit to USSR, 264-5  
 Afghans in Persia, 224  
 Ahmad Mustafi Agi Dilzar, 307  
 Aigun (Aihon) river, 142  
 Akbar, 242  
 Ak-Baytal river, 13  
 Akchurin, Alimdzhan, 310ff.  
 Akhmedzhyanov, A. V., on Muslim organizations in India, 232  
 Akhunova, Tursunoy, 45  
 Akmolinsk obl., 51ff.  
 Akramov, Z. M., 46  
 Ak-Su river, 5ff.  
 Ak-Tash, Pamir Mts., 10, 12  
 Aktyubinsk, 149, 152, 195  
 Akulintsev, V. K., 285  
 Alan-Goa, 247  
 Alaska, 136  
 Alay Mts., 6  
   Alayev, M. B., 295  
   Albanians in Yugoslavia, 188  
   Albazin on Amur (Yaksa), 137ff.  
   Aleksey Mikhaylovich, Tsar, 245  
   Alekseyev, Erik, 174  
   Alekseyev, V. M., 305  
   Alexander II, 19  
   'Ali Azari Amirkhizi, 66  
   Ali Qoli Khan, 68  
   Alichur, Pamir Mts., 10  
   Aliyev, A. S., 295  
   Aliyev, S. M. 223  
   Aliyeva, A., 45  
   Alma-Ata, Kaz., 80, 155, 183, 215, 348  
     education in, 192ff.  
     everyday life in, 261  
     foreign visitors to, 82, 259  
     obl., 81, 153  
     rebuilding in, 260  
     Uygurs in, 91  
   Altai, Sink., 180, 206ff.  
   Altan Sandality, 247  
   Altanbulag (formerly Kyakhta), MPR, 32  
   Altay language, 98ff.  
   Alte Shahr, Sink., 212  
   Altin Khan, 137ff.  
   Altmann, V., 24  
   Altyn khans, 244  
   Altyn Tagh Mts., 207  
   Aminov, A. M., 287ff.  
   Amu-Dar'ya otdel, 55  
   Amu-Dar'ya river, 11  
     Bukhara Canal, 172  
   Amur river, 136ff.  
   Anand, Mulk Raj, 116  
   Anatolia, Turkey, 325  
   Andizhan, 50, 80, 81, 198  
     obl., 45ff., 171  
   Anikeyev, N.P., on the national liberation movement, 231-2  
   Antonova, K. A., 295  
   Aq Mechet (later Simferopol), 17

- Aqsu, Sink., 212, 213  
 Arabadzhyan, A. Z., on the Soviet-Iranian Economic Future, 338-41  
 Arabic language, 98ff., 200  
 Arabs in Persia, 224  
 Araks river, 341  
 Ardahan, 185  
 Argun river, 144ff.  
 Armenia, 281ff.  
 Armenians, 98ff.  
   in Crimea, 17  
   in Karachay-Cherkess A. R., 219  
   in Persia, 224ff.  
 Artush, Sink., 214  
 Arumyunov, S. A., 303  
 Asghar, Professor Mohammad, 353  
 Ashkhabad, Turk., 61, 64, 80, 173, 283ff., 346  
   education in, 189ff.  
   -Tedzhen power line, 260  
 Ashraf, Princess, 265  
 Asht rayon, Tad., 191  
 Assyrian people in Persia, 224  
 Astrakhan, 185  
 Atbasar, Tselinograd obl., 80  
 At-Bashi, Kirg., 260  
 Atsamba, F. M., 295  
 Auezov, Mukhtar, 81  
 Auliye-Ata uyezd, Kaz., 56  
 Aya, Karliyeva, 191  
 Aybel (Musa Tashmukhamedov), 348  
 Ayub Khan, President, 84, 176, 263, 264, 352  
 Azad Abul Kalam, 232  
 Azarbaijan, Persian, 185, 225ff., 295  
 Azerbaijanis in Persia, 185, 224ff.  
 Azerbaydzhan, 281ff.  
 Azerbaydzhani language, 103  
 Azerbaydzhanis in Georgia, 258  
 Azeri language, 98ff., 224  
 Azeri people, 219  
 Babakhanov, Muftiy Ziyavutdin, 174  
 Babakhodzhayev, M. A., *Russo-Afghan Trade and Economic Relations in the Second Half of the 18th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century*, reviewed, 168-9  
 Babesh Bek of Sarykol, 6  
 Babur Nameh, 13  
 Badakhshan, 5ff.  
 Baddeley, John F., 136ff.  
 Bagdasarov, Yu.M., 286ff.  
 Baghdad, 322  
 Bailey, Colonel F., 171  
 Bailey, Mrs. Molly, 26  
 Baishev, S. B. (ed.) *The Development of the Economy of Kazakhstan in Fifty Years of Soviet Rule*, reviewed, 256  
 Bakhchisaray, 16ff.  
 Bakhtiari people in Persia, 223ff.  
 Baku, Azerb., 22, 52, 60  
   First Turkological Congress, 1926, 97, 98  
 Balaklava, 19  
 Balayan, B. P., *Iran's International Relations, 1813-1828*, reviewed, 253-5  
 Balin, V. I., on Rahim, 242  
 Ballis, W. B., 27, 28  
 Baltic economic region, 281ff.  
 Baluchi people in Persia, 224ff.  
 Bandar Abbas, 266  
 Bannerjee, D. N., 236  
 Barakatullah, Muhammad, 322ff.  
 Barannikova, R. I., 240  
 Bartol'd, V. V. 35, 306  
 Bashkiria, 16, 22  
 Bashkir language, 98ff.  
 Bashkirs, 309  
 Baskakov, N. A., 69,  
   on Turkic Languages of the USSR, 97-109  
 Basmachi, 279, 317  
 Batur Khuntaydzh, 244  
 Bawden, C., 27, 28  
 Bayan, Gol, Sink., 70  
 Baykov, V., 351  
 Baypazy, Vakhsh valley, 172  
 Baza-i-Gumbaz, Pamir Mts., 9, 10  
 Begaliyev, S., 346  
 Bekabad, Uzb., 196  
 Bekmuratova, A. T., 47  
 Belan, V., on *Notes on Industrial Development*, by Dr. Margaret Miller, 159-60  
 Belobrova, O. A., 240  
 Belova, N. K., 296

- Bel'skiy, A., on Jan Sangh, 231  
 Benares, Indian Scientific Conference, 174  
 Bengal, 111ff.  
 Bengali language, 111ff.  
 Bennigsen, Alexandre, 20ff., 40  
 "Mixed Marriages in the Caucasus: The Problem as observed in the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region", 217-22  
 Bertels, D. Ye., 305  
 Besmeyn, Turk., 173  
 Beynau, 174  
 Bhagat Singh, 111  
 Bhils, 121  
 Bichurin, N. A., 245  
 Bihar, India, 261  
 Bikzhanova, M. A., 40  
 Binder, M. A., on Central Asian Bureau, 278ff.  
 Birkin, M., 48, 49  
 Birobidzhan, Crimean Tatars in, 25  
 Bishi, P., 119  
 Black Lisu people, 70  
 Black Sea, 265  
 Bochagov, A. K., 17ff.  
 Bogdo massif, China, 70  
 Bogomils, 188  
 Bogoutdinov, A. M., (ed.) *The History of the Communist Organizations of Central Asia*, reviewed, 342-3  
 Bojnurd, Persia, 223  
 Bokhara, see Bukhara  
 Bol'shakov, O. G., 303, 305-6  
 Bol'shoy Namangan Canal, Uzb., 172  
 Bombay, 83, 111ff., 174, 176, 261  
 Bongard-Levin, G. M., 303  
 Book Reviews, 71-8, 161-70, 249-57, 342-4. See under authors' names for individual reviews.  
 Boriskovskiy, Dr. P. T., on palaeolithic research in India, 118  
 Borovoy, B., 176  
 Borozheykina, Z. N., 307  
 Borshchevskiy, Yu. Ye., 304  
 Borujerd, Persia, 223  
 Bosnia, 188  
 Bosnia-Hercegovina, 188  
 Bosphorus, 21  
 Braginskiy, Professor I., 82  
 Braj dialect, 242  
 Brezhnev, L. I., 92, 355  
 Bronewski, Martin, 18  
 Brosalina, Ye. K., on Tagore, 118-9  
 Browne, Edward, 65ff.  
 Broydo, G. I., 309, 319  
 Brzhezitskiy, Lieutenant, 9ff.  
 Budapest, Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, 266, 269  
 Buenos Aires, University of Salvador Publications, *Ethnographical Map of the Turanians*, comments on, 96  
 Bujaq, 18  
 Bukhara, 7, 44, 80, 279ff., 324, 349  
 Communist Party in, 309ff.  
 education in, 194ff.  
 Emir of, 311  
 oblast, 44ff., 153, 172  
 rayon, 49  
 Bulgakov, P. G., 304  
 Bulgaria, 187  
 Bulgarians in Crimea, 17  
 Bulungur rayon, Uzb., 49  
 Bulun-Kul', Pamir Mts., 11  
 Burhan Shahidi, 357  
 Buryats, 303  
 Bushire, Persia, 66, 67  
 Bystra river, 143  
 Caffa, see Feodosiya, 15  
 Cairo, 186  
 Calcutta, 111ff., 236, 240, 262, 351  
 Caspian Sea, 206, 224  
 Castle, Mrs. Barbara, 337  
 Catherine II of Russia, 16  
 Caucasus, 20, 22, 185, 217ff.  
 Cawnpore, India, 241  
 Chagatay language, 106  
 Chakyr-Agyl, 8  
 Chanda, A., 237  
 Chandra, Bankim, 120  
 Chandra, Romesh, 262  
 Chang Hsi-lin, 88, 90  
 Chardara, Kaz., 259

- Charshanga rayon, Turk., 199  
 Charvak, Uzb., 348-9  
 Chatterji, Bankim Chandra, 112, 114  
 Chaudari, N. C., 231  
 Chauhan, Sh., 115, 116  
 Chechens, 217ff.  
 Chelebiyev, President, 22  
 Cheleken, Turk., 202  
 Chelyshev, Ye. P., 302  
 Chen, Vincent, on *Sino-Russian Relations in the 17th Century*, 136-46  
 Cherkesk, Karachay-Cherkess A. R., 218  
 Cherkess people, 217ff.  
 Chiang Ching, Madame, 357  
 Chiang Kai-shek, 356  
 Chicherov, A. I., 296  
   on Indian economy, 113  
 Ch'i-chio-ching, China, 70  
 Ch'ien Lung, 13, 212, 214  
 Chimbay rayon, Uzb., 41ff.  
 Chimgan, Uzb., 348-9  
 Chimkent, Kaz., 56  
   foreign visitors to, 259  
   oblast, 149, 195, 283ff.  
 China, 1, 172, 178, 182ff., 187, 200ff., 205ff., 245, 259, 266, 267ff.  
   agreement with Pak., 87  
   clashes with India, 82  
   Communist Party in, 91  
   Dungans in, 182  
   in Central Asian press, 79  
   national minorities of Western, 69-70  
   press and radio in, 87-90, 179-181, 270-2, 356-9  
   "Russia and China in the Pamirs, 18th and 19th Centuries," 4-14  
   Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1, 4, 93-4, 186, 274  
   "Sino-Russian Relations in the 17th Century", 136-46  
 Chinese people in Tibet, 86  
 Chinghai plateau, 180  
 Chingis Khan, 34, 35, 246  
 Chokur, Chief, 138  
 Choudhury, R., 114  
 Chou En-lai, Premier, 88, 186, 209  
 Choybolsan, 32  
 Chu valley, 259  
 Chuguchak, Sink., 215  
 Chuguyevskiy, L. I., on N. A. Bichurin, 245  
 Chulanov, G. Ch., (ed.), *The Development of the Economy of Kazakhstan in Fifty Years of Soviet Rule*, reviewed, 251  
 Chuvash language, 98ff.  
 Communist Party  
   Caucasian Bureau of, 279, 310ff.  
   Central Asian Bureau of, 278ff.  
   Far Eastern Bureau of, 279  
   in Khorezm, 308ff.  
   in Turkestan, 310ff.  
   Second Congress of the Communist International, 235, 310  
   Siberian Bureau of, 279  
   Theses, 94-5  
   XXth Party Congress, 287, 294  
   XXIIInd Party Congress, 95, 186  
 Conolly, Violet, 95  
 Coomaraswami, Ananda K., 112  
 Cossacks, 9, 137, 142  
 Crimea, 185  
   ASSR created and abolished, 23-4  
   oblast, 24  
   Tatars of, 15ff.  
 Crimean Tatars in Central Asia, 25  
 "The Tatars of the Crimea: A Retrospective Summary", by Madame Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, 15-25  
 Curzon, Lord, 95  
 Czechoslovakia, 259, 273, 345, 355  
 Dacca, 84  
 Dagayev, General, 351  
 Dagestan, 217  
 Dagestanis in Karachay-Cherkess, A. R., 217ff.  
 Dalai Lama, 360  
 Dandekar, R. N., 116  
 Dange, Shripata Amrita, 83, 110, 111  
 Danibegashvili, Rafail, 240  
 Danzan, Lubsan, 36  
 Dardzhayev, 360  
 Darkhan, MPR, 33, 38  
 Dashkov, V. A., 18ff.  
 Daur people in Sink., 214-5

- Delhi, 262, 272, 351  
conferences, 175
- Demin, A. I., *Agriculture in Present Day Iran*, reviewed, 74-6
- Denau, Uzb., 50
- Denikin, General, 22
- Desai, M. G., 111
- Desai, R., 231
- Devlet Girey Khan, 16
- Devyatkina, T. F., 238
- Dhar, P. H., 231
- Dhebar, N., 116
- Dhebar, U. N., 233
- Dinkar, R., 117
- Dorz, Namran, 37
- Drew, W. J., 87, 179-81, 182-4, 267-9, 270-2, 356-9, 360-1  
"Sinkiang: The Land and the People", 205-16
- Drivedi, Hazari Prasad, 115
- Dubcek, Premier, 346
- Dulling, G. K., "The Turkic Languages of the USSR: A New Development", 97-109
- Dumezil, G., 117-8
- Dungans, 209  
books on, reviewed, 249-53  
in Sink., 208, 211-2  
in Turkestan, 56  
in USSR, 182
- Dushanbe, 149, 158, 173, 197ff., 346, 348, 349
- Dvoryankov, Dr. N. A., 82
- Dzasaktu Khan Subudi, 244
- Dzhalal-Abad, Kirg., 155
- Dzhambul obl., 195
- Dzharkent, Kaz., 60
- Dzhaved, Dr. Ahmad, 82
- Dzhunaid Khan, 311ff.
- Dzhungaria, 212
- Dzhungar khañate, 244ff.
- Dzhungars (Oyrats) 36, 137ff.
- East Pakistan, 176
- Editorials,  
No. 1. Five Year review of *Central Asian Review*, 1-2  
Soviet reactions to CAR, 2  
Soviet usage in describing Central Asian and Kazakh republics, 4
- Editorials—*cont.*  
No. 2. Geoffrey Wheeler's retirement, 93  
Sino-Soviet dispute, 93-4  
nationalities policy, 94-5  
population and rural conditions in Soviet Central Asia, 95-6  
*Ethnographical Map of Turanians (Uralo-Altaians)*, comments on, 96
- No. 3. Cultural and racial affinities of Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East, 185-7  
Position of Islam in USSR compared with other Communist countries, 187-8
- No. 4. Czech crisis and the Soviet attitude towards nationalities problems, 273-5  
Prospects for the future of the Central Asian Research Centre, 275-7
- Education. See under individual countries/republics.
- Enbekshi-Kazakhskiy rayon, Alma-Ata obl., 153
- Engels, F., 328
- Enthoven, R. E., 121
- Enver Pasha, 279
- Esenov, Rahim, 353
- Esfahan, Iran, 177, 224
- Eski Krym, Crimea (later Levkopol') 17
- Evans, Hubert J.,  
"Recent Soviet Writing on the Mongolian PR", 26-39  
"Recent Soviet Writing on India", 110-21 and 135, 229-43  
"Recent Soviet Writing on the Mongolian PR: Oriental Studies and Linguistics", 244-8  
"Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental and African Historical Study", 294-8  
"Indian Revolutionary Organizations of Central Asia", 322-7  
"British Behaviour towards Pakistan: A Soviet Interpretation", 333-7

- Evans, Hubert J.—*cont.*  
 Book Reviews, 71–6, 78, 165–9,  
 170, 253–5, 256–7  
 Soviet Press Comment on Coun-  
 tries adjoining Soviet Central  
 Asia, 82–6, 174–8, 261–6,  
 349–55
- Fars, Persia, 224
- Fedchina, V. N., *How the Map of  
 Central Asia was Created*, re-  
 viewed, 169–70
- Feodosiya (formerly Caffa), 15, 19
- Fergana, Uzb., 5ff., 80, 81  
 Dungans in, 182  
 education in, 193ff.  
 oblast, 45ff., 326  
 rayon, 49  
 taxation in, 51ff., 151
- Filippov, A., 84, 176, 263, 353
- Fil'shtinskiy, I.M., 303
- Firyuza, Turk., 153
- Freeberne, Michael, 216
- Frunze, 149, 153, 155, 171, 260  
 conferences in, 173, 349  
 film festival, 261
- Fukien, China, 356
- Fu Teh, 7
- Gabdulin, M., 48
- Gagauz language, 98ff.
- Galdan, Chief, 137ff.
- Galikin, V., 44
- Galiyev, Sultan, 23
- Gallyaaral, Tad., 260
- Gamaullina, L. M., 37
- Gandhi, Mrs. Indira, 83, 84, 174, 175,  
 261, 262
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 112, 120, 175,  
 230, 233, 239
- Gantimur, Chief, 140ff.
- Gapurov, M., 290
- Gasprinskiy, Ismail, 20ff.
- Genoese people, 15
- Geok-Tepe, Turk., 80
- Georgia, 192, 281ff.  
 foreign visitors to, 263  
 mixed nationalities in, 258
- Georgians in Karachay-Cherkess,  
 A.R., 219
- Gerbillon, J. F., 143
- Germans in Crimea, 17, 19  
 in Turkestan, 56
- Ghate, S. V., 111
- Ghulam Muhammad, 326
- Gilaki people, 224ff.
- Gilan, Persia, 228
- Gillett, Sir Michael, on "The  
 National Minorities of Western  
 China", 69–70
- Ginsburg, G., 27, 28
- Gissar, Tad., 158
- Gobi desert, 38, 86, 206ff.
- Gochmamed-khan, 309, 311
- Gol'dberg, N. M., 297
- Golden Horde, 15
- Gol'man, M. I., on the MPR in  
 Bourgeois Historiography, 26–  
 9, on Mongolian relations in the  
 17th Century, 244–5
- Golovin, F. A., 143
- Golwalkar, M. S., 231
- Gombodzhah, Taydzhii, 35
- Gopner, D.Yu, 313
- Gorbitsu river, 144
- Gordon, L. A., on the Indian work-  
 ing class, 229–31
- Gordon-Polonskaya, L. R., 294
- Gorgan valley, Persia, 224
- Gorno-Badakhshan, A. O., 4
- Gorokhova, G. S., on the Early  
 Mongols, 246
- Goths, 15
- Gotlover, Yu., 35, 83
- Gözlev, Crimea, (later Yevpatoriya),  
 17
- Greeks in Crimea, 15ff.
- Grekov, B. D., 36
- Grey, Edward, 67
- Grierson, J., 121
- Grombchevskiy, B., 6
- Grumm-Grzhimaylo, G. Ye., 34
- Gubaydullin, Kh., 16ff.
- Gujerat, 113
- Gupta, Jagdish, 116
- Gupta, Professor Prakash Chandra,  
 115
- Gurko-Kryazhin, V., 65
- Gurlen, Karakalpak ASSR, 312ff.
- Gur'yev, Kaz., 149  
 -Astrakhan railway, 80
- Gusev, Yu., on Indian castes, 120

- Gushchin, V. M., 288  
 Guzevatykh, Ya., 328  
 Gwadar, 336
- Hajji Girey, 15  
 Hami, 179, 212  
 Hardwar, India, 121, 175  
 Haryana, 262  
 Haris Bitlisi, 306  
 Harris, Richard, 209  
 Harrisson, S., 236  
 Hayward, M. T., 93  
 Hazaras in Afgh., 96,  
   in Persia, 224  
 Herat, Afgh., 307, 353  
 Hindi language, 115ff., 200, 238, 242  
 Hind Mazdoor Sabha, 230  
 Hindu Kush Mts., 10  
 Hindustan, 175  
 Ho Chin-t'ao, 136ff.  
 Hoshangabad, 118  
 Hsin-Chiang (*see* Sinkiang)  
 Huhehot, Inner Mongolia, 89, 178,  
   181, 271, 359  
 Hui (Chinese Muslims). *See*  
   Dungans.  
 Hunan, China, 210, 357  
 Hungry Steppe, 282ff.  
 Hunza people, 5ff.  
   khanate of, 9ff.  
 Husain, President Zakir, 262, 345,  
   346, 349-50  
 Hussein, Ghulam, 110  
 Hutchinson, Lester, 111  
 Hyderabad, Indian National Con-  
   gress Session, 174
- Ibero-Caucasian people, 217ff.  
 Ibragimov, I. A., 295  
 Ides, Evert Isbrandt, 145  
 Ili Kazakh autonomous chou, 213  
 Il'inskiy, G. N., 297  
 Ili Rebellion, 360  
 Ili river, 207ff., 215  
 Iliyev, Broadcaster, 267  
 Il'yaly, Turk., 158  
 Iminov, Vice-Chairman, 356  
 India, 13, 20, 95, 172, 274, 296, 348  
   agriculture in, 113-4  
   Anniversary celebrations, 309  
   books on, reviewed, 170  
   India—*cont.*  
   Caste system in, 120-1  
   clashes with China, 82  
   Communist Party in, 83, 110-1,  
     230, 234, 262, 351  
   Congress Party, 83, 174, 230, 262  
   foreign visitors to, 83  
   Fund of Asia in, 351  
   Hindu Mahasabha, 232  
   journals in, 115-6  
   Jan Sangh party, 231, 232, 237, 262,  
     351  
   National Congress, 111  
   Pakistan border incidents, 83  
   palaeolithic research in, 118  
   population problems, 328-32  
   "Recent Soviet Writing on India",  
     110-21 and 135, 229-43  
   relations with Pak., 334ff.  
   religious affairs in, 135  
   RSS party, 232  
   "Revolutionary Organizations in  
     Central Asia", 322-7  
   Soviet Press Comments on, 82-4,  
     174-6, 261-3, 249-51  
   Swatantra Party, 262, 351  
   Tashkent Declaration, 174  
   Trades Unions in, 82  
   writers in, 111-3  
 Inner Mongolian Autonomous Re-  
   gion, 1, 90, 183, 215, 216  
   Chinese press and radio comment  
     on, 89-90, 180-1, 270-1,  
     358-9  
 Iolotan, Uzb., 60, 349  
   rayon, Turk., 156  
 Ionov, Colonel, 9ff.  
 Iqbal, Muhammad, 116-7  
 Iran (Persia), 20, 36, 102, 185, 274,  
   296, 301, 324  
   Azerbaijanis in, 185  
   books on, reviewed, 74-6, 166-8  
   "Economic Co-operation with  
     Iran: The Immediate Future",  
     338-41  
   Kosygin's visit to, 265  
   Matveyev versus CAR, 64-8  
   "Nation-forming processes in  
     Iran", 223-8  
   October Revolution, 85  
   relations with USSR, 354  
   Revolution, 1905-11, 294-5

- Iran (Persia)—*cont.*  
 Shah of, 85, 265, 354  
 Soviet Press Comment on, 85, 177,  
 265–6, 353–4  
 Soviet visitors to, 265  
 Tudeh Party in, 85–96, 274  
 Turkic tribes in, 96  
 Turkmens in, 185  
 Iranian people, 211, 215, 217ff.  
 Iraq, 185–6  
 Irkutsk, 32, 263, 354  
 Irtysh-Karaganda Canal, 80  
 Irtysh river, 137  
 Ishanov, A. I., 280ff.  
 Ishkashim canal, Pamir Mts., 172  
 Iskandarov, B. I., on Russia and  
 China in the Pamirs in the 18th  
 and 19th Centuries, 4–14  
 Islamabad, Pak., 87, 176, 263  
 Ismukhamedov, A., 194ff.  
 Israel, 185  
 Arab-Israeli war, 167, 186, 263,  
 265  
 Issyk, Alma-Ata obl., 153  
 Istanbul, 20, 22  
 Ivanov, M. S., 65ff., 294–5  
 “Nation-forming Processes in  
 Iran”, 223–8  
 Ivatullin, P., 42  
 Izzetdinov, Mukhammedzhan, 314
- Jaipur, 262  
 Jalay, Jai Kumar, 115  
 Jalalabad, Afgh., 353  
 Jammu, 263  
 Jamshids in Persia, 224  
 Jaoda League, Inner Mongolia, 89  
 Jassy, Treaty of, 18  
 Jews in Crimea, 17, 19  
 Jolmo, Lungma, Mt., (Everest), 180  
 Josh, S. S., 111
- Kabards in Karachay-Cherkess A. R.,  
 217ff.  
 Kabul, 82, 176, 325, 352, 353  
 Kadyshhev, S. I., 286  
 Kakharov, A., 290  
 Kakhkhar, Abdulla, 261  
 Kalgan, Khan, of, 138, 139  
 Kallinnikov, A. D., 34
- Kalmyks (Kalmuks), 7, 137ff., 214,  
 303  
 Kamaraj, K., 83  
 Kambakhsh, Abdulsamad, 85  
 K'ang-hsi, Emperor, 137, 142, 143  
 Kansu, Sink., 206, 210, 211  
 Karachay-Balkar language, 98ff.  
 Karachay-Cherkess, A. R., mixed  
 marriages in, 217–22  
 Karachayevsk, Karachay-Cherkess,  
 A. R., 218  
 Karachays, 217ff.  
 Karachi, Pak., 84, 87, 176, 263, 264,  
 337  
 Karaganda, Kaz., 152, 198  
 -Irtysh canal, 80  
 -Magnitogorsk railway, 80  
 Karakalpak ASSR, 151, 198  
 agriculture in, 172  
 women in, 41ff.  
 Karakalpak language, 98ff.  
 Karakalpaks, 317  
 Kara-Kirgiz people, 96  
 Kara-Kitays, 185  
 Karakoram Mts., 207  
 Karakul', Lake, Pamir Mts., 9, 10  
 Karakum canal, 79, 80, 173  
 Karamai, China, 270  
 Karashahr, Sink., 211, 214  
 Karasubazar (Byelogorsk), Crimea,  
 21  
 Karatau range, 260  
 Karpushin, V. A., 300–1, 303  
 Kars, 185  
 Karshi, Kashka-Dar'ya obl., 174,  
 obl., 201  
 Steppe, 347  
 Kashgar, Sink., 5ff., 69, 138ff., 212,  
 214, 324  
 Kashgaria, 7ff., 21  
 Kashmir, 207, 263, 335, 337  
 Kasymov, T. K., on Central Asia,  
 280ff.  
 Katmandu, 84, 264  
 Kayrakkum, Tad., 197  
 Kazakh-Kirgiz people, 96  
 Kazakh language, 98ff.,  
 in Sink., 94  
 Kazakhs, 57ff., 138ff., 182, 317ff.,  
 in Sink., 70, 180, 208, 209, 213–4

- Kazakh SSR, 20, 118, 159  
   agriculture in, 79-80, 122ff., 172, 259, 347  
   books on, reviewed, 170  
   construction work in, 80-1, 348  
   education in, 147-58, 173, 189-204  
   film festivals, 261  
   foreign visitors to, 79, 261, 348  
   government affairs in, 79, 258, 345-6  
   house building in, 260  
   industry in, 260  
   irrigation in, 80  
   mixed nationalities in, 258  
   plenum meetings in, 345  
   publications, 8, 173  
   social conditions in, 81  
   Soviet usage in describing, 3  
   territorial changes in, 81  
   T.V. in, 80  
   Transport in, 80  
   Uygurs in, 182, 183, 268  
   Writers' Jubilee Plenum, 82  
 Kazalinsk uyezd, 52, 55, 57  
 Kazan', 16, 17, 106, 155, 185, 245  
 Kazandzhik rayon, Turk., 157  
 Kemal Ataturk, 212  
 Keppen, P. L., 19  
 Keraim people, 98  
 Kerala state, 82, 83  
 Kerki rayon, Turk., 152  
 Kerman, Persia, 226  
 Kermanshah, Persia, 223, 228  
 Kesravi, A., 66  
 Khabarov, Y. P., 137, 140  
 Khabarovsk, 354  
 Khabul Khagan, 247  
 Khakas language, 98ff.  
 Khakimov, M.Kh., on Uzbekistan, 280ff.  
 Khaikas people, 137ff.  
 Khamzy rayon, Tashkent, 174  
 Khanazarov, K.Kh., 47  
 Khan Khoja, 7  
 Khanki, Khorezm obl., 318  
 Khasanova, S., 45  
 Khasanov, K., 279ff.  
 Khasanov, Kh., 194  
 Khazarasp, Khorezm obl., 318  
 Khazars, 98  
 Khaznadar, M., 307  
 Khemshils in Georgia, 258  
 Khiva, 279ff., 308ff., 324  
   Young Khivans, 308ff.  
 Khodzha-Bobo, 317  
 Khodzhambas rayon, Turk., 149  
 Khodzhayev, Nizametdin, 315  
 Khodzhet uyezd, Kaz., 56  
 Khodzheyli, Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 312  
 Khoja Burhan-eddin, 7  
 Kholov, M., 350  
 Khorasan, Persia, 223, 354  
 Khorezm, 280ff.  
   obl., 49-51  
   "The Khorezm Communist Party, 1920-1924", 308-21  
 Khotan, Sink., 212  
 Khoyt-Tsenker Aguy, MPR, 37, 38  
 Khvostov, V. M., 4ff.  
 Khrushchev, N. S., 4, 94, 147, 186, 278ff.  
 Khudayar, Khan of Kokand, 5  
 Khuzestan, Persia, 223ff.  
 Kiakhta, 145  
 Kiev, 198  
 Kipchak languages, 106  
 Kirgiz language, 98ff.  
 Kirgiz people in Pamirs, 5ff.  
   in Sink., 205, 213-4  
 Kirgiz SSR, 38, 84, 260  
   agriculture in, 79-80, 122ff.  
   ballet in, 261  
   books on, reviewed, 78  
   Central Asian Bureau in, 281ff.  
   cinema in, 173  
   Communist Party in, 174, 345  
   Council of Ministers, 171  
   education in, 147-58, 189-204  
   foreign visitors, 79, 259  
   government affairs in, 79, 171, 345  
   irrigation, 80  
   local soviets in, 345-6  
   publications, 81  
   resorts, 261  
   social conditions in, 81  
   Supreme Soviet Session, 345  
   Teachers' Congress in, 261  
   Uygurs in, 268  
 Kirimal, Edige, 16ff.  
 Kirovskoye reservoir, Kirg., 80  
 Kislyakov, N. A., 47, 48

- Kizil-Tepe, Transcaspia, 310ff.  
 Kizyl-Atrek rayon, Turk., 157  
 Klyashtornyy, S. G., 306  
 Kokand, 5ff., 45  
 Kokchetav, obl., 152, 192  
 Kolontayev, A. M., on Indian agriculture, 113-4  
 Kolykhalova, G. P., on British Behaviour in Pak., 333-7  
 Komarov, E. N., 112  
 Komarov, I. N., 295, 296  
 Komlyar, P. S., 295  
 Kondrashov, V., 84, 264  
 Konrad, N. I., on Study of Eastern Cultures, 300-4  
 Kontsevich, L. R., on Oriental Cultures Conference, 299-304  
 Kopal, 62  
 Kor-Ogly, Kh.G., *Uzbek Literature*, reviewed, 342, 344  
 Kossini, Russian Ambassador, 12  
 Kosven, M. O., 219  
 Kosygin, A. N., 82, 85, 94, 175, 176, 177, 262, 263, 264, 350, 352, 353  
 Kotovskiy G. G., *Ivan Pavlovich Minayev. A Collection of Articles*, reviewed, 165-6  
 Kotsarang, Pak., 176  
 Kozin, S. A., 35, 246  
 Krasnovodsk, Turk., 61, 62, 202, 260  
 Krim-Tatar language, 98ff.  
 Kruglov, Y. V., on Communist press in India, 110-1  
 Krym, Salomon, 22  
 Kuban' river, 217  
 Kucha, China, 182, 212  
 Kuchkarov, A., 196, 197  
 Kuchkarov, Dzhafarbergen, 312  
 Kudara, Pamir Mts., 11  
 Kulagina, L. M., 295, 297  
 Kuldja, Sink., 59  
 Kulikov, V. N., 288  
 Kuman (Turkic) people, 15  
 Kumyk language, 98ff.  
 Kunduz province, Afgh., 352  
 Kungrad, Karakalpak ASSR, 174, 312  
 Kun Lun Mts., 207  
 Kunya Urgench, Turk., 312  
 Kuo p'eng, 179  
 Kurbangaliyeva, R., 41, 48  
 Kurdish language, 306  
 Kurds, 223ff., in Georgia, 258  
 Kurgul'dzhinskiy rayon, Tselinograd obl., 156  
 Kushan, 241, 242, 348  
 Kustanay obl., Kaz., 80, 196  
 Kutsanov, A., on Indian castes, 120-1  
 Kutsobin, P., 234-5  
 Kutyakov, N., 317  
 Kuybyshev, 198  
 Kuznetsova, N. A., 297  
 Kwangsi, China, 356  
 Kwangtung, China, 270  
 Kyakhta, (now Altanbulag), MPR, 32  
 Kyzyl-Kiya, Kirg., 155  
 Kyzylkum desert, 174  
 Kyzylkumy, Turk., 260  
 Kyzyl-Orda, obl., 149, 195  
 Laba river, 217  
 Ladakh, India, 207  
 Lahore, 84, 263  
 Lakhuti (Abul Qasem Lahuti), 81  
 Lanchow, 88, 270  
 Lao Feng Kon pass, Tien Shan mts., 207  
 Lapina, Z., on 50 Years of Soviet Oriental and African Historical Study, 294-8  
 Lattimore, Owen, 27, 28-9, 210, 216  
 Lemerrier-Quellejeay, Madame Chantal, 40  
 "The Tatars of the Crimea: A Retrospective Study", 15-25  
 Lenin, V. I., 29, 92, 183, 184, 235, 259, 261, 264, 267, 297, 323, 324, 328, 345  
 Leninabad, Tad., 197  
 Leningrad, 44, 198, 245, 260, 263, 349, 352  
 Conferences, 299-304, 305-7  
 Leninskiy rayon, Tad., 158  
 Lepeshkin, A. I., 285  
 Levin, A. Ya., 296  
 Levkopol' (formerly Eski Krym), 17  
 Levkovskiy, A. P., 296  
 Lhasa, Tibet, 86, 178, 214, 266, 268, 272, 357

- Liaqat Ali Khan, 335  
 Li Chang-ch'üan, 90  
 Li Hung-chang, Viceroy, 12, 13  
 Litman, A., on Swami Shivananda, 121  
 Litman, A. D., 233  
 Liu Shao-ch'i, 88  
 Lobacheva, N. P., 47  
 Lobashev, A. I., *The Rural Population and Agriculture of Afghanistan*, reviewed, 170  
 Lob Nor, Lake, 207  
 Lobsan, son of Altin Khan, 138ff.  
 Lomonosov, V. G., 285  
 Lubsan Danzan, 246-7  
 Lundin, A. G., 303  
 Lung Shu-chin, 357  
 Luristan, Persia, 228  
 Lur people, 223ff.  
 Lydall, H. F., 231  
 Lyubimov, A., on Bichurin, 245-6  
  
 Macedonia, 188  
 Madali Khan, 6  
 Madaniyat (Naryn) Pumping Station, 347  
 Madhok, B., 231  
 Madhya Pradesh, 262  
 Madras, 118, 175, 176, 261, 262  
 Magada, King of, 247  
 Maharashtra, 113  
 Mahdi Malekzadeh, 66  
 Maheshwari, B., 114, 115  
 Mahtab Ali, 115  
 Majumdar, B. K., 116, 121  
 Mambetov, B., 171  
 Manchu language, 144  
 Manchuria, 145, 206ff.  
 Manchus, 137ff.  
 Manelis, B. L., 285ff.  
 Mani Singh, 84  
 Mankhan Somon, MPR, 37  
 Mao Tse-tung, 4, 85, 86, 87ff., 91-2, 94, 136, 178, 179, 182ff., 267ff., 356ff.  
 Maretin, Yu. V., 303  
 Margelan, Uzb., 41, 48  
 Margulan, A. Kh., *The Culture and Way of Life of the Kazakh Aul*, reviewed, 76-8  
 Markevich, A. T., 18ff.  
  
 Marx, Karl, 113, 178, 259, 295, 296, 323, 328  
 Mary, 202  
     rayon, 157  
 Masani, M. R., 232  
 Maseyeva, Hatime, 182  
 Mashhad, Persia, 66, 67  
 Maslennikov, A., 174, 262, 351  
 Mathur, R. N., 114, 115  
 Matveyev, A. M., *versus the Central Asian Review*, 64-8  
 Matveyeva, G. S., on the MPR 29-30  
 Mayakovskiy, 348  
 Mayev, O. V., on the Indian Monopolies Commission 237-8  
 Mayevskiy, V., 263, 351  
 Mayskiy, I. M., 30, 34  
 Mayskoye, Turk., 173  
 Mayvandval (Meyvandval) Muhammad Hashim, 82  
 Mazandarani people, 244ff.  
 Medvedev, Ye. M., 295  
 Meerut, India, 111  
 Megh, R. K., 115  
 Mengli Girey, 15  
 Menon, K. P. S., 121  
 Menonites in Crimea, 17  
 Men'shikov, L. N., 305  
 Metel'skiy, N., 86  
 Meyer, M. S., on Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental and African Historical Study, 294-8  
 Middle Volga, 16, 20  
 Mikhail Fedorovich, Tsar, 245  
 Miklukho-Maklay, N. D., 307  
 Miller, Dr. Margaret, "Notes on Agricultural Development", 122-35, "Notes on Industrial Development", 159-60  
 Milyutin, Kustanay obl., 80  
 Milyutin, M. M., 258  
 Minayev, Ivan Pavlovich, *A Collection of Articles on Ivan Pavlovich Minayev*, reviewed, 165-6  
 Minsk, Turkmen dancers in, 348  
 Mints, I. I., 81, *The Triumph of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan*, reviewed, 161-5  
 Mirkhasilov, S., 41

- Mirsharapov, Mirkamov, 314  
 Mohammad 'Ali Mirza Shah, 67  
 Mohammad Taqi Khan, 225  
 Moiseyev, S. G., 346  
 Molomzhamtsa, D., 266  
 Mongolia, Inner, 137ff., 200ff., 258-9, 270  
 Mongolian PR, 1, 174, 214, 274, 349  
     Chinese Press and Radio Comment on, 90, 181, 271, 359  
     Communist Party in, 32, 33, 354-5  
     47th Anniversary, 354  
     October Revolutions, 86  
     Recent Soviet Writing on, 26-39, 244-8  
     Soviet Press Comments on, 85-6, 177-8, 266, 354-5  
 Mongol language, 103, 266, 358  
 Mongols, 137, 185, 303  
     in Sink., 70, 91, 208ff., 268  
 Mookerjee, Dr. Syama Prasad, 231  
 Morison, David, 93  
 Morozov, M., 48  
 Mosaddeq, Dr., 227  
 Moscow, 20, 80, 245, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 278ff., 310ff., 322, 327, 339, 349  
     Conferences in, 347  
     disturbances at US embassy in, 94  
     foreign visitors to, 83, 84, 86, 350, 351-2  
     Institute of Eastern Languages Conference, 294-8  
     Kazakh theatre in, 348  
     II Congress of Soviets, 318  
     20th International Congress of Orientalists, 27, 28  
 Moskovskiy rayon, Kirg., 153  
 Muhamedova, D. M., 239  
 Muhammad Akbar Khan, 325  
 Muhammad Ali, 324, 326  
 Muhammad Riza b. Muhammad Kazim Barnabadi, 307  
 Muhammad Shafiq, 324, 326  
 Mukerji, Abani, 325, 326  
 Mukhamed Rakhimi, 348  
 Mukhamedberdiyev, K., 309ff.  
 Mukimdzhanova, R. M., on British behaviour towards Pakistan, 333-7  
 Mulkush canal, 260  
 Mundorf, A., 138, 139  
 Munkuyev, N. Ts., 36  
 Murgab oasis, 173  
     rayon, 157  
     river, 5, 10, 12  
 Murphy, G., 27-8  
 Musayev, Makhmud, 312  
 Mustag, Pamir Mts., 11  
 Muzaffar Ahmad, 111  
 Muzaparov, Sh., 48  
 Muz-Kol' river, 11  
 Mysore state, 83  
 Nagar people, 5  
 Nakaryakov, VI., 177  
 Nalini, Gupta, 111  
 Namangan rayon, Uzb., 41, obl., 81  
 Narpay rayon, Uzb., 49  
 Naryn river, 260  
 Nasenko, Yu. P., on Religious Signs of the Hindu Sects, 135  
 Nasilov, V. M., 69  
 Nationalities Policy, 95, 183, 325  
 Natsagdorzh, Sh., 37  
 Navoi, Alisher, 348  
 Nazarov, M., 84  
 Nebit-Dag, Tad., 202, 260  
 Nehru, Jawarharlal, 113, 175, 234, 337  
 Nepal, 352  
     foreign visitors to, 84  
 Nepesov, G., 309ff.  
 Nerchinsk, Treaty of, 136ff.  
 Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, 358  
 Nicolson, R. A., 68  
 Nigam, R. K., 231  
 Nijalingappa, S., 83  
 Nikiforov, V. N., 295  
 Ningcheng county, Inner Mongolia, 89  
 Ninguta, 140  
 Nipchu. *See* Nerchinsk.  
 Nogay language, 98ff.  
 Nogay people, 15ff., 215, 217ff.  
 North Vietnam, 178  
 North West Frontier Province, 327  
 Northern Fergana Canal, Uzb., 172  
 Novikova, V. A., on Bankim Chandra, 120

- Novosibirsk, 198, 200, 354  
 Nur Ahmad E'temadi, 82  
 Nur Devlet, 15  
 Nurek GES, Tad., 349  
 Nurullayev, Chairman, 317  
  
 Ob' river, Siberia, 137  
 Ogibenin, B. L., on Vedic mythology, 117-8  
 Okhotsk, Sea of, 137  
 Okladnikov, A. P., 37  
 Oksu. *See* Ak-Su.  
 Ombo Erdeni, 244  
 Omsk, 52, 59, 60  
 Orazmuradov, M., 177  
 Orbeli, R. R., 240  
 Ordzhonikidzeabad, Tad., 80  
 Ormuz, Straits of, Persia, 224  
 Osh, Kirg., 155  
 Oskolkova, O., on caste system in India, 120  
 Ossetes in Karachay-Cherkess AR, 217ff.  
 Ovsienko, V., 328  
 Oyrats, 247  
 Ozenbashly, Ahmed, 18  
  
 Pahlavi Gulf, 341  
 Pahlen, Count, Turkestan Commission, 51ff.  
 Pak, M. N., 295  
 Pakhta-Aral, Kaz., 288  
 Pakistan, 95, 172, 175, 232, 262, 265, 274, 346  
     agreement with China, 87  
     books on, reviewed, 71-4  
     "British Behaviour towards Pakistan: A Soviet Interpretation" 333-7  
     Kosygin's visit to, 263  
     Pakistan-Soviet Society, 84  
     Relations with USSR, 264  
     Soviet press comment on, 84, 176, 263-4, 351-2  
     Tadzhik visitors to, 84  
 Pal, Bipin Chandra, 112  
 Pali (Himalayas), 272  
 Pamir Mts., 38, 206ff.,  
     "Russia and China in the Pamirs: 18th and 19th Centuries", 4-14  
  
 Panj river, 352  
 Pant, Indian port, 115  
 Paotow, Inner Mongolia, 89  
 Parchina, M., 247  
 Park, Alexander, on Turkestan, 280  
 Patna, 234,  
     TCP Congress, 175  
 Patolichev, N. S., 175, 352  
 Pavlov, V. I., 296, on agriculture in 19th Century India, 113ff.  
 Pavlovich, M., 65  
 Pavlovskiy, General, 351  
 Pecheneg (Turkic) people, 15  
 Peking, 10, 32, 86, 86-9, 90, 92, 94, 137ff., 177, 179, 183, 270-272, 356, 357  
 Pel'she, A. Ya., 175, 234  
 Perekop, Crimea, 18, 19  
 Perevoshchikov, K., 83, 174, 262  
 Periera, T., 143  
 Perovsk (now Ak-Mechet'), 53, 55, 57  
 Persia. *See* Iran.  
 Persian language, 104ff., 200  
 Peshawar, Pakistan, 84  
 Peter the Great, 145  
 Petlin, I., 138, 139  
 Petro-Aleksandrovsk, 308ff.  
 Petropavlovsk, 192  
 Petrosyan, Yu. A., 301-4, 305  
 Petrov, A. A., 246  
 Petrushevskiy, I. P., 36  
 Petukhova, N. Ye., 279ff.  
 Pigulevskaya, N. V., 303  
 Piotrovskiy, B. B., 300  
 Pitnyak, Khorezm obl., 318  
 Pobozhiy, A., on MPR, 38-9  
 Podgorniy, N. V., 82, 264, 350, 354  
 Pokrovskiy, M. N., 68  
 Poona, 118  
 Popov, Yu., 174  
 Poppé, N., 108  
 Potapov, N., 95  
 Powcha, Pavel, 37  
 Prasad, Jaishankar, 115  
 Pratap, Mahendra, 322ff.  
 Prigarina, N. I. on Iqbal, 116-7  
 Przheval'sk, Kirg., 155, 172  
 Pubayev, R. E., 303  
 Puchkovskiy, L. S., 35, 246  
 Punjab (also Panjab), 111, 113, 259

- Putyata, Captain, 8  
 Pyandzh river, 5ff.  
 Pyatigorskiy, A. M., 303
- Qandahar, 353  
 Qashqay people in Persia, 224ff.  
 Qasim, Adbul Karim, 185  
 Qavam, Persian Prime Minister, 227  
 Qomul (*See* Hami).  
 Quchan, Persia, 223  
 Quetta, 336
- Radakrishnan, 119  
 Rafiq Ahmad, 325  
 Rahim, Khan-Khana, 242-3  
 Rajmata, 262  
 Rajnish, Govind, 115  
 Rakhimov, T., 69-70, 268  
 Rakhmanov, Mulla Bekchan, 311ff.  
 Ramdass, 114  
 Rang-Kul', Lake, Pamir Mts., 5ff.  
 Rao Rajeshwar, 83  
 Rashidov, Sh., 41, 49, 79  
 Rashiduddin, 35, 246  
 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 231  
 Rawalpindi, 84, 176, 263  
 Raymond, D., 27  
 Reddy, Dr. N. Sanjiva, 263  
 Regar, Tad., 158  
 Regel', A., 8  
 Rerikh, Nikolay, 241  
 Rerikh, Yu. N., 241  
 Reysner, I. M., 295, 296, 297  
 Reysner, L., on the Indian bourgeoisie, 233-4  
 Reznikov, A., on M. N. Roy, 235-6  
 Rishikesh, 175  
 Roberts, Goronwy, 177  
 Roerich, G. N., *see* Rerikh, Yu. N.  
 Roshchin, S. K. on the MPR, 30-1, 37  
 Roy, M. N., 110, 235-6, 326-7, 328  
 Roy, R. L., 116  
 Roy, Ram Mohan, 112  
 RSFSR, 23, 25, 192, 217, 278ff., 311  
 Rudaki, 350  
 Rudenko, M. B., 306  
 Rupen, R., 27, 28  
 Rushan, Pamir Mts., 5ff.  
 Russia and China in the Pamirs:  
 18th and 19th Centuries, 4-14
- Russian language, 97ff., 144  
 in Central Asian schools, 193ff.  
 Russians, 182  
 in Karachay-Cherkess AR, 217ff.  
 in Sink., 208, 215  
 in Turkestan, 56  
 in Uzb., 47  
 Russo-Turkish War, 1788-92, 18  
 Rybach'ye, Kirg., 155
- Safavids, 224  
 Safonov, M. V., 311ff.  
 Said Khalimov, 18  
 Saifuddin Aziz, Governor, 88, 179,  
 270, 357  
 St. Petersburg, 8ff., 17ff., 67  
 Sakharov, I. V., on Indian Oriental  
 Studies, 240  
 Salang Pass, Afgh., 353  
 Salisbury, Harrison, 27  
 Samarkand obl., Uzb., 55, 151, 172,  
 196ff., 326, 346, 349  
 railways in, 174  
 taxation in, 51ff.  
 women in, 40ff.  
 Sampurnanand, 233  
 Sandy-Kachi, 349  
 Sanskrit, 242  
 Sariqol, Pamir Mts., 215  
 Sarkar, S. Ch., 116  
 Sarkisov, A. A., 289  
 Sarts, 96, 212  
 Saryagach, Kaz., 259  
 Sarykol Mts., 6ff.  
 Save-Astara gas supply, 340  
 Savel'yev, N. A., 230  
 Sayfullin, M. M., on Indian Federa-  
 tion, 236  
 Sazanov, N. M., 242  
 Sazonov, S. G., 258  
 Schuyler, Eugene, 95  
 Seistan, Persia, 228  
 Selenginsk., 143  
 Selim ibn Sheman, 306  
 Selucky, Radoslav, 40  
 Semashko, I. M., on the Bhils, 121  
 Semenova, N. I., 295  
 Semipalatinsk, 19, 152  
 obl., 51ff.  
 Semirech'ye, obl., 51ff., 60, 182  
 Sen, D., 236

- Senga, Chief, 138  
 Serbia, 188  
 Serebryakov, I., 83, 174, 262  
 Sergeev, Admiral, 352  
 Seryy, Ya. M., 31  
 Sevastopol', 19, 21  
 Shadzhan, Pamir Mts., 12  
 Shahseven people, 224ff.  
 Shakhrisyabz-Karaulbazar water main, 347  
 Shamide, A. I., *The Workers and Trade Union Movements in Iran, 1946-1953*, reviewed, 166-8  
 Shanghai, 88, 270  
 Shantineketan, West Bengal, 84  
 Sharafutdinov, T., 314, 315  
 Sharafutdinova, R., 40  
 Shastina, N. P., on Mongolian History, 33ff.  
 Shastitko, P. M., 239  
 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 175  
 Shcherbatskoy, F. I., 241-2  
 Sheehy, Ann,  
 "Russia and China in the Pamirs: 18th and 19th Centuries", 4-14  
 "Primary and Secondary Education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan—The Current Situation", 147-58, 189-204  
 "Phases in the Economic Organization of Soviet Central Asia: Central, Regional and Republican Interests in Conflict", 278-93  
 "The Khorezm Communist Party, 1920-1924", 308-21  
 Book Reviews, 76-8, 161-5, 169-70, 249-53, 256, 342-4  
 Shekhitlinskoye, Turk., 173  
 Shen, Shukumar, 119  
 Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 69, 212  
 Shensi province, China, 211  
 Shigatsze, Tibet, 86  
 Shilka river, 140, 144  
 Shiraz, Persia, 177  
 Shirendev, 184  
 Shirendyb, B., 37, 177  
 Shirokov, G., on the Indian bourgeoisie, 233  
 Shirvan, Persia, 223  
 Shivananda, Swami, 121  
 Shrisvastava, Paramanand, 116  
 Shugnan, Pamir Mts., 5ff.  
 Shuster, Morgan, 65ff.  
 Siberia, 102, 136ff.  
 Crimean Tatars in, 25, 38  
 Sibo people, in Sink., 208, 215  
 Sidorov, M., on the Demographic Problems of India, 328-32  
 Sidorovich, General, 351  
 Sikkim, 180  
 Silingol League, Inner Mongolia, 89  
 Simferopol (Formerly Aq Mechet'), 17, 19, 22, 84  
 Simonov, V., 351  
 Simpson, C. G., 108  
 Sind, 326  
 Singh, B., 231  
 Singh, Professor S. L., 115  
 Sinkiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region, 1, 3ff., 69-70, 93, 138ff., 267  
 border with USSR, 186-7  
 Chinese Press and Radio Comment on, 87-9, 179-80, 270, 356-7  
 in Central Asian press, 79  
 cultural revolution in, 87-8  
 language in, 94  
 Muslims in, 91, 185  
 peoples of, 96  
 "Sinkiang: The Land and the People", 205-16  
 Soviet Broadcasts in Uyghur for, 91-2, 182-4, 267-9, 360  
 Soviet Press Comment on, 86, 178, 266, 355  
 Sitdikov, Z., 353  
 Skalov, G. B., 308ff.  
 Skosyrev, V., 349  
 Slesarchuk, G. I., on Mongolian Relations in the 17th Century, 244-5  
 Smilyanskaya, I. M., 296  
 Smirnov, A. G., *The Scientific and Technological Intelligentsia of India*, reviewed, 170  
 Smirnov, N. A., 16ff., 296, 297  
 Smirnova, Ya. S., on Mixed Marriages in the Karachay-Cherkess A.R., 217-22  
 Sokuluk reservoir, Kirg., 347  
 Solun people, in Sink., 208, 215

- Songotu, Prince, 143
- Sosina, N. N., on panchayats in India, 114-5, on *Indo-Asian Culture*, 116
- Soviet Press Comment on the Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs, 79-82, 171-4, 258-61, 345-9
- Spafariy, N. G., 140ff.
- Stalin, I. V., 23
- Stanovoy Mts., USSR, 137, 144
- Stavropol kray, RSFSR, 216
- Stepanova, Z. N., 297
- Stepanyants, M. T., *Philosophy and Sociology in Pakistan*, reviewed, 71-4
- Steppe Statute, 51ff.
- Stratanovich, C. G. (ed.), *Outline History of the Soviet Dungans*, reviewed, 249-53
- Strika, Vincenzo, on Muslims in Yugoslavia, 187-8
- Stuchevskiy, I. A., 295
- Sukhareva, N. M., 297
- Sukhe Bator, 32, 178
- Sulkevich, General, 22
- Sultanmuradov, Dzhumaniyaz, 309, 310ff.
- Sumarokov, R. A., 18
- Surkhandar'ya obl., Uzb., 47, 50, 195
- Sushanlo, M. (ed.), *Outline History of the Soviet Dungans*, reviewed, 249-53, *The Participation of the Dungans in the October Revolution and the Civil War*, reviewed, 249-53
- Suyumbayev, A. S., 171
- Sverchevskaya, A. K., *A Bibliography on Iran*, reviewed, 256
- Syr-Dar'ya obl., 51ff., 198
- Szechuan, Tibet, 90
- Taberda river, 217
- Tabriz, Persia, 226
- Tadzhik language, 103
- Tadzhik SSR, 4, 40, 85, 118, 159, 177  
 administrative changes in, 258  
 agriculture, 74-80, 122ff., 172  
 Central Asian Bureau in, 281ff.  
 Communist Party in, 258  
 construction work in, 80
- Tadzhik SSR—*cont.*  
 cultural exchanges, 79  
 education in, 81, 147-58, 173, 189-204, 348  
 foreign visitors to, 79, 263, 346, 350-1  
 government affairs in, 79, 171, 258  
 health resorts, 261  
 industry in, 173, 260  
 irrigation in, 172, 260  
 law and order in, 173  
 publications, 81  
 social conditions in, 81  
 Uzbek cultural festival in, 348
- Tadzhiks, 5  
 in Afgh., 185  
 in Bukhara, 44  
 in Persia, 224  
 in Sink., 208, 215
- Tagayev, T. T., 49
- Tagore, Rabindranath, 112, 118-9
- Taiwan, China, 356
- Takla Makan desert, 207, 212
- Talas, Kirg., 155  
 river, 80
- Talysh people, 224ff.
- Tamil' language, 174, 239
- Tamilnad, 239
- Tamkina, E. N., 305
- Tanjur, 262
- Taranchi (Uyghur) people, 59, 212
- Tarim river, 11, 207
- Tashauz, Tad., 202
- Tashkent, 25, 69, 81, 149ff., 171, 183, 283ff., 308ff., 322ff., 345  
 agreements in, 259  
 conferences, 260, 263, 348, 349  
 Declaration of, 172, 174, 337  
 education in, 198ff.  
 foreign visitors to, 259, 346, 349  
 metro in, 174  
 Soviet Broadcasts in Uyghur from, 91-2, 182-4, 267-9, 360-1  
 University of, 171  
 Uyghurs in, 91, 268
- Tashkurgan river, 6
- Tashqurghan, Sink., 215
- Tashtemirov, U., 48
- Tatar language, 23, 25, 98ff.

- Tatars, 15, 219 (*See also* Crimean Tatars)  
 in Bukhara, 44  
 in Khorezm, 309ff.  
 in Sink., 208, 215  
 Tatar National Directorate, 22  
 Tatarstan, 23  
 Tatybekova, Zh. S., *The Women of Soviet Kirgiziya in the Struggle for Socialism and Communism*, reviewed, 78  
 Tavrida, 17  
 Tbilisi, 265, 349, 352, 354  
 Tedzhen, Turk., 79, 260  
 Tehran, 96, 177, 224ff.  
 conferences in, 265  
 Soviet-Iranian Commission on Economic Co-operation, 266  
 Tekeli, Taldy-Kurgan obl., 81  
 Temuchin (*See* Chingis Khan)  
 Teng Hai-Ch'ing, 181  
 Ter-Grigoryan, A., 86  
 Ter-Minasova, N., 177, 353  
 Thompson, E., 119  
 Thun-Tsyan'-Gan-mu, 246  
 Tibet, 1, 92, 93, 206ff., 247, 268, 356  
 Chinese Press and Radio on, Comment on, 90, 180, 270-2, 357-8  
 Soviet Press Comments on, 86, 178, 266, 355  
 Tashkent Uyghur broadcasts on, 272, 360  
 Tibetan language, 86  
 Tibetan people, in China, 268  
 Tien Shan, 138, 207ff., 213  
 Tientsin, China, 210  
 Tikhonova, A. A., 295  
 Tito, President, 175, 176  
 Tobol'sk, Siberia, 145, 245  
 Toder, F. A., 297  
 Tolbuzin, Governor, 142  
 Tomsk, 138, 245  
 Toynbee, Arnold, 300  
 Transcaspian obl., 52ff.  
 Transcaucasia, 187, 219, 223  
 Transoxania, 185  
 Tredwell, Roger C., 171  
 Trofimov, A., 85  
 Trotsky, L. D., 235  
 Trubnikova, S. V., on *Alochana*, 115-6, on R. Dinkar, 117  
 Trufanov, I. P., on Indian emigration overseas, 239  
 Tsangpo river, 357  
 Tsendenbal, Premier Yu. Yu., 32, 86, 266, 355  
 Tselinograd, Kaz., 80  
 obl., 150, 196  
 Tsend, D., 37  
 Tseng, Yung-ya, 358  
 Tseten, Khan Sholoy, 244  
 Tsiganes (Gypsies) in Crimea, 20  
 Tsinghai, 70  
 Tso Tsung-tang, 210  
 Tsukerman, I. I., 306  
 Tugasheva, L. Yu., 306  
 Tungusic people, 137ff., in Sink., 208, 214-5  
 Tunmann, 18  
 Turanians, Ethnographical Map of, 96  
 Turco-Tatars, 96  
 Turfan Depression, Sink., 207, 212  
 Turgay obl., 51ff.  
 Turkestan, 3, 7, 323ff.  
 Commission, 278ff., 310ff., 324  
 Communist Party of, 259, 278, 309ff., 323  
 Eastern, 92, 182  
 Turkey, 19, 20, 140, 185, 186, 274, 324  
 Turkic languages, 20  
 "The Turkic Languages of the USSR: A New Development", 97-109  
 Turkic peoples, 223, 306  
 Turki (Uyghur) people, 70, 207ff.  
 in Karachay-Cherkess A.R., 217-22  
 in Sink., 70ff.  
 Turkish language, 20  
 Turkmen language, 98ff., 224  
 Turkmen people in Afgh., 353  
 in Khorezm, 309ff.  
 in Persia, 224ff.  
 Turkmen SSR, 40, 353  
 agriculture in, 79-80, 144ff., 172, 346  
 Central Asian Bureau in, 281ff.  
 cinematographers meeting in, 82  
 Communist Party in, 258, 345  
 education in, 147-58, 189-204

- Turkmen SSR—*cont.*  
 exchanges with Iran, 354  
 foreign visitors to, 79, 348  
 government affairs in, 79, 258, 345  
 industry in, 173  
 irrigation, 80  
 publications, 81  
 rural life in, 96  
 social conditions in, 81  
 26 Baku Commissars Anniversary  
 in, 349
- Turks in Georgia, 258  
 in Yugoslavia, 188
- Turmanovich, N. N., 307
- Tushetu Khan Gombo Dorzhi, 244
- Tuviniian language, 98ff.
- Tyulenov, A., 201
- Tyurin, V. A., 296
- Ubaydullayeva, R., 46
- Uda river, 144
- Ufa, Bashkiria, 155
- Ukraine, 15, 192
- Ukrainian Cossacks in Crimea, 17
- Ukrainians in Karachay-Cherkess  
 A. R., 217–22, in Uzb., 47
- Ulan Bator (Urga), 38, 178, 181, 355
- Ulanfu, 181, 271, 358
- Ul'yanova, L. P., on Indian Federa-  
 tion, 236
- Urals, 136, 159  
 Crimean Tatars in, 25
- Ural'sk obl., 51ff., 157
- Ura-Tyube, Tad., 347
- Urdu language, 110ff., 200, 239, 324
- Urga. *See* Ulan Bator
- Urgench, Khorezm, 315
- Urlanis, B., 328
- Urmiiyyeh (now Rezaiyeh), Lake,  
 Persia, 223ff.
- Urumchi, Sink., 70, 87–9, 179, 208ff.,  
 270, 356, 357
- Urup river 217
- Usmani Shaukat, 111
- Usov, S. A., 17
- Ustinov, V. M., 279
- U Thant, 265
- Uttar Pradesh, 83, 231, 262
- Uygur language, 94, 98ff.
- Soviet broadcasts in, 91–2, 182–4,  
 267–8, 360–1
- Uygurs (*see also* Taranchis and  
 Turki), 69–70, 98  
 in China, 268  
 in Sink., 91–2, 208, 209, 212–3,  
 268  
 in USSR, 182
- Uzbek language, 81, 98ff.
- Uzbeks, 182, 308ff.  
 in Afgh., 185  
 in Sink., 208, 215
- Uzbek SSR,  
 agriculture in, 79–80, 122, 172, 346  
 Central Asian Bureau in, 281ff.  
 Communist Party in, 171, 258, 345  
 Congress of Uzbek Women, 82  
 Crimean Tatars in, 25  
 cultural exchanges in, 79  
 education in, 81, 147–58, 173, 189–  
 204  
 foreign visitors to, 79, 261, 263,  
 346, 348  
 film festival, 261  
 government affairs in, 79, 258, 345  
 irrigation in, 172  
 law and order, 260  
 mixed nationalities in, 258  
 Plenum Meeting, 345  
 publications, 81, 173  
 Punjab Agreement, 259  
 social conditions in, 81  
 telegraph agency in, 259  
 territorial changes in, 81  
 Uygurs in, 268  
 women in, 46–50
- Uz-Bel', (Uch-Bel) pass, Pamir Mts.,  
 4, 8, 11, 13
- Uzgen rayon, Kirg., 153
- Vafayev, O., 44
- Vagabov, M. V., *Islam and Women*,  
 reviewed, 342 and 343–4
- Vaidyanath, R., 280ff., 316
- Vakhani, Pamir Mts., 5ff.
- Vakhsh rayon, Tad., 259  
 river, 80, 172, 260
- Validor, Jemaleddin, 21
- Valiyev, A. K., 42
- Varma, Mahadar, 115
- Varma, S. P., 262
- Vasil'yeva, G. P., 47, 481
- Veli Ibrahimov, 23

- Venkatachar, C. S., 121  
 Verbiest, F., 141  
 Vernikov, V., 355  
 Veselov, S. M., 285  
 Vietnam, 171, 175, 176, 259, 262,  
 263, 265, 346, 350  
 Viktor Viktorovich, 45  
 Vivekenanda, Swami, 112  
 Vladimirtsov, B. Ya., 35  
 Vladivostok, 354  
 Volgograd, 84  
 Volinskiy, V., 139  
 Vostrov, V. V., *The Culture and Way  
 of Life of the Kazakh Aul*,  
 reviewed, 76-8  
 Vranghel', General, 22  
 Vrevskiy, Governor-General of  
 Turkestan, 8ff.  
 Wang En-mao, 88, 89, 179, 183, 357  
 Wallachians in Crimea, 17  
 West Bengal, 83, 268  
 Wheeler, Geoffrey, 93  
 Whiting, Allen S., 216  
 Willetts, H. T., 93  
 Williams, D. S. M., on "Taxation in  
 Tsarist Central Asia", 51-63  
 Wurm, Dr. S., 107, 108  
 Yablonovyy mts., USSR, 137, 144  
 Yaftali, M., 82, 177  
 Yahya Khan, General A. M., 251,  
 352  
 Yaksa. *See* Albazin  
 Yakubovskiy, A. Yu., 36  
 Yakut language, 98ff.  
 Yakutsk, 138ff.  
 Yalta, 84  
 Yalta uyezd, 19  
 Yan-Darin, Commander, 11  
 Yangi-Yer, 283  
 Yang-liu-ching, Tientsin, China, 210  
 Yaqub Bek of Kashgar, 5, 7, 182  
 Yarenskaya, S., 201  
 Yarkand, Sink., 7ff., 138ff., 212  
 Yashil'Kul', Lake, Pamir Mts., 5ff.  
 Yatskovskaya, Kh., on Mongolian  
 philologists, 247  
 Yavan valley, Tad., 80, 172, 260  
 Yefimov, Professor G. V., 246  
 Yegorova, M. N., on the Indian  
 working class, 229-30  
 Yelisyeva, N. V., on Oriental Scholar-  
 ship Conference, 305-7  
 Yenisey river, 137  
 Yerevan, Armenia, 354  
 Yesenov, Sh. Ye., *October and  
 Science in Kazakhstan*, reviewed,  
 170  
 Yevpatoriya, Crimea (Formerly  
 Gozlev), 17, 19  
 Younghusband, Captain F. E., 8-9  
 Young Khivans, 308ff.  
 Young Turks, 20  
 Yugoslavia, 187  
 Yunnan, China, 70, 356  
 Yusuf-Ali-khan, 5  
 Yusupov, I., (ed.), *The Participation  
 of the Dungs in the October  
 Revolution and the Civil War*,  
 reviewed, 249-53  
 Yusupov, Palanniyaz, 309ff.  
 Zahir Shah, King, 82, 265  
 Zakariya, 322ff.  
 Zakharov, Marshal, 266  
 Zakhoder, B. N., 297  
 Zelenchuk river, 217  
 Zelenskiy, A. N., on Yu. N. Rerikh,  
 241, on F. I. Shcherbatskoy, 241  
 Zeravshan river, 172, 260  
 Zeya river, 141  
 Zhaba, A. D., 306  
 Zhamtsarano, Ts., Zh., 35, 246  
 Zhukov, Ye. M., 299-300  
 Ziyadullayev, N., 44  
 Zlatkin, I. Ya., 36  
 Zor-Kul', Lake, Pamir Mts., 5  
 Zoroastrians in Persia, 223ff.